Abstract
The Bible presents God journeying with the weak and the poor. God’s involvement in the affairs of the less privileged was because of God’s nature of being just, compassionate, eternal, omnipresent and unchangeable. These attributes gave the weak hope as God intervened in their circumstances. Although in perpetual suffering, one would expect God’s nature to remain unchanging, unfortunately, the oppressed people grapple with the Doctrine of God in the context of different sociopolitical and economic traumas. For example, Zimbabwe suffered a sociopolitical ordeal for more than two decades resulting in the weak and the oppressed questioning God’s divine justice, the just and the omnipotence of God. To invite God to be on the side of the oppressed, the leader of the opposition party, Nelson Chamisa coined a mantra titled #Godisinit to involve Godself in the Zimbabwean sociopolitical crisis. The hashtag became a slogan and a campaigning strategy inviting God to arbitrate on the side of the weak. Moreover, the hashtag represents the decoloniality of theology where the elite apply it to empower the weak of the society suffering different forms of socioeconomic challenges. In addition, the hashtag remained the hope of the people as they believed that God would intervene in the Zimbabwean sociopolitical and economic crisis. This literature research used secondary sources and the Internet to explore how Nelson Chamisa used #Godisinit to invoke the Doctrine of God in the Zimbabwean sociopolitical environment.
Contribution: The contribution of this study lies in its clarification of the role of hashtags, its analysis of how Nelson Chamisa utilised #Godisinit to engage the Doctrine of God within Zimbabwe’s sociopolitical sphere, and its demonstration of how the infinite nature of God is intertwined with the struggles of the weak and oppressed.
Keywords: #Godisinit; Nelson Chamisa; doctrine of God; Zimbabwe; Citizen Coalition for Change.
Introduction
The doctrine of God has always been at the centre of theological discourse. The debate survived during different phases of the history of Christianity. In these engagements, theologians were grappling with the existence of God, the relationship of theology and philosophy, the relationship of the Father and the Son, the un-conflicting divine and human natures of Jesus, the inter mutual penetration of the Godhead, the incarnation of Jesus, his resurrection and the ascension, Threeness in the Oneness and Oneness in Threeness of the Godhead, the existence of just God in a world of evil among other debates (Kazen 2008; McGrath 2016; Wright 2020). The later debate became an unending discourse as the world continues to be engulfed in different forms of violence and abuse of the weak, the least and the innocent.
This article aims to explore how Nelson Chamisa used #Godisinit as a theology from below to invoke the Doctrine of God in the Zimbabwean socioeconomic and political environment to solicit votes and to give people hope. Structurally, the article starts by tracking the origins of hashtags and presents a brief analysis of the Zimbabwean socioeconomic and political environment that became a seedbed for the #Godisint mantra. This analysis will be followed by an engagement on how Chamisa used the chant to invoke the Doctrine of God in the Zimbabwean political landscape. The article will conclude by demonstrating the infinity of God in the context of the Godself involvement in human affairs.
Data were collected by analysing literature on the involvement of God in human affairs, and the literature on Zimbabwean politics. The article also used social media platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and Facebook pages as these sites present verbatim presentations of Nelson Chamisa and his contender Emmerson Mnangagwa.
Hashtags: Message of the voices from below
The use of hashtags was first brought to Twitter by Chris Messina in 2007 to identify individuals with certain subject matters be they social or political (Cooper 2013). The hashtags later developed to become tools of social cohesion, economic empowerment, status and political emancipation. As the users used hashtags, it became common that they found themselves as homogeneous groups advocating for different social or political issues. The Britanica.com Dictionary (n.d.) mentions that:
… the use of hashtags in Twitter helps categorise messages and makes it possible for others to find their tweets when they search for messages on the same topic. Hashtags make it easy to quickly find messages about a topic that interests individuals.
Commenting on the impact of hashtags in everyday life, Dagsaan (2013:1) argues:
[H]ashtags have changed the way individuals search and share information. Hashtags are a symbol that has taken the world by storm, changing everything from social media feeds to advertising strategies. Hashtags also become powerful tools for organising groups of people and tracking trends throughout history. They are used to organise and find content, share a topic, use a trending topic, to make content more searchable on the internet, especially if it’s not already in front of everyone else’s eyes!
During their frequent and wide use, hashtags became voices from below, campaigning tools and advertisements among other uses (Bangirana 2019). According to Nenjerama (2020:65):
From the time hashtags became popular countries, like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt were among examples of contexts where social media amalgamated collective protest voices in speaking against issues of deteriorating economies, exorbitant living expenses and social injustices from tyrannical governments.
In South Africa, #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall social media campaigns were employed as a strategic and effective communication method to disrupt the status quo and pursue an activist role in communicating the poor students’ grievances over tuition increases’. (Mpofu 2015:84).
#FeesMustFall was particularly a voice from the underside challenging the government to stop the fee increase as most students were coming from less privileged backgrounds. The protests ended with the announcement that fees were not going to be increased (Greeff et al. 2021). #FeesMustFall was followed by #RhodesMustFall which saw the removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes at Cape Town University on 09 April 2015 (Jamal 2025). The #RhodesMustFall movement also campaigned for Rhodes University to change its name. However, in 2017, the Rhodes University Council declined to change the university’s name (Ispas 2015). The #ZumaMustFall followed as a clarion call to force President Jacob Zuma to resign. In Nigeria, the #BringBackOurGirls also informed the impact of a collective voice from the underside to call for the release of the girls who were abducted by Boko Haram (Nenjerama 2020).
In the United States of America (US), #BlackLivesMatters was introduced in July 2013 ‘after the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the shooting of an African American teen Trayvon Martin in Florida in February 2012’ (Garza, Khan-Cullors & Tometi 2013):
Although the Florida jury found George Zimmerman not guilty of the second-degree murder of Trayvon Martin, many people saw his acquittal as racially biased after he killed an unarmed Black high school student. (Garza et al. 2013)
As a social movement, #BlackLivesMatter focussed largely on the lack of accountability for state violence committed against Black Americans (Garza et al. 2013). This reaction justifies the assertion that hashtags are a means of communicating grievances from the margins.
In Zimbabwe, the first hashtag that went viral was the 2016 #ThisFlag which was started by Pastor Evan Mawarire who posted on his Facebook and Twitter to express his discontentment with President Robert Mugabe’s regime. ‘The #ThisFlag movement started with a single video that the pastor posted on his Facebook timeline on 19 April 2016’ (Oberdorf 2017:v). The post had the Zimbabwean flag as its symbol. #ThisFlag remained independent from any political party, with the message of the movement focussing on anti-corruption and a lack of basic services (Oberdorf 2017:v). In the #ThisFlag, Mawarire sought to get Zimbabweans to rally around the national flag and speak out against President Mugabe’s policies. According to Nenjerama (2020:65), ‘The #ThisFlag movement was a massive post-independent social media engendered protest that left an indelible mark on Zimbabwean politics and history’. The hashtag was also a dissenting voice as most people who criticised Mugabe were arrested, persecuted, abducted, tortured and murdered. For Mawarire, the flag was a rallying call to the oppressed and suppressed Zimbabweans to get involved and cry out for liberation (John Hopkins 2022). Nenjerama (2020) prefers to call the #ThisFlag a voice from the subaltern under the dictator’s rule.
Zimbabwean sociopolitical space: A wailing platform for God’s intervention
The draconic laws of Zimbabwe under the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government, Mugabe’s autocratic rule, and the persistent suffering of the citizens compelled them to seek a just God in the face of evil. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai from 1999 to 2018 presented an alternative for the Zimbabweans and in this prospective change, Zimbabweans envisaged a God who answers prayers of the suffering. Faced with a possible loss of power and to intensify his stay in power, Mugabe made Zimbabwe a warzone. He introduced targeted violence levelled against Tsvangirai’s followers since 2000, and this selective brutality continued at every election until 2023 during a post-Mugabe election. The violence and brutality imposed on members of the opposition resulted in the party leaders and their members leaving everything in the hands of God as they felt that their rights were being violated and abused, and they were serving a government that had lost the compass and direction to perform its duties and only God can redeem them.
Mugabe also religionised politics. This religionisation was supported by the African Independent Churches and the newer religious movements (Chitando 2013). Regardless of religionising his political path, Mugabe continued to brutalise the members of the opposition through, torture and abductions (Macheka 2022):
This ruthlessness resulted in the displacement of many Zimbabweans with some resorting to seeking asylum in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America among other safe countries. (Mujinga 2020:345)
Forced migration and unemployment were among other elements of direct and indirect violence that pervaded the Zimbabwean state (Chitiyo 2020:4; Rwafa 2023:4). Mugabe’s tyrannic rule remained the Zimbabwean system of governance when Emmerson Mnangagwa became the President after the assisted ‘military coup’ on 15 November 2017 (Nyathi & Ncube 2020:825). The military coup raised hopes for a political and economic revamp (Czerep 2018:1). In 2018, Tsvangirai died and Nelson Chamisa became the leader of the opposition party now called the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A).
Mnangagwa and Chamisa squared off in the 2018 General Election (which elects the President and Members of the House of Assembly). Being aware of the people’s faith in religion, Mnangagwa appealed to what Gunda (2015:24) called the biblification of the Zimbabwean political space by coining a mantra, ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God’. In using the word biblification, Gunda (2015:24–25) described the widespread use of biblically derived symbols in the Zimbabwean political space. Mudzanire and Banda (2021:2) further argue that ‘Mnangagwa also consolidated the people’s hopes, by portraying himself as a churchman’. Under the leadership of a ‘purported churchman ordained to rule Zimbabwe by God’, the country suffered serious misgovernance resulting in the opposition politicians seeing no change from Robert Mugabe’s autocratic rule:
Just like Mugabe, Mnangagwa was supported by the Vapostori (white garment church African Independent Churches) who remained the backbone of Zimbabwean politics, in some cases involved in political violence aimed at dismantling the opposition. (Dube 2019:1)
In 2018, both Mnangagwa and Chamisa fused Christianity within Zimbabwean politics because religion and politics play an important role in organising or polarising the society. ‘Religion had been used for various purposes in Zimbabwean politics, such as holding on to power, contesting power, rebuking leaders, and silencing opponents’ (Dube 2020:1). The reasons cited by Dube justify why both Mugabe and Mnangagwa depended on the African Independent Churches and newer religious movements who spiritualise their appointment as a divine act of God. On the one hand, Mnangagwa was chanting his mantra, the voice of the people is the voice of God, to authenticate his rule as a new leader:
[H]owever, his actions raised questions on the foundational attributes of God of justice because he never showed signs of a born again Christian although he masqueraded as a Methodist Church in Zimbabwe congregant. (Mujinga 2023:62)
On the other hand, this biblification of the public space also led Nelson Chamisa to champion his mantra #Godisinit as an alternative statement of hope in the context of hopelessness (Nenjerama 2022:752). Given that #Godisinit was the first religious hashtag to go viral in Zimbabwean political space, it provided an answer to the question, ‘Where is God when it hurts?’ Whereas ZANU PF believed in the God of violence as Mnangagwa clearly said in one of his speeches (ZimEye 2013 [0.00–0.45 min]), the opposition party, knowing how brutal and vindictive ZANU PF could be, opted for the route of peace (Masengwe & Dube 2023:194). This brutality is historical, and ZANU PF uses the military and the police to take advantage of being the ruling government (Langa 2023:1). Chamisa’s decision to invoke religion into politics demonstrates his vulnerability and the people under his leadership.
Chamisa’s understanding of the #Godisinit
To popularise #Godisinit, Chamisa took advantage of his previous appointment as a Minister of Information, Communication, and Technology during the Government of National Unity (2009–2013) to use the Internet to influence people to love his party and what he believed. Moreover, in the post-colonial history of presidential aspirants in Zimbabwe, no politicians have been as overtly religious as Nelson Chamisa (Tarusarira 2020:31). As a former Minister, Chamisa knew the impact of technology and social media on spreading the voices of the dissenting masses. Moreover, the socioeconomic and political situation in Zimbabwe also created a void for people as the ZANU PF government was only interested in violence as discussed earlier. According to Banda (2023:23), ZANU PF subscribes to a narrow notion of uncritical patriotism. This philosophy divides citizens into either patriots or traitors. Under uncritical patriotism, patriots are those supporting ZANU PF ideologies while the traitors refer to anyone against their system of governance. This category constitutes the larger population of Zimbabweans who follow opposition politics as an alternative to their socioeconomic and political struggles and unfortunately, they suffer selective violence (Banda 2023:23). Uncritical patriotism also divides the citizens into a paradox of peace lovers and those with an appetite for violence.
Both Mnangagwa and Chamisa invoked religion in their national electoral campaign through rallies and posts on social media, before the 2018 General Elections and during the disputation of the results. Chamisa employed Christianity as a campaign tool while Mnangagwa used the war cry ‘The voice of the people is the voice of God’ (Chimininge 2019:37; Mpofu 2021:324). For Chamisa #Godisnit was a tool of confidence in the face of ZANU PF’s cunning brutality. The hashtag was popularised through his rallies, statements and different social media platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), TikTok and Facebook pages. In addition, Chamisa used the #Godisinit in his election campaign material including various Christian symbols such as a recorded prayer and calling on citizens to fast and hold prayer vigils for the defeat of the ruling ZANU PF (Mudzanire & Banda 2021). While Chamisa used Twitter to popularise the #Godisinit, ZANU PF also used the same platform to push the #EDpfee (i.e., ‘Emmerson Dambudzo (ED) must be President at all cost’) and #EDHasMyVote. Dube (2020:1) highlighted that enablers of Mnangagwa’s regime actively ensured that he remained in power, regardless of his failures to deliver a prosperous country to the citizens. Furthermore, ZANU PF forces people to accept Mnangagwa’s name through, propaganda, and where necessary, they use violence. Being aware of how Mnangagwa desires power at all costs, Chamisa decided to invoke the divine in his speeches and at times speak in riddles and catchy phrases to advise his followers of the dangerous political playground they were part of.
The other reason why Chamisa decided to invoke God in his political strategy has been his conviction that God is God of all seasons and all situations and the Zimbabwean situation is not extraordinary. #Godisinit presented a God who is involved in the affairs of the suffering populace and also a God whose evident evolvement in human affairs cannot be questioned especially in the context of Zimbabwean socioeconomic and political challenges. In one of his rallies, Chamisa said to his supporters:
[W]e have been given the mandate by the people of Zimbabwe. We have the mandate from the Most High God. Some people criticise God and yet the God of the valley is the same God of the mountains. In good and in bad the God who allowed Joseph to be thrown in the pit is the same God who took him to the palace. The God who allowed David to be chased by Saul is the same God who took him from being chased to be the king. #Godisinit means that God even allows thieves to steal for the faithful to be raised. He allowed the Pharaohs to torment the Israelites. He is the same God who raised Moses from the same palace. God is the God of miracles. (TikTok 2023a [00:18 min])
In the context of fear of persecution, victimisation and abduction, and still wanting to lead the country, Chamisa ventured into the theological space which was a lucrative option for him to assure his supporters that in all he was doing God was involved. Moreover, the introduction of the #Godisinit was a religiopolitical survival strategy in the Zimbabwean political landscape as Mnangagwa had also religionised his political position, although he fell short of demonstrating this religiosity. Without the #Godisinit, it is my opinion that the opposition politics in Zimbabwe would have lost its relevance in a politically volatile country where their opponent knew no other means of achievement than violence. Chamisa’s #Godisinit is centred on the doctrine of the omnipotent and omniscient God, one who remains just in every circumstance. His statements whenever he speaks demonstrate the centrality of God in pain and peace. This centring of a seemingly absent God during times of crisis was best described by Elie Wiesel, a Jewish survivor under Adolf Hitler’s harshness when he narrated an ordeal that he encountered; Weissel comments on a situation in which devout Jews questioned the omnipotence and omnipresence of God as they witnessed a child gruesomely being placed in a concentration chamber by Hitler.
Weissel narrated:
Where is God? Where is He?’ someone behind me asked. For more than half an hour [the child in the noose] stayed there, struggling between life and death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full in the face. He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue was still red, his eyes were not yet glazed. Behind me, I heard the same man asking: ‘Where is God now?’ And I heard a voice within me answer him: ‘Where is He? Here He is—He is hanging here on this gallows’. (Weissel 1956:2)
The suffering endured by the child in the concentration chamber illustrates how Zimbabwe undergoes similar ordeals, with God standing alongside the traumatised. #Godisinit presented a choice between peace and violence built on the violent nature of ZANU PF which saw most Zimbabweans living as slaves in their country. This reign of terror divided the citizens into victims and victors. The victims consistently belonged to the opposition party, while supporters of the ruling party often engaged for the sake of accessing resources acquired through unconventional methods. Others align themselves to evade the openly declared targeting by the President. For example, at one funeral, Mnangagwa said in Shona one of the major native languages of Zimbabwe translated to read:
I grew up with my mother telling me to go to church. I always ran away. My sister would always look for me and bring me into the house for prayers, I grew up as a Christian knowing the Jehovah of Shalom [the Lord of peace] when I grew up, I began to realise that there is also Jehovah of War. I decided to choose the Jehovah of War. The Jehovah of Peace is the Jehovah of War. You love peace because all comes from God, but my conviction is that whoever makes a mistake must be beaten. No one is lost, those who want peace belong to Jehovah and those who love war belong to Jehovah. (ZimEye 2013 [0.50–1.17 min])
The declaration of loving violence by Mnangagwa in the trending video cited above also justifies the use of #Godisinit as a strategy of hope for the hopeless. Masengwe and Dube (2023) argue:
Coalition for Citizens Change (CCC) which Chamisa formed in 2022 and contested as its President in 2023 utilise fasting, praying vigils, and messages of love and peace to promote calmness in a political violent environment. (p. 194)
Chamisa invoked the God of peace as a means of countering the use of the God of war propagated by ZANU PF. These strategies led to positive turnouts of people at his rallies and also reduced bloodshed during the election (Masengwe & Dube 2023:194). In a country defined by hate speech, targeted political violence and abductions of innocent and defenceless citizens, Chamisa saw an opportunity to journey with the troubled and dejected who were always questioning the presence of God in times of trauma. People’s turning to God for hope was inevitable as ZANU PF had defined itself with brutality and bloodshed. Masengwe and Dube (2023) buttress this point by arguing that:
[W]hile taking the route of peace, ZANU PF took a different stance of acknowledging that they believe in the God of Violence to control the dissenting voices and maintain its hold on power. The party believes that they need violence to force their ideology and suppress those who do not conform. In using #Godisisit, Chamisa acknowledged that he was aware of the enemy he was fighting. (p. 194)
Chamisa’s introduction of #Godisinit suggests that his leadership plans for the country were grounded in religious mysticism (McClendon & Riedl 2019:225) in the context of a hostile country where peace is not an option. In most of his X (formerly Twitter) handles and rallies, Chamisa would always end with #Godisinit as an emphasis on the place of God in his style of politics that is grounded in peace. In explaining the meaning of #Godisinit, Chamisa emphasised that:
We don’t invest in noise we invest in peace. While others are making noise, we make peace. Where others invest in violence, we invest in peace … the definition of action cannot be limited to violence and demonstration. (TikTok 2023b)
In one of his messages of hope, after he resigned from the Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) on the allegation that the part was contaminated by ZANU PF and he could not swim in the contaminated sewage, Chamisa continued to preach peace to the demoralised Zimbabwean in the context of pain:
… Let’s drive out hate and selfishness. Let’s look out for the weak amongst us and prioritize clients’ needs in all professions … We just don’t need the change of faces but that change of heart. We need a software change not just a change of the hardware. It’s the soft issues most! We’re pivoting to happiness. Welcome to a brighter future. #EthicalSociety #Respect #Love #ProtectEachOther #OnePeople #Godisinit. (ZimEye 2024):1
Critic of the #Godisinit
Although the #Godisinit was a mantra of hope to the hopeless Zimbabweans who were questioning the omnipotence of God amid the invincible ZANU PF, some individuals feel that the hashtag was just another mystic claim. Chamisa was criticised for Christianising politics for self-gain. He believed that holiness was demanded by God from his people if they were to enjoy the fruits of Zimbabwe (Masengwe & Dube 2023:60). Waddicombe’s (2020) understanding of Origen’s teaching, shows that God is incorporeal, one and simple, the good, God transcends being and mind. #Godisinit summarises the God presented by Origen, one who is eternal and who remains incognito.
One of the critics of Chamisa’s hashtag was Gibson Nyikadzino. Nyikadzino (2021) argues that ‘#Godisinit is an unscientific political lie … the phenomena is a form of religious fundamentalism that continues to insist on the impossible … results without hard work and effort’. ‘The use of #Godisinit is not a political philosophy but a religionisation of politics by Chamisa to get votes through sympathy’ (Nyikadzino 2021). Nyikadzino (2021:1) further stresses that, the hashtag is a populist selling point by colluding demagogues who only expect positive political outcomes using unscientific claims. ‘It is a lie meant to pacify the voters so that they will not be critical of the misdeeds of failing politicians despite the consequences.’ #Godisinit’s mantra demonstrates the rhetoric of the opposition. For example, (when Morgan Tsvangirai was the MDC presidential candidate in 2008, the party crafted a mantra ‘Morgan is more’).
An analysis of the critical points raised by Nyikadzino demonstrates his objectivity as far as warning the voting for Chamisa was concerned. However, the arguments can also be treated as ZANU PF propaganda as most people who publish with the Herald are believed to be pro-ZANU PF while those who publish with independent papers such as NewsDay are believed to be aligned with the opposition. On the other hand, Nyikadzino might be arguing from the neutral ground warning the opposition of the potential danger of ZANU PF to its opponents; however, his criticism can also be viewed as threatening the opposition supporters to lose trust in their leadership and boycott voting thereby giving ZANU PF a win in a silver platter. Whatever Nyikadzino stands for, it remains that the hashtag targets the opposition supporters as victims who needed a way out of ZANU PF injustices and brutality, and the religionisation of politics by Chamisa attracted his followers.
The Review and Mail (2023) mentioned that, before the 2023 elections, people were optimistic that God had finally answered their prayer and that the #Godisinit movement had become a reality. However, the hashtag remains a wish as the Zimbabwean elections were disputed by all election observers starting with the Southern African Development Community, the African Union, and many election observers. The disputed results showed that Emmerson Mnangagwa had won by 52.6%, while Nelson Chamisa got 44%. In his response, Chamisa took to his X (formerly Twitter) saying:
[T]he election process was fraudulent. I know you are anxious. I will give you an address soon. Never lose hope. Don’t give up. You did your very best. You sacrificed all. It’s not in vain. ‘They stole your voice and vote but never your hope. It’s a blatant and gigantic fraud. Our God is faithful. There shall be freedom and justice in Zimbabwe! Remember, #Godisinit’. (Review and Mail 2023:1)
Another critique of the hashtag was Apostle Talent Chiwenga who accused Chamisa of lying. Chiwenga stated: ‘If God was in it, Chamisa would have won in 2018 and 2023. Zimbabwe Electoral Commission collided with ZANU PF and the political landscape remains unchanged’ (Anna 2023). In his response, Chamisa expressed his belief that God will visit Zimbabwe and display his power and strength to the weak and the oppressed:
Let them mock you, God will show himself mighty and strong. You will love it; He is always on it. Ignore these manly and shameful slideshows, don’t say I didn’t tell you; God has never let him down. Be happy Zimbabwe! Isaiah 33:22 #OnePeople. (Anna 2023)
According to Masengwe and Dube (2023):
The critics of Chamisa expressed views of anger and hatred in their tweets. The expressions are biased and limited as the critics failed to provide specific examples and contexts for the critical tweet in question. (p. 193)
Analysis and conclusion
While Chamisa used #Godisinit as a political tool to lure people into his political party the hashtag transcends mere politico-religious mysticism. Firstly, the hashtag prioritises his conviction and commitment to the Christian faith even in politics, especially about #Godisinit. Chamisa showered his unwavering stance regarding the Christian faith about which he had been unapologetic. This conviction shows that the doctrine of God whose attributes are omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience can still be applicable in politics to give hope to the hopeless poor people.
Secondly, the #Godisinit presents a God who is involved in human affairs as presented in the Bible. God is always on the side of the weak, the poor and the vulnerable. In using the #Godisinit, Chamisa was reliving the true attributes of God who fought for the weak and the vulnerable. This is even though he was speaking from the position of the elite first as a former member of Parliament at the age of 25 and second as a former Minister of Information Communication and Technology. #Godisinit also reflects the mission of God for the poor and the oppressed. For example, Job 5:15–16 states that:
He rescues the poor from the cutting words of the strong, and rescues them from the clutches of the powerful. And so, at last, the poor have hope, and the snapping jaws of the wicked are shut.
Proverbs 14:31 also mentions that: ‘Those who oppress the poor insult their Maker, but helping the poor honours him.’
Theses verses present a just God and #Godisinit qualifies to present a God who remains on the side of the oppressed and also against the wicked powerful.
Lastly, #Godisinit reflects that God is not on the fringes of God’s world but is deeply involved through spiritual and providential activity. This statement also demonstrates that the doctrine of God cannot be influenced by the problems people face every day but remains as a voice from the underside.
Acknowledgements
Competing interests
The author declares that they have no financial or personal relationship(s) that may have inappropriately influenced them in writing this article.
Author’s contributions
M.M. declares that they are the sole author of this research article.
Ethical considerations
This article does not contain any studies involving human participants performed by any of the authors.
Funding information
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and is the product of professional research. The article does not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated institution, funder, agency or that of the publisher. The author is responsible for this article’s results, findings and content.
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