Nietzsche and our discourses on identity

indicates where crucial decisions regarding our presuppositions have to be taken. Its aim was not to produce knowledge but, in line with Nietzsche’s practice, to ‘produce ignorance’, to question the terms we use confidently, without fully considering their meaning or implications.


Introduction
Although Nietzsche wrote to Lou Salomé 'werde der, der du bist' (BVN-1882, 239;cf. FW-82, FW-102) and subtitled Ecce Homo 'Wie man wird, was man ist', he seems an unlikely contributor to debates about identity. To him the notion of identity (Identität) depends on the false assumption 'dass es gleiche Dinge gibt' (NF-1885, 36 [23]; cf. FW-56). It is mistaken to believe that people have shared 'identities' that allow us to treat them alike (NF-1880, 6 [144]). Nevertheless, Nietzsche, through the interpretations of Heidegger, Deleuze and particularly Foucault, exerts a hidden influence on current identity discourses. This becomes evident in two common subtexts in these discourses.
The first is that identity is a function of power relations. Identity predisposes people to think and act in specific ways, but within the ubiquitous network of power relations identity is constantly under threat, setting up an interplay of domination and resistance. In this struggle the sole constant is the will to power. The second is that identity emerges from the perspective of individuals or groups. As perspectives reflect different life experiences, they cannot be assessed or compared from a neutral, privileged position. Significantly, Stanley Fish (2016) cites Nietzsche's perspectivism to support his view that groups with different 'vocabularies' and 'basic assumptions' see different 'truths'. At least he envisages conversations between groups that could lead to agreement.
Through his perspectivism and view on power, Nietzsche appears in the 'genealogy' of our discourses, yet these are strands in a complex web, and Nietzsche said, philosophers should not 'isolate thoughts' (GM-Vorrede-2). In the conclusion it is argued that challenges to our identity discourses emerge when these are linked to other aspects of Nietzsche's thought: his elitism and his rejection of human rights, compassion and what we call morality. Before that, however, come some 'showing' and 'telling' (cf. Millgram 2012:10f). After showing how difficult it is to assess an identity by considering Nietzsche from various angles, his views that bear on the matter, as expressed in his writings, are briefly summarised.
Through his views on perspectivism and the will to power, Nietzsche indirectly influences many current discourses on identity. This article places these themes in the broader context of Nietzsche's thought. Firstly, it is indicated how difficult it is to speak of someone's identity by showing how many 'Nietzsches' appear in his writings, notebooks and letters and the accounts of his contemporaries. Such comparative readings, although they may cast new light on Nietzsche's philosophy, are rare in Nietzsche scholarship. Next, his views on identity are briefly explored, paying attention to his rejection of the centred subject, equality and morality and his view on hierarchy, creativity and power struggles. Finally, it is argued that Nietzsche confronts our discourses on identity with challenges regarding the ubiquity of power struggles, the role of ressentiment, the possibility of communication across boundaries, the importance of the individual and the problem of affirmation.
Nietzsche's notebooks and letters, instead of clarifying matters, confuse the picture further. Sometimes he was less guarded in them, sometimes more tentative and self-critical. He identified traces of fanaticism in his early writings (NF-1880, 3 [1]) and regarded their style as too diffuse (NF-1880, 8 [33]). He admitted that in his 'untimely meditations' he was among the most modern of modernists (NF-1885, 2 [201]). The statement that it is unworthy of a philosopher to hate mediocrity (NF-1887, 10 [175]) was probably meant for himself -although he ignored it. A note, clearly intended for the preface of a book, suggesting that he had taken a public position too early and now had to retract, never appeared in print (NF-1876, 23 [159]). Similarly, his praise for the Parsifal overture -at a late stage -was not repeated in print (BVN-1887, 793, to Köselitz). Apparently he was unwilling to be too self-critical in print.
Some notes reflect earlier stages in Nietzsche's thought.
Although never a socialist, his early notes on socialism are mild. Socialists do not overlook differences among people but argue, partly rightly, that these are negligible (NF-1876, 23 [25] There are some constants. Nietzsche consistently praised courage and cleanliness (mental and physical), regarded friendship highly and opposed the death penalty. The idea of 'self-overcoming' appeared early on (Cate 2003:31f), so did the irrational notion that the truth is ugly and unpleasant, hinted at in an early letter to his sister (BVN-1865, 469) and later stated bluntly (NF-1887, 11 [108]; NF-1888,16 [30]; cf. Bittner 2003:xxviii). His elitism, sometimes amounting to snobbery, was always there, coupled with disdain for 'the rabble'. Überflüssigen (Za-I-Goetzen) is an example of his many pejoratives for the latter. He desperately wanted to be vornehm and later called himself a Polish nobleman of pure blood (EH-Weise-3). But do such disparate traits amount to an 'identity'?
Although exceptional, Nietzsche bore the imprint of his time and was not as creative as he gave himself out to be. Schmidt (2016) showed how often he took credit for the ideas of others. On the importance of the unconscious (e.g. FW-333), he relied particularly on Erich von Hartmann, but the idea was fashionable (Schmidt 2016:92f). So was the apparently novel idea that matter can be reduced to energy (Kraft) (Schmidt 2016:17ff.). On eugenics he was influenced by Galton (Cate 2003:448 Given this, it may be better to use the word 'identity' sparingly -as shorthand for a complex set of problems. Even then it is 'verbal' rather than 'nominal': it is enacted, performed, attributed, adopted and waved as a banner. And although few people are as clever, witty and skilful with words as Nietzsche was, he admitted that all people are infinitely complex (JGB-225).

What Nietzsche told about identity
Nietzsche was interested in exceptional people, not in large groupings. 'Humanity' to him was an experiment on the way to 'higher types', the highest being the overman (Übermensch), the meaning and purpose of life and the earth (Za-I-Vorrede-7; Za-I-Vorrede-3; NF-1884, 26 [232]), who would relate to us as we do to apes (Za-I-Vorrede-3) and would replace God (Za-IV-Menschen-2). Overmen have not yet appeared (Za-II-Priester), but we may prepare the way for them (Za-II-Tugend-2; Za-II-Inseln).
[Nietzsche's speculations, mainly in the late notebooks and frankly metaphysical (pace Clark 1990:98ff), raise problems that cannot be discussed here. , able to bring together all the aspects in themselves and to make sense of (not find sense in) the world of flux. They are creators rather than knowers, who say, 'This should be' rather than 'This is' (JGB-211: cf. MA-I-94; JGB-9). Progress depends on them alone (JGB-257), although, being great destroyers too, their effect is unpredictable (FW-370 and elsewhere). Nietzsche's heroes, Julius Caesar and Napoleon, were creators and destroyers on a grand scale who said 'yes' to the will to power and therefore to life itself.
The apogee of creativity, it seems, is giving orders. Probably Nietzsche was influenced by Genesis in which creation arises from the divine fiat (cf. GM-I-2). To give orders is to create an order, a Rangordnung; to evaluate is to create (Za-I-Ziel).
Those who give orders are distinguished because they make distinctions (cf. FW-301; JGB-225). Since commanding and obeying are reciprocals, Nietzsche held that some form of slavery must be the lot of those fit only to serve (JGB-207; JGB-258). Typically, he argues that it would be practical to grant workers many benefits, provided that they have no significant power (MA-I-93; WS-286;NF-1883, 9 [47]). Still others have no right to live (NF-1884, 25 [343]) and should be 'helped to go under' (AC-2; cf. JGB-62; GM-I-12).
Those who say 'no' to the will to power do not escape its workings. Lacking the overt power of 'higher people', they exert power in sneaky ways ('Schleichwege' -GM-II-14), using morality, particularly the morality of equality, human rights and compassion, as a tool. Morality arises when the slaves revolt against the masters and reverse the 'natural' order based on power (JGB-195;GM-I-7;NF-1888, 15 [44]). It is born of ressentiment, the 'vengeful thinking' (Sinhababu 2007:264) or 'frustrated vindictiveness' (Solomon 1994:95) of the slaves. There is some sense in this. In Christian morality, the burdens mostly fall on the 'strong' (who must give handouts, show compassion, awards rights, etc.), while the weak, having nothing to contribute, reap the benefits. Even after that, the weak are, by default, the morally good and holy , while the strong are at best suspect (AC-51).
Nietzsche, who had 'nothing but contempt for most forms of human life' (Leiter 2020 -14).
This lies at the heart of Nietzsche's attack on Christianity. He did not object ( Focusing on enticing and thought-provoking parts in Nietzsche will not make other parts go away. His silly remarks such as the one about female cooks  show that Nietzsche is not always profound when he is puzzling. Nietzsche scholars would do well to pay more attention to these 'margins' in his writings and to the views of contemporaries, who are often unfairly denigrated. Yet even if, as Millgram (2012:26f.) surmises, Nietzsche could never resolve the tensions within himself, the questions he posed remain. In a world of flux, can we have identities that are more than useful lies -useful for gaining power? Can even useful lies apply to us if we are conglomerates and never identical to ourselves? Or can we have identities only if we are, by choice or chance, utterly stereotypical -and utterly boring?

Challenges
We cannot dismiss Nietzsche's views as the rantings of a megalomaniac. As indicated here, some of what he said makes sense. At several points he issued challenges that we cannot conveniently evade. Some of them are discussed here.
As long as we, consciously or unconsciously, see identity purely in terms of power and power struggles, Nietzsche will haunt us. If identity remains caught in a circuit of domination and resistance, Nietzsche's dictum that life is the will to power (JGB-13; JGB-36; NF-2 [190]) sounds plausible. Terms that, although sounding better, remain within the ambit of power and power struggles (politics, empowering, struggle, confronting, subverting, challenging, etc.) hardly help.
[What exactly Nietzsche meant by the will to power remains unclear: scholars give an array of incompatible accounts -see Leiter (2020:3.1) for some. Perhaps it remained 'an empty, metaphysical concept' (Geuss 1997:13). What is clearer is that he used it to disqualify most other motives.] Discourses of power perpetuate power relationships -with reassigned roles -if power remains the bottom line. Nietzsche showed how easily goals such as liberation, love and justice can be reduced to the search for power (NF-1887, 9 [145]). And power, he clearly saw, is inherently non-moral and hierarchical. As Anderson (2017:2) points out, 'excellence' implies inequality. While envisaging a sublimated form of power struggle (FW-283), Nietzsche did not exclude tyranny (Anderson 2017:3.1;cf. Foot 1994:6ff.;Nehamas 1999)  The escape into the glorious freedom of 'different perspectives' and 'multiple interpretations' is illusory. Firstly, both Leiter (1994) and Gemes (2013) have argued compellingly against the 'received view' that Nietzsche's perspectivism entails epistemological relativism. For instance, he never held that all perspectives and interpretations are equal (Leiter 1994:340f;cf. BGE-22;GM-III-13). Secondly, rejoicing in cultural differences, diverse gender identities and creative interpretations (etc.) leaves those decisions that affect people's lives and have to be made untouched. Justice (for instance) has to be served now and inexorably imposes an 'either-or'. Even in academia the prevailing view is the one that has prevailed over others, while those with countervailing views risk being 'de-platformed'.
Are there sources of identity that are not power disguised or power deferred? Of old many regarded truth as such a source. Nietzsche's complex and changing thoughts on truth cannot be discussed here -see Clark (1990:1-127) for a full, widely accepted account. Some of his epigones, however, have been blunt; truth has been annexed to power as power-knowledge. Our feelings of human solidarity (compassion, etc.), beauty, wonder and awe, joy, longing and justice too were candidates as long as they were regarded as inherent to human nature. Now that they are proclaimed to be (social) constructs, they are under fire. All mere social constructs can be interpreted as reflexes of the will to power.
Perhaps there is an independent 'will to powerlessness' that cannot be reduced to masochism or self-sacrifice and that relates both to our joyful terms 'captivated', 'fascinated', 'entranced' and 'swept off our feet' (as Nietzsche initially was by Wagner's music) and to our longing to depend and be depended on, as explained by Gilligan (1993:21f. and passim). It would not be less 'Dionysian' than the will to power and Nietzsche did once consider it (M-271), seeing it as necessary preparation for new power struggles. Discourses on identity will be richer and more hopeful, if this term and others mentioned here can maintain themselves alongside power. Not in place of power, because that would be both impossible and undesirable. Kenneth Burke (1952:124) speaks of 'Love, Knowledge, Authority' as ideally a trinity.
A richer vocabulary is also needed to counter Nietzsche's claim that morality arises from ressentiment. Much of what he says rings chillingly true (cf. Anderson 2017:2). Have you never heard the dulcet voice of justice but felt the grasping hands of greed? Have you never seen eyes eager to drag others down to their level? It is easier to foist your humiliation, deprivation and abjection on others than to strive to attain their abilities, voice and agency. 'Im Grunde sind wir allesamt eigennüztiges Vieh und Pöbel' (NF-1884, 26 [282]), or 'equal worthlessness in the eyelessness of Godlessness' (Burke 1952:334). It is easier too for the privileged to salve their consciences by imposing hardships on their peers than to help the non-privileged to equality by treating them as equals, that is, not lowering standards or withholding criticism. We are not that indulgent to those we really regard as equals.
When there is a disjunction between the easy equality we automatically accord to some and the strained 'equality' we award to others, ressentiment will flourish (cf. GM-III-14).
The 'compassion' (understanding) shown to the second group is degrading and perpetuates weakness and resentment. Then 'identities' arise in which groups define themselves primarily in counter-distinction to other groups, leading to a 'plurality in hostility'. Further 'identity markers', often taken from a fictional past, accrue later. The entire process is reactive and oppositional (cf. GM-I-10) rather than creative. Would you rather be criticised or be patronised? Would you rather be told that you are wrong or that allowances are made for you because you cannot possibly understand?
Here we may need a vocabulary that goes beyond power and justice. Love, the obvious candidate, is too protean a term to be of practical use. Nietzsche enjoyed showing how love can be part of a power game (M-532, FW-14, Za-II-Ueberwindung; GM-I-8). Generosity, the traditional counterpart of envy, does not escape Nietzsche either. Der schenkende Tugend (Za-I-Tugend-1), apparently generosity, is possible only to those who have selfishly acquired much power in various forms and then give as a display of their superabundance. Think of Andrew Carnegie. Gustavo Gutiérrez's term 'gratuitousness' may be best, particularly because Gutiérrez insists that gratuitous love lies beyond justice (Gutiérrez 1984(Gutiérrez :110, 1987. Nietzsche himself saw mercy, a prerogative of the strongest, as something beyond justice (GM-II-10) and praised Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism for not making redemption dependent of 'works'  What Nietzsche says about persons challenges us to rethink the question of individuality (not individualism) and agency. The individualist-communalist binary is sterile. In expounding African communitarian (not communalist) ethics, Gyekye (2011:3, 4) starts with character and personhood. Humans are born; personhood is attained and turns on moral accountability. It is acquired in the community but enables the person to function independently. Without this independence, the person cannot effectively contribute to the community. This makes perfect sense. Nicholson (2010:46f) points out that historically individuality has mostly been the privilege of those with power. For instance, women (blacks, etc.) had an identity as a group: their characteristics were attributed to the group. Men, being 'the norm', were not lumped together: they had personalities, not a shared identity. Perhaps we attribute identities to groups because we deny their members personalities. They are treated as herds, while independence is 'ein Vorrecht der Starken' (JGB-178). Afterwards people may embrace the attributed group identity because that alone allows them to be heard.
Here Nietzsche's insistence on the value of solitude (e.g. JGB-212) cannot be ignored. It is an ethical matter, for etymologically at least 'having a conscience' means 'knowing with yourself', not simply with others. If you cannot be alone, how can you ever stand alone? Dorfman's (2004) play Manifesto for another world gives voices to a series of people from across the world who stood up for good causes. Some paid with their lives -one just after the play was first performed (Dorfman 2004:21n). The first voice says: 'Courage begins with one voice. It's that simple. I did what I had to do. Anything else would have tasted like ashes' (Dorfman 2004:27). These words, in various selections and combinations, recur throughout the play. Or should we wait for the chorus and then join it?
Nietzsche was a moralist who, in his battle against the dominant morality, called himself an immoralist (see Geuss (1997, a particularly clear discussion), Clark (1994:16ff.;2015:4), Leiter (2020:1.1), pace Sinhababu (2007), Berry (2015: 378ff.). His ethos is too harsh for me and his gospel is bad news for most people. Although his negations were many, sharp and witty and his affirmations few and faltering, he sought something to affirm (FW-276). To say 'no' effectively, one has to say 'yes'. For instance, it is not clear what 'the nation state is violent' implies unless one can point to a social ordering that is not (or significantly less) violent. Criticism by itself, without appreciation, does not make anything appreciate in value; instead, everything sinks into decadence by itself. This seems to be Nietzsche's (valid) point.
It is riskier to affirm than to criticise. In the section Was ist vornehm in Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Nietzsche seems to affirm the consummate prig. To move beyond Nietzsche's reductive hierarchy requires more than the facile deconstruction of hierarchies. A pluralism that retains equality and rights as safety nets but abandons them as ultimate goals may undercut Nietzsche, lead to a more joyful science and liberate us from the burdens of fraught identities. What exactly is identity? Perhaps we should say, in Nietzsche's words, not in his spirit, that it is what we want it to be -that which we can wholeheartedly affirm.
Perhaps. 'Please understand, I never said I had a secret chart to get me to the heart of this or any other matter' (Leonard Cohen, Stranger Song).

Notes
Nietzsche is quoted from the Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), a digital version of the standard Kritische Gesamtausgabe edited by Colli and Montinari. The digital edition, available at www.nietzschesource.org/ eKGWB, is open-access, stable and searchable. References use the standardised acronyms established by Colli and Montinari and the forms followed in eKGWB. The standardised (German) acronyms are as follows: