Scientific data indicate that violence is involved in the emergence of higher forms of life from lower forms. This seems incompatible with the God of Christian revelation, who is the source of love and mercy. Current attempts to explain this tension usually focus on two approaches: the ‘gift of freedom’ (McLeish) or the ‘only way’ theory (Southgate). I will argue that Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of nature is able to provide an interesting framework for the challenges posed by the way of the appearance of life. The article will present Aquinas’ theology of nature, which seems to fit perfectly with the current state of scientific knowledge, especially when considering the relationship between God and creation.
The article shows that the problem of the interpretation of paradise in the Christian tradition may be related to the influence of the Neoplatonic tradition, which reduces paradise to the idealistic sphere. Attention is drawn to the concept of perfection, which does not mean the absence of any disvalue in the natural world, but is a relational concept. The death of animals and natural evil need not be explained by moral evil, but requires a broader interpretation of the value of the natural order.
The topic of the natural order has become the subject of a particularly active dialogue between science and religion, providing both sides with new insights (eds. Torrance & McCall
It seems that the notion of ‘nature’ is crucial for a proper understanding of the relationship between religion and science, both from a historical and a cultural perspective. At the same time, the Thomistic approach to the order of nature allows us to answer the question of the meaning of suffering and violence in its development, which becomes clearer when we consider the role of nature in the plan of creation (Tabaczek
The purpose of this article is to show that Thomas Aquinas understands paradise as a real existing place (Vijgen
The article consists of three parts. The first part presents Aquinas’ vision of the original constitution of nature, its perfection and integrity, the second part deals with Aquinas’ dynamic concept of nature and order and the third part points out the consequences of the Fall for the order of nature.
The image of the origin of life seems to challenge the traditional theological claim regarding the world, which is understood as called to the existence by perfect and good God and containing neither suffering nor death because it is the sin that is the cause of death and evil as reported in the Bible (cf. Wis 1:13; Rm 5:12; Rosenberg
One of the first answers to these difficulties might be found in ancient Neoplatonism and the static conception of original justice that characterised first human beings in paradise. The earthly realities of the Platonic tradition are a reflection of spiritual things – namely the ideas. The Fall, which occurred in such an ideal world, led people to experience physicality and its effects as punishment (Franck
Suppose, however, that one shifts the Fall to a non-temporal and strictly spiritual level, in accordance with the Platonic model. In such case, it would still be difficult to explain many of the details about paradise, such as Adam’s naming of the animals, which suggests his work and thus his development. At the same time, emphasising the change in God’s plans after the first humans sinned is a strategy that remains at odds with the truth presented by biblical revelation (according to which redemption was part of God’s plan from the very beginning). Such an approach focuses only on selected biblical episodes instead. This seems to impose an alien framework on the biblical description of original happiness, which according to Aquinas, does not depend on the non-existence of evil, but – as Tomasz Gałuszka (
The Platonic paradigm proved inefficient in providing explanation that would be convincing in the context of modern science. But its incompatibility with the biblical vision was also already perfectly recognised by Aquinas, who observed that the Platonic concept of trans-temporal Fall does not take into account the divine plan for man’s salvation, which existed from the very beginning (and not appeared only after the sin of first people) as God chose us before the foundation of the world (cf. Eph 1:4) It is not that there is a new plan B after original sin – it is still the same plan A, albeit with some modifications. For Aquinas, the abandonment of paradise after sin was not a transition to another world, but a modification of the conditions of God’s original plan, which henceforth is implemented ‘differently’, but still for the benefit of man, so that he may attain, albeit in a different way and whilst preserving his freedom, the intended happiness.
For Aquinas, the universe that existed before Adam and Eve is a dynamic scenario of real history that takes place in the spiritual environment and whose traces or consequences affect the world in which humans live (Houck
Such charges against the Christian vision of the original state of nature can be answered on the basis of Aquinas’ theology of life in paradise. This life is described as perfect – as is the entire formation of nature before sin (
Aquinas’ reflections on the original state of nature before the original sin are characterised by the fundamental belief that there is an inequality among creatures, which is the result of the will of God, who acts in the manner of an artist (
The PANE of the world is predicted not on the basis of the nature of beings (which in itself is a good thing, e.g. it is proper for a snake to have venom), but on the basis of utility. For Aquinas, however, this is not the full perspective:
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As far as the relationship between creatures is concerned, it can be seen that evil – from the beginning of nature – indicates that creation as such is not a common good, but is ‘particular and contracted’ (
The world before Adam’s sin was characterised by its perfection, which consisted in the integrity of the universe, and therefore in the wholeness of the parts (
Accordingly, the description of the world before sin refers to its fullness and completeness and having the right things to accomplish its purpose, namely the fullness of happiness at the end of time. The first institution is the fulfilment of nature, and thereby the initiation of grace and glory is causal (the existence of an end is primary, its realisation is secondary). This is why Aquinas emphasises that
To be more precise, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of perfection by referring to the metaphor of a house: one type of perfection concerns living in the house (its definition includes being inhabited) and the other is about possessing the components of the house (buttresses, beauty of the house). In other words, a perfect house is not an ‘empty place’ but a house in which someone lives, that is, a house that lacks nothing because it possesses all the necessary elements. From such a perspective, Aquinas’ statement that the perfection of the universe is ‘the union of the perfection of all individual things’ (De Veritate, q. 2, a. 2 c) is not surprising. Consequently, perfection takes place in this twofold way: when the object is not possessed but perfected.
It is worth emphasising that Aquinas regards the perfection of the universe as relational, that is, he does not recognise it as the epitome of any particular being, but takes into account only place of this being in the whole order. For this reason he states directly that:
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This is because of the assumption, accepted by Aquinas, that a thing occupies the best place for it in the given order (De veritate, q. 5, a. 3 c). Therefore, in
Accordingly, perfection is seen as a specific ‘opportunity’ created in proper relation to the whole, rather than as an abstract entity considered absolutely. It is an argument that appears in
Something about the goodness of the universe would be lacking if nature did not exist, hence the statement in the description of creation that created individuals are ‘good’, while the whole is ‘very good’. Aquinas’ reasoning on this explains that it is better when two things are good rather than just one; the good of nature is greater than the good of the individual; therefore, the multiplicity of individuals of a given nature contributes to the good of the universe because both kinds of entities, permanent and decaying, have good nature both of which are beneficial for the universe (De veritate q. 5, a. 3, ad 3). It is only from this perspective that the understanding of the perfection of the universe, which is related to the multiplicity and diversity of the degrees of goodness of each entity, becomes more accessible, for none can provide the fullness of the first goodness, thus some entities are simple, other complex, some destructible, other indestructible. The lack of variety prevents the good of order, which contributes to perfection – hence the bold comparison by Aquinas:
If every part of the house were the roof, the house would be imperfect and fail of its purpose which is to shelter from rain and disaster. Accordingly, we must conclude that the multitude and diversity of creatures proceeded from one principle, not on account of a necessity imposed by matter, not on account of a limitation in power, not on account of goodness or a necessity imposed by goodness, but from the order of wisdom, in order that the perfection of the universe might be realised in the diversity of creatures. (De potentia, q. 3 a. 16 c.)
According to this logic, the imperfection of created things is a pursuit of the greater good, preferred by God over lesser evil (which for Aquinas is also good – and not evil – in a certain sense), because ‘God loves what is better’ (De veritate, q. 5, a. 5, ad 3). That God allows the existence of the imperfect
At the same time, such approach leads to proper understanding of human salvation, which does not consist in escaping the world (where remaining in the world is understood as a punishment), but – as Aquinas sees it – in profound ordering of man in relation to the purpose of the whole universe (De potentia, q. 6 a. 1, ad 21). At the same time the perfection of the universe is not something that would add any goodness to God (as if his goodness could increase), nor does God’s goodness depend on the perfection of the universe (S.Th., III, q. 1 a. 3, ad 2).
The use of the term ‘order of nature’ (
Aquinas introduces several terms to approximate the understanding of nature through the prism of an ‘ordinary course’ rather than from the point of view of fixed determinism that deprives and excludes freedom (Silva
Accordingly, nature must be viewed in terms of the purpose to which it is directed and as a dynamic. This view does not allow nature to be treated as externally directed by God, who would impose His will despite the creature’s freedom. Rather, God’s action consists in giving created beings the power to act – hence the popular Thomistic metaphor of God as the sun, which makes vision possible but which is not looked at directly. Nature itself gives the power to enact what it is. For this reason, its main characteristic is not being a ‘thing’ distinct from some another kind of being, but the way it evolves, namely out of itself:
Nature is nothing but a certain kind of art, i.e. the divine art, impressed upon things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end. It is as if the shipbuilder were able to give to timbers that by which they would move themselves to take the form of a ship. (In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio lib. 2, cap. 8, lect. 14)
It is clear that nature for Aquinas means a process of self-directing development. It is not a matter of the purchased pieces of furniture ‘assembling themselves’ at home, thanks to the one who follows the plan. Nature is characterised by internal dynamism and creativity (Novo-Pereda-Sanchez, Pereda & Sanchez-Cañizares
Given this perception of nature as
As there is no ontological change after sin, what was the state before it? What was the state of the Fall? The earlier state of man stems from God’s creation of man’s
Man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. (S. Th., I, q. 94 a. 1 c)
Crucial to understanding the state of nature before sin is the realisation that it wasn’t a case of something ceasing to exist after the Fall, but of change in the order and in the relationships between its parts. Sin does not introduce any new phenomena – like earthquakes or other catastrophes – that did not exist in paradise. Aquinas mentions that poisonous animals had poison (if they had not, something in the essence of their being would be missing), but it was not harmful to humans because of the
Michael Foster argued that the view of nature as an established order created the conditions for the emergence of modern science (Foster
Aquinas’ reflections on nature – in its state at the beginning of its existence – can be summarised in three statements:
For Aquinas nature is a system (
The primal perfection of nature, before the Fall, is not absolute, but open to fullness. The purpose of human life does not change after sin (access to heaven remains), but the procedure of obtaining it varies because the original
In contrast to the later Scotism (Verdia
Is it worthwhile for God to take care of nature, which has been thrown into turmoil by sin? Aquinas’ reflections suggest that God respects nature: it is not a matter of controlling nature after the Fall, but of ‘healing’ it. If this is naturalism, it is very theological and leads to the discovery of something more profound in the nature itself.
The author would like to acknowledge Dorota Adamiec for language editing.
The author declares that he has no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced him in writing this article.
P.R. is the sole author of this article.
This article followed all ethical standards for research without direct contact with human or animal subjects.
National Science Centre, Poland, No. 2019/35/B/HS1/00305.
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analysed in this study.
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