The Indonesian Constitution guarantees the freedom of Indonesian citizens to worship according to their religion. In reality, however, the Indonesian government had issued regulations that restrict the building of worship places, which is one way of expressing religious freedom. These regulations, being trapped in the discourse of the politicisation of religion and the religionisation of politics, are contradictory to the aspirations of the founding fathers as expressed in the Indonesian Constitution. This article seeks to deal with this problem by conducting a critical and reflective study on religion–state relations, particularly on the concept of sphere sovereignty proposed by Abraham Kuyper. This study employed the content analysis method. The study demonstrates that this concept, when applied to the Indonesian situation, would prove helpful in restoring normative leadership to Indonesian politics and would enable it to align itself with the values of the Indonesian Constitution. The study also recommends a number of practical strategies in protecting religious freedom and rights in Indonesia, especially with regard to the restrictions on building worship places.
The study of the concept of Kuyper’s Sphere Sovereignty can be helpful in restoring normative leadership to Indonesian politics and would enable it to align itself with the values of the Indonesian Constitution and allow religion to fulfil its responsibility towards the state and the state towards religion, without being trapped in the discourse of the politicisation of religion and the religionisation of politics.
In today’s world, Indonesia is a country of uncertainty. Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and the world’s third biggest democracy, with a population of 265 million people (Bappenas
Although Islam is not the state religion and the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion to Indonesian citizens, Indonesia’s history has shown a recurring tension in the relations between those of the majority religion and of the minority. One of the issues that has raised so much concern for religious freedom is the restriction regarding the construction of worship places. A regulation regulating the construction of worship sites was published jointly by the Ministers of Religion and Internal Affairs in 1969. The directive was issued in reaction to a considerable number of conversions from Islam to Christianity in specific parts of the nation, as mentioned in the Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB, Joint-Decision Letter) No.1/BER/MDN-MAG/1969 addressing the building of worship facilities (Willis
In 2006, the SKB was revised and renamed the
Dealing with this ambiguity, the author discusses the thought of Abraham Kuyper who initiates a strand of contemporary Christianity, known as Dutch neo-Calvinism, which from the beginning has been remarkably accompanied by a notion of democracy (Harinck
The question arises as to whether any points of contact exist between Kuyper and Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. The answer is yes. One such point is the evidence of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, which began in 1602 and lasted for 350 years. It is important to note that during Kuyper’s term as prime minister in the Netherlands (1901–1905) and through the
This article explores how Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty could be applied to bring about normative leadership to Indonesian politics (‘descriptive’) in order to enable it to align itself with the aspiration of the founding fathers (‘prescriptive’) expressed in Pancasila and the Constitution. The main discussion of the article consists of four parts. The first part elaborates on the ideas of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty and how they could establish a pluralistic and tolerant society. The second part explains the SKB and PERBER – discriminative regulations issued by the Indonesian government – that regulate the establishment of worship places. The third part presents a critical and reflective evaluation of the SKB and PERBER from the perspective of sphere sovereignty. The fourth part evaluates the SKB and PERBER by presenting an interpretation of the Indonesian Constitution from the perspective of sphere sovereignty. The discussion ends with a summary and a number of recommendations for protecting religious freedom in Indonesia.
Kuyper first used the term
Rooted in Calvin’s political thought, Kuyper (
Based on God’s sovereignty, Kuyper holds that God has created the world with various structures and institutions that operate within different spheres of social life. The sovereign God has delegated his sovereignty ‘by dividing life into
In short, all spheres of life – the family, the church, the school, the civil government, the marketplace and so on – are thus not sovereign in their relationships to God. Each of them, however, has its own God-given task, and God commands human beings to serve as office holders in these various spheres of life. As the neo-Calvinist Gordon Spykman has put it, ‘[e]ach sphere has its own identity, its own unique task, its own God-given prerogative. On each God has conferred its own particular right of existence and reason for existence’ (Spykman
Although each sphere has its own identity and its own laws of life, they are not independent of one another; rather, they are all interrelated. In Kuyper’s words, the ‘cogwheels of all these spheres engage each other and precisely through that interaction emerges the rich, multifaceted multiformity of human life’ (Kuyper
When kept together, this twofold principle preserves communal life against both monotonous uniformity and tyranny, on the one hand, and fragmentation and polarization, on the other. Sphere sovereignty (diversity of tasks) may not be sacrificed to sphere universality (unity of life), nor vice versa. (Spykman
Regarding church–state relationships, sphere sovereignty proposes ‘[a] free Church in a free State’ (Kuyper
It was unthinkable for Kuyper to engage the idea of a theocratic state or church-controlled culture of ecclesiasticism. If the church claims to have sovereignty over all spheres of life, it would blatantly contradict the doctrine that appropriates sovereignty over all of life solely to the triune God. Such a claim of the church would cause it to pretend to be God. Kuyper observes that wherever this theocratic rule of the church was established, it had always led to tyranny and national corruption. Moreover, within the theocratic state, ‘given the authority
The idea of
[
Therefore, Kuyper (
Although church and state are separate from each other, they, according to Kuyper, should have a mutual responsibility towards each other (Kuyper
Someday there will be coercion, when Christ descends in majesty from the heavens, breaks the anti-Christian powers with a rod of iron …. He has a right to this because he knows the hearts of all and will be the judge of all. But we do not. To us it is only given to fight with spiritual weapons and to bear our cross in joyful discipleship. (p. 220)
And Christ has never delegated this right to the state in order to enable it to discern the true church from the false one. Regarding freedom of conscience, instead of using ‘
In this sense, it is important to note that Kuyper disagrees with Calvin or with Article 36 of the Belgic Confession. Calvin, although maintained that church and state should be kept distinct, encourages civil government ‘to defend sound doctrine of piety and the position of the church’ (Calvin
[
Kuyper notes that here Calvin’s approach has a strong Constantinian influence, and that it would be a great mistake for Christians to accept this position (Kuyper
As regards the church’s responsibility towards the state, Kuyper challenges secularism and its idea of a secular state, which removes religion from the public sphere. Sphere sovereignty acknowledges that civil government is part of the created order and as such it derives its power and authority from God and should therefore subject itself to God’s claim of sovereignty. For this reason, civil government, as Kuyper has put it, should consider itself as ‘a servant of God’ in the sense that ‘willingly or unwillingly, it is and remains dependent on God’ (Kuyper
In the secular state, religious voices tend to be relegated to the private domain. In this case, the secular state has usurped the domain of religion, restricted the rights of religion and thus opposed the idea of sphere sovereignty. It has pretended to be God. Kuyper (
In sum, Kuyper’s view of sphere sovereignty has shown that religion is inseparable from politics. Kuyper (
The problem of conflict and violation of religious freedom in Indonesia, particularly over the houses of worship belonging to religious minorities and especially Christians, has been a long-standing and multifaceted one. Based on the Annual Report of Religious Intolerance and Church Restrictions from the Indonesian Christian Communication Forum, the number of the closing, burning and demolition of churches has greatly increased from only two during Sukarno’s presidency (17 August 1945 – 07 March 1967) to 456 during Suharto’s administration (07 March 1967 – 21 May 1998; averaging 1.19 per month) (Tahalele & Santoso
The main issue of the SKB is the requirement for the building of worship places. Prior to building a new place of worship in a certain area, a permit has to be obtained from an authorised state official. The official must first seek the advice of representatives from local religious groups and spiritual leaders on the matter (Sairin
About one month after the issuance of the SKB, the DGI (Indonesian Council of Churches) and MAWI (Supreme Council of Indonesian Bishops) issued a joint memorandum criticising the SKB. The memorandum states that because of the SKB:
[
As the SKB touched the fundamental issue of human rights, the DGI and MAWI asked the government to review the decree (Mujiburrahman
As the SKB had made it difficult and even impossible for Christians to build their churches in areas where Muslims constitute a majority, numerous churches had operated within Muslim communities without a building permit or license (Mujiburrahman
The destruction of churches had increased from 156 during the Habibie administration (21 May 1998 – 20 October 1999; averaging 9.18 per month) to 232 during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (20 October 1999 – 23 July 2001; averaging 11.048 per month). This increase was because of the efforts made by certain groups to discredit Wahid’s vision of a tolerant Islam. However, during Megawati’s administration (23 July 2001 – 20 October 2004), the number of the closing, burning and demolition of churches has decreased to 160 (averaging 4.154 per month) (Tahalele & Santoso
Many observers of Indonesian politics agree that the issuance of the SKB was a result of an agreement between Muslim leaders and the state as both entities strove for political power. Their efforts frequently took the form of either politicisation of religion, in which religion was dragged into the public sphere and turned into a symbol of contention and a tool for group solidarity or religionisation of politics, in which a particular religion demanded a greater role as the sole decision-maker on state matters. The severity of religious violence in Indonesia has highlighted Robert Hefner’s argument that religious violence is evidently sanctioned by both the state in its endeavour to politicise religion and religious groups who insist on hegemony in their effort to religionise politics (Hefner
It’s worth noting that both Muslim leaders and the government have utilised the Ministry of Religion to enact discriminatory government rules such as the SKB to further their own objectives. The formation of the Ministry of Religion on 03 January 1946, as a concession to the rejection of the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), demonstrates how religion has become politicised, resulting in religious discrimination. While confronting Dutch military assault at the time, the Indonesian government made this compromise in order to gain support from the Muslim majority. Thus, Islam was elevated to the role of the privileged religion (Intan
On the other hand, the concession also indicated that the religionisation of politics, in claiming the dominion and hegemony of Islam, was also happening. Initially, the Ministry of Religion was established with the purpose of administering the affairs of one religion only, namely Islam. Only subsequently was its jurisdiction extended to include all of the official state religions – Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. But in spite of this development, religious discrimination still exists, because from the outset the main interests in religious matters were focused on Islam as the majority religion. As Clifford Geertz has aptly observed, religious matters in Indonesia are ‘for all intents and purposes a
The state’s acceptance of Islam as a majority religion demanding special treatment has naturally resulted in prejudice against other faiths. As the following examples demonstrate, the adoption of exclusive, discriminatory rules is intimately linked to an agreement between a religion that desires dominion over others and a state that wants to keep its control.
In the era of reform after Suharto, precisely during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency, consecutive violent attacks had been launched against religious minorities, especially Christians, in 2004–2005. As a result of these attacks, in 2006, the government replaced the SKB with a Joint-Regulation (PERBER) of the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs 2006 No. 8 & 9, titled ‘Guide for Head of Regional Leaders in Implementing Their Function in Maintaining Religious Harmony, Empowering the Forum of Religious Harmony and the Establishment of Worship Places’ (Crouch
Under the PERBER, the issue of obtaining a building permit for a new place of worship is further exacerbated by an additional regulation based on the religious composition of the local community. To obtain a building permit, at least 90 local residents of a religious community and 60 local residents from other religious communities must give their approval by submitting their signatures and photocopies of their national identity cards. Indeed, photocopies of their national identity cards would reveal whether they live close to the new place of worship’s site. As this requirement must be signed by the head of the village (
Still another regulation under the PERBER concerns the application process for obtaining building permits. The application should be accompanied by a written recommendation from the city’s or regency’s Ministry of Religion office and from the city’s or regency’s Inter-religious Harmony Forum. These recommendations are then used by the mayor or regent to support his decision in approving or rejecting the application. What happens here is, very often, that the local authorities ‘tend to take the side of members of the religious majority who wish to refuse the request’. Salim (
The fact that district governments may delay, or even refuse, issuance of building permits for new places of worship to religious minorities with valid applications shows that these governments represent the religious majority rather than the people as a whole. (p. 120)
Although in certain areas the Ministerial Joint-Regulation had resulted in counterproductive consequences such as religious violence, it has not been withdrawn and is still in effect today. The following section provides a critical assessment of the PERBER from the perspective of Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty.
In this research study, the author employs the content analysis method – a research technique used to systematically explain and analyse the content of writings such as books, newspapers and journal articles to make valid conclusions from the text to the applied context (Krippendorff
The content analysis method used in this study involves two steps: firstly, the author selects texts that are relevant to the purpose of the research, based on a literature review that seeks to obtain representative texts related to the prescriptive (‘what ought to be’) part – the application of Kuyper’s Sphere Sovereignty to the Indonesian situation, as well as the descriptive (‘what is’) part – in this case, the restriction of building worship places in Indonesia. The search has found 34 reference sources related to the topic. Secondly, the coding of messages embedded in the text according to the concept of sphere sovereignty and its application in the Indonesian context. At this stage, the author first unites or identifies the appropriate message unit for creating the code using a technique suggested by Krippendorff (
The politicisation of religion and the religionisation of politics, we may assume from the preceding investigations, are the major issues behind the SKB and PERBER. Religion is being used to promote itself as the only answer to the state’s problems as a result of the state’s subjection to religion. The state has acquired control of the private realm of religion by subordinating religions to political power. The relationship between religion and politics under many circumstances has gone well beyond Kuyper’s concept of sphere sovereignty.
Religion’s attempt to subjugate the state in order to defend and perpetuate its existence is known as religionisation of politics. According to Kuyper’s interpretation of sphere sovereignty, the state’s subjection to religious institutions – which ultimately results in a ‘theocratic state’ – will inevitably lead to tyranny and national corruption. He goes on to say that in a theocratic state, religion would lack the authority to make particular public policy decisions.
The majority religion is using the state’s power through the SKB and PERBER to prevent minority religions from building houses of worship. By applying the principle of Golden Rule (Luke 6:31 [ESV]), ‘And as you wish that others would do to you, do so to them’), it is important to note that the PERBER’s 90/60 requirement is requisite not only for the building of non-Muslim places of worship in areas inhabited by the Muslim majority but also for the building of mosques in non-Muslim-majority areas. It would be difficult for Muslims to build mosques in Bali, where Hinduism is the majority religion or in Papua and on the island of Timor, where the majority of the people are Christians. In short, the attempt of the Muslim majority in power to religionise politics has made a negative impact on Muslims themselves rather than producing a beneficial result. The theocratic rule proves to be counterproductive.
Religions that use state power are unaware that the religious legitimacy, which they confer on the state for providing permits for houses of worship will be gravely dangerous. The state with such a religious legitimacy can pretend to be God. It will become what Kuyper calls ‘an octopus, which stifles the whole of life’ (Kuyper
It is true that the PERBER allows the state to intervene in the internal affairs of religion. It marked the beginning of the manipulation of the state by religion for its own interests. But on the other hand, what happened in those cases was not merely the religionisation of politics but also the politicisation of religion, in which religion was dragged into the public sphere and made into a symbol of contention and a tool for the state’s political interest. As observed by Salim, the local authorities had taken side with the religious majority ‘in exchange for its support in local elections’ (Salim
The subordination of religion to the state in the form of the politicisation of religion will produce a ‘state religion’ in the end. When this happens, as sphere sovereignty has pointed out, such a religion will lose its transcendental character because its infinite self is being matched with the temporal and mortal power of the state. Without a transcendent identity, religion will be crippled. It can no longer function critically and prophetically. As a result, it ceases to carry out its mission as the guardian of the state’s morality.
The 90/60 requirement of the PERBER would cause the state to segregate its citizens on the basis of their religion, as it could divide the community into religious enclaves in which each religion has its own place of worship surrounded by residential areas of its adherents. This condition could eventually weaken the unity and harmony of the nation, which is ironically the prime task of the state to achieve. With the PERBER’s legislation the internal religious relationships have subordinated interreligious relationships, affecting the unity of society.
Finally, by allowing itself to become a mere tool for pursuing certain religious interests, the state would immediately lose its most noble function as a non-discriminating guardian, dedicated to the good of its citizens. The state would undergo a major change, from its initial nature of inclusive and nonsectarian to discriminative and authoritarian.
It is now clear that the source of religious intolerance actually lies in the elements of the politicisation of religion and the religionisation of politics contained in the concept of religious discrimination. Religion and state must never be totally fused. In other words, neither a state religion nor a theocratic state should be considered as legitimate options.
However, this conclusion does not mean that a secular society that promotes complete separation of religion and state will automatically address the problem of religious liberty. Although the state and religion are two different and distinct institutions, the secular state’s proposal of an absolute separation between them is not realistic. As previously stated, Kuyper believes that the ‘irreligious neutral standpoint’ of the secular state is simply unrealistic.
State and religion are, in reality, united or integrated in each individual’s own self. In Kuyper’s view of the cosmic Christ, all of life is religious; there is no morally neutral ground. Spykman underscores this fact by stating, ‘every societal issue is a human issue and every human issue a religious issue’. He implies that the ‘public affairs of society and the state are no less religious than the so-called private affairs of the individual, church, home and school life’ (Spykman
The final part of this discussion elaborates on what the Indonesian Constitution says about the relationship between religion and the state. Viewed from the perspective of sphere sovereignty, the Constitution could provide for the development of a proper relationship between religion and state that can promote religious freedom in Indonesia.
As the Principle of One Lordship – the first principle of Pancasila – and its implementation in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution emphasises that the state acknowledges One Lordship and guarantees religious freedom and the religious rights of every citizen of Indonesia, it indicates, firstly, that Indonesia is a non-theocratic state. Being a non-theocratic state implies that no single religion is officially acknowledged in the state, and that religion does not have the right to control the state. In this sense, Pancasila and the Constitution could be seen as conforming to the idea of sphere sovereignty. However, the declaration that Indonesia is a non-theocratic state does in no way trivialises religion. On the contrary, religion has been given an honourable position in this state. As sphere sovereignty advocates, the state should not only preserve religious life but also encourage its growth, thereby confirming that no religious hegemony exists in Indonesia.
For this reason, as the Ministry of Religion has sought primarily to support the agendas of Islam, it needs to transform its orientation and structure from initially serving mainly one religion to becoming a
With regard to the religion–state relationship, the Ministry of Religious Affairs would undertake as its primary task the creation of a community of freedom for religion and the state – a free religion in a free state – and the prevention of efforts to
Secondly, the Constitution provides individuals religious rights, indicating that Indonesia is a non-secular state that recognises the importance of religion in national life. Confining religion to the narrow space of the private sphere as promoted by the secular state is therefore not legitimised by the law. The state recognises the societal importance of religion in Indonesia because many religions have made major contributions to the country’s fight for independence.
For this reason, both the SKB and the PERBER should focus on the issue of religious freedom more than that of religious harmony. As a democratic state, Indonesia should, when issuing its laws and regulations, prioritise the agenda of religious freedom more than that of religious harmony. Rahardjo, a leading Muslim intellectual, is right in maintaining that what Indonesia urgently needs is ‘not a restrictive regulation, but a statute that offered religious liberty to all citizens’ (Salim
Regrettably, to this day Indonesia has not yet established the constitutional rights of religious freedom. As Simatupang observes, both the Principle of One Lordship and its implementation in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution concerning religious freedom and religious practice, ‘ha[ve] not been worked out in a detailed legal ordinance’ (Simatupang
Thirdly, viewed from the perspective of Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty, the Principle of One Lordship presupposes the idea of God’s sovereignty. This implies the recognition that the Indonesian society believes in ‘God’ and that the state will be based on religious beliefs. In other words, the Indonesian state must be a religious state, which is very similar to Kuyper’s idea of the state. As a religious state, the state acknowledges that it derives its power and authority from God and should, therefore, remain dependent on God. It is important to note that Kuyper’s idea of religious state ‘stands outside the domain of revealed religion’. But it possesses, he adds, the ‘natural knowledge of God’ and not ‘the supernatural kind, at least not directly’ (Kuyper
In promoting religious freedom, the state follows what sphere sovereignty calls the principle of state–society distinction, in which the state has to be distinguished from the society. This principle views the state as part of the society, although the state is not the society itself. As previously discussed, the societal community is very broad; it comprises the social spheres of family, education, religion, economics and the state. Each social sphere has its own ‘sphere sovereignty’, that is, to say, ‘it derives its power from sources available at its disposal, not as a grant from the state but as a direct gift from God’ (Harinck
This study has shown how Kuyper’s idea of sphere sovereignty could still be applied to Indonesian politics today and proved to be relevant to situations where restriction on the building of worship places and religious intolerance are sanctioned. Sphere sovereignty would allow religion to fulfil its responsibility towards the state and the state towards religion, without being trapped in the discourse of the politicisation of religion and the religionisation of politics. By interpreting Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution from the perspective of sphere sovereignty, Indonesian politics could avoid violations of religious freedom and instead protect religious freedom and rights of all Indonesian citizens, notwithstanding their religion.
The author declares that he has no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced him in writing this article.
B.F.I. is the sole author of this article.
This study followed all ethical standards of research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.
This research work received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any affiliated agency of the author.