A comparison on Wang Yangming’s xin [heart-mind] and Husserl’s ego

ego (a Western idea) illustrates that people should adopt a new approach to science, which takes knowledge and morality as a unity, and follow the highest heavenly principles. This is a serious theological and philosophical response to teleology.


Introduction
is the most influential figure in Neo-Confucianism, as he established a new school of Confucianism called Study of xin [heart-mind]. His Study of heart-mind had thousands of followers in his lifetime and countless ones after. However, because of the difficulties in practicing his zhi xing he yi [unity of knowing and doing], most of his followers are learning his doctrine as knowing yet are not doing by their liangzhi [innate moral conscience]. In this regard, Wang Yangming could be seen as quite isolated.
A similar isolated philosopher is Edmund Husserl (1859Husserl ( -1938, the founder of phenomenology. Since 1901, when Husserl formally inaugurated phenomenology for the first time in his Logische Untersuchungen, phenomenology as a philosophical movement has been evolving for more than 100 years. But similar to the case with Wang, Husserl does not have true followers among his countless readers, and he is thus a leader without followers. Almost all his colleagues, disciples and late-comers do not follow his original methodology, but struck their own independent paths (see Moran 2000:1-3).
Although Wang and Husserl are both isolated masters, we will compare them not because of this but rather because of their shared approach of subjectivity in developing their systems. We will discover that these two teachers could find their best friend and supporter in each other across vast temporal, spacial and cultural differences. In this essay, the author compares Wang's xin [heart-mind] with Husserl's ego and illustrate that the two ideas are essentially the same thing, though with different perspectives. And then the author will analyse their contextual discrepancies in teleology. At the end, the author will propose a unity of the two doctrines to benefit the extension of human knowledge.
approach. This is deemed by a Chinese Scholar, Yun (2022:173-180), as an intent to modify Wang's study through phenomenology. Yun does research on Kern's book and illustrates liangzhi as substance and argues the feasibility to transform Wang's study to phenomenology. Li Youzheng, a Chinese scholar who did the most of the Chinese translations of Husserl's works, has shed some light on the complementary potential of the two studies too. Li calls Husserl's studies and Wang Yangming's studies as 'xin studies', because he thinks 'they both directly and indirectly pay attention to the existence, demarcation and application of subjective domains in a completely different way' (Li 2013:9-24). But Li does not illustrate the details of his reasoning. All the researches have hinted that Wang's Study of xin and Husserl's phenomenology do have close connections, and there are potentials of enriching each other. But no one has made such a bold discovery that ego and xin are the same thing as the author intends to do.
The discovering of the sameness of ego and xin makes great sense both for Husserl's phenomenology and Wang's Study of xin. On the one hand, Wang's approach of enhancing xin will provide a way to increase the capability of the ego to which Husserl does not give a method. Husserl has illustrated that the ego can tell the truth of objects, but because the capability of the ego is insufficient, it must be necessary to increase the capability of the ego. Wang tells us xin's capability can be increased by gewu [rectify deed in line with heavenly principles], thus provides a way to phenomenology to increase the capability of the ego. On the other hand, if xin and ego are the same, xin will be able to discover the truth of objects, which Wang has not done very much. The complementary effect of phenomenology and Study of xin, one from the West and one from the East, will help to extend human knowledge together.

Wang Yangming's xin [heart-mind]
As suggested by its name, Study of heart-mind, Wang's doctrine is centred on the idea of xin, which literally means heart, but much more than that. In ancient Chinese, xin was taken as an organ constituted by soil, which is one central element of wuxing [the five elements or energies that constitute everything] (see Xu 2014:285). And the faculty of heart is to think. Thus, it may denote mind, thinking, intention or consciousness (see Wang & Cen 2016:455).
Wang Yangming seems to be a monist when he constructs his study. In his Questions and Answers on Great Learning, a thematic essay of Study of heart-mind, Wang Yangming makes clear that humanity as the core of man has determined the people and heaven, earth and all things are united (see Wang 2012b:70). He takes xin and shen [body] as a unity as well. In the same book, he describes heart and body in this way: 'What is body? The body of heart that operates and functions is. What is heart, the intelligent, bright (灵明 ) ruler of body is' (Wang 2012b:73). Wang Yangming takes heart as containing everything -the principles of heaven, things, gods and ghosts. He asserts, 'there are no principles outside xin, and there are no things outside xin' (Wang 2012a:89). In summary, Wang Yangming's xin is a unity that contains everything that is thus inside xin.
So far, Wang Yangming's idea of heart is still quite obscure; we only know it is a unity with body and everything and rules the latter. To learn more about it, we have to explore its structure and how it rules.
Xin has substance and functions. Liangzhi, the innate knowledge of moral nature or the knowledge of conscience, is its substance. Liangzhi is a central concept of Yangming's Study of heart-mind. He told his student Shouyi in a letter: 'Recently I realized extending liangzhi is the true treasure of sagehood, which is so self-sufficient that with it at hand, you will never get lost'. Wang Yangming believes that liangzhi is a priori. All are born with liangzhi; even a thief or a thug has liangzhi (see Wang 2012a:171). 'Liangzhi is just the heart of knowing right or wrong, knowing right or wrong leads to like or dislike' (Wang 2012a:190).
As to the functions of xin, xin can be applied in treating father, king, friends and governing the citizens. And it will manifest as filial-piety, loyalty, honesty and benevolence, respectively (see Wang 2012a:76) . In fact, xin can be applied to everything, including hearing, seeing, talking and action.
Here we need to note that everything mainly means doing something rather than things themselves. Wang says, 'wherever your consciousness is directed toward is a thing' (Wang 2012a:79). Now we can try to construct the structure of Wang Yangming's xin: a unity consists of body, heaven, earth, things, deeds, gods, ghosts and everything that one can see, hear, talk, move, think and imaging. Whatever one does, thinks or discusses are all inside xin. It is impossible to find any truth or principles external to xin. In this approach, Wang turns his eyes from the outside world to the inner world, thus makes his approach subjective. The inner world is not a concrete one, but a world of ideas. The core of the unity is liangzhi, or highest good, which is a priori and given by birth.
Liangzhi is capable of telling what is right or wrong, distinguishing between bad and good, through evidenz. When xin moves or is moved, intention or consciousness will arise. Some of the intentions are right, some are wrong; some are good, some are bad. Liangzhi can choose right and good rather than wrong and bad. This establishes moral principles for living 'a good life'.
As liangzhi is a priori, and it can choose right and good, why are some people more righteous than others? And why people choose the wrong and bad from time to time? Wang Yangming affirms that in quality, everyone's liangzhi is the same, either for common people or sages. But liangzhi has been covered by dust and dirt from birth, and the cover gets even dirtier and thicker along the way of living via misconduct of themselves or influence of others. Liangzhi is like a mirror. A sage's liangzhi is clean and clear, 'whose mirror may reflect everything as it is' (Wang 2012a:86). By practicing gewu, one can restore liangzhi to it clarity and cleanness. Gewu means to rectify deed in line with heavenly principles. For example, when we see a kid climbing on to the verge of a well, liangzhi will tell us to stop him immediately or he may fall into the well. This is the heavenly principle in a specific deed. So, we follow liangzhi's command, and thus we process this deed with principles of heaven, completing gewu over this deed. Whenever we can achieve gewu successfully, liangzhi will get clearer and cleaner, thus stronger. However, disobeying liangzhi will lead to a thicker cover that makes liangzhi weaker. Is it possible that liangzhi is fully covered to the extent that it cannot function? Wang's answer is 'no'. There will always be some crack on the cover. And liangzhi will penetrate the crack at certain time naturally, like when one wakes up at mid-night and finds his xin is quite clear. The state is called yeqi, the pneuma of night. At the moment, one should grab the opportunity and extend his liangzhi immediately. Gewu will extend liangzhi gradually and continuously. Finally, liangzhi will be strong enough to command every action and thought. Heart will reach the state of transparency, evidenz and happiness.

Husserl's ego
Husserl uses his concept of 'ego' to describe the intuitive experience 'I as man'. Husserl defines the ego as having transcendent self-consciousness. By 'transcendent' Husserl refers to anything that we experience as having more to it than is given in a finite amount of experience (things that are experienced through perspectives and thoughts) (see Miller 1986:534-549). In Husserl's phenomenological intuition, the ego is discovered from inner perception or 'introspection' of the unbroken flux of consciousness, which is a unity of sensations, perceptions, remembering, feelings, affects, et cetera. In the unitary flow, there are further unities that Husserl uses strata to describe, though they are not really in layers but interwoven together. Among these unities are the unity of pure (transcendental) ego and empirical ego (see Husserl 1993:98). But the pure ego and the empirical ego are not two egos. The ego in the process of cogito is the empirical ego, and the self without cogito is the pure ego.
By further investigating the direction of the empirical ego, the ego is discovered and it takes everything as its belongings, including the lived experiences, the phantasies and bodily qualities. The ego: [N]ot only ascribes to itself its lived experiences as its psychic states and likewise ascribes to itself its cognition, its properties of character, and similar permanent qualities manifest in its lived experiences, but which also designates its Bodily qualities as its ' own' and thereby assigns them to the sphere of the ego. (Husserl 1993:99) The ego consists of body and soul, but the two are closely entwined. The mind is superior to the body. According to Husserl (1993:99), 'It can therefore be said: I am not my body, but I have my body. I am not a soul, but I have a soul'. 'if there is no soul, the body is dead matter, meaningless matter'. Conversely, the mind needs to be experienced through activation of the body. And consciousness is not simply the annexes of bodies either. They are all connected together internally.
So far, we can discover the structure of Husserl's ego. First of all, the ego is a unity, and it is found in the unity of consciousness flow. The whole picture is the ego that ascribes everything to itself and that is references 'I as man'. Below the concept ego, there are the empirical ego and the pure ego. The pure ego is nothing but 'I myself'. And the empirical ego is cogito, or 'I think', which consists of all psychic experience. All these are discovered through retrospection, from a subjective point of view. The ego is transcendent, but the transcendence comes from the pure ego through the empirical ego. There are no clear borders between the egos, for they are unitary, one ego. But the part that can transcend most is the pure ego, because it is nothing but itself. This begs the question of the functions of the pure ego.
Husserl thinks that the pure ego has pure functions. It: [E]xercises its pure 'functions' in the acts of the multi-formed cogito, discrete ones or ones connected by this cogito, and to that extent we could call the acts themselves, by transferring over the sense of the word, functions. (Husserl 1993:105) In another word, the acts of cogito are functions of the pure ego. But it is clear that cogito is not the pure ego itself. The pure ego functions in cogito and connects the objects through it. Husserl (1993:109) says, 'Each and every cogito, along with all its constituents, arises or vanishes in the flux of lived experiences. But the pure subject does not arise or vanish'. The transcendent ego functions, by transcending itself to both the world and subjectivity. The transcendent ego enters the rational space to perform categorical acts and reveal the truth and the identity of the object. The process of disclosure is not limited by the subject of 'I'. It can reveal what 'I' didn't know. At the same time, the pure ego is transcendental, independent of any experience, and a priori.
When performing its functions, the pure ego does have its freedom. Whenever I direct to the object, a ray will shoot from the pure ego to it, and meanwhile, a back ray will come back to the pure ego. I will be influenced by the back ray nevertheless by either following the emotion aroused or oppressing it, which result in active or passive actions of the ego.
As to the question of the mutability of the pure ego, Husserl's view seems to have changed. At first, Husserl believed that the transcendental ego was immutable and remained the same in the process of experience. But finally in his Cartesian Mediations, Husserl (1960) writes clearly: [B]ut it is to be noted that this centering ego is not an empty pole of identity, any more than any object is such. Rather, according to a law of 'transcendental generation' with every act emanating from him and having a new objective sense, he acquires a new abiding property. (p. 66) The transcendental ego is not the static and existing centre of all conscious activities, but the generated subjectivity. Pure self is a continuous totality in my conscious life. In the continuous process, any behaviours and propositions taken by the pure ego will be accumulated as 'habits'. A Chinese scholar, Wang Jiatang (Wang 1995:116), discovers that as Husserl introduces the concept of 'generation' into the study of transcendental subjectivity and establishes the phenomenology of occurrence, the transcendental ego is subject to the law of universal generation, and the concrete subjective process not only constructs its object but also constitutes the unity of the universal generation of the self. The ego constructs itself in a kind of 'historical' unity. With the pure ego as an identical pole, along with the multiplicity of its intentional life, objects meant, and that constituted as existent for it, the monad ego takes form. Through phenomenological reduction, the pure ego may discover the descriptively formulable, intentionally explicatable types, and the monad itself. So, in Husserl's model, the monad ego contains everything that pertains to the author. The pure ego is to discover types through the monad.

Wang Yangming's xin and Husserl's ego
The author has discussed Wang Yangming's xin and Husserl's ego in the above sections, the concepts, their structures, and how they manifest in human Weltanschauung, emotions, intellect and perceptions of the world. Now the author will make a comparison between them. At first, the author will compare two sets of concepts, Wang's xin versus Husserl's ego, and Wang's liangzhi versus Husserl's pure ego, because the author believes there are many similarities (or each pair is the same thing). At the same time, the author will point to the differences in the two sets. Finally, the author will point out the general differences between Wang and Husserl.

Xin versus the ego
Wang takes xin and shen [body] as a unity. Husserl believes that the ego consists of body and soul, but the two are closely entwined. On the unity of shen [body] and xin [psyche], the two thinkers strike an agreement. They even use similar ways to illustrate the unity. Husserl explains that if there is no soul, the body is dead matter, meaningless matter. Conversely, the mind must be experienced through the activation of the body. While Wang (2012a) points out: Ears, eyes, mouth and limbs are the body. Without xin how could it see, hear, talk and move? But these actions are impossible without ears, eyes, mouth and limbs, too. Thus, without heart there is no body, and without body there is no heart. (p. 168) Both Wang and Husserl consider the soul has superiority over the body. Wang refers the body as that to fill, and the soul as that to rule. And mingling(xin) extends all over the space. 'My mingling is the ruler of heaven, earth, gods and ghosts', Wang (2012a:205) denotes. Husserl (1993:100) asserts, 'it is easy to see that the psychic has a priority and that it is what determines the concept of the ego essentially'. In other words, the soul determines 'life essence'.
Wang's xin contains everything while Husserl's ego ascribes everything to itself. Wang Yangming believes that outside xin, there is nothing. In his dialogues with his disciples, he (Wang 2012a:89, 206) reiterates it: 'There is no principles outside xin, and there is nothing outside xin'. 'There are no principles outside xin, and no deeds either'. 'For a dead person, when his xin has dissolved, where are his heaven, earth, gods, ghosts and things?' Husserl, on the other hand, affirms that the ego designates everything experienced to its sphere. As he (Husserl 1993) denotes, the ego: [N]ot only ascribes to itself its lived experiences as its psychic states and likewise ascribes to itself its cognition, its properties of character, and similar permanent qualities manifest in its lived experiences, but which also designates its bodily qualities as its ' own' and thereby assigns them to the sphere of the ego. (p. 99) In his later analysis, when he uses monad to describe the ego, it is more obvious that the ego does contain everything.
Wang's xin and Husserl's ego have the above similarities. We can draw a bold conclusion that the two concepts refer to the same thing. The author believes there are some discrepancies in the meanings on the subtle level, like in many words from different languages. This the author finds naturally forms concepts from different cultures and backgrounds. But they believe that people have much more similarities than differences in their way of thinking. Thus, the author will assume that Wang's xin and Husserl's ego are essentially the same 'thing', even though they use different terms.

Wang's liangzhi and Husserl's pure ego
At the core of the two masters' concepts are liangzhi and the pure ego. The author believes the two concepts also share great similarities, and that they are fundamentally the same thing. However, Wang and Husserl focus on their different functions, which may weaken the author's argument, but it still leaves some room for a potential complementary development of the two studies.
In Wang's and Husserl's studies, both liangzhi and the pure ego are a priori. Wang asserts that everybody is born with liangzhi. Wang analogises liangzhi to a mirror. When one is born, she or he is born with a clean and clear mirror. After birth, the mirror will get covered in dust because of bad experiences and influences from others along the way of living. Husserl describes the a priori from a different facet. He takes the constitution of ego itself as a priori. Husserl (1960)

points out:
There resulted the all-embracing unity of the essential form belonging to the total constitution accomplished in my own ego the constitution as whose correlate the objectively existing world, for me and for any ego whatever, is continually given before-hand, and goes on being shaped in its sense-strata, with a correlative a priori form-style. And this constitution is itself an a priori. (p. 137) As xin and the pure ego are all a priori, they are all transcendent. The transcendent ego can transcend itself to both the world and subjectivity. The process of transcendence is not limited by the subject of 'I'. It can reveal what 'I' didn't know. Liangzhi is like a mirror, and although it is empty it can reflect and reveal everything it encounters. Both liangzhi and the pure ego have intentionality. Wang affirms that there is no intention that is not about something and Husserl agrees. When performing the intentionality, both xin and the pure ego have their freedom. Wang thinks liangzhi can disregard any theory or teachings from books or other sages and decide by itself. Husserl asserts that when the back ray comes to the ego-pole, the pure ego may choose to respond, react or neglect it by choice.
But there are quite obvious differences between liangzhi and the pure ego, which lie in their functions. Wang's xin is to distinguish right from wrong and do the right. And Husserl's pure ego is to reveal the truth of the thing or the eidos of the thing. Liangzhi's focus is on practicing, while the pure ego on cognition. But they are still the same thing. As at the beginning of Confucianism, gewu has the meaning of revealing the truth of everything. Another famous Confucian scholar, Zhu Xi espouses this idea. Though Wang Yangming disagrees with this idea and derives from it to his own xin study, he examined Zhu's studies in his later life and announced that there are no conflicts between Zhu and himself. Husserl confesses that the pure ego also develops. In the process of interacting with other people and things in the world, one gradually unearths virtue and makes it one's knowledge, even one's trait. Here an important point emerges: Xin and the pure ego are basically the same thing but are used on different foci by Wang and Husserl. The potential for complementing the two masters' studies lies in this point, which the author will discuss in the last section of this essay.

The general differences between Wang Yangming and Husserl
There are many differences between Wang and Husserl, including their nationalities, living times, positions in society and roles. But these differences do not determine their discrepancies in philosophy so much as their teleology. The distinction in their teleology means they take different positions on the meaning of life and philosophical views.
In the Chinese traditional philosophy, the heavenly principle is the highest theme, and becoming a sage is the ultimate pursuit of being a person. Wang adopts the theme and creates the Study of xin. A sage means a perfect person who possesses the supreme good and moral compass. The only way to become a sage is to extend liangzhi to every deed through gewu. It is impossible to achieve by being a hermit away from the world. Thus, Wang's study is primarily about doing the right thing and becoming a sage.
For Husserl, the goal of his life was to become a true philosopher. Being a philosopher is a path to discover the truth. In 1911, in a letter to his student Arnold Metzger about his early years, Husserl wrote: Indeed the powerful effect of the New Testament on a 23-year old gave rise to an impetus to discover the way to God and to a true life through a rigorous philosophical inquiry. (Moran 2000:68) Husserl wanted to discover the way to God and a true life, and his approach was rigorous philosophical inquiry. In his most works, Husserl devotes himself in discovering truth. He explores the mystery of subjectivity to reveal the truth and eidos of the object. In his The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, one of the later works in his life, Husserl reiterates the mission of a true philosopher as the universal science of the world, the ultimate knowledge and the totality of truth itself (see Husserl 2001:330).
Because of the discrepancy in their teleology, Wang and Husserl formed their general differences. Based on the same discovery of xin and ego, they developed distinguishable studies. One is on epistemology and another on practice. But may the two studies develop towards each other or overlap in some important ways? Can they be reconciled and be complementary? If they can, what sense does it make?

The complementary potential of Husserl's phenomenology and Wang's Study of xin
Husserl and Wang discovered the same mysteries of subjectivity, though in different ways, with Husserl exploring the truths of the world, and Wang becoming a sage. What they found are the ego, xin, the pure ego and liangzhi. The core is the pure ego and liangzhi. The pure ego may transcend itself to acquire the truths of the object. And liangzhi may tell and direct the subject what to do or not to do. Each does these through intuition and evidenz. It is so obvious that the pure ego and xin may extent the other way. The pure ego may extend the sphere of doing things, while liangzhi may extend to that of knowing things.
As noted above, some scholars have suggested the complementary potential of the two studies. For example, Li compared the reductionism of the two studies, aiming to draw ethical connections between them. This is one way of extending from Wang to Husserl. Yun proposed to modify Wang's Study of xin according to phenomenology.
To most people, Husserl's study is philosophy of rigorous science. This is true as most of works of Husserl are about discovering truth though phenomenology. But many manuscripts after Idea II have revealed that Husserl does extensive research on practice and value (see Zeng 2016:74-83), though these research efforts are not comprehensive and systemic. In a manuscript in the mid-1920s, Husserl claims that each person has an individual ethical idea. The person's value accepts the meaning of the person's personality from the deep and individual love, there is no choice, no difference in 'quantity', no difference in importance. These individual values are absolute 'commands' -'they bind me as I am' (see Mailer& Fang 2002:42-51). From this statement, an accord with Wang Yangming can be inferred, that is, as the personal values are absolute commands, are they something relative to liangzhi?
How about Wang Yangming's xin, or liangzhi? Can it be applied to discover truth in and/or of objects? The answer is also yes. As discussed above, Wang Yangming's gewu is quite different from that of Zhu Xi. Wang also applies liangzhi on discovering the truth of the object. Once he discussed using a pipe with ashes inside to sense the season change recorded in a famous ancient book. He told his disciple Tang Xu, it is not the pipe that can tell the accurate time change, but the heart. It is clear Wang uses liangzhi to discover truth too.

Conclusion
As a conclusion, both Wang and Husserl, and some other scholars, support the idea of using liangzhi or the pure ego another way. Studies on the object and practice can all be based on liangzhi or the pure ego. Though studies are divided into different disciplines, the primary discoveries can all come from intuition. All knowledge can be traced back to liangzhi or the pure ego. Making Wang's Study of xin and Husserl's phenomenology mutual complementary will bring about a new approach to science, which will result in the unity of knowledge and morality. In this approach, a researcher will do the right research and discover the truth at the same time. As stated by Li (2013:9-24), 'scientific studies cannot necessarily guarantee virtue, on the contrary, virtue may improve scientific studies'.