The main concern of De beata vita and Contra Academicos is to refute academic scepticism, which claims that happiness exists in the pursuit of truth. According to academic scepticism, there is no truth but rather a probability. One should avoid making errors to achieve tranquility of the mind.

Augustine rejects academic scepticism by stating that they are ‘caducarii’ – those who suffer from the falling sickness, known today as epilepsy (De beata vita 2.16). On the one hand, Augustine illustrates the unchangeable truth of, for example, mathematics and dialectic. On the other hand, Augustine appeals to the certainty of givenness. With the illustration of a curved rudder in the water, Augustine emphasises the certainty of impressions. Even though the impression is false because of sense perceptions, the perceiver is still certain of what he or she has seen.

In De beata vita, Augustine defines happiness as ‘possessing God’ (deum habere). He argues that God is ‘eternal and everlasting’ (semper est indigus) (De beata vita 2.11). Therefore, those who possess God would never lose happiness. Happiness does not lie in the pursuit of external, concrete pleasures but the internal search for oneself and the pursuit of the inner good. Thus, Augustine considers happiness an unchanging, timeless being, an idea, absolute truth, wisdom and God. The search for happiness is then transformed into the knowledge of the truth.

We can illustrate the definition of happiness as ‘possessing God’ from two perspectives. Firstly, this definition of happiness resembles Augustine’s ‘two worlds’ theory. Augustine’s theory of happiness is based on Platonic metaphysics, namely the distinction between the intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis) and the sensible world (mundus sensibilis). For this distinction, Augustine finds its biblical support – ‘My kingdom is not of this world’ (Jn 18:36). The division between the two worlds implies that one should not seek the changeable, visible world but rather the unchanging, eternal world of ideas. For Augustine, unhappiness lies in searching for the things we will necessarily lose.

Secondly, possessing God relies on truth and wisdom. Through the knowledge of truth and wisdom, man can know and possess God, achieve happiness and complete the soul’s journey, namely the return to the Oneness (reditus ad unum). When reason rests in what is eternal, happiness can never be lost. This labels the intellectual approach towards happiness in Augustine’s philosophy.

Augustine advocates for happiness as contemplation throughout his works. In Contra Academicos, Augustine defines happiness as ‘living according to the best in man’,² where ‘the best’ refers to reason (ratio). In Augustine’s view, the rational soul is God’s creation and is closer to God than anything else. The participation of ideas (participatio), which is based on the eyes of the soul, can be identified as the happiest vision (beatissima visio). In De quantitate animae, Augustine argues that the highest level of the soul is the contemplative state (contemplatio). This position persists in his later works. Although Augustine criticises the philosophers’ claim to pursue happiness in this life (hac vita) in De civitate Dei XIX, he formulates the state of happiness in the eschaton as the viewing of God (visio dei) in De civitate Dei XXII.29. The definition of happiness through vision is not only an interpretation of 1 Corinthians 13:12, which states that ‘then shall we come face to face’, but it is also an interpretation of the contemplative life advocated by neoplatonism.

In order to achieve such a vision, Augustine provided an intellectualist approach, namely the ascent of the soul, which he described in Confessiones VII, summarised as follows: the body or corpora (numeri sensibiles or locales), the soul or anima (sensus), the interior power or interior vis (sensus interior), rational power or ratiocinans potentia (ratio, mens), intelligence or intellegentia (sapientia and numeri intelligibilis), and the incommutable or incommutabile (unum) (Horn 1994:414). The seven steps correspond to the seven levels of the soul: animation, perception, art, virtue, tranquility, approach and contemplation.

In Retractationes, Augustine has criticised his confidence in rational power mainly from three aspects: (1) the over-emphasis of liberal arts (Retractationes 3.3.2); (2) the over-emphasis of mind (mens) or rational power (ratio) (Retractationes 1.1.2.); and (3) the dependence of wisdom of the soul (Retractationes, 2.1.2). To sum up, Augustine argues that he was confident in man’s perfection through human efforts or by relying on humans’ natural faculties.

Augustine describes the miserable life of human beings in De civitate Dei XIX. A remarkable argument is Augustine’s attack on the pagan cardinal virtue. In De libero arbitrio II.19.50, Augustine defines virtue as the excellent good (magnum bonum) leading to happiness. However, Augustine states that the cardinal virtues are proof of the misery of human life. We can take his comment on prudence as an example.

According to Augustine, prudence is not a constant state of mind but rather evidence of the existence of evil. Even though people can distinguish good from evil by prudence, weakness and moral sickness dominate human life. The disorder between soul and body leads to unhappiness in this life.

In my view, the conflict between soul and body is rooted in the chain of the will that Augustine presents in Confessiones VIII.5. Augustine is split into two wills, which are the ‘new will’ (nova voluntas) and the ‘old will’ (veta voluntas), or carnal and spiritual. Augustine transforms the conflict between spirit and flesh into the battle within the will. This conflict cannot be solved by humans but rather by the grace of God.

Augustine’s work Ad Simplicianum I.2 was addressed to Simplician and was an exegetical work to The letter to the Romans. This work plays an essential role in the development of Augustine’s thoughts. On the one hand, Augustine has changed his previous ideas on God’s grace and human weakness. On the other hand, Augustine started Confessiones after finishing Ad Simplicianum.

In this work, Augustine presents the election of Jacob and Esau, where the relationship between grace, faith and action is shown. Furthermore, he dealt with this question in the context of his doctrine of original sin and grace.

The order for a happy life is as follows: grace (gratia), faith (fides), good works (bona opera) and eternal life (aeterna vita). The beginning of faith lies neither in human work nor in God’s foreknowledge of faith. Therefore, it seems that neither work (opus) nor will (voluntas) contribute to achieving a happy life. The achievement of happiness is no longer in the good will (bona voluntas), as Augustine states in De libero arbitrio.

Faith and work are not man’s merit (meritum) but a gift of God (donum dei). Those who receive grace can begin to believe and do good works. This leads to Augustine’s statement in Retractationes: ‘I, indeed, laboured in defence of the free choice of human will; but the grace of God conquered’.⁴

We have already presented the contradictory characteristics of Augustine’s theory of happiness. On the one hand, Augustine identifies the truth and happiness and the intellectual vision of God. On the other hand, Augustine emphasises the imperfection of life, the weakness of human power and God’s grace.

The first discontinuity argument is based on Augustine’s shift from optimism to pessimism. The passage Rist relies on is De beata vita 4.25, where Augustine argued for the soul’s happiness for the sake of its perfection. Augustine criticised this passage in Retractationes I.2 by pointing out that a happy life can only be achieved in the life to come. According to Rist, Augustine has established his Christian idea of happiness in De vera religione, namely that happiness cannot be achieved in this life but rather in the next life (Rist 1994:50). Thus, Rist presents a shift from optimism to pessimism in Augustine’s development.

However, is such a claim plausible? Firstly, Retracationes I.2 describes the harmonious relationship between body and spirit regarding happiness. In contrast, Augustine has not mentioned the body in De beata vita 4.25. Whether one can achieve happiness depends not only on the perfectness of the soul but also on whether the body is subject to the soul. From this contrast, we can remark that Augustine ignored the impediment of the body in De beata vita 4.25. In this passage, he does not discuss whether man can achieve happiness in this life.

Secondly, we need to remark on the characteristics of the earlier dialogues. Augustine does not present his idea to his interlocutors directly, but leads them and the reader step by step to his thought through the Socratic art of midwifery. In De beata vita 4.25, it seems that Augustine advocates the perfection of the soul. However, it does not mean that Augustine holds that human beings can achieve happiness in this life. He claims later in the text that ‘we’ (the interlocutors in this dialogue) are still not wise and happy and in search of God (De vita beata 4.35). If we take this dialogue as a whole, Augustine does not advocate for the perfection of the human soul. Besides, we can remark that Augustine realised the impediment of the body (labe corporis) in Soliloquia I.6.12. That is to say; earlier, Augustine has already acknowledged that human beings could not achieve happiness in this life.

The second argument for the discontinuity is based on our interpretation of free will. At first sight, Augustine has given up his theory of free will by claiming it has been conquered by the grace of God. God solely decides the election and damnation of humans. Therefore, human efforts do not make any contribution to the achievement of happiness. Thus, Brown (2000:149) argues that humans are utterly dependent on God. Flasch denies the synthesis between grace and will.

However, this thesis is not plausible. Firstly, we can contrast his earlier and later works regarding the relationship between free will and God’s providence. The third volume of De libero arbitrio was finished in 395. The letter that is addressed to Simplician was written after 397. Augustine began to write De civitate Dei after the fall of Rome in 410. In the De libero arbitrio III, Augustine argues for the compatibility between the providence of God and free will by differentiating necessity (necessitas) and providence (providentia). It resembles the discussion in De civitate Dei V.9. Augustine criticised the theory of determinism of the Stoics and the negation of God’s providence by Cicero. Therefore, it is not plausible to claim that Augustine has radically changed his understanding of free will in this single letter.⁸

Secondly, we can consider Augustine’s distinction between free decision (liberum arbitrium) and will (voluntas). Free decision is the faculty to decide, whereas the will is the inclination. With this structure in mind, free decision is not necessary but not sufficient to formulate a good will (bona voluntas). Augustine holds that the grace of God does not influence the free decision of human beings but rather the inclination of the will (Horn 1996:127).⁹

Based on this conceptual distinction, we can find more textual evidence to show Augustine’s defence of freedom of will in Ad Simplicianum I.2. As indicated by the following quote:

It is evident that Augustine insists on his understanding of power and will and voluntary sin.

Furthermore, we should notice the relationship between the vocation (vocatio) and the assent of the will (nutus voluntatis). Augustine has emphasised the effect (effectus) of vocation by introducing the conception of congruous vocation (vocatio congruens) (Ad Simpicianum I.2.13). However, Augustine still leaves the possibility of rejecting this call. ‘Because they did not follow even though they were called’.¹¹

According to Brown, Augustine states that the delight of humans is entirely dependent on the grace of God and escapes self-control in Ad Simplicianum I.2 (Brown 2000:149). Thus, no one is sure whether they can be chosen. This labels the weakness of human beings. We can turn directly to the text where Augustine discusses delight (delectatio) in Ad Simplicianum I.2.22.

The passage is concerned with the relationship between power (potestas) and will (voluntas). The discussion of the power of will could be traced back to the Stoics and Aristotle, especially ‘what is up to us’. It is accepted that wisdom, virtue and reason are in our power, through which we can long for happiness. In their teaching on emotion, the Stoics believed that ‘impression’ (phantasia) is produced by an external object. However, human power lies in rational judgements about the ‘impression’ to consent or reject it. Augustine, influenced by Stoic philosophy, would also argue that the action of God on the ‘perceptual presentation’ of the mind does not destroy the power of reason and will.

Now we turn back to the passage of delight and power of will. The stem of the word delectatio, electo or lacio means allure, entice and grip (Van Bavel 1993:504). Therefore, delectatio expresses only the objective properties of the object. The will is attracted by delight and changes its inclination. However, it does not necessarily follow that the will has entirely lost its power. In a word, the grace of God has only influenced the inclination of human will.

Above all, we can conclude that the later Augustine does not give up the freedom and power of the will. He still defends the freedom of will in the Ad Simplicianum I,2.