לבה לכה in Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 12:8 – Descriptive metaphysics of properties as comparative-philosophical supplement

In this article, a supplementary yet original contribution is made to the ongoing attempts at refining ways of comparative-philosophical conceptual clarification of Qohelet’s claim that לבה לכה in 1:2 (and 12:8). Adopting and adapting the latest analytic metaphysical concerns and categories for descriptive purposes only, a distinction is made between לבה as property of לכה and the properties of לבה in relation to לכה . Involving both correlation and contrast, the second-order language framework is hereby extended to a level of advanced nuance and specificity for restating the meaning of the book’s first-order language on its own terms, even if not in them. Contribution: By considering logical, ontological, mereological and typological aspects of property theory in dialogue with appearances of לכה and of לבה in Ecclesiastes 1:2 and 12:8 and in-between, a new way is presented in the quest to explain why things in the world of the text are the way they are, or why they are at all.


Introduction
One of the fundamental associated comparative-philosophical foci in research on ‫הבל‬ in Qohelet is its appearance as ‫הבל‬ ‫הכל‬ to form and inclusion to the book as a whole (1:2 and 12:8) with the traditional archaic English rendering as most readers have come to know it: Most of the research concerned with these verses is primarily focussed on the word ‫הבל‬ as first-order term of art and second-order essentially contested concept (Fox 2019:559-563;Sneed 2017:879-894;Weeks 2020:248-260;cf. Mokoena 2019 andclassically Fox 1986:409-427). The word ‫הכל‬ takes second place and might have been ignored, were it not quantifying ‫הבל‬ in 1:2 and 12:8 and therefore part of what has been variously called the book's 'motto ', 'thesis', 'challenge', 'theme', amongst others (cf. Crenshaw 2009:47 and recently Weeks 2020:248 for an overview; Anderson 1998:289-300 for a neglected voice of reason). The major concern here is how Qohelet related ‫הבל‬ to ‫,הכל‬ a problem was succinctly formulated by Lohfink (1989:201-216) in a highly influential related publication entitled: Koh 1, 2 'alles ist Windhauch' -universale oder anthropologische Aussage?: Koh l,2, der erste Satz des Buches, Motto und Rahmenvers zugleich, ist subtil gebaut. Zunächst liegt die ganze Emphase auf dem Prädikat. Also auf hcebce/. Der Leser merkt, daß es darauf ankommt: Alles ist nicht etwa schön, wertvoll, bleibend, ewigkeitsträchtig oder wie immer, es ist 'Windhauch'. Doch mitten im Satz wird die Emphase verlagert. Das noch nicht genannte Subjekt der hbl/-Aussage wird unverhältnismäßig zurückgehalten. Dadurch steigt die Spannung darauf. Wenn es dann endlich kommt, steht es nicht in Normalposition, hinter dem Prädikat, sondern durch einen Neuansatz des ganzen wird ihm ermöglicht, an der Tonstelle, vor dem Prädikat, zu stehen. Das bedeutet, daß der Satz in einem gewissermaßen noch eine zweite Aussage enthält. Nicht nur die, daß die Wertung 'Windhauch' gilt, sondern dazu, daß sie nicht von diesem oder jenem gemacht werden muß, sondern von hakkol. Also von einem universal zu fassenden Subjektbereich. (p. 201) 1.The Hebrew and English translation in this article represent a selective adaptation and at times modernisation of the online resource Mechon Mamre (2016). Some of the anachronistic punctuation marks have been removed (commas in the Hebrew The way Lohfink sought to make sense of how ‫הכל‬ was understood in relation to ‫הבל‬ includes not only linguistic considerations but restatement of what Qohelet was up to in descriptive metaphysical terms. This was part of the reason for this article's interest, namely the comparative-philosophical nuance it was able to add to the ongoing discussion of how Qohelet's words ‫הבל'‬ ‫'הכל‬ might be correlated or contradicted to an old pre-Socratic quest in new post-Aristotelian form (cf. Müller 2003:67-80;cf. von Loewenclau 1986:327-338 and earlier through influential studies like those of Braun 1973, Ranston [1925 and Palm [1885] amongst others). To be sure, in contemporary discussions of the doxography of ancient Greek philosophy and in research on 'pre-Socratic' philosophers, Lohfink's historically uncritical link with anecdotal secondary sources' references to the saying of the Cynic Monimos (and the presumption of verbal equivalence entailing semantic identity) will appear controversial (cf. Curd 2020; Mansfeld 2020:n.p. and as repeated in Crenshaw 2009:41-62). In the end, Lohfink (1989)  This classic reading and its formulation of the problem of what Qohelet meant by ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ in 1:2 and 12:8 (and elsewhere) is still the accepted frame of reference for the related research problems (see Weeks 2020:248-260;cf. Bartholomew 2009;Crenshaw 1987;Fox 1989Fox , 1999Köhlmoos 2015;Krüger 2001:184-195;Krüger 2000;Idem 2000;Lohfink 2003Lohfink , 2009Longman 1998;Murphy 1992;Schellenberg 2013;Schoors 2013;Schwienhorst-Schönberger 2004;Seow 1997 et al.). As for the mode of description in the literature as to how Qohelet is thought to relate ‫הבל‬ to ‫,הכל‬ the philosophical flavour of the book of Ecclesiastes as it is known in English and the popular dating of the text to the Persian or Hellenistic periods have made comparative-philosophical perspectives on the text comparably less controversial than they would be when applied to other biblical modes of discourse. Not surprisingly then, existing comparativephilosophical readings include correlating and contrasting Qohelet with not only Western but also Eastern counterparts (see, e.g. Heard 1996:65-93;Lorgunpai 1994:155-162;Sekine 1991:3-54; for a more extensive overview of the associated research, see Gericke 2015a:1-7) for a more complete list of related research).
The present study's original contribution to the related comparative-philosophical research is motivated by Lohfink's seminal findings. A supplement to existing perspectives will be offered in light of new comparativephilosophical concepts, concerns and categories that have been doing the rounds (cf. Littlejohn 2021:n.p.) More specifically, the discussion to follow will investigate the pros and cons of a new way of restating what is involved when Qohelet used the words ‫הבל‬ ‫הכל‬ by way of an experimental adoption and adaptation of the language of 'properties' in analytic metaphysics (cf. Allen 2021:n.p.). This choice of the particular domain of second-order discourse is motivated, on the one hand, by the already accepted use of certain secondorder terms indicated here (e.g. the relatively unproblematic tendency to refer to ‫הבל‬ and ‫הכל‬ as 'concepts' in a more or less technical sense in conjunction with linguistic cum philosophical jargon that include speaking of the concepts in connection with their relation to other theoretical entities, for example, ‫הבל‬ as 'predicate', 'attribute', 'feature', 'quality', 'characteristic' of ‫.)הכל‬ On the other hand, the metaphysical assumptions, as opposed to epistemological and ethical ones in Qohelet, remain under-represented in the research (see Gericke 2015b:n.p.) The theoretical argument of the study states that a fruitful distinction can be made between ‫הבל‬ as property (of ‫)הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ (in relation to ‫.)הכל‬ The discussion to follow will operate mostly on the level of illustrated theory. Given the limited application value of opting for any particular interpretation of ‫הכל‬ and‫,הבל‬ these terms will be left untranslated. When a specific interpretation is nevertheless presupposed or implied, it is used only as part of the hypothetical examples and as such does not imply committing to or being dependent on the associated meanings of ‫הבל‬ and ‫הכל‬ therein.
It is, however, not assumed that all perspectives in the related research and all possible translations of ‫הבל‬ and ‫הכל‬ are equally valid. In addition, the involvement of property theory as it has taken shape within analytic philosophy is motivated by comparative-philosophical interests and not by an assumption that the associated presuppositions, problems and perspectives represent a perennial philosophical idiom. Although not usually treated in the same idiom in 'Continental' and other thinkers, as one recent commentator observed: All the pros and cons associated therewith are readily granted and the present discussion is limited to conceptual clarification in the service of historically oriented exegesis, being neither dependent on the assumption that Qohelet is a (better) philosophical text (or not) or philosophically important (or not) (cf. Littlejohn 2021).

‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬
In related research, ‫הבל‬ is assumed to be property (of ‫)הכל‬ and there are assumed to be properties of ‫הבל‬ (in relation to ‫.)הכל‬ This much is implicit whenever their grammatical relation is defined in terms of predicates. The latter linguistic terminology has a history in philosophy and overlaps with philosophical senses of the term 'property'. Of course, some philosophers would argue that ‫הבל‬ as a predicate should contrast with simple nouns such as ‫.הכל‬ Following Frege, nominalised predicates such as ‫הבל‬ came to stand for a 'concept', whilst observing that the associated ontological distinction is motivated by the fact that Qohelet's Hebrew does not, aside from its quasi-appearance as such in 1:2a as ‫הבלים‬ ‫,הבל‬ allow for the use of the predicate ‫הכל‬ in a subject position (for a more in-depth discussion and one to which this study is indebted, see Allen 2021) Second-order nominalisation of the predicate in descriptions of Qohelet as saying ‫הכל‬ 'is ‫'הבל‬ is then taken as implying that ‫הבל‬ is somehow also assumed to be something approximating what in philosophical terms is called a property (of ‫.)הכל‬ This inference is further corroborated by the generally accepted use of singular terms in the literature, for example, 'being ‫'הבל‬ or 'vanity' and in Qohelet's use of demonstratives, for example, 'this too is ‫'הבל‬ (cf. Heal 1997).
Once ‫הבל‬ is seen as (also) a property (of ‫)הכל‬ and as such distinguished from the properties of ‫הבל‬ (in relation to ‫,)הכל‬ in comparative-philosophical terms it follows that in the world of the text certain objects (in the broad metaphysical sense) can be said to instantiate or exemplify ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫.הכל‬ In different related terminology, ‫הכל‬ is assumed to possess, bear or have ‫הבל‬ as a property so that, inversely, ‫הבל‬ characterises or inheres in ‫.הכל‬ In this sense, ‫הבל‬ is assumed to be a property (of ‫)הכל‬ and there are assumed to be properties of ‫הבל‬ (in relation to ‫)הכל‬ in the ontological assumptions in the world of the text to investigate, irrespective of our choice of associated vocabulary or whether ‫הבל‬ was in fact assumed to be part of one or more than one kind of instantiation or exemplification (see, e.g. Lowe 2006:77).
There appears to be a general agreement in the literature that ‫-הבל‬exemplifying states of affairs obtaining within relations in the world of the text involve just one kind of exemplification, applying indifferently to different categories of ‫-הבל‬bearing entities in ‫.הבל‬ This monist view may indeed be considered the default one as condition of possibility for the meaningfulness of the generalisation in Qohelet in 1:2 and 12:8. Even so, different theories of conceptual structure already in place can be supplemented with additional nuance and specificity by distinguishing ‫הבל‬ as a property (of ‫)הכל‬ as particular from it as a relation or state of affairs exemplified. Alternatively, a pluralist ontology in our categorial distinctions means the instantiation of ‫הבל‬ as property (of ‫)הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ (in relation to ‫)הכל‬ in Qohelet can be treated as different sorts of objects, namely kinds (substantial universals), attributes and modes (tropes) (see Lowe 2006).
In comparative-philosophical counterpart terms, ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ is often located in ‫ָה'‬ ‫ֲׂש‬ ‫ַע‬ ּ ַ ‫ַּמ‬ ‫ׁה‬ ‫ָת‬ ׁ ‫ֲּש‬ ‫ַע‬ ‫ּׂנ‬ ָ ׁ ‫ּש‬ ‫ַת‬ ‫ח‬ ‫ּתַ‬ ‫ֶׁש‬ ‫ָמ‬ ׁ ‫ַּש‬ ‫.'ה‬ This is further evidenced in the different number of ways in which the word ‫כל‬ is grammatically and semantically used and configured in relation to ‫הבל‬ elsewhere in Qohelet: As has already been noted in the research but not restated in these terms, the use of the word ‫כל‬ in Qohelet is not limited to the sense and reference it has in 1:2 and 12:8 in relation to ‫.הבל‬ Interestingly, appearing only in 8 out of 222 instances, after1:2 and 12:8 have been excluded, ‫כל‬ appears at least twice in four of the six verses (2:11; 3:19; 9:1 [3x]; 11:9). It only features once in 2:17 and 8:9. In 10 of these 13 appearances in the book's total of 15, only 4 instances connect it directly to ‫הבל‬ as property in ways related to 1:2 and 12:8 (2:11; 2:17; 3:19 and 11:9). In only three of these does it appear as ‫הכל‬ (11:9 only has ‫.)כל‬ Of these four, two have ‫הבל‬ as property, not of any metaphysical particular but of Qohelet's 'agency' (and that related to him). An alternative philosophical term for what is present in the particular states of affairs would be 'events' ‫ׁש(‬ ֶ ‫מ‬ ָ ׁ ‫ַּש‬ ‫ה‬ ‫ַת‬ ‫ח‬ ‫ּתַ‬ ‫ה‬ ָ ‫ֲׂש‬ ‫ַע‬ ‫ּנ‬ ֶ ‫ׁש‬ ‫ה‬ ֶ ‫ֲׂש‬ ‫ע‬ ַ ‫ַּמ‬ ‫ה‬ 2:11, 17). The other two simply refer to ‫הבל‬ as property, once undefined as ‫הכל‬ in the context of the mortality of living things (3:19) and the other as exemplified undefined in what is to come (11:9).
In the four texts observed, the property is lost in translation in the sense of being temporally located as being exemplified specifically (also) in the present twice (2:11 and 3:19), in the past (2:17) and in the future (11:9). Spatially all are either explicitly or implicitly ‫ׁש‬ ֶ ‫מ‬ ָ ׁ ‫ַּש‬ ‫ה‬ ‫ַת‬ ‫ח‬ ‫ּתַ‬ 'under the sun' (3:19; 9:1; 11:9 lacking the phrase in the verse but featuring it in the surrounding pericope). The other uses of ‫כל‬ with or without prepositions are as indicative of both every particular subject and object in the domain of discourse (2:11 x 1; 8:9 x1; 9:1 x2) and is extended in use to refer to all being of one 'air, breath' (3:19) and all of the 'days' and 'all this' ‫ֶה(‬ ‫ָל-ז‬ ‫ת-ּכ‬ ֶ ‫א‬ 8:9 x 2 and 9:1 x 1) that Qohelet has seen, thought of and sought (thus links to as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ only implicitly).
In the light of these observations, it would seem that interpreting ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ in 1:2 and 12:8 and in explicit references to ‫הכל‬ or ‫כל‬ quantified over one state of affairs or another is both unified and diverse. Although Qohelet is of course focussed on the human condition, the anthropological domain is supervened on by cosmological spatio-temporal mereological part-whole relations for ‫.הבל‬ Here a problem arises for an analytic metaphysical or ontological restatement operating in tandem with the comparative-philosophical counterpart for ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫,הבל‬ that is, the predication of ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ are not univocal. This makes formal-logical specificity in analysis seeking to clarify the identity and existence conditions and mereological nuances in the nature of the relation between ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ impossible. That being granted, as Qohelet uses ‫הבל‬ in a metaphorical sense and ‫הכל‬ rarely quantifies over a universal state of affairs, analogical predication and a fictional ontology, perhaps a neo-Meinongian framework able to operate with two modes of predication ('external' and 'internal') is better suited to comparative philosophical restatement (cf. Allen 2021:n.p.).
The above-mentioned alternative approach combined with an exemplar (as opposed to classical or prototype) theory of conceptual structure when considering extensions in texts explicitly mentioning ‫הבל‬ and with reference to which it can be restated property of ‫הכל‬ in terms of its constituent parts, for example, '… This is also ‫'לבה‬ ( Restated in comparative-philosophical terms, ‫הבל‬ and ‫הכל‬ are clearly fuzzy concepts as their boundaries of application in the world of the text and in their relations to each other vary considerably according to Qohelet's foci. The associated vagueness gives the impression that both terms lack fixed meaning in spite of obviously and most certainly not lacking in specificity. This relativises the value of even a formal fuzzy concept analysis, which usually seeks to link ‫הבל‬ and ‫הכל‬ by making the former the point of departure. In the given table, this relation is inverted according to extensional and intensional aspects of ‫הכל‬ in relation to ‫הבל‬ in 1:2 showing the problematic, somewhat arbitrary and generally unsatisfying outcome of attempting precising descriptions of the relation to the respective ‫-הבל‬instantiating states of affairs in conjunction with dispositional attitudes, agency and events in their metaphysical senses. What is apparent from the intensionally and extensionally inadequate representation of ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ instantiated in all ‫ָה‬ ‫ֲׂש‬ ‫ַע‬ ‫ּּמַ‬ ַ ‫ה‬ ‫ָת‬ ׁ ‫ֲּש‬ ‫ַע‬ ‫ָּנ‬ ׁ ‫ּש‬ ‫ַת‬ ‫ח‬ ‫ּתַ‬ ‫ֶׁש‬ ‫ֶמ‬ ‫ַׂש‬ ‫ה‬ is that Qohelet sometimes does diverge to include exemplification For if a man live many years, let him rejoice in them all, and remember the days of darkness, for they shall be many. All that cometh is vanity. (11:9) links to and inseparable from more abstract objects such as youth and the future in general (see Table 1). It also shows why an exemplar approach to the properties as concepts may work better than classical and prototype views of conceptual structure. A piece-meal identification goes a lot further than finding a common denominator in either necessary and sufficient conditions or in family resemblances. Doing so in conjunction with property theory may not solve the interpreter's version of the 'one over many problem', that is, of finding unity in diversity with reference to ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫.הבל‬ Yet it will be better able to dissolve some of the problem's rough edges via a more nuanced clarification of its complexity. After all, such was one of the main motivations for including properties in both philosophy and in world of the text ontologies to begin with (Allen 2021:n.p.)

‫ִי‬ ‫ִּב‬ ‫ֶל-ל‬ ‫א‬ ‫י‬ ‫ּתִ‬ ‫ָתַ‬ ‫נ‬ ‫ֶה‬ ‫ָל-ז‬ ‫ת-ּכ‬ ‫אֶ‬ ‫ֶה‬ ‫ָל-ז‬ ‫ת-ּכ‬ ‫אֶ‬
Although not usually approached from this angle, it therefore appears relevant to ask how ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ is conceived in Qohelet in relation to the universal-particular debate since Plato. When commentators refer to ‫הבל‬ or ‫הכל‬ by using words such as idea or form they usually do not use these terms with the original metaphysical import of indicating Platonic realism as universalia ante res ‫-הבל‬ness as coming before particulars in ‫.)הכל‬ Yet this does not do away with the question of how Qohelet assumed the variety of ‫-הכל‬instantiating things as all capable, (in typical cases) of having the same properties that makes ‫הכל‬ and allow for the superlative relation within the broader mereology as condition of possibility to claim: ‫ִים‬ ‫ָל‬ ‫ֲב‬ ‫ה‬ ‫ֵל‬ ‫ֲב‬ ‫.ה‬ Despite the vagueness in Qohelet's language, what is obvious is that ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ and ‫הכל‬ as being ‫הבל‬ in Qohelet is nevertheless implied as themselves not identical to ontological particulars, or individuals.
The inference just made is further corroborated by the observation that in the world of the text the property of ‫הבל‬ is assumed as being somehow multi-located, both spatially and temporally. Although this does not make Qohelet's associated metaphysical assumptions Platonist (which is basically assuming the existence of abstract objects rather than merely extreme realism about universals). Yet there is something about ‫הבל‬ as property and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ so that within the part-whole (mereological) relations between them there is always more than one part of ‫הכל‬ instantiating the property of being ‫הבל‬ and more than one property of ‫הבל‬ included in the state of affairs comprising a contextually sensitive exemplification link in ‫.הכל‬ Of course, an alternative and roughly contemporaneous comparative-philosophical counterpart for correlation and contrast would be Aristotle's moderate realism whereby ‫הבל‬ as general term is also a kind of universal existing and exemplified only in particulars instantianting the properties of ‫הבל‬ (universalia in rebus). It seems hard to affirm or deny this with reference to the world of the text, which is basically silent about this matter even when using ‫הבל‬ as a general term in relation to and quantified by ‫.הכל‬ And thought as the second-order language of the real reader today may assume a form of conceptualism or nominalism in discussing these terms as part of describing a world of the text by default operating on a fictionalist ontological status, attributing this to Qohelet would be conceptually historically anachronistic. It would therefore fail to be descriptively apt in classifying the mereology involved in the one-over-many problem, adapted to the discussion about ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫.הכל‬ The same applies to literary-critical approaches where ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ are deemed to function in a figurative sense, for example, metaphorical and constructed as tropes. The latter term in the domain of discourse as it appears in biblical scholarship should, however, not be confused with the metaphysical sense of being aligned to nominalism, despite some form of nominalism being the default literary-critical ontology as well. Since trope-theory is often discussed separately from property theory in metaphysics, futher related remarks are beyond the scope of the remainder of the discussion about ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫.הכל‬ To close the discussion, the interest now turns to the type of property that ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ was assumed to be. Not because Qohelet had such an interest but because the text contains related assumptions allowing for conceptual clarification of the properties involved along these lines and irrespective of one's ontological commitment to a specific type (or the lack thereof). Although not exhaustive in typological terms, the following will suffice to illustrate the ways in which this element of property theory can be comparative-philosophical correlation and contrasting can be part of conceptual clarification.
Based on their distinction in Aristotle, ‫הבל‬ was assumed to be an accidental property of ‫הכל‬ in the context of all ‫ה‬ ֶ ‫ֲׂש‬ ‫ע‬ ַ ‫ַּמ‬ ‫ה‬ ‫ה‬ ָ ‫ֲׂש‬ ‫ַע‬ ‫ּנ‬ ֶ ‫ׁש‬ ‫ַת‬ ‫ח‬ ‫ּתַ‬ ‫ׁש‬ ֶ ‫מ‬ ָ ׁ ‫ַּש‬ ‫ה‬ despite it being permanently instantiated. In other words, it was conceivable for Qohelet that in at least one possible world, the one in which the conditions of possibility for the discontent are found, ‫הכל‬ as a whole of sorts with reference to the related mereological parts would not lose its identity is ‫הבל‬ was not exemplified as Another type of property that ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ was not assumed to be is a sortal property. Although prima facie the particulars in the world of the text instantiating it can be counted, the vagueness and generalisations in places imply otherwise. The complication involved here partly arises because of ‫הבל‬ being assumed to be an extrinsic rather than intrinsic property of ‫הכל‬ as it is with reference to any instance of ‫;הכל‬ it is only exemplified within this relation. And this is, mutatis mutandis, also applicable to the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫.הכל‬ This in turn suggests that ‫הבל‬ was a tertiary property of ‫הכל‬ in the sense of being able to alter its primary properties such as number, motion, shape, solidity and form of particulars (and not a secondary property as those connected to the senses or its literal meaning's relation to the classical elements in 1:4-7) (also Lohfink 1985:125-149).
Conversely, ‫הבל‬ can now be seen as a multigrade or variably polyadic property in relation to ‫הכל‬ in the sense that being ‫הבל‬ was assumed to be true of various numbers of things not limited to ‫הכל‬ as mereological scope.
Further types can be distinguished and identified, for example, ‫הכל‬ assumed to instantiate ‫הבל‬ as structured property, given the presence of compound properties in their relations, that is, ‫‪'s‬הכל‬ exemplification of ‫הבל‬ meant having other properties as well as a result of this relation (see the given  table). Accordingly, one can describe ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ in the world of the text as supervening through changes the set of properties of ‫הבל‬ necessarily implying a changing set of properties for ‫.הכל‬ This did not, interestingly enough, manifest in ways that precluded the same properties of both from being emergent, that is, not all present in initial conditions but being exemplified over time. From this follows that ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ could get more specific and in both cases involve determinable properties, whatever these are understood to be. Last but not least, all along it has been observed that ‫הכל‬ not only has ‫הבל‬ as property but that the latter has additional sets of properties instantiated in relation to the former, thus implying the presence of higher-order properties in the way ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫הכל‬ are implied to be present in the world of the text.

Conclusion
In this study it was argued that the concepts of ‫הבל‬ and ‫הכל‬ can be fruitfully clarified through correlation and contrast thereof in comparative-metaphysical terms with reference to the second-order term property already in different ways implicit and explicit in the associated research. To this end, a helpful distinction has been shown as between ‫הבל‬ as property of ‫הכל‬ and the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫.הכל‬ Although this in itself does not explicate exactly what Qohelet might have meant by these words, it does help to describe the way ‫הבל‬ is instantiated in relation to ‫הכל‬ and its own properties thereby exemplified. Although the language was philosophical and the distinctions second-order, it is clear how the concepts under consideration can be correlated and contrasted in order to restate the associated metaphysical and ontological assumptions in Qohelet's language on their own terms, even if not in them. Thus, constructing ‫הבל‬ as a property of ‫הכל‬ and distinguishing it from the properties of ‫הבל‬ in relation to ‫,הכל‬ irrespective of the merits of the philosophical views utilised in philosophy itself, is in the ways illustrated helpful to describe dimensions of the conditions of possibility that must be postulated to account for why things in the world of the text are the way they are, or why they are at all.