Chapter 4
Model, theory, perspective and method

4.1 MODEL

4.1.1 Introduction

In section 2.5, it was argued that the second research gap which exists in the current debate of Galilee versus Jerusalem in Mark's story of Jesus, is the ethnocentristic/anachronistic and reductionistic reading of the text. To address this research gap, it is postulated that an ethnocentristic/anachronistic and reductionistic reading of the text can possibly be overcome by analyzing the focal spaces of Galilee and Jerusalem (as narrated by Mark) with the help of a cross-cultural model[1].

However for some, according to Carney (1975:xiii), a model may be 'an incantation [that] symbolizes a mysterious process of great power, without telling much about what that process is'. Models may also be sometimes 'awkward and tricky to use' (Carney 1975:38). At the same time, however, models are 'the best thing we have by way of a technique' (Carney 1975:38). This is also the opinion of Malina:

> How then do we get to understand another culture? How do you get to understand anything? Understanding seems to lie in the genetic ability of most human beings to think abstractly. Abstract thinking, often called generalization or generalized reasoning, is the ability to think in terms of ideas or concepts instead of concrete images. Ideas and concepts are abstract representations of the essences of things; they are the result of the ability to 'chunk' common qualities from a large number of concrete different items, and then to express these chunks in terms of non-concrete signs and symbols .... Now patterns of abstract thought, patterns of relationships among abstractions, are called models.
>
> (Malina 1981:16-17)

Malina (1981:16-17) thus argues that one understands different cultures, and for that matter, texts, by thinking in terms of abstractions, ideas or concepts. These abstractions are used by us to see the essence of things, and are called models.

Furthermore, in regard to the use of models, Carney (1975:38) is of the opinion that, as a cognitive map (as explained by Malina above), we all use them, either consciously or unconsciously (Carney 1975:38). In this regard Neyrey (1991:xvi) makes the following remark:

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> Since every historical interpreter approaches the biblical texts with some model of society and social interaction in mind, the advantage of explicitly setting out one's model at the beginning is that it clearly lays bare the presupposed model of social relations and makes it possible for the reader to see how the model organizes and explains the data. This allows for the explicit test of the model in terms of its fit and heuristic power. To proceed otherwise is to proceed with hunches and conclude with guesses.
>
> (Neyrey 1991d:xvi)

Neyrey (1991d:xvi) thus agrees with Carney (1975:38) that we all use models when we interpret, either consciously or unconsciously. In section 3.3.8, a choice was already made in this regard. Only by explicating, explaining and justifying one's own conceptual construction of social reality, the conclusions and results that grow from such an endeavor can be exposed to verification and critique, and thereby contribute to an actual advance in understanding. The advantage, therefore, of explicitly setting out one's model at the beginning is that it clearly lays bare the presupposed model of social relations, which is in our case, that of first-century Mediterranean society as mirrored in the microsocial world of Mark. Furthermore, by explicating the model to be used, the exegete not only shows how the chosen model organizes and explains the data, but also allows the possibility for the model to be tested.

According to Elliott (1986:3), '[m]odels play a key role in [especially] social scientific analysis'. He, however, also warns that the undifferentiated use of words like metaphor, example, exemplar, analogy, image, type, reproduction, representation, illustration, pattern, parallel, symbol or paradigm as synonyms for model, can result in terminological confusion (cf also Van Staden 1991:154). We are therefore in need of clarity and precision, that is, the clarifying of what is meant when the term *model* is used.

As stated in section 3.3.2, this study has as a point of departure the employment of an association of a narratological and social scientific analysis of the text. However, in section 3.3, other presuppositions which will be employed in this study have also been spelled out: This study is not historical-critical in character (section 3.3.1), but rather is designated to move from text to social world (section 3.3.3) in order to read the text in terms of the ideological perspective of the narrator in Mark's story of Jesus (section 3.3.5). Furthermore, it will consider the microsocial as well as the macrosocial world in terms of symbols (section 3.3.6). And finally, some of these symbols used in Mark's microsocial world are spatial references to settings like Galilee and Jerusalem (section 3.4). Because of these presuppositions, and from what has been said above in

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this section in regard to ethnocentrism/anachronism and reductionism, an explication of what the notion model entails is therefore clearly indispensable. This, then, will be the task in the following section.

4.1.2 Defining the notion model

Models simply stated are *interpretative tools*. This short and perhaps bold definition, however, is confirmed by the following definitions of a model given by Carney (1975:9), Barbour (1974:6), Gilbert (1981:3), Malina (1981:17) and Elliott (1986:5):

> The key characteristic of a model ... is that it is, before all else, a speculative instrument. It may take the form of a descriptive outline, or it may be inductive — even deductive — generalization. But whatever it is, it is first and foremost a *framework of reference*, consciously used as such, to enable us to cope with complex data .... Each model presents an alternative view of reality. Indeed, the whole purpose of employing a model may be to check whether the novel view of reality which it provides adds to our understanding of that reality.
>
> (Carney 1975:9)

> [A] model is a symbolic representation of selected aspects of the behavior of a complex system for particular purposes.
>
> (Barbour 1974:6)

> A model is a theory or set of hypotheses which attempts to explain the connections and interrelationships between social phenomena. Models are made up of concepts and relationships between concepts.
>
> (Gilbert 1981:3)

> Models are abstract, simplified representations of more complex real world objects and interactions. Like abstract thought, the purpose of models is to enable and facilitate understanding.
>
> (Malina 1981:17)

> [Models are] conceptual vehicles for articulating, applying, testing, and possibly reconstructing theories used in the analysis and interpretation of specific social data.
>
> (Elliott 1986:5)

As stated in the beginning, basic to all the definitions cited above is the conception that a model is a tool or a speculative instrument. Or, as Elliott (1986:7) puts it: 'Models are *tools* for transforming theories into research operations'. However, there are also three other common features models possess that can be detected in the above citations:

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First, any model, or for that matter any social scientific model as well, is not a replica of whatever it presents (see Carney 1975:8-9). Rather, any model is, in terms of its nature, *highly selective*, 'obscuring the idiosyncratic peculiarities of the phenomenon under discussion and thereby highlighting [only] its fundamental characteristics' (Van Staden 1991:156). Models, therefore, are selective representations which focus attention on major and selected components of interest and their priority of importance. They are the lenses through which we establish the meaning of what we allow ourselves to see. Because of this, the use of any model establishes a specific point of view and necessarily excludes others (Osiek 1992:89)[2]. Malina (1986b:149) formulates this aspect of models as follows:

> All persons who communicate with others carry on an interpretative enterprise. People carry around one or more models of how society works, and how human beings interact. Such models serve as radar screens constraining people to see certain things in their experience while blocking out the rest.
>
> (Malina 1986b:148-149)

Would this mean that the use of models has to be discarded because of its selectivity or biases? This question can be answered by citing the following remark from Carney (1975:1), although used by him in a different context: 'But then, it is also true that all perception is selective and constrained psychologically and socially, for no mortal enjoys the gift of 'immaculate perception'' (Carney 1975:1). Thus, it is not difficult to state the reasons why models are necessary, despite their selectivity: Not only models, but all human perceptions are selective and limited, and when used to study texts from a different culture, also culture-bound. The cognitive maps with which we select, sort and organize complex data interpose themselves between events and our interpretation of them whether or not we are cognizant of such an action. It is always present. The only real question, therefore, is whether we are willing to raise this process of selective interpretation to a conscious level for examination, or prefer to leave our biases alone as if they do not exist. Also, 'it helps break the myth of the objective observer by raising the consciousness of its user to the subjective and limited focus being used' (Osiek 1992:89).

Second, models are used to study the complex system of behavior (Barbour 1974:6), to explain the connections and interrelationships between social phenomena (Gilbert 1981:3), or to enable and facilitate understanding (Malina 1981:17). Or more precisely, models are used to analyze and interpret specific social data. A model, therefore, has the aim of organizing, profiling and interpreting a complex welter of data which would not have been possible without using a well-defined conceptual model (cf also Elliott 1986:5; Van Aarde 1991d:56).

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Third, a model is usually not at hand; it has to be constructed (Van Aarde 1991b:4, 12). Especially in terms of conceptual models (see below), they have to be 'consciously structured and systematically arranged' (Elliott 1986:5).

Models, therefore, are *perspectival* in nature, have a *heuristic* function, and have to be *constructed*[3].

In terms of the difference between the concepts of model and metaphor, it is especially these three features of a model, just described above, which makes it possible to delineate clearly between these two notions. In some ways, a model is like a metaphor, because they both compare similar properties and stimulate imagination in order to advance understanding from the more well-known to the less well-known. However, a model differs from a metaphor in terms of its comprehensiveness, its selectivity, complexity and often, its intended function (Elliott 1986:4). Therefore, while a model is consciously structured and systematically arranged in order to serve as a speculative instrument for the purpose of organizing, profiling and interpreting certain specific data, this is not the case with a metaphor. This distinction between model and metaphor can also be explained in terms of the discussion of focal space as metaphors/symbols in section 3.4. In this section, it was argued that focal space in Mark can be seen as a symbol/metaphor that gives expression to certain beliefs, values and attitudes that exist in the macrosocial world of a text. Understood as such, the difference between model and metaphor is that a model is used to organize, profile and interpret these metaphors in the text.

For the sake of clarity, models should also be differentiated from *paradigms*, *theories* and *perspectives*. According to Elliott (1986:7), a paradigm is represented by the traditions, presuppositions and methods of a discipline as a whole. Such traditions, presuppositions and methods constitute what Kuhn (1970:178) calls a 'disciplinary matrix', within which solutions are sought for acknowledged problems. A prevailing paradigm of a research community (i e its disciplinary matrix), can therefore be seen as its traditions transmitted through historical exemplars and corpuses of scientific work which embodies a set of conceptual, methodological and metaphysical assumptions, commitments and values (Kuhn 1970:174-210)[4].

In terms of the difference between theories and models, Carney (1975:8) is of the opinion that a theory is based on axiomatic laws and states general principles:

> [A theory is] a basic proposition through which a variety of observations or statements become explicable. A model, by way of contrast, acts as a link between theories and observations. A model will employ one or more theories to provide a simplified (or an experimental or a genera-

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> lized or an explanatory) framework which can be brought to bear on some pertinent data. Theories are thus the stepping stones upon which models are built.
>
> (Carney 1975:8)

In sociological research, models are used to select and apply certain theories for the investigation and interpretation of certain data (i e specific social phenomena). According to Elliott (1986:6), a model should consist of clearly formulated ideas or theories about what it is interpreting. Models may therefore vary according to the nature and scope of data to be studied, but also according to the theories preferred by certain researchers and schools of thought. Theories, in a sense, will always determine the model(s) used, because the preference for certain theories (and research objectives) will determine the kind of model which will be employed.

Finally, in distinguishing between models and perspectives, Elliott (1986:7) differs from Turner (1967:18) and Malina (1981:16-24; 1983:119-133) in that he prefers to identify the sociological orientations of structural-functionalism, conflict theory and symbolic interactionism[5], and other styles of theorizing, as 'theoretical perspectives' rather than 'models' (Elliott 1986:7). These perspectives are not themselves models, but rather determine the models used through preference for certain theories and research objects.

To summarize our discussion on the difference between models, paradigms, theories and perspectives, the following remark of Elliott (1986:7-8) will suffice:

> 'Models' are tools for transforming theories into research operations. 'Perspectives' are more encompassing ways or 'styles' of theorizing. And 'paradigms' refer to the traditions, presuppositions, and methods of a discipline as a whole. For a parallel in the field of exegesis, the prevailing contemporary *paradigm* is the so-called historical-critical method. Within this paradigm there are, for instance, different *perspectives* concerning Gospel source theory, and *styles of theorizing* about Gospel relationships. According to these varying perspectives or theoretical styles, different *models* are used for construing and interpreting synoptic properties and relationships (e.g. two or four source models).
>
> (Elliott 1986:7-8)

In terms of the method that will be used in the following chapters, one other aspect in regard to models, untouched upon until now, is also of importance here. Previously, Elliott (1986:5) was cited as remarking that *models* are conceptual vehicles for articulating, applying, testing and possibly reconstructing theories used in the analysis

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and interpretation of *specific social data*. According to Van Staden (1991:156), this statement can fruitfully be used to explain the difference between *emic* and *etic* states of social data, with the term models (conceptual vehicles) understood as reflecting the etic mode, and specific social data as reflecting the emic mode. Van Aarde (1991b:10) is also of the opinion that models (as operationalized theories) can be employed practically in terms of emics and etics. Before looking at the different cross-cultural theories to be used for an analysis of Galilee and Jerusalem as focal spaces in Mark (see section 4.2), the distinction between emics and etics will first be discussed in the following section.

4.1.3 Emics and etics

According to Gottwald (1979:785), the terms *emic* and *etic* were coined by a linguist Kenneth Pike, by the use of analogy with the concepts of phon*emic* and phon*etic*. Gottwald (1979:785) explains these two terms as follows:

> '*Emics*' refers to cultural explanations that draw their criteria from the consciousness of the people in the culture being explained, so that emic statements can be verified of falsified according to their correspondence to or deviation from the understanding of the cultural actors. '*Etics*' refers to cultural explanations whose criteria derive from a body of theory and method shared in a community of scientific observers. These cultural explanations constitute 'a corpus of predictions about the behavior of classes of people'. Etic statements cannot be verified of falsified by what cultural actors think is true, but only by their predicative success or failure. 'Emics' systematically excludes 'etics', but 'etics' makes room for 'emics' insofar as what cultural actors think about their action is part of the data to be accounted for in developing a corpus of predictions about lawful social behavior.
>
> (Gottwald 1979:785)

In regard to the distinction between emics and etics, Malina (1986a:190), argues that while one can readily discern what people of a different culture than that of the reader say and do, it is often far from certain whether one can so easily discern what is meant by such actions and words. Because meaning realized in language is always rooted in a specific social system, one must have recourse to that specific social system to understand what is meant by particular deeds and words. What makes our understanding of words and deeds in other cultures even more difficult is the fact that native speakers usually take their social system for granted. 'They use language with the

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presumption that all with whom they interact understand 'how the world works' in the same way they do' (Malina 1986a:190). Therefore, descriptions of behavior from the native's point of view, is called emic description. The term emic emphasizes the fact that any formation of a social nature within any text is historically 'dated'. As such, the New Testament writings might therefore be considered an anthropologist's field book full of emic data, that is, 'dated' history (Malina 1983:122; 1986a:190; cf also Leach 1976:112; Kraft 1979:13; Ohnuki-Tierny 1981:96). The study of different cultures therefore requires some model of how 'the world works that might include both the world of the observer and the world of the observed in some articulate, non-impressionistic, and independently verifiable way' (Malina 1986a:190). Malina (1986a:190) calls descriptions derived from such models, etic descriptions.

According to Malina and Neyrey (1988:137), the distinction between emics and etics is a useful one in the sense that it allows us to understand that we work with material which refers to a reality vastly different from our own, and that we should therefore be sensitive enough not to modernize the meanings in the text. It also makes us to realize and recognize the conceptual gulf which exists between observer and observed. Or, in Malina's words: 'In philosophical terms the articulation of the emic in the etic mode overcomes the so-called 'hermeneutical gap', the gap in understanding between people in different cultures, whether past or present' (Malina 1986a:190).

The importance of the distinction between emics and etics in a social scientific analysis of the biblical world and biblical texts is also endorsed by Elliott (1991a:11). He explains this distinction as follows:

> The term 'emic' identifies information provided by a native from a native's point of view as determined by his/her cultural setting, experience, and available knowledge. The term 'etic' identifies the perspective and categories of thought of the investigator or interpreter as determined by his/her different social, historical, and cultural location, experience, and available knowledge.
>
> (Elliott 1991a:11)

Emic descriptions of events, therefore, are accounts perceived, narrated and explained according to the experience, folk-knowledge, folklore, conceptual categories, ratiocinations and rationalizations of the indigenous narrator. Etic accounts, on the other hand, are external analyses and explanations by means of operationalized models which reflect the theory and methods of contemporary social science. According to Elliott (1991a:11), the main advantage of the distinction between emics and etics is thus the fact that it acknowledges the cultural differences in the manner in which reality is perceived, construed and described.

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Elliott (1991a:11) and Malina (1986a:190) are thus unanimous in recognizing that this distinction has the advantage of making exegetes of ancient texts and ancient cultures understand that there is a conceptual gulf between the culture under scrutiny, and the culture to which the exegete belongs. However, it also helps us to overcome the so-called 'hermeneutical gap' (Malina 1986a:190). According to Malina (1986b:148), interpretation entails providing the requisite information so that a given text might be readily understood: 'To interpret, then, means to make explicit and clear those features in a text that are implicit and unclear, and thus facilitate effective communication' (Malina 1986b:148). Implicit features in texts are thus emic data, and to make them explicit an etic interpretation is needed.

In this regard, Van Staden (1991:156) surmises that the difference between the concepts emics and etics can fruitfully be employed by relating the concept of emics to specific social data (e g in texts) and the concept etics, for example, to social scientific models that are used to reflect on and interpret social data conceptually[7]. Van Aarde (1991d:10) argues in more or less the same vein: Emics can be seen as the enterprise through which all relevant data from the text, or artifacts for that matter, are systemized according to, for example, social institutions, roles, status and social class, as well as conflicts. This data can then be interpreted by a constructed, conceptual social scientific model. Hence, this is the manner in which the study of the opposition between Galilee and Jerusalem in Mark (emical data) will be undertaken in chapter 5 and 6 from an etical point of view.

This will be done as follows: The emic reading of Mark's story of Jesus will consist of a narratological study of focal space by using the narratological model to study space as developed in section 3.4. The emic reading of Mark will thus consist of a study of the ideological perspective and interest of the narrator on the topographical level of the text. This will be done in section 5.2, by concentrating on systemizing all the relevant spatial data in the Gospel in terms of Jesus' activities described by the narrator. These spatial data, as well as the identified ideological perspective and intent of the narrator on the topographical level of the text, will then be interpreted from an etical point of view in chapter 6, that is, by using the social scientific model to be constructed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Presented in this way, it may be possible to avoid the fallacies of ethnocentrism/ anachronism and reductionism.

This proposed method also corresponds with the other aim of this study, namely to analyze focal space in Mark by the association of a narratological and social scientific analysis. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the narratological analysis will be used for the emical reading of the text, and the social scientific analysis for the etical interpretation of the results that were yielded by the emical reading of the text.

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4.2 THEORY

As stated above, theories can be seen as the stepping stones of models. Or defined differently: Models are theories in operation. It has also became clear from section 4.1.2, that theories determine the model to be used because the preference for certain theories (and research objectives) will determine the model to be employed.

It is therefore necessary that the different theories that will be used in constructing a social scientific model to be used in this study are clearly spelled out. Furthermore, to avoid the fallacies of ethnocentrism/ anachronism and reductionism in studying focal space in Mark's story of Jesus, it is not only necessary to indicate which theories are operationalized in the developed model, but to also clearly explain the theories put forth for use. This will be the task of this section.

The different cross-cultural (and other) theories that will be used for constructing a model to read Galilee and Jerusalem as symbols of political oppositions in Mark are the following: Honor and shame as pivotal values in first-century Mediterranean world (section 4.2.1), patronage and clientism (section 4.2.2), the theory in regard to first-century dyadic personality (section 4.2.3), ceremonies and rituals (section 4.2.4), labelling and deviance theory (4.2.5), sickness and healing (section 4.2.6), purity and pollution (4.2.7), kinship as the dominant institution in first-century Mediterranean world (section 4.2.8), and first-century Mediterranean society as a stratified society (section 4.2.9)[8].

4.2.1 Honor and shame

Honor and *shame* were pivotal values of the first-century Mediterranean world (Malina 1981:25)[9]. Malina (1981:27-28; cf also Malina & Neyrey 1991a:25-26) gives the following description of *honor*:

> Honor might be described as socially proper attitudes and behavior in the area where the three lines of power, sexual status, and religion intersect[10] .... Honor is the value of a person in his her own eyes (that is, one's claim to worth) *plus* that person's value in the eyes of his own social group .... Honor, then, is a claim to worth *and* the social acknowledgement of that worth .... When a person perceives that his or her actions do in fact reproduce the ideals of society, he or she expects others in the group to acknowledge the fact, and what results is a grant of honor, a grant of reputation.
>
> (Malina 1981:27-28; his italics[11])

Honor can either be *ascribed* or *acquired* (Malina 1981:29; Malina & Neyrey 1991a:27-29). Ascribed honor one gets, for example, by being born into a wealthy family. This would be described as ascribed wealth. Ascribed honor, is therefore, the

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socially recognized claim to worth which befalls a person, that happens passively; 'not because of any effort or achievement' (Malina & Neyrey 1991a:28). Acquired honor, in contrast, 'is the socially recognized claim to worth that a person acquires by excelling over others in the social interaction that is called challenge and response' (Malina 1981:29).

Challenge and response is a sort of social pattern (or game) in which persons hassle each other accordingly to socially defined rules in order to gain the honor of the other. Honor, like all goods in first-century Mediterranean society, was a limited good. To acquire honor therefore meant that some else has to lose honor. A challenge is a claim to enter the social space of someone else, or to dislodge another from his social space, either temporarily or permanently. Challenges always take place in public, and normally consist of the following three phases: 1) The challenge itself in terms of some actions, word or both; 2) the perception of this challenge by both the one who is challenged and the public at large (or present); and 3) the reaction of the receiving individual and the evaluation of the reaction on the part of the public. Furthermore, these challenge-response games can only take place between equals[12]. Thus in the Gospels, the scribes, Pharisees and Sadducees who challenged Jesus considered him their equal. *Shame*, on the other hand, is also a positive symbol, meaning

> sensitivity for one's own reputation, sensitivity to the opinion of others. Any human being worthy of the title 'human', any human group worthy of belonging to the family of man, needs to have shame, to be sensitive to its honor rating, to be perceptive to the opinion of others. On the other hand, a shameless person is one who does not recognize the rules of human interaction, who does not recognize social boundaries.
>
> (Malina 1981:44)

The shameless person is, therefore, one with a dishonorable reputation beyond all social doubt, one outside the boundaries of acceptable moral life, hence one who must be denied the normal social courtesies. To show courtesy to a shameless person makes one a fool, since it is foolish to show respect for boundaries when a person acknowledges no boundaries. According to Malina (1988a:46), certain families and institutions such as first-century tavern and inn owners, actors, and prostitutes as a class were considered irretrievably shameless because they did not respect any lines of exclusiveness, and therefore were symbols of the chaotic.

Along with personal honor, an individual also shares in a sort of collective or corporate honor. If the family head was dishonored, so was his extended family. The head of a voluntary group (like the Jesus-faction) was responsible for the honor of the group with reference to outsiders, and also symbolized its honor as well.

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Honor as corporate honor applies to both sexes. However, actual conduct or daily concrete behavior always depends upon one's sexual status. When honor is therefore viewed as an exclusive prerogative of one of the sexes (like men that work outside the house and women who must work inside), honor is always male, and shame is always female.

According to Bechtel (1991:47-76), shame was one of the main values in the first-century Mediterranean world that sanctioned social behavior. She poses there is a distinction between the emotional response of feeling shame or being ashamed on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the social sanction of shaming or putting to shame. According to Bechtel, the emotional response of shame 'relates to the anxiety aroused by inadequacy or failure to live up to *internalized, societal and parental goal and ideals* (Bechtel 1991:49; her italics). These goals and ideals dictate expectations of what a person 'should' be able to do, be, know or feel, as well as picture what the society should be. The fear for being shamed is therefore that of 'loss of social position' (Bechtel 1991:50).

According to Douglas (1973:33), 'people's main source of identity comes from belonging to the strongly bounded group ... the group is capable of exerting great pressure on people, in order to control their behavior' Because of this, and for the fear of being shamed, Bechtel asserts that shame functioned in terms of the following: 1) As social control to repress aggressive and undesirable behavior; 2) as a pressure to preserve social cohesion; and 3) as an important means to dominate others (Bechtel 1991:53).

Bechtel (1991:54-70) then goes into shaming on social, judicial and political areas of society, of which social and political shaming are of importance for us here. Social shame functioned effectively in the Israelite (and therefore also first-century Mediterranean) community because the society was predominantly group-orientated. It was close-knit, and people's major source of identity stemmed from the group. People relied on, and were strongly pressured by the opinions of others. What influenced those opinions was the external appearance of things. This social structure made people particularly susceptible to shaming.

Spitting in a person's face, for example, was a common informal and social sanction which defiled and degraded people, rendering them unclean and socially unacceptable (Bechtel 1991:59; cf also Malina & Neyrey 1991a:35). Spitting was not only shameful, but also rendered the person spit on unclean and unacceptable; it threatened the person spit on of being cut off from the community. In this regard Douglas (1966:118-123) also points out that, symbolically, the body is a bounded system, a symbol of the community. Any substance produced by the body is accept-

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able while in the body, but becomes unacceptable or unclean when it is expelled from the body. In spitting, therefore, the saliva is expelled from the body and is unclean, similar to unclean things that are cast out of the community.

In turning to political shaming, Bechtel notes that it was particularly shameful to be captured by the enemy, or for that matter, by anybody. To shame captured people further, they were stripped of their clothes; nakedness made people's sexual parts publicly exposed. Their nakedness was also symbolic of the defenselessness of their nation and demonstrative of its failure to attain victory. Other common shaming techniques used to degrade captives further were making them laughingstocks, or by slandering, taunting, scorning or mocking them (Bechtel 1991:72).

To summarize: In section 6.4.7, it will be indicated, that by using the above discussed cross-cultural theory of honor and shame, Jesus, because of his activities on Galilean soil in episodes such as Mark 1:21-29, 40-45, Mark 2:1-12, 15-17, 18-20, 23-28, Mark 3:1-6, Mark 5:1-20, 25-34, Mark 6:35-44 and Mark 8:1-10 was regarded as a shameless person, someone with no honor. In the eyes of the scribes and Pharisees (from Jerusalem), what Jesus did in Galilee made him a fool, because he showed courtesy to shameless persons, and especially to the crowd(s) that followed him. However, it will also be indicated that, according to the narrator, Jesus was an honorable man, unlike his adversaries. This was especially confirmed by the crowd(s). By using the above theory of honor and shame, it will also be indicated that Jesus redefined honor and shame as understood in the society in which he lived (as it is narrated by Mark). According to the Markan Jesus, it was more important to be honored by his heavenly father than to be honored by the 'honorable men' of society. This theory will also be used to analyze Jesus' trial(s) and execution in Jerusalem in section 6.5.2. In this regard, the following questions will be asked: What did it mean that Jesus was spit on when he was captured (Mk 14:65; 15:19)? What did it mean that Jesus was 'crowned' by the soldiers (Mk 15:17), that they slapped his face (Mk 15:19), or that Jesus had to carry his cross to Golgotha, and that his clothes were stripped from him when he hung on the cross (Mk 15:23)? Was this political shaming, as described by Bechtel (1991: 47-67)? Furthermore, what is the implication that Jesus was honored in Galilee by the crowd(s) as a result of his healings and teaching, but that he lost all of his honor in Jerusalem? Does this give any indication of how the narrator is using Galilee and Jerusalem as focal space/symbols in the narrative? Finally, in chapter 7, where the final conclusions will be drawn in regard to the political opposition between Galilee and Jerusalem in the Gospel of Mark, it will be indicated that the aspect of ascribed honor is of great importance to understand the political aspect of this opposition.

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4.2.2 Patronage and clientism

According to Elliott (1987b:39), 'literary and epigraphic evidence from the Greco-Roman period abundantly attests of a Roman social institution as *clientela*, or, in modern terms, patronage and clientism'[13]. This type of relationship grew out of the principal of *reciprocity* (cf Carney 1975:169-171). Reciprocal exchange or reciprocity involved the giving of gifts, whereby the recipient of the gift was obliged to reciprocate. In this way a person of substance could acquire influence over a group of others, and could 'call in his debts' when needed (see Carney 1975:167).

Malina (1981:80) defines reciprocity as 'a sort of implicit, non-legal contractual obligation, unenforceable by any authority apart from one's sense of honor and shame'. In following Forster (1961:1178), he calls it a 'dyadic contract', and identifies two types of contracts, namely those between persons of equal status (colleague contracts or horizontal dyadic relations), and those between persons of unequal status, called *patron-client contracts*.

Unequal patron-client contracts are respectively defined by Elliott (1987b:42) and Moxnes (1991:242) as follows (cf also Blok 1969:366; Carney 1975:171; Van Staden 1991:184-185):

> It is a personal relation of some duration entered into voluntarily by two or more persons of unequal status based on differences in social roles and access to power, and involves the reciprocal exchange of different kinds of 'goods and services' of value to each partner ... [D]esigned to advance the interests of both partners, a 'patron' is one who uses his/her influence to protect and assist some other person who becomes his/her 'client[14]', who in return provides to this patron certain valued services .... In this reciprocal relationship a strong element of solidarity is linked to personal honor and obligations informed by values of friendship, loyalty, and fidelity.
>
> (Elliott 1987b:42)

> Patron-client relations are social relationships between individuals based on a strong element of inequality and difference in power. The basic structure of the relationship is an exchange of different and very unequal resources. A patron has social, economic, and political resources that are needed by a client. In return, a client can give expressions of loyalty and honor that are useful for the patron.
>
> (Moxnes 1991:242, in following Blok 1969:336)

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According to Eisenstadt & Roniger (1984:48-49; cf Moxnes 1991:248) the features that all patron-client societies (like first-century Mediterranean society) have in common are the following:

* they are particularistic and (usually) diffuse;
* they involve the exchange of a whole range of generalized symbolic media[15], like power, influence, inducement and commitment;
* the exchange entails a package deal, so that generalized symbolic media cannot be given separately (e g concretely useful goods must go along with loyalty and solidarity);
* solidarity entails a strong element of interpersonal obligation, even if relations are often ambivalent;
* these relations are not fully legal or contractual, but are very strongly binding;
* in principle, patron-client relations entered into voluntarily can be abandoned voluntarily, although always proclaimed to be life-long, long-range or forever;
* they are vertical and dyadic, and thus they undermine the horizontal group organization and solidarity of clients and other patrons[16]; and
* they are based on strong inequality and difference between patrons and clients.

In addition to Eisenstadt & Roniger, Malina (1981:80) notes that dyadic contracts (i e patron-client contracts) are initiated by means of a positive challenge, like the acceptance of an invitation to supper, or of a benefaction like healing. To accept an invitation with no thought of future reciprocity implies acceptance of imbalance of society (see also Silverman 1977:12; Waterbury 1977:354; Saller 1982:37-38; Moxnes 1991:251). Jesus' calling of Levi (Mk 3:13-17), for example, leads to the response of Levi to invite Jesus to dinner. Jesus' accepting of this invitation again put him in the position of repayment. Malina (1981:81) notes that it was exactly this sort of dyadic relationship that bothered Jesus' critics when he ate with 'sinners and tax-collectors'[17].

Malina (1981:82) also notes that in patron-client relationships, the dyadic relationship obliges no wider than the individuals (and perhaps their embedded females and children) who went into such a patron-client relationship. Consequently, it would be quite normal for the disciples of Jesus to squabble with and challenge each other, since they had ties with Jesus and not to each other (e g Mk 9:33-34).

Apart from these features of patronage and clientism noted by Eisenstadt & Roniger and Malina, Elliott (1988:5-8) notes another important aspect in regard to patronage and clientism, namely *favoritism*. In following Landé (1977:xv), Elliott (1988:5) states that the larger goal pursued by means of dyadic relations is favor, something received on terms more advantageous than those which can be obtained by anyone

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on an ad hoc basis in the market place or which cannot be obtained in the market place at all. Favoritism, therefore, is the main quality of such relationships. The New Testament is heavily sprinkled with the vocabulary of favoritism, such as benefaction, reward, gift and grace[18]. In horizontal dyadic relationships between individuals of equal status and power, favors and help are exchanged in time of need, usually of similar quality. In vertical dyadic relationships, that is patron-client relationships between individuals of highly unequal status, power or resources, however, the exchange of favors and help is of a qualitatively different sort: Material for immaterial, goods for honor and praise, force for status support, and the like (see Malina 1988:7).

Such patron-client relationships are commonly employed to remedy the *inadequacies of all institutions, that is, to cushion the vagaries of life for social inferiors*. Thus, the slave might be protected against the risks of being sold, killed or beaten, while the slave owner obtains the trust and commitment of the slave in question. Therefore, what a patron-client relationship essentially entails is endowing and outfitting economic, political or religious institutional arrangements with the overarching quality of kinship. *Such relations 'kin-ify' and suffuse the persons involved with the aura of kinship, albeit fictive or pseudo-kinship.* And since the hallmark of kinship as a social institution is the quality of commitment, solidarity or loyalty realized in terms of generalized reciprocity, patron-client relationships take on these kinship dimensions. Thus, economic, political and religious interactions now take place between individuals bound together by mutual commitment, solidarity, and loyalty in terms of generalized reciprocity, rather than the balanced reciprocity of unconnected equals or the negative reciprocity typical of superiors to their subordinates.

Malina (1988b:3-18), for example, applied this model of patronage and clientism (especially using the concept of favoritism), to understand and present the God of Israel. In short, his argument is as follows: God, as the heavenly patron, allows vertical dyadic alliances with the people of Israel. Jesus, in announcing this arriving patronage and by gathering its clientele, sets himself up as broker[19]. He recruits a core group to facilitate his brokerage and enters into conflict with rivals in the same profession. With his core group and new recruits, Jesus founded a person-centered faction to compete for limited resources bound up with brokerage with the heavenly Patron. The vocabulary of grace, favor, reward and gift all pertained to this brokerage. With the end of Jesus' brokerage career, his core group emerges as a group-centered faction with features of his own[20]

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In more detail, Malina's argument looks as follows: When Jesus called God father, what he did was to apply kinship terminology to the God of Israel, the central and focal symbol of Israel's traditional political religion. According to Malina (1988b:9), this sort of 'kin-ification' is typically patron-client behavior. God the 'father', is therefore nothing less than God the patron[21]. According to Malina (1988b:9-10) 'the kingdom of God'[22] would be God's patronage and the clientele bound up in it: To enter the kingdom of God would mean to

> enjoy the patronage of God, the Heavenly Patron, and hence, to become a client; and the introductory phrase, 'the Kingdom of [God] is like' would come out as 'the way God's patronage relates and effects his clients is like the following scenario'.
>
> (Malina 1988:10)

In this regard Aalen (1962:240), described Jesus' conception of the kingdom of God as 'a new state of affairs, a definite outpouring and sending of powers ..., as restitution of mankind, a fulfillment of the world'. Also, for Aalen (1962:226) kingdom is not kinship or reign, but a community, a 'house'[23]. Malina (1988b:10) further argues that all the Synoptics agree that Jesus proclaimed the kingdom of God, that is, the enjoyment of the patronage of God, and each gospel accounts a heavenly voice witness to Jesus as beloved son (cf Mk 1:11), as the one who enjoys special divine patronage (cf Moxnes 1991:248). It is therefore no surprise then that Jesus' essential emphasis was on the readily available patronage of the God of Israel for all his clients. Of course, the place where God was traditionally and readily available was the temple. In Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God, however, clients could now approach the divine Patron without officialdom, regardless of their social standing.

Jesus however behaved not as a patron but as a broker, in that he put prospective clients in touch with the heavenly Patron[24]. He proclaimed the ready enjoyment of God's patronage and by healing, teaching and forgiving sins, he took up the role of broker relative to the patronage offered by God to Israel. Or, in Malina's words:

> In the gospel story, Jesus takes up the role as broker, not as patron .... In the gospel story, Jesus launches on a ... serious task, given the embedded quality of religion in the first century. He is a broker of the Kingdom of [God], offering to put people in contact with a heavenly Patron who, in turn, is ready to provide ... resources of a political, religious, and economic sort.
>
> (Malina 1988:13-14)

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On the question of why Jesus became a broker, Malina (1988b:14-15) answers as follows: People choose to become brokers, as a rule, when two necessary and sufficient criteria are met: Firstly, the structure and content of a person's social network must be sufficient to allow for brokerage, and, second, a person must be willing to use that social network for personal gain in order to develop a profession or means of livelihood. In regard to the first aspect the features of time, centrality and power is of importance. In this regard Malina (1988b:15) states that Jesus learned from John the Baptist not only of God the Patron with a renewed and growing clientele, but also learned of his own ability to accept the position as broker between the patron and his traditional clientele, Israel. At the time John was imprisoned, Jesus started to devote himself to this brokerage full time. Relationships had to be served, and Jesus had time. The more time one has, the more amounts of and wider social relations can be created. By recruiting a faction to participate in this brokerage, Jesus also put himself in a good position to service relationships with excellent opportunities for success. Finally, Jesus also had power, especially over unclean spirits/demons and different kinds of sickness, as well as teaching abilities that were 'not like the scribes'.

Jesus, as broker, acquired the following benefits (Malina 1988b:15-16): He acquired a personal network of relationships between people, especially in Capernaum, since those he summoned there to form his coalition did so readily. Because of his services (e g healings and teaching), he amassed debt, was invited to homes, his fame spread and he acquired social standing. The effect of all this was that Jesus effectively destroyed rival communication networks, that is, that of the temple, scribes and Pharisees. Jesus' conflict with the scribes and Pharisees thus might be viewed as competition to gain monopoly control of access to the heavenly Patron.

This insight of Malina, namely that the main analogy behind the Synoptics is that of God as patron and Jesus as broker, was taken up by Moxnes (1991:241-268) and refined further. According to Moxnes the ministry of Jesus represents an important transformation of the very basis of patronage. According to the patron-client model, patron-client relationships are held together by reciprocity within a structure of great inequality between patron and client, especially when it comes to resources and power (Silverman 1977:12; Waterbury 1977:354; Saller 1982:37-38). Jesus however acted as broker, but without expectations of reciprocity in terms of gratitude, or in terms of assessing debt or power. According to Moxnes (1991:264), Jesus removed the power aspect from the patron-client relationship in that he wanted social relationships to function on the basis of an equal status before God, in which all are fictive kin in God's household. It was therefore a radical departure from a situation in which wealth, status and power determined social relations.

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This transformation of the basis of patron-client relationships is argued by Moxnes as follows: In first-century Palestine there were large differences between center and periphery, between city and village (e g Jerusalem and outlying regions like Galilee), and between God and human beings. These contrasts effected all areas of power: Political, economical and religious. Because the distance between these two centers was so great, no immediate or direct contact was possible. In such a stratified society, a broker was needed to function as middleman, for example, between city and village, or God and humans. Also, brokers normally came from the 'upper' section of society, from the cities, and in terms of God-human relationships from those who worked in the temple.

As such, the priestly elite in Jerusalem as well as the Pharisees in Galilee were brokers. In Jewish society, power was ultimately linked to God and access was granted to God through the temple and the Torah. The priests therefore served as brokers in terms of the temple in Jerusalem, and the Pharisees as brokers in terms of the Torah. The priests as brokers, however, did not facilitate access to God, but blocked it instead. This, for example, became the theme of several of the conflict scenes between them and Jesus. People who were in need of healing or salvation came to Jesus. But the Pharisees, for example, tried to use the Torah to stop them by means of arguments based on legality and the sabbath laws (cf Mk 2:23-3:6). Thus, the leaders that were supposed to be brokers did not fulfill their function or role.

On the other hand, Jesus as broker started a new fellowship in Galilee (the periphery), and his clients followed him on his way to Jerusalem, the center. Jesus as broker, however, was not a broker on the center-periphery axis (that is coming from the center as the priests and Pharisees). Jesus did not have access to the traditional channels to God via the temple and the Torah. Instead, he came from Galilee, from the periphery, and also identified himself with the periphery, the rural and the lowly (Moxnes 1991:258). This did not conform to the model of 'mediation' or brokerage from the center to the periphery as practiced by the elders, scribes, priests and, for that matter, the Pharisees. As a mediator from the outside, Jesus was therefore rejected by the elite.

While being in Galilee, and on his way to Jerusalem, Jesus however redefined patron-client relationships in terms of the new household of God. He ate with sinners and tax-collectors without looking for reciprocity (Mk 2:13-17), healed many without asking them to follow him (e g Mk 8:22-26) and sometimes even tried to get away from the crowds (Mk 6:31). When Jesus was on his way to Jerusalem, and the disciples argued the question of who of them was the greatest (which was normal in patron-client relationships; see again Silverman 1977:12; Waterbury 1977:354; Saller

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1982:37-38), he taught them: 'Whoever wants to be first must be last of all and servant of all' (Mk 9:35). When James and John asked Jesus to sit at his right and left hand in his glory, Jesus answered: 'You know that among the Gentiles those whom they recognize as their rulers (i e patrons — EvE) lord it over them, and their great ones are tyrants over them. But this is not so among you; but whoever wishes to become great amongst you must be your servant, and whoever wishes to be first among you must be slave of all' (Mk 10:42-44). These are statements of Jesus, according to Moxnes (1991:259), that represent a new concept of leadership and patronage.

In section 6.4, Malina's insight of Jesus as broker of the kingdom of God, in terms of the cultural anthropological model of patronage and clientism, will be used in regard to the etic interpretation of Jesus's activity in both Galilee and Jerusalem. It will be argued that Jesus became the broker of God's availability and presence in a brokerless kingdom, that is, a kingdom brokered in such a way by the religious leaders that it resulted in God as being not available to all (especially the sinners and expendables). It will also be indicated that Jesus brokered God's presence especially in terms of his healings, exorcisms and teaching. Furthermore, Moxnes' understanding of Jesus as broker, but also his understanding in relation to Jesus' redefining of patron-client relationships, will also be used. Finally, Malina and Moxnes' remarks in regard to the relation between patron-client relationships and the institution of kinship will also be employed in this section. As indicated above, Malina (1988b:2-32) has argued that the main analogy behind the Synoptic gospels is that of God as patron and Jesus as broker. This insight of Malina has been used by Moxnes (1991:241-268) to analyze this analogy in Luke-Acts. In section 6.4, building on the results of Malina and Moxnes, this analogy will be used to study the narrative world of Mark, that is, God as patron, Jesus as broker, and his followers as the clients.

4.2.3 First-century personality

As was indicated in section 4.2.1, honor and shame were two of the most pivotal values in first-century Mediterranean society. In that society, the virtuous man was the strong man who knew how to maintain and perhaps increase his honor rating along with that of his group (Malina 1981:51). What sort of personality sees life exclusively in terms of honor? To begin with, such a person would always see himself or herself through the eyes of others. After all, honor requires a grant of reputation by others (see again section 4.2.1), and therefore what others tend to see is all important. Furthermore, such an individual needs others for any sort of meaningful existence, since the image he has of himself has to be indistinguishable from the image of himself held and presented to him by the significant others in his family or village. In this sense, a

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meaningful existence depends upon the individual's full awareness of what others think and say about him, along with his living up to that awareness. Literally, this is conscience. According to Malina (1981:51), the Latin word *conscientia* and the Greek word *syneidesis* stand for 'with-knowledge', that is, knowledge with others, individualized common knowledge, commonly shared meaning, or common sense[25]. Conscience thus refers to a person's sensitive awareness to his public ego-image with the purpose of striving to align his own personal behavior and self-assessment with the publicly perceived ego-image. A person with conscience is thus a respectable, reputable and honorable person. Respectability, in this social context, would be the characteristic of a person who needs other people in order to grasp his or her own identity (Malina 1979:128, 1981:51).

From this it is clear that the first-century Mediterranean person[26] did not share or comprehend our (modern and Western) idea of an 'individual' at all. Instead of individualism, what we find in the first-century Mediterranean world is what might be called 'dyadism' (from the Greek word meaning pair, a twosome). A dyadic personality is one that simply needs others continually in order to know who he or she is (cf Foster 1961:1184; Selby 1974:113). Or, in the words of Malina & Neyrey (1991c:73-74): 'For people of that time and place, the basic, most elementary unit of social analysis is not the individual person but the dyad, a person in relation with and connected to at least one other social unit, in particular, the family'. People in this culture, according to Bowen (1978:75), might be said to share 'an undifferentiated family ego mass'. They were primarily part of the group in which they found themselves inserted. They existed solely and only because of the group in which they found themselves embedded. Without the group they would cease to be (Malina & Neyrey 1991c:73).

What this means is that the person perceives himself or herself as always interrelated to other persons, as occupying a distinct social position both *horizontally* (with others sharing the same status, ranging from center to periphery) and *vertically* (with others above and below in social rank). Such a person internalizes and makes his own what others say, do and think about him because he believes it is necessary, for a human being to live out the expectation of others. He needs to test his interrelationships, moving the focus of attention away from his own ego and towards the demands and expectations of others who can grant or withhold reputation and honor. Dyadic persons, therefore, would expect others to tell them who they are (cf Mk 8:27), what is expected of them and where they fit. Thus, a first-century Mediterranean person would perceive himself as a distinctive whole *set in relation* to other such wholes and *set within* a given social and natural background, in that every individual is perceived as embedded in some other, in a sequence of embeddedness (see Malina 1979:128, 1981:55; Malina & Neyrey 1991c:73).

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Persons in first-century Mediterranean society can thus best be described as strong group persons[27]. Strong group persons define themselves rather exclusively in terms of the groups in which they are embedded, and their total self-awareness emphatically depends upon this group embeddedness. Although they are single beings, individual and unique in their being, their psychological ego reference is primarily to some group. 'I' always connotes some 'we', inclusive of the 'we' (see Malina & Neyrey 1991c:74). The dyadic individual is therefore always symptomatic and representative of some group. From this perspective, the responsibility for morality and deviance is not on the individual alone, but on the social body in which the individual is embedded. It is because something is amiss in the functioning of the social body that deviance springs up (cf Mk 6:1-6; see section 4.2.5). The main objective of first-century Mediterranean societies therefore was to keep the family, village or fictive group sound, both corporately and socially.

Furthermore, all strong group persons make sense out of other people by thinking 'socially' (Malina 1979:129-130, 1981:56-60; Malina & Neyrey 1991c:72-76). This means that the individual person makes sense of everything on the basis of reasons, values, symbols and modes of assessment typical of the group. 'Social' thinking entails thinking about persons in terms of *stereotypes* (Malina & Neyrey 1991c:74). Stereotypical thinking submerges any individuality we might find in another in favor of what is common, general and presumably shared by the category (such as gender or ethnicity) or group to which a person is assigned. Stereotypical perceptions yield fixed or standard mental pictures which various groups commonly hold of each other. These standard, mental pictures represent their expectations, attitudes and judgment of others. Since individuals find themselves inserted into various groups by birth, family ties and the wider ranging ties already forged by their elders, group-orientated personalities take this feature of human experience as primary. Strong group people find it overpoweringly obvious that they are embedded in a group and that they always represent that group. Consequently, the common stereotypes of dyadic persons relate to that embeddedness.

According to Malina & Neyrey (1991c:74-75), the following can be seen as representing the basic stereotypes whereby first-century Mediterranean people understood themselves and others:

* Family and clan: People are not known individually, but in terms of their families (e g Mk 2:15-19; 6:3). By knowing the parent or clan, one knows the children.

* Place of origin: Dyadic persons might be known in terms of their place of birth, and depending on the public perception of this place, they are either honorable or dishonorable (e g Mk 2:24; 15:21).

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* Group of origin: People are known in terms of their *ethnos*, and certain behavior is expected of them in terms of this. For example, to know one Greek is to know all Greeks (cf Mk 14:70).

* Inherited craft-trade: Persons might, moreover, be known in terms of trade, craft or occupation. People have fixed ideas of what it means to be a worker of leather, a landowner, a steward or a carpenter. Because of this, for example, trouble could arise if a carpenter displayed wisdom, performed great deeds and heals, acts which did not belong normally to the role of a carpenter (cf Mk 6:3).

* Parties and groups: Furthermore, people might be known in terms of their social grouping or faction as Pharisees, Herodians or Sadducees. Membership of groups was not a matter of personal and individual choice, but of group-orientated criteria, such as family or clan, place and/or group of origin or inherited craft or trade. This allowed access to and networking with specific people.

Because dyadic persons perceive themselves in terms of qualities specific to their ascribed status, they tend to presume that human character is fixed and unchanging. Every family, village or city would therefore be quite predictable, and so would be the individuals who are embedded in and share the qualities of family, village or nation. Moreover, since human beings have no control over lineage and parentage, dyadic persons tend to perceive the role and status of clans and families as well as of individual members in them as ordained by God. Since the social order, both theoretically and actually, is God's doing, it follows that there is a built-in resistance to social mobility and to status and role changing (cf Malina & Neyrey 1991c:76).

Also, first-century Mediterranean persons are anti-introspective (Malina 1979:132-33; Malina & Neyrey 1991c:78-79). In more direct terms, the Mediterranean is simply not psychologically-minded at all. Rather, disturbing or abnormal internal states are blamed on persons, either human ones or non-human ones. Thus, in society, an abnormal person will be described by saying he/she is 'a sinner', 'submits to Satan' or 'is possessed by a spirit/demon'. Such a person will be in an abnormal position because the matrix of relationships in which he/she is embedded is abnormal (cf Pienaar 1989:25). The problem is not within, but outside a person, that is, in faulty interpersonal relations over which a person usually has no control.

What follows from this is the important observation that the honorable man would never expose his distinct individuality, personhood or his inner self with its difficulties, weaknesses and secret psychological core (Malina & Neyrey 1991c:78). He is a person of careful calculation and discretion, normally disavowing any dependence on others. In this regard, it is interesting that Mark typifies Jesus who does not regard the face

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(honor), but who is intensely concerned about his reputation (cf Mk 8:27). Also, in first-century Mediterranean society, social awareness was of great importance. For example, the institution of keeping females away from males by means of woman's quarters, chaperoning and various gender-based space prohibitions, indicates that behavioral controls exist in the social situation. Thus, behavioral controls are 'social', deriving from a set of social structures to which all are expected to adhere.

Finally, in first-century Mediterranean society the way in which the human being is perceived as fitting into his rightful place in regard to his environments (physical and social), and acting in a way that is typically human, is by means of his innermost reactions (eyes-heart), as expressed in language (mouth-ears) and outwardly realized in activity (hands-feet: cf Malina 1979:132-235; 1981:60-62). These three zones comprise the non-introspective makeup of man and are used to describe human behavior. Man thus consists of three mutually interpenetrating yet distinguishable zones of interacting with his environments: The zone of emotion-fused thought, the zone of self-expressive speech, and the zone of purposeful action. This distinction is also used to describe the difference between God and man. In terms of God's behavior, these three zones always work effectively and in harmony. What God conceives with his heart and speaks with his mouth is good, and effectively takes place. Human beings however are not consistently effective nor do they evidence harmony between the three zones[28].

This then is the perspective from which the characters in Mark's story will be analyzed in section 6.4.8. Some of the questions that will come to the fore are the following: Did the Markan Jesus, in terms of his activities on Galilean soil, ask his followers to break with their belief in external responsibility? Did he teach his disciples not to be anti-introspective, and not to be strong group persons in terms of the boundaries of their society? Did Jesus therefore try to redefine first-century Mediterranean personality? And if this is the case, did he not then also redefine society as understood for example by the religious leaders in Jerusalem (and those in the cities on Galilean soil like Sepphoris? And if the latter is found to be true, does it mean that the Markan Jesus' understanding of first-century Mediterranean personality had implicit political implications?

4.2.4 Rituals and ceremonies

According to Turner (1969:94-103), the concept culture can be seen as the whole array of interlocking symbols and sets of symbol systems in any society. Culture, one can also say, is the symbol systems it produces, and these systems also provide the means, namely rituals and ceremonies, in, by, and through which society is ordered. Rituals and ceremonies serve the purpose of ordering, that is drawing and redrawing boun-

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daries around the both natural and social spaces and identify them as 'good or bad, inside or outside, clean or unclean, high or low' (McVann 1991a:334). In short, rituals and ceremonies construct and maintain a cosmos; they are building blocks of culture (cf Turner 1969:99; Sahlins 1976:78; McVann 1988:97, 1991a:334).

Ceremonies and rituals are distinguished from each other in terms of the following different features (see Malina 1986a:139-142; McVann 1991a:334-335): In the course of routine daily living, individuals take special time off, either to pause from routine or to intensify aspects of it. When the pause occurs *regularly*, it is called a ceremony. If the pause is *irregularl*, it is called a ritual. Ceremonies are therefore *predictable* (when planned), and rituals *unpredictable* (when needed), in terms of daily routine. These pauses, moreover, are under the care of specific people. Those who preside over ceremonies, are called *officials* (e g father/mother presiding over a meal or a priest conducting a temple sacrifice), and those who preside over rituals are called *professionals* (e g physicians, judges, clergy)[29].

Furthermore, ceremonies function in terms of the *confirmation of values and structures* in the institutions of society. Institutions are patterned arrangements, sets of rights and obligations (called roles), of relationships among roles (called statuses), and of successive statuses or status sequence which are generally well-recognized and are regularly at work in a given society[30]. Institutions encompass kinship, politics, education, religion and economics[31]. Ceremonies, therefore, confirm the social institutions which structure life shared in common. They confirm the respective statuses of persons in those institutions, even as they effectively demonstrate solidarity among all those who gather together and give shape to them.

On the other hand, rituals function in terms of *status transformation*. They take place between social structures in order to mark the transition or transformation of some person or group from one state to another, or from one set of duties and obligations to another. People might change different roles: Those who have been excluded from aspects of societal life, for example, the sinners, can be brought back into the life of society by means of rituals which signal status reversal (e g from ill to clean/acceptable or from impure to pure). The time focus of ceremonies is therefore *past-to-present* (how things were in the past are again confirmed), and that of rituals *present-to-future* (how things were in the past will now be different in future).

In terms of the definition of *ceremonies* given above, it is clear that ceremonies are especially relevant when foods and table-fellowship are involved. Because these two aspects are both present when a meal is eaten, meals as a ceremony can provide a good example for looking deeper into a cross-cultural theory of ceremonies. People of the first-century Mediterranean world tended to structure their world by classifying per-

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sons, places, things and times, and thus imposed some order on what otherwise seemed to be chaos (see Neyrey 1991c:271-304). Such a system of classifications expressed order and gave clues to a group's symbolic universe. According to Neyrey (1991b:365), this is especially true of the classifications surrounding meals, for, as it has been observed by Cohen (1968:508), '[i]n no society are people permitted to eat everything (things — EvE), everywhere (places — EvE), with everyone (persons — EvE), and in all situations (time — EvE; see also Crossan 1991a:341; Elliott 1991e:386-399)[32].

The *map of persons* as implemented by the Pharisees, illustrates perfectly the principle that people basically eat with others with whom they share certain values (Neyrey 1991b:364). Hence, the Pharisees criticize Jesus, who claims to teach a way of holiness, for eating with tax collectors and sinners (see Mk 2:16), because shared table-fellowship implies that Jesus shares their world, not God's world of holiness. Moreover, one would not expect Jews, God's holy people, to eat with Gentiles. Even when likes eat with likes, one would expect in a strongly structured cosmos such as the first-century Mediterranean world that there would be some sort of map of persons even at the meal, some order of who sits where. Seating arrangements signal and replicate one's role and status in a group (see Mk 12:39). It could also happen that not all the participants at a meal would eat the same food or would be served the same amount (Pervo 1985:311-313). Some hosts might also rank their guests by different quantities and qualities of food and drink.

In terms of the *map of things*, all foods were classified, and certain foods were proscribed and prescribed. Some foods were automatically declared unclean (see Lev 11:1-47; cf Douglas 1966:41-57), others needed to be prepared in a certain way, and others were made clean by virtue of the tithes paid on them. This concern for clean/unclean foods extended even to the dishes used in their preparation and consumption. As we learn, for example from Mark 7:4, there were Pharisaic rules concerning the porosity of vessels and rules concerning washing them. Even the talk at the table was a thing mapped. Certain talk was appropriate and even required at meals. At family meals, for example, one would expect the conversation to be supportive of family ideals and traditions, not divisive or critical. In line with this concern with table talk, it should also be noted how in the biblical tradition bread is a common symbol of wisdom and instruction (Neyrey 1991b:365-366; cf also Feuilett 1965:76-101)[33].

Turning to the aspect of the *map of places*, the perception of an ordered universe was replicated in the spatial arrangement of persons and things at a meal, especially in regard to the place where one eats (Neyrey 1991:366; Van Staden 1991:216-220). A Pharisee, for example, would be concerned about the place where he eats to ensure that

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the proper diet was prepared in a proper way and served on and with proper utensils. Conversely, Jesus' celebrated multiplication of the loaves ostensibly flouted the perception of a specific place for meals (see Mk 6:35-42; 8:1-10). A 'desert place' (Mk 6:31; 8:4) is unsuitable for eating, because it would preclude concern for proper foods correctly tithed and prepared, proper persons with whom one might eat, and proper water for purification rites (Neyrey 1991b:366).

Finally, the *map of times* refers to certain meals that had to be eaten at specific times, like the Passover. Furthermore, according to Douglas (1972:66), even in the course of a meal, there might be an elaborate time arrangement in which dishes were served in the right sequence (cf also Jeremias 1968:41-62; Bahr 1970:182).

When we distinguished between ceremonies and rituals above, we noted that *rituals*, unlike ceremonies, are concerned with *status reversal/transformation* or passage from one role or status to another. People may move horizontally up or down the social scale, or laterally from inside to outside. Ritual transformation of status may either occur voluntarily, or involuntarily (e g trial and execution). These transformations of status, however, are nearly always and everywhere surrounded by complexes of symbols (McVann 1991a:336). Seen as such, rituals provide the participants with the means of understanding the way the world is perceived by their social group and a way of participating in its patterns. Thus, 'ritual is a symbolic form of expression which mediates the cultural core values and attitudes that structure and sustain society' (McVann 1991a:336). A ritual is characterized by a three-step process involving the following (Turner 1969:93-130): 1) *separation*; 2) *liminality-communitas*; and 3) *aggregation* (cf McVann 1988:96-99; 1991a:338-341, 1991b:152-154).

Individuals undergoing status transformation rituals tend to experience *separation* in three ways: Separation from *people*, *place* and *time*. Separation from people encompasses the separation of the participants from the ordinary rhythm of the group's life (e g a young man who is to be married). At the point of ritual separation, the initiand(s) and the place of initiation also become 'off-limits' (Turner 1967:97). The initiands are also removed to a place separated from the locus of ordinary life, because the experience into which they will enter is very much 'out of the ordinary'. The place chosen for the rite is usually a 'sacred space', like mountains, forests and deserts. Separation of time refers to the fact that, usually, the participants in a ritual are thought to be removed from the normal flow of time. They leave 'secular' time, and enter 'timelessness'. During the ritual, time is broken up in new or unfamiliar ways. The usual times for eating, sleeping, working and learning are altered, and sometimes even reversed.

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In regard to the second step of the process, namely *liminality-communitas*, the term liminality refers to the negative side of the ritual process and describes the state into which the initiands are brought by virtue of their separation from the everyday familiar world. This is their 'threshold' period. During the liminal period, initiands, who are cut off from the persons and activities who shaped their life beforehand, in a sense 'disappear', or 'die'. They are required to abandon their previous habits, ideas and understandings about their personal identities and their relationships with others in the society. During this stage they lose their previous status as well. They are also perceived as dangerous or as a pollution to those outside the ritual process, because they could not be situated within clear lines or boundaries (see section 4.2.7). Communitas, on the other hand, refers to the positive side of the ritual process, to the initiands' recognition of their fundamental bondedness in the institution into which they are being initiated.

The final step of the ritual process, *aggregation*, usually starts with ritual confrontation where the initiands are challenged in terms of their new roles and statuses. However, by virtue of the ritual, the larger society acknowledges that the initiand now has the capacity required for fulfilling his new role within it. His status in the community has then been redefined.

This ritual process as explained above also involves certain *ritual elements*, which help effect passage to the new role and status, namely the *initiands*, the *ritual elders* and certain *ritual symbols* (Turner 1969:130-151). The initiands are the people who individually or as a group experience the status transformation ritual and so acquire new roles and statuses in the society. The ritual elders are those persons officially charged with conducting the ritual. They see to the strict enclosure of the initiands and supervise their activity. The ritual elders are thus 'limit breakers, or 'boundary jumpers' (see Malina 1986a:143-153; McVann 1991a:337-338). Unlike other people, they are licensed to deal with initiands who are in the dangerous or polluted state of liminality. They are immune to the powers harmful to those outside the process because they have been appointed to conduct the ritual and have themselves been transformed by it (Turner 1967:97). The elders see to it that the preconceived ideas about society, status and relationships are wiped out. They also instill new ideas, assumptions and understandings that the initiands will need to function effectively when they assume their new roles at the aggregation rite. Finally, ritual symbols, take various shapes. Normally, however, they are 'sacred objects' like skulls, rings, candles and books. They are objects that are 'out of the ordinary', which provide a focus for the initiands during liminality and ensure that the initiands concentrate on the values and attitudes of the new statuses which are concentrated symbolically and highlighted in them.

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In regard to rituals, it is especially McVann (1988:96-101; 1991b:333-360; 1991b:151-157) who has used this cultural-anthropological theory described above as a model to investigate certain aspects in the Gospel of Mark. According to McVann, the passion in Mark can be seen as a transformation ritual (McVann 1988:96-101), along with the baptism of Jesus and some of Jesus' miracles in Mark's story of Jesus (McVann 1991b:151-157). In section 6.2.2, the cultural-anthropological theory of rituals will be used to analyze Jesus' baptism as a status transformation ritual, when he becomes the official broker of the kingdom of God and therefore replaces the 'official' religious leaders as the brokers of God's presence to the sinners/sick/expendables in society. In section 6.4.5 it will be argued that Jesus' healings were status transformation rituals, and were received and interpreted by the crowds in such a positive manner that Jesus, according to the narrator, became the new official ritual elder in Mark. This, of course, meant conflict with the 'official ritual elders' in Jerusalem. Turning to ceremonies, this cultural-anthropological theory will be used in section 6.4.3 to analyze the four passages in Mark's Galilean section of the gospel, namely Mark 2:15-17, 18-29, 6:35-44 and 8:1-10. It will be indicated that Jesus' meals can be seen as symbols of the kingdom he was brokering, in that it symbolized inclusiveness/commensality (see sections 6.4 and 7.2) *vis-a-vis* the exclusiveness of the temple. Understood as such, it will not only be indicated that Jesus' meals, in a certain sense can be understood as rituals, but also as critiques on the temple.

4.2.5 Labelling and deviance theory

The Mediterranean world has traditionally been a conflict-ridden world (Malina & Neyrey (1988:xvi, 1991b:98). Hence it should come as no surprise that the gospel stories of Jesus and early first-century Palestine groups emerged as stories of conflict. It is quite significant to note that Mediterranean conflict has always been over practical means to some end, not over the ends themselves. Jesus and the faction he recruited were in conflict with other groups over how best to heed the command of God, not over whether God should be obeyed at all (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:98). Such conflict was over practical means, it in no way implied doubts over ends. Conflicts thus were over ways to realize the traditional values of Israel, and also in regard to 'limited goods' in society such as honor and status: It was conflict over structures (either new ones or revitalized ones) or conflict over how to facilitate proper obedience to the God of Israel. According to Malina & Neyrey (1991b:99), one of the ways to study these conflicts in the gospels is to analyze them from the viewpoint of *labelling and deviance theory* with the aid of other cross-cultural features (cf also Davis 1961:120-132; Schur 1971:12-17; Turner 1972:307-321; Pfhul 1980:3-7). Employed as such, labelling and deviance theory can be used as a model to read the data in the Gospels (cf e g Saldarini 1991:38-61).

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When people are put on trial, or challenged in terms of his/her actions, they are necessarily accused of charges which the accuser deems serious. Two examples from Mark (the text which is our concern here), are as follows: Jesus is called as being from Beelzebul by the scribes from Jerusalem because of his exorcising of unclean spirits (Mk 3:22), and at his trial before the chief priests and the whole Sanhedrin, Jesus is accused of saying that he is 'the Messiah, the Son of the Blessed One' (Mk 14:61). These charges are the stuff of deviant labels, and will benefit for our discussion to follow on what deviance labels are, and how they function.

People in the Gospels frequently call each other various names. Names are social labels by means of which the reader or the hearer/reader comes to evaluate and categorize the persons being labelled, either negatively or positively. In regard to positive labels in Mark, for example, God calls Jesus his beloved Son (Mk 1:11), those who follow Jesus are called his brothers and sisters (Mk 3:35), and John the Baptist is ironically regarded righteous and holy by Herod (Mk 6:20). In the negative vein, some people are called 'tax-collectors and sinners' (Mk 2:15), Jesus is called as being from Beelzebul (Mk 3:22), and Jesus warns the disciples of the 'yeast of the Pharisees and the yeast of Herod' (Mk 8:15).

Labels therefore are powerful social weapons. In the mouths of an influential coalition' (like the Pharisees, the scribes and the chief priests), they can inflict genuine injury when they succeed in defining a person as being a deviant, that is, being radically out of place. This social name-calling is a type of interpersonal behavior and is technically called *labelling* (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:100).

As a rule, a deviant is anyone who can be defined as being radically out of place socially. Deviants are invariably designated by negative labels: Sinners, prostitutes, lepers, tax-collectors, sinners, and the like. Negative labels are in fact accusations of deviance. Behavior is deviant when it violates the sense of order or the set of classifications which people perceive to structure their world[34]. Deviance, therefore, like the lines that produce it

> is a social creation; what is considered 'deviant' is what is perceived by members of a social group to violate their shared sense of order. In short, deviance lies in the eyes of the beholder, not the metaphysical nature of things. Deviance, moreover, is nearly always a matter of moral meaning, of distinguishing the evil and the wicked from the good.
> (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:100)

Because labelling and deviance always lies in the eyes of the beholder, a key element in labelling someone as a deviant is the understanding of the labelers themselves. The important question here is: Who does the labelling and why? In social science theory, deviance refers to those behaviors and conditions assessed '*to jeopardize the interests*

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and social standing of persons who negatively label the behavior and the condition' (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:100; their italics). It is therefore important to keep in mind the relationship of deviance to perception. Deviance intrinsically depends on the perceptions and judgment of others. Someone will therefore be labelled as a deviant if the social system shared by the members of the group is perceived violated, and this violation is perceived precisely by those whose interests in that social system are jeopardized. Their reaction to this perceived deviance is the act of social aggression known as negative labelling (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:100)[35].

Deviance therefore refers to those behaviors and conditions judged to jeopardize the interests and social standing of persons who negatively label the behavior or condition. A deviant person is one who behaves in ways characterized as deviant or who is situated socially in a condition of deviance; he is perceived as out of place to such an extent as to be redefined in a new negative place, the redefinition deriving from the labelers (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:100). Deviance therefore is nothing else than a status assumed by persons identified as rule breakers who step out of place in some irrevocable way.

From this it is clear that when people are labelled deviants, a statement is made about their social status in society. In general, the term *status* refers to a person's position within a social system. This is status as social position. At the same time, in such a social system of ranked positions, status is invariably assessed in terms of what others perceive a person's position to be worth. This is status as value.

Because status as value depends on the perception and appraisal of others, it is based on two considerations: *Ascribed* characteristics, and personal *achievements*. The first will include characteristics like sex, birth and physical features, thus some quality that befalls a person through no effort on his/her own and which a person continually possesses. In terms of deviance, *ascribed deviant status* is rooted in some quality like being born blind or lame. Here deviance is a matter of being, the very meaning of a person's being (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:101). Personal *achievements*, on the other hand, are accomplishments deriving from one's own personal efforts like marriage, occupation or accomplishments. In terms of deviance, *acquired deviant status* is based on a person's performance of some publicly perceived overt action that is banned (e g Levi who collects taxes; cf Mk 2:14).

In general, according to Malina & Neyrey (1991b:102; cf also Turner 1972:312-317; Pfhul 1980:21-32), there are three steps in a typical deviant process: 1) a group, community or society *interprets* some behavior as deviant; 2) *defines* the alleged person who behaves as a deviant; and 3) *accords* the *treatment* considered appropriate to such deviants. If the labelling process succeeds, the alleged deviant will be caught up in the

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role indicated by the label (e g sinner) and increasingly live out the demands of the new role. The new label comes to define the person. This is called a *master status* which engulfs all other roles and labels (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:101).

The group which interprets and defines overt deviant behavior is termed the *agents of censure* (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:102). Agents of censure are called rule creators or moral entrepreneurs. They usually form interest groups (e g scribes, Pharisees and Sadducees). Interest groups are normally coalition groups which focus on shared and distinct interests. Moral entrepreneurs, or rule creators, and their followers normally wish to interpret some behavior as deviant for the purpose of obviating, preventing or correcting interference in their interests[36]. To this end they attempt to change, enforce or establish rules, or to maintain their own rules (or, e g, their understanding of God or the Torah). They do this by defining certain behaviors or actions and those who engage in them as inimical to their values and interests (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:102). By means of labelling, rule creators are thus constantly busy drawing or redrawing boundaries around something or someone of social significance, thus situating them 'out of bounds' or as a threat or danger.

To succeed in labelling someone as a deviant usually needs the deviance process to *disseminate* and gain greater *respectability* (Malina & Neyrey 1991b:103). Dissemination involves giving a high degree of visibility to the meanings developed by the moral entrepreneurs and their coalition[37]. This dissemination in turn is given broader respectability by linking the new interpretation with some previous positive value, while tying the accused to negative values[38]. Dissemination and respectability are further enhanced by raising the awareness concerning the value of the new interpretation or rule itself. This is done by *rule enhancers* (see Malina & Neyrey 1991b:103) which can either be optimistic, neutral[39] or normal. All of this can be achieved by converting others to one's point of view, that is, by developing a counter ideology. By ideology Malina & Neyrey (1991b:103) mean that set of values, attitudes and beliefs which group members hold and which mark their group off from other contending groups and bind group members together. In chapter 6 it will be indicated that the Markan Jesus' death can be understood as inter alia the result of conflicting ideologies in first-century Palestine[40].
Malina & Neyrey, for example, has used this model to analyze the social values of Jesus as witch/deviant in Matthew 12, as well as his trial in Matthew 26-27 (Malina & Neyrey 1988a). In section 6.4.6, this model will be used to analyze the notion of labelling in Mark's gospel, concentrating especially on Mark 3:20-30. It will be indicated that, because Jesus' ministry of healings, exorcisms and teaching on Galilean soil was perceived as a critique of the temple, some scribes and Pharisees came down to Galilee to label Jesus in an attempt to neutralize him. It will thus be indicated that labelling in Mark 3:20-30 is used by the narrator to further highlight the opposition between Galilee and Jerusalem in the Gospel.

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4.2.6 Sickness and healing

According to Pilch (1991:182), 'medical materialism' is an anthropological term for the tendency to utilize modern, Western, and scientific medical concepts and models to interpret apparent health concerns in all cultures of all times without regard for cultural differences. Medical anthropology identifies this erroneous methodology as 'medicocentrism' (Pilch 1991:183). Because of this, Pilch (1991:182) feels that a new perspective is needed, a perspective that must build on the insight that in first-century Mediterranean world

> health or well-being is but an example of *good fortune*. Alternately, sickness is but one example of a wide range of *misfortunes*. The key lies in understanding the relation of sickness and healing to *fortune* and *misfortune*, not a modern idea, but one quite frequent in and more appropriate to other cultures.
>
> (Worsley 1982:330, cited by Pilch 1991:182; italics in the original)

According to Pilch (1991:182), the application of a cross-culturally developed model like that of medical anthropology (see Pilch 1988b:62) can not only help modern readers to understand health and sickness in the first-century Mediterranean world as described above by Worsley, but can also enable them to cast Jesus' healing activity in the gospels in a new light.

By using the works of Kluckholm & Strodtbeck (1961) and Papajohn & Spiegel (1975), Pilch (1991:184-190) notes the following cultural variations in values between modern (Western) society and what we find in the Bible. The reason for starting with a theory of cultural variations in values is because values determine the identification of human misfortunes like illness, the appropriate and inappropriate responses to it, as well as the expected outcome of treatment, if indeed treatment is available. The following variations are noted by Pilch (1991:184-190):

Activity: Persons living in most modern societies normally emphasize *doing* over being and becoming. In first-century Mediterranean society *being* as primary value orientation is manifested in the spontaneous expression of impulses and desires. Note, for example, the spontaneous response of the townsfolk in Nazareth when Jesus is rejected in his own hometown. Life, moreover, in a good state of being (e g clean, pure or whole) is preferable to life in an undesirable state (e g unclean with leprosy, or being blind or deaf). Hence, in Mark 1:41, Jesus restores a leper to a clean state of being.

Relationships: Persons living in most modern societies prefer to be highly *individualistic*. Individual goals have primacy over the goals of either the collateral group (equals) or lineal groups (superiors). However, in first-century Mediterranean society

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collateral relationships constituted the primary value orientations, and group goals are preferable to individual goals. People related to each other on the basis of the goals of the laterally extended group. When Jesus heals Peter's mother-in-law, 'she began to serve them' (Mk 1:31). In Mark 2:3 we read that some people brought a paralyzed man to Jesus to be healed, from which it is clear that the extended family brings its sick members to Jesus for healing, demonstrating their lateral or horizontal relationships with kin and neighbors[41]. Groups in the Mediterranean world would also select lineal relationships as primary value orientations, that is, they would order their behavior in terms of some hierarchical perspective or some vertical dimension. Thus the crowd is startled to observe that Jesus commands unclean spirits with authority and power and they come out (Mk 1:27). In their perspective, this power over spirits puts Jesus in a position higher than they are. A society that attends to hierarchical ordering is always interested in learning 'who's in charge'. In matters of health and healing, this is a fundamental concern.

Time: Most people in modern societies are *future-oriented*. The future will always be bigger and better, and no one wants to be considered old fashioned by holding on to old things. People in first-century Mediterranean society are primarily orientated towards the *present* time. Peasants worry about the crop or flock today, day to day. Tomorrow is part of the rather widely perceived tomorrow. The future, moreover, is unknowable and unpredictable (e g Mk 13:3, 32). At the same time, focus on the present results in a concern for people's present hunger. Rather than accept the disciples' suggestion that he dismiss the crowd and let them fend for themselves, Jesus is concerned that they are fed now (Mk 6:36-37). Jesus' penchant for healing people on the sabbath (cf Mk 2:23-28) may also reflect his preference for the needs of the present moment.

Humanity and nature: In modern societies a nearly unanimous conviction is found that nature exists to be *mastered* and put to the service of human beings. People of first-century Mediterranean society, however, felt there was little a human being could do *to counteract the forces of nature*. Because of this, Jesus' miracles like the stilling of the storm (Mk 4:35-41) stand out as exceptional events in a world where humankind had no power over nature. That a human being in this culture could take command of nature or be immune to its effects is wondrous and awesome.

Human nature: Most persons living in a modern society believe that human nature is either *good* or a *mixture of good and evil* which requires control and effort, but which also can excuse some occasional lapses. Conversely, in first-century Mediterranean society, Jesus' answer to the rich young man in Mark 10:18, 'Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone', is a good reflection of how they thought about

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human nature. Does this imply that humankind is evil? Not at all. This response of Jesus manifests the cultural humility expected from anyone who is paid a compliment. After all, given the pivotal belief in the evil eye in first-century-Mediterranean culture, a malevolent spirit might hear this compliment and do something to cause a good person like Jesus to become or do something evil, exactly because evil was expected everywhere (see Elliott 1988:42-71; 1990a:262-273; 1991c:147-159; 1992:52-65). So the common and predictable strategy is to deny the compliment. What Jesus statement also reflects is the first-century belief that *human nature is a mixture of good and evil propensities*. Each case must be judged accordingly.

From the perspective of the above preference for value orientations, Pilch (1991:189) defines health in first-century Mediterranean society as follows: 'Health is a state of complete well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity'. The emphasis here is on *state of being*, rather than on the ability to function as in a modern (Western) culture. Health or well-being is but an example of *good fortune*. Alternately, sickness is but one example of a wide range of *misfortunes*. The key lies in understanding the relation of sickness to healing, from *fortune* to *misfortune*, not a modern idea, but one quite frequent in and more appropriate to other cultures. Health in the first-century Mediterranean world, therefore, was a state of *complete well-being*, and not the restoration of individual activity or performance.

With this understanding of sickness and health in first-century Mediterranean society, Pilch (1988b:61) turns to biblical healing by remarking the following: 'Human sickness as a personal and social reality and its therapy are inextricably bound to language and signification'. In terms of the biomedical or empiricist model (i e the model used in the practicing of modern medical medicine; see Pilch 1988b:60), it is believed that the order of words should reflect and reveal the order of things. If someone, for example uses the word 'leprosy', that word should reflect and reveal how the world as a matter of empirical fact is constituted and functions. The biblical use of the word 'leprosy', however, simply does not reflect the order of medical things. Therefore, it has to be decoded. The relationship of disease to culture (in modern society) is therefore two-dimensional: *Words* and *things*.

In contrast, medical anthropology (i e a model that studies ethnic or religious differences in interpreting human misfortune; see Pilch 1988b:60), when using the word 'leprosy', seeks for the connection between the words (flaky and repulsive skin condition) and the things (parts of the body in a certain condition) and the human experience (unclean). Here the relationship of disease and culture is three-dimensional: *Words*, *things*, and *human meaning*. Human sickness, or illness, can thus be conceived as a coherent syndrome of meaning and experience which is linked in society's deep semantic and value structure (Pilch 1988b:61).

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The difference between disease being cured in modern cultures, and illness being healed in cultures like that of the first-century Mediterranean world is illustrated by Pilch (1988b:65) in using the example of leprosy: In terms of leprosy, the main task of the modern (Western) practitioner is to decode the symptoms and translate them to the name of the disease. The symptoms must be listed, laboratory tests would have to be ordered, and bodily systems have to be checked out. The goal is clear: The disease must be identified (diagnosed) and explained, the symptoms must be correctly related to bodily disorder or disease, and then the therapist must intervene in the disease process to eradicate it or halt its process.

However, when a medical anthropological model is used to interpret an illness such as 'leprosy', such an approach rests on two assumptions (Pilch 1988b:63): Firstly, all illness realities are fundamentally semantic. *Sickness becomes a human experience and an object of therapeutic attention when it becomes meaningful.* Physicians make sickness meaningful by identifying the disease that fits the symptoms. Lay people make sickness meaningful in a very subjective way, drawing upon a wide range of knowledge, and ultimately construct an illness. Thus, illness realities will differ very widely from individual to individual within a society, culture or ethnic group. Secondly, all healing is a fundamentally hermeneutic or interpretive activity. The illness reality is uniquely subjective, a 'patch of personal biography' (Lewis 1981:156). The patient's symptoms and identified illness represent personal and group values and conceptualizations and are not simply mere biological reality. Understood as such, healing is essentially an interpretive activity carried out according to the specific interpretive strategies adopted by the healer (Pilch 1988b:63).

Thus, the process of healing according to a medical anthropological model, will entail the following: When an illness like leprosy surfaces, it will only be meaningful if it is a reality for the sufferer. Such a person will be labelled as unclean. Therefore, the leper will want to be declared clean (Mk 1:40). The fact that so many lepers in the gospels appeal to Jesus for mercy (see again Mk 1:40), suggests that the condition elicited no compassion from others. No doubt it also entailed aversion and perhaps even rejection. Most likely, the issue of pollution rather than contagion was at stake, in that an illness was construed in a humanly meaningful way rather than a disease based on unseen bacteria. Furthermore, the following questions will be asked to the leper: What do you call your problem? What name does it have? What do you think caused it? Why do you think it started when it did? What does your sickness do to you? How does it work? How long will it last? What do you fear most about your sickness? What is the chief problems it causes you? What kind of treatment do you think you should have?

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Answers to these questions, deduced from the accounts of healing lepers in the Gospels will look more or less like the following: The inflicted person is invariably called a leper or described as covered with leprosy. The use for this problem may be seen as God's punishment for sin (i e being 'out of place', and therefore unclean). The effects the sickness causes on the person is that he is seen as unclean, and consequently deprived of normal social intercourse. Small wonder then that the request to Jesus in almost every instance is 'make me clean', a request for compassion, mercy or pity. The expected result most probably will be the return of such a person to his own home and to full membership in the community. This Crossan calls *commensality*, that is 'shared home and common meal' (Crossan 1991a:341-344).

Therefore, decoding semantic illness networks demands that the analyst focus on group conceptualizations and values and strive to discover the deep personal meanings associated with an illness or a symptom. The overarching concern to be clean or cleansed most probably can be related to the command so often repeated in Leviticus 17-26: 'You must be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy (Lev 19:2). At the very least then, what Jesus did when he healed sick persons was to declare a person (like a leper) clean, that is, acceptable and welcome in the community. Jesus thus extended the boundaries of society and included in the holy community many who were otherwise excluded (e g lepers, sinners, tax-collectors and prostitutes). In this regard, Kleinman (1980:82) makes the following interesting remark:

> 'Cultural healing' may occur when healing rites reassert threatened values and arbitrate social tensions. Thus therapeutic procedures may heal *social stress* independent of the effect they have on the sick person who provide the occasion for their use.
>
> (Kleinman 1980:82; his italics)

In Mark 1:41, for example, Jesus touches a leper. Apart from the fact that leprosy is only mildly contagious, the touching might draw its significance not so much from fear for pollution as a physical symbol of acceptance in the community. What Jesus thus did was 'to heal' the leper, that is, to invite him into the community again by healing his social stress in terms of not being accepted, independent of the fact whether the man was cured from his disease.

Thus far an explicit distinction was made between disease and curing, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, illness and healing. The reason for this is that, in medical anthropology, the word sickness is seen as a blanket term describing a reality, while the words disease and illness are explanatory concepts and terms useful in exploring different facets of that single reality. In this regard, the concept *disease* reflects a

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biomedical (modern) perspective which sees abnormalities in the structure or function of organ systems. As such, a disease affects individuals and only individuals are treated. To think in terms of individuals and individual disease, however, is a perspective quite foreign to first-century Mediterranean society which was radically group orientated (see again above this section, and also section 4.2.3). In such a society, persons were dyadic personalities rather than rugged individuals. The concept *illness* is therefore used in medical anthropology to reflect a socio-cultural perspective on sickness that depends entirely on social and personal perception of certain socially disvalued states including, but not necessarily restricting, what modern Western science would recognize as disease. Or, in the words of Young (1982:270):

> The notion of disease refers to organic pathologies and abnormalities. Illness is a process through which worrisome behavioral and biological signs, particularly one originating in disease, are given *socially recognizable meanings*, i.e, they are made into symptoms and socially significant outcomes. Sickness, on the other hand, is the process through which worrisome behavioral and biological signs, particularly originating in disease, are given socially recognizable meanings. Illness personalizes disease, and sickness socializes them both[42].
>
> (Young 1982:270)

The same principle applies to the differentiation between the concepts of curing and healing. Technically speaking, when therapy can effect a disease in order to check or remove it, that activity is called *curing*. When an intervention, however, affects an illness, it is called *healing* (Pilch 1991:192). Thus, disease and curing go together, as illness and healing go hand in hand. The obvious social concern, therefore, that accompanies the reports of human health-related misfortunes in the New Testament is evidence that the discussion of them in the gospels centers on illness, which are almost always healed. This suggests that all of Jesus' dealings with the sick in the gospels are truly *healings*, although they might not be *cures* in the technical sense (Pilch 1991:192; see again Kleinman 1980:82).

Finally, let us discuss the health care system in first-century Mediterranean as described by Pilch (1981:109; 1985:143-150; 1991:192-200; 1992:28-31), in following Mackintosh (1978)[43]: The *professional sector* of a health care system includes the professional, trained and credentiated healers. A good example of these kinds of healers is found in Mark 5:26, where Mark explicitly says this is the sector in which the woman might have placed her confidence considering this is where she exhausted all her resources. In the *popular sector*, the principle concern of the lay, non-

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professional, non-specialist is health and health maintenance, not sickness and cure (Pilch 1991:194). Obviously this focus on health sensitizes people to note deviance from the culturally defined norm known as 'health'. Therefore, it is in this, the popular sector, that the deviant condition known as sickness is first observed, defined as illness and treated. There are several levels in the popular sector of the health care system: The individual, family, social networks (institutions) and community beliefs and activities. Many individuals in the gospels are reported to have different kinds of illness, and in most of the cases the families are also effected. The consequences of healings, therefore, effected this wider group as well. In terms of institutions, people were always 'checked' out by others (Malina 1979:128), because persons lived in a continual dependence upon the opinion of others, inclu-ding the judgment of whether or not one is ill. Finally, the popular sector of the health care system is characterized by a distinctive set of community beliefs and practices (Pilch 1991:198). For example, the belief in spirits and spirit-aggression including possession is found in all the gospels (cf Elliott 1988:42-71; 1990a:262-273; 1991c:147-159; 1992:52-65). The worldview of the gospels lies heavily under the in-fluence of spirits, demons and the like. Spirits could be everything, from unclean spirits (cf Mk 1:23) up to the demon 'fever' (cf Mk 1:30). In addition, a few spirit-related illness episodes are found in Mark (cf Mk 1:21-28; 3:19b-30; 5:1-20; 9:14-23). Spirit-related illness thus looms large in Mark, and healers such as Jesus (and other, cf Mk 10:38) must have been able to address this human ailment with some measure of success.

Finally, in terms of the *folk sector*, Jesus can be seen as a folk-healer (Pilch 1991:197), and his 'license to practice' is tacitly granted and acknowledged by not only each sick person, but also by the local communities in which he operated (cf Mk 1:27). The power of Jesus in regard to evil-spirits and demons is indeed noteworthy. A central function of his healing ministry is to lead those whose lives have lost cultural meaning back to the proper purpose and direction of life. That is, he preached repentance, change of heart and the transformation and broadening of boundaries (Pilch 1991:194)[44]. The folk healer normally shares significant elements of the constituency's world view and health concepts. All the Mediterranean contemporaries of Jesus and his followers believed in the reality of a spirit world that regularly meddled in human affairs. Folk healers also accepted everything that was present as naturally co-occurring elements of a syndrome. The story of the Gerasene demoniac (Mk 5:1-20) is a good example. That he wore no clothes and lived among the tombs were all of equal importance to Jesus. Jesus' final words for him to go home was also part of the therapy instructing him on his proper residence and place in society, his house.

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The majority of folk healers also treated their clients as outpatients. During healings, there was normally a crowd present because the healing episodes are very likely bounded with the core values of honor and shame in the first-century Mediterranean world. Furthermore, folk healers take the patient's view of his/her illness always at face value, and the vocabulary used to describe an illness was invariably associated with the sick person's everyday experience and belief system. The varied terms for malevolent spirits (unclean spirits, evil spirits, demons) quite likely reflect the lay perspective on this kind of illness which is rooted in the Mediterranean belief in spirits (Pilch 1991:199). Finally, since folk healers are native to the community and know well its mores, history and scandals, they make special use of the historical and social context of each illness. Jesus, for example, taught in many synagogues, and many of his healings took place in that context (cf Mk 1:21-28; 3:1-6).

To summarize: Using a medical anthropological model not only helps the modern reader of the gospels to avoid 'medicocentrism', but also makes it possible to distinguish between disease and illness (and set them off from the concepts of curing and healing). Illness refers to a social and personal perception of certain socially disvalued states, and can be seen as but one example of a wide range of misfortunes. Because illness was a disvalued state, it usually led to the ill person being cut off from the community, thus labelled unclean. Jesus, as a healer from the folk sector, healed many an illness in his day, especially by given mercy or being compassionate towards people that were removed from the community because their illness threatened community holiness and integrity. The concept of biblical healing should therefore be understood, not only in terms of curing certain diseases, but also in terms of the fact that Jesus declared unclean persons clean, and by doing this, rendered them acceptable in society.

In section 6.4.4 it will be argued, by using the above discussed medical anthropological model of sickness and healing, that the narrator of Mark uses Jesus' exorcisms and other healings to indicate that Jesus did not only have at least the same (or even more) authority than the 'official' religious leaders of his day to be the new broker of the kingdom, but also his healings of especially the expendables in society were aimed at creating the new household of God (or the broadening thereof). By this is meant that Jesus' healing of ill people (those who were rendered 'unclean' and thus excluded from the holy community) involved establishing new selfunderstandings so that these ill people now found themselves 'clean, and within the holy community (see also Pilch 1988a:60; 1991:181-210). Also, by these healings, as well as by forgiving sins, Jesus indirectly challenged the temple in Jerusalem. The following question will also specifically be attended to: How, for example, would Jesus' healings on Galilean soil have been interpreted by the religious leaders in Jerusalem (like the chief priests, elders and

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scribes), and their representatives on Galilean soil (cf e g Mk 3:22; 7:1), which clearly belonged to the popular sector of the health care system in the first-century Mediterranean world? In this section it will be argued that Jesus' healings was seen by them as being religiopolitically subversive.

4.2.7 Purity and pollution

The concept of purity and pollution was first introduced to cultural anthropologists and biblical scholars by Mary Douglas, in her book *Purity and danger: An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo* (1966), which was followed by her subsequent book *Natural symbols* (1973). In these works, Douglas introduced a theory in terms of which societies classify and arrange their respective worlds. Douglas (1966:13) calls the process of ordering a socio-cultural system 'purity', in contrast with 'pollution', which stands for the violation of the classification system, its lines and boundaries (Douglas 1966:14)[45]. The study of purity, according to Douglas (1966:34), is therefore the study of symbolic systems. It is also important to note that Douglas (1966:18-22) understands the concept of purity as relating to two meanings: On the one hand, groups normally have a *general* system of purity by which their society is classified and structured. On the other hand, however, one may also speak of the *specific* purity rules and norms of a given group. Ancient Jews, for example, had specific purity rules which classified foods as clean or unclean, which ranked objects according to degrees of uncleanness, and which identified persons as fit or unfit to enter the temple in Jerusalem. By these specific rules people and objects were thus declared sacred/ profane, clean/unclean or pure/polluted.

The term purity is the best understood in terms of its binary opposite, namely 'dirt' (Douglas 1966:34-35). When something is out of place or when it violates the classification system in which it is set, it is called 'dirt' (Douglas 1966:35). For example: Dung, where cows are milked is not dirt because it is where one should normally find dung. However, when the farmer comes inside the house with dung-covered shoes, the dung is dirt, it is out of place, it is impurity inside. Thus, dirt is the wrong *thing* that appears at the wrong *time* in the wrong *place*. Understood as such, purity is an abstract term which stands for the order of a social system, that is, the pattern of perceptions and the system of classifications (Neyrey 1991c:274), an abstract way of interpreting data (Neyrey 1986a:92). The idea of dirt, according to Douglas (1966:35), is pivotal in the exposition of purity for two reasons:

> It (dirt — EvE) implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt, then, is never an isolated unique event. Where there is dirt, there is a system. Dirt is the by-product of a

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> systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements.
>
> (Douglas 1966:35)

According to Douglas (1966:37-39), we all draw lines in our world relative to things, places, activities and times. These lines tell us *what* and *who* belong *when* and *where*. Because these lines help us to classify and arrange our world according to some dominant principle, they convey through their structural arrangement the abstract values of the social world of which we are part (see also Malina 1981:25-27, 124-126). Our culture is intelligible to us in virtue of our classification system, the lines we draw, and the boundaries we erect (Neyrey 1986a:93).

Purity, therefore, refers to the cultural system and the organizing principle of a group. Douglas (1966:38-39) notes that culture, in the sense of public standardized values of the community, mediates the experience of individuals. It provides in advance some basic categories, a positive pattern in which ideas and values are tidily ordered. Purity then is an abstract way of dealing with values, maps and structures of a given social group (Douglas 1966:34-36). It provides a map or a series of maps which diagram the group's cultural system and locate 'a place for everything and everything in its place' (Douglas 1966:35).

In terms of the second meaning of purity, that is, the more specific rules and norms of a given group (in this case Judaism), we regularly in the Old Testament come across statements such as 'You shall be holy, for I, the Lord your God, am holy' (Lev 19:2) and '[t]heir flesh you shall not eat, their carcasses you shall not touch, they are unclean to you' (Lev 11:8). There is, therefore, no doubt that ancient Israel had a keen sense of purity and pollution. In terms of Jewish notions of 'holy' and 'unclean', Douglas (1966:48-57) states that holiness, an attribute of God, resides in God's power to bless or curse. 'God's work through the blessing is essentially to create order, through which men's affairs prosper' (Douglas 1966:50). When the blessing is withdrawn, confusion occurs, with barrenness and pestilence (cf Deut 28:15-24). God's premier blessing act was the ordering of creation, when time was structured into work and rest days, when creatures were created in their pure forms (no hybrids or unclean animals), when all creatures were assigned proper foods, as well as their proper place in creation. Creation, the ultimate act of ordering and classifying the world, thus was the original map (Douglas 1966:51). Holiness, in turn, involves 'keeping distinct the categories of creation'; it involves correct definition, discrimination[46] and order (Douglas 1966:51; cf also Soler 1979:24-30).

The creation in Genesis 1, according to Neyrey (1991c:277), fully expresses the divine order of the world. It encoded various 'maps' or configurations of lines which God made for Israel to perceive and follow (cf Soler 1974:24). According to Genesis

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1, God did not make things helter skelter, but arranged them orderly in a proper cosmos. By constantly 'separating' things (cf Gen 1:4, 7, 14), God created a series of maps which order, classify and define the world as Jews came to see it (see Neyrey 1991c:277):

* *Time*: At creation, time was separated into day and night, and the week then was separated into work days and sabbath rest, also the sun and moon and stars served to precisely mark time. The fundamentals of a calendar were thus established.
* *Things*: Birds, animals and fish were created in their pure form (no hybrids), and each class was separated in terms of its proper place, food and means of locomotion.
* *Place*: At creation, dry land was separated from the waters above and below, each creature was separated into its proper place, animals roamed the earth, birds flew in the air and fish swam in the sea.
* *Diet*: At creation, a proper diet was assigned to each creature.
* *Role/Status*: At creation, the hierarchy of creation was established, in that heavens ruled over the night and the sun ruled the day. Among creatures on the dry land, Adam was given dominion over them all.

Creation, therefore, constitutes the original map of 'purity' or holiness for Israel. The holy God expressed holiness through this order. Thus, the saying 'You shall be holy, as I, the Lord your God, am holy' became the norm which indicated how things in Israel's world should replicate and express the divine order established in God's initial, programmatic action of creation. According to Neusner (1979:103-127), this 'holiness' came to be embodied especially in the central symbol of Israel's culture, the temple, where specific maps replicating the patterns of Genesis 1, regulated the temple as a focal symbol of the Jewish world, which was often thought to be the center of the universe. The following abstract order of creation, according to Neusner (1979:109; cf Fennelly 1983:274-275), determined the following specific purity rules for the temple system:

1. *what animals* may be offered:
   only 'holy' animals, viz. those which accord with the definition of a clean animal and which are physically perfect;
2. *who may offer* them:
   a 'holy' priest, who has perfect blood lines, who is in perfect physical condition, and who is in a state of purity;

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3. *who may participate* in the sacrifice:
only Israelites, and only those with whole bodies (Lev 21:16-20);
4. *where* the offering is *to be made*:
in Jerusalem's temple, which is a microcosm of creation
5. *when* the offerings are to be made and what offering is appropriate on which occasion.

(Neusner 1979:109; his italics)

The temple system then was a major replication of the idea of order and purity established in the creation. As such it thus became the central and dominant symbol of Israel's culture, religion and politics.

Although only priests needed to observe the specific rules of purity, there were Jews in Jesus' time (e g the Pharisees, see section 6.3) who would extend them to the people of Israel at large, so that all people might be holy, as temple and priests were holy (Neusner 1973a:82-83; Fennelly 1983:277-283). The creation thus also yielded maps for structuring aspects of Jewish life beyond that of the temple. By 'map' is meant the concrete and systematic patterns of organizing, locating and classifying persons, places, time and actions according to some abstract notion of 'purity' or order (Neyrey 1991c:278). Thus, maps of *places*, *persons*, *things* and *times* were used to structure Jewish life beyond that of the temple. In discussing the following maps we are aided by Douglas' discussion of the map of dietary rules (see Douglas 1966:41-57) and by Malina's description of purity in Judaism in the time of Jesus (see Malina 1981:131-137).

Map of places: As Matthew 23:16-22 indicates, Jews could order space in terms of progressive degrees of holiness. The clearest example of this is the map of places from m. Kelim I, 6-9:

> *6.* There are ten degrees of holiness. The *Land of Israel* is holier than any other land .... *7.* The *walled cities* [of the Land of Israel] are still more holy, in that they may send forth the lepers from their midst; moreover they may carry around a corpse therein wheresoever they will, but once it is gone forth [from the city] they may not bring it back. *8.* *Within the wall* [of Jerusalem] is still more holy .... The *Temple Mount* is still more holy, for no man or woman that has a flux, no menstruant, and no woman after childbirth may enter therein. The *Rampart* is still more holy, for no gentiles and none that have contracted uncleanness from a corpse may enter therein. The *Court of the Women* is still more holy, for none that had immersed himself the selfsame day [because of

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> uncleanness] may enter therein .... The *Court of the Israelites* is still more holy, for none whose atonement is yet incomplete may enter therein .... The *Court of the Priests* is still more holy, for Israelites may not enter therein save only when they must perform the laying on of hands, slaughtering, and waving. *9. Between the Porch and the Altar* [it] is still more holy, for none that has a blemish or whose hair is unloosed may enter there. The *Sanctuary* is still more holy, for none may enter therein with hands and feet unwashed. The *Holy of Holies* is still more holy, for none may enter therein save only the high priest on the Day of Atonement at the time of the [Temple-] service.
>
> (m. Kelim I,6-9; see Danby 1933:605-606[47])

From this list it is clear that, since the Gentiles are not God's people, they are not on the map at all. But all of Israel is holy. As though one was ascending a series of concentric circles, one travels upward and inward toward the center of holiness, the temple (Neyrey 1986a:95; 1991c:279). The Holy of Holies is the most holy. Therefore, it is the center of the universe, the navel of the world. Also, the direction of the map suggests the principle of classification: Holiness is measured in terms of proximity to the heart of the temple, the center of the map. Galilee in first-century Palestine therefore, although holy as a part of Israel, was less holy than Jerusalem, because of its remoteness from the temple. However, it must also be remembered that in Matthew 4:15 Galilee is called Galilee of the Gentiles (cf also 1 Macc 5:15).

Map of people: People likewise are mapped. Like the map of places in m. Kelim, people are ranked in a specific sequence according to a discernible hierarchical principle. According to Jeremias (1969:271-272), the classification list/map of persons is to be found in a number of places in rabbinic literature (m. Kid 4.1; m. Hor 3.8; t. Rosh Has 4.1), but the most complete one is found in t. Megillah 2.7[48]. This passage, according to Neyrey (1991c:279), lists people who may be present for the reading of the scroll of Esther. It looks as follows:

1. Priests
2. Levites
3. Israelites
4. Converts
5. Freed slaves
6. Disqualified priests (illegitimate children of priests)
7. *Netzins* (temple slaves)
8. *Mamzers* (bastards)

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9. Eunuchs
10. Those with damaged testicles
11. Those without a penis

(t. Meg. 2.7; cf Neyrey 1991c:279)

Two principles of classification are operative here: Firstly, holiness means wholeness, and so people with damaged body parts are ranked last because their lack of wholeness signals a corresponding lack of holiness. Those with damaged family lines (slaves, bastards) are ranked next to last, for their wholeness is also defective. Secondly, the ranking of people on this map replicates the map of places, for one's rank corresponds with one's proximity to the center of the temple. People defective either in body or family lines are on the perimeter of the temple, converts may stand closer, still closer to the center are full Israelites, and closest of all are Levites and priests. This map of persons was also used to create a map of marriages, which indicated ranking and permissible/impermissible unions in terms of marriage (see Malina 1981:110-113, 131-133; Van Aarde 1991a:685-715; 1992b:436 for a discussion in this regard).

Above we indicated, in terms of the map of persons, that the Israelites constitute an undifferentiated block of people in Israel. However, this block may be further broken down and classified in terms of a *map of uncleanness*, by which a more detailed map of persons can be drawn of Jewish society. Firstly, a basic distinction was made between *observant* and *non-observant* Jews. Those in Jerusalem were perceived to be concerned with Jerusalem's temple and with purity, while the 'people of the land' (e g those living in Galilee) are just that, people who live apart from the city and its temple, in the countryside, in villages, even in Galilee of the Gentiles, which was far removed from the temple and its purity concerns (cf Meyers 1981:31-47). Secondly, even among *observant* Jews there were further classifications, like the Essenes (who considered the present priesthood of the temple to be impure and invalid), the Pharisees (with their own interpretation of the purity lines and boundaries as advocated by the temple system) and the scribes (who were charged with the promotion of the Torah and its dominance in all aspects of life). Thirdly, full-Israelites who are non-observant may further be classified. Public sinners (e g tax-collectors and prostitutes) were distinguished from the masses. They are, at best, on the margins of the covenant map. Also on the margins are physically unclean folk such as lepers, the blind and the lame. According to the Law, these people were unclean and were not permitted in the temple. They are those who have put themselves on the perimeter of the purity map (sinners) and those who find themselves put there because of their physical lack of wholeness (the sick and deformed). Fourth, even observant Israelites may pass through stages of purity and uncleanness. One can and should know one's place in the purity system at

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all times, but for this, one needs a specific *map of impurities*. In m. Kelim 1,5, for example, a list is to be found that name the ten degrees of uncleanness in men, which classifies the contaminant, how long he is contaminated, and what must be done to remove the respective degree of contamination. In the same tractate (m. Kelim I), one also finds the following map in which a general hierarchy of uncleanness is mapped as follows[49]:

> *1.* These Fathers of Uncleanness, [namely] a [dead] creeping thing, male semen, he that has contracted uncleanness from a corpse, a leper in his days of reckoning, and Sin-offering water too little in quantity to be sprinkled, convey uncleanness to men and vessels by contact .... *2* They are exceeded by carrion and by Sin-offering water sufficient in to be sprinkled ... *3*. They are exceeded by him that has connection with a menstruant .... They are exceeded by the issue of him that has a flux, by his spittle, his semen, and his urine, and by the blood of a menstruant....They are exceeded by [the uncleanness] what is ridden upon [by him that has a flux], for it conveys uncleanness even to what lies beneath a stone .... [The uncleanness of] that is ridden upon [by him that has a flux] is exceeded by what he lies upon .... [The uncleanness of] what he lies upon is exceeded by the uncleanness of him that has a flux ....
>
> (m. Kelim I, 1-3; Danby 1933:604)

Furthermore, the uncleanness of a man is exceeded by the uncleanness of a woman, whose uncleanness is exceeded by that of a leper, then by that of a corpse (m. Kelim I,4). It is thus safe to say that Israel was both intensely concerned with purity and with the appropriate lines and boundaries which classified everything in its proper place, even uncleanness.

Map of times: Times may be mapped as well, for Jews certainly had both a lunar and solar calender to differentiate days and seasons by means of which they identified days of pilgrimage, sacrifice, fasting, feasting and the sabbath. The very structure of the second division of the Mishna, the *Moed*, is an index of special, classified times with lists of appropriate rules for observing these times:

Shabbat	Sabbath
Erubin	The Fusion of Sabbath Limits
Pesahim	Feast of Passover
Shekalim	The Shekel Dues
Yoma	The Day of Atonement

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Sukkah	The Feast of Tabernacles
Yom Tob or Betsah	Festival days
Rosh ha-Shana	Feast of the New Year
Taanith	Days of Fasting
Megillah	The Scroll of Esther
Moed Katan	Mid-Festival days
Hagigah	The Festal Offering.

(Danby 1933:i)

Sabbath goes back to creation, when God himself rested; it is the most holy of all times. Jesus' healing on the sabbath (cf Mk 3:1-6) therefore, was such a great offense in the eyes of the Pharisees that they immediately, according to Mark, started to conspire with the Herodians to kill Jesus. Passover is the feast commemorating the creation of Israel when God led them out of Egypt, thus it ranked second in sacredness. Then follow the other major holy days, which are in turn followed by the lesser holy days and festivals.

If purity means maps and classification systems which locate things where they ought to be, it follows that considerable attention will be given to the *lines* and *boundaries* of these maps. The prime activity of a group with a strong purity system will be the making and maintenance of these lines and boundaries. In relation to these lines and boundaries, Douglas (1966:114) notes that 'the image of society has form; it has *external boundaries, margins, internal structure*' (her italics). Boundary lines basically indicate who's 'in' and who's 'out', or what belongs and what does not (Neyrey 1991c: 281). For example, there are clear and specific boundary lines separating members and non-members of God's covenant people, like special food (kosher diet), special times (the sabbath) and special bodily marks (circumcision).

The maps listed above thus are Jewish attempts to classify and locate all times, places and persons, with the aim of structuring the Jewish culture internally. Also, since purity means the exact classification of persons, times and things, there is great concern over things which either do not fit a given definition or do not find an exact place on the map. Something out of place is inherently suspect. For example, a hybrid does not fully fit any determined definition in terms of clean animals, and is therefore polluted and dangerous (Douglas 1966:94-98).

In terms of internal lines/structure, Neyrey (1986a:101) gives the following interesting map of Jewish social structure as to be found in the New Testament as an illustration of how Israelites are internally ranked according to a purity system. According to Neyrey (1986a:101) the map should be seen as supplementing the map of persons found in t. Megillah 2.7 (see above)[50]:

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1. Dead Israelites
   concern over Jesus' dead body (Mk 15:43; 16:1)
2. Morally unclean Israelites
   tax-collectors and sinners (Mk 2:15)
3. Bodily unclean Israelites
   lepers (Mk 1:40-45)
   poor, lame, maimed, blind (Mk 8:22-26)
4. Unobservant Israelites
   disciples of Jesus (Mk 2:18)
   Jesus (Mk 3:1-5)
5. Observant Israelites
   the rich young man (Mk 10:17-20)
6. Pharisees (Mk 7:3-5)
7. Scribes and priests (Mk 2:16)
8. Chief priests (Mk 14:63).

(Neyrey 1986a:101)

According to Neyrey (1986a:101-102), this map is very important, for if one had to know one's purity ratings at all times, a code was needed for classifying people to know where they stand in the system. Observant Jews were always concerned that proper lines and boundaries were maintained[51]. Marginal objects as well as people were to be shunned and kept away from the space of full and holy Israelites. Persons of lesser purity rank were not allowed to intrude on the space of those of higher purity status. It is not surprising then that a group like the Pharisees built a 'fence' around the law (Neyrey 1986a:102)[52]. Fences might be called 'the tradition of the elders (Mk 7:4-5)' (Neyrey 1991c:281). To keep the core clean and pure, one extended the boundary around the core, 'put up a fence on the perimeter, and guarded that 'outer' fence. Hence the chief rule was to ... [m]ake a fence around the Law' (Neyrey 1991c: 102). And if the fence was appropriate around the Law as a whole, it was appropriate around individual aspects of the Law also.

Let me finally turn to Douglas' interpretation of the relation between the human body and boundaries (Douglas 1966:91-115). Above it was indicated how purity boundaries are fixed in terms of the maps of places and persons. According to Douglas (1966:115; cf also Neyrey 1986b:129-170), there is still another map where lines and boundaries are drawn, that is, the map of the human body. According to her, the human body is a replica of the social body, a symbol of society:

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> The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious.
>
> (Douglas 1966:115)

The map of the body, then, replicates the map of the social body[53]. As the social body draws lines, restricts admission, expels undesirables and guards its entrances and exits, so this tends to be replicated in the control of the physical body. According to Douglas (1973:93; 1982:70-71), '[b]ody control is an expression of social control ... abandonment of bodily control in ritual responds to the requirements of a social experience which is being expressed ... [therefore] the physical experience of the body ... sustains a particular view of society'.

This means that in a culture where there are strong purity concerns and clear lines and boundaries, we should be sensitive to the map of the body, and especially how certain bodily features like *nudity and clothing*, *orifices* of the body and *surfaces* of the body and head are treated. Clear maps for the body in terms of its *boundaries*, *structure* and *margins* thus existed. In terms of bodily boundaries, the skin and clothing (which replicates the skin as boundary) were very important. Since clothing signals gender, woman should wear woman's clothing and men men's. Nudity was seen as dangerous and threatening. The true boundary of the body, its skin, also has orifices which are gateways to the interior of the body, just as walled cities had gates. These orifices were the object of great scrutiny. As gates to the interior, they had to screen out what does not belong and guard against a pollutant entering it. The guarded orifices tended to be the eyes, mouth, ears and genitals. For example, the genital orifices were of great concern. Semen and menses were regarded unclean. Concern for the surface of the skin is also shown in the horror displayed towards skin diseases and 'leprosy' in the Bible.

In terms of bodily structure, a well-regulated society (where roles and classifications are clear) was to be replicated in the physical body. Also, in terms of bodily margins, lines should be clear, there should not be 'too little' or 'too much' (Neyrey 1991c:284). Too much is polluting, as in the case of a hermaphrodite which is both male and female. Bodies that have too little, like that of an eunuch (with damaged sexual organs), or being blind, deaf or lame, were rendered unclean.

To summarize: Purity means lines and firm borders, and pollution refers to what crosses those boundaries or what resides in the margins and has no clear place in the system. In the previous discussion, we identified unclean persons and things as people who are not physically whole in body or family lines, who either experience emissions from bodily margins or who come in contact with these emissions, and foods and animals which do not fit clearly within defined boundaries. A person therefore begins in a

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given state of purity, but that can be lost either because he/she crossed a boundary and entered a more holy space than he/she is permitted to enter (cf Frymer-Kensky 1983: 405), or because something else less holy crossed over and entered his/her space (Douglas 1966:122). Crossing of boundaries then means pollution. The maps of places, persons, things and times are important for knowing just what these boundary lines are.

From this it is logical that the appropriate strategy in this type of world is defensive. What is called for is avoidance of contact with what is either to holy or marginal and unclean, and reinforcement of boundaries and purity concerns. People who continually have even passing contact with sinners, lepers, the blind, the lame and corpses and the like are perceived as spurning the map of persons. People who show no respect for holy places such as the temple are crossing dangerous lines on the map of places, and would be judged by some in some way to reject the system. Such people would be rated as unclean. Not only are they themselves polluted, they become a source of pollution to others.

In section 6.4.2, it will be indicated that Jesus continually crossed these boundaries and lines (cf inter alia Mk 1:21-28, 40-45, 2:1-12, 18-22, 3:1-5, 7:1-13). Or, to state it more precisely: Jesus ignored the purity rules of his day, and to ignore them was to subvert them at the most fundamental level, that is, it was nothing less than a calculated attack on the temple in Jerusalem. This could only lead to conflict. It will also be argued that the way Jesus ate constituted the internal norms and values of the new (broadened) household (section 6.4.3), and the way Jesus treated the purity rules of his day constituted the external norms of the new (broadened) household of God (section 6.4.2).

4.2.8 Kinship as the dominant institution in first-century Mediterranean society

According to Malina (1986b:152), it is common to distinguish between four basic social institutions or structures in any society, as a means by which basic human values are realized. These four basic institutions may be called kinship, economics, politics and religion (Malina 1986b:152). Briefly, *kinship* is about naturing and nurturing people, is held together by *commitment*, and forms a structure of human belonging. *Economics* is about provisioning a group of people and is held together by *inducement*, that is, the exchange of goods and services[54]. *Politics* looks to effective collective action, is held together by *power* and forms the vertical organizational structure of society[55]. *Religion* deals with the overarching order of existence and is held together by *influence*, that is, it provides reasons for what exists and the models that generate those reasons. Hence, religion forms the meaning system of a society, and as such,

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feeds backwards into the kinship, economic and political systems, unifying the whole by means of some explicit or implicit ideology (see Malina 1986b:152; cf also Malina 1981:54-55; 1989:131-137). In New Testament scholarship, especially in regard to scholars who employ social scientific models to read biblical texts, there is more or less a consensus in regard to this insight of Malina (cf inter alia Polanyi et al 1957:33; Polanyi 1977:53; Ohnuki-Tierny 1981:16; Pilch 1985:146, 1988b:61; Hollenbach 1987:52; Horsley 1989b:4-5; Smith 1989:22; Oakman 1991a:34-35).

However, the question of which of these four institutions must be regarded as maintaining primacy over the others, has thus far not been clearly answered. Some of these scholars argue that kinship was the main institution (Heilbroner 1972:37; Finley 1973:50; Carney 1975:149; Polanyi 1977:46; Ohnuki-Tierny 1981:16; Malina 1986b: 153; Smith 1989:23; Horsley 1989b:5), while others are of the opinion that kinship *and* politics were the main social institutions in first-century Mediterranean society (Hollenbach 1987:52; Pilch 1988b:61; Oakman 1991a:35). Let us look more closely to their different arguments: According to Malina (1986b:153), one can argue that, as a general rule (in both past and present societal arrangements) one of the four institutions of kinship, economics, politics and religion maintains primacy over the others. In medieval Christendom in the past, for example, kinship, politics and economics were embedded in religion. According to Marxist theories, however, kinship, religion and politics are embedded in economics, and in most countries which use a capitalistic mode of economics, kinship, religion and politics were determined by the economical institution. In first-century Mediterranean countries, however, religion, politics and economics are determined by the kinship institution (cf also Malina 1988b:8). The fact that kinship was the primary institution in first-century Mediterranean society is described by Malina (1989:131) as follows:

> While all human societies presumably witness to kinship institutions, the Mediterranean world treats this institution as primary and focal .... In fact in the whole Mediterranean world, the centrally located institution maintaining societal existence is kinship and its sets of interlocking rules. The result is the central value of *familism*. The family or kinship group is central in social organization; it is the primary focus of personal loyalty and it holds supreme sway over individual life.
>
> (Malina 1989:131; his italics)

According to Malina (1989:131), therefore, kinship was the centrally located institution without which the society would perish or be radically altered. This argument of Malina finds support in the works of Polanyi (1977:46), Ohnuki-Tierny (1981:16), Horsley (1989b:5) and Smith (1989:23). According to Polanyi (1977:46) and Horsley

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(1989b:5), the fundamental forms of ancient agrarian life centered on the peasant family and the village community of several such families. And, according to Smith (1989:23), the family as a central institution formed a web in which all other social networks were embedded. Finally, the opinion of Ohnuki-Tierny (1981:16) in this regard is as follows:

> [In first-century Mediterranean society] the locus of symbolic differentiation remains social relations, principally kinship relations, and other spheres of activity are ordered by the operative distinction of kinship.
> (Ohnuki-Tierny 1981:16)

However, Hollenbach (1987:52), Pilch (1988b:61) and Oakman (1991a:35) differ from the above points of view in that they postulate kinship *and* politics together were the two main institutions in first-century Palestine: 'All other realities that we moderns perceive as quite separate and distinct as education, religion, and economics were embedded into *kinship* and *politics* (Hollenbach 1987:52; his italics). As has been indicated, the points of view of Pilch (1988b:61) and Oakman (1991a:35) concur with that of Hollenbach.

The most recent, and maybe still relatively unknown work of Fiensy (1991), can help us understand the differences among the above named scholars. Fiensy's work is a study of the social history of Palestine during the Herodian period (37 BCE-70 CE) in which he concentrates more specifically on the relationship between the urban elites and the rural peasants. The first-century Mediterranean world was that of an agrarian society[56] (Fiensy 1991:7; cf also inter alia Carney 1975, Polanyi 1977, Belo 1981, Horsley & Hanson 1985, Freyne 1988, Myers 1988, Elliott 1989, Waetjen 1989, Crossan 1991a, Van Aarde 1992d:94-95). In agrarian societies most of the population consisted of peasants[57]. In following Redfield (1956), Kippenberg (1978) and Oakman (1986), Fiensy (1991:2) states that among the peasants there existed a notion regarding land tenure that differed in stark contrast with that of the urban elite. This notion was also known as the difference between the Little Tradition and the Great Tradition (Redfield 1956:43)[58]. The Little Tradition consists of the belief that the land belongs to Yahweh and was given in trust to Israel. The land was the promised land, not to be used as capital or to be exploited in terms of economical gains. Because the land belonged to God, according to the Little Tradition, the Jubilee and sabbatical rest laws (which specify that every seven years the land must lie fallow and all debts must be forgiven) was of great importance. In terms of the Jubilee, they also believed that all land should be apportionately distributed with no one becoming wealthy to the impoverishment of others (Redfield 1956:44).

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Fiensy (1991:7-11) is convinced that there is little evidence that anyone observed the Jubilee in the Second Temple period. There is, however, evidence that the peasants longed for the Jubilee-Sabbatical year laws to be enforced. During the periods of the Ptolemies and Seleucids, land became an article to be exploited. The Ptolemies inherited the belief that all the land belonged to the king, and this idea was carried out by the Seleucids. In the Herodian period, the same attitude toward the land of the peasants prevailed. However, the tendency of the Herodians to acquire more and more land was not based on the right of the monarch, but solely on entrepreneurship and investment (Fiensy 1991:23). The result was that fewer and fewer of the many peasants owned their own land, and the few elites owned more and more land in Palestine[59]. To substantiate this claim, Fiensy then goes on to show, especially from archaeological evidence, that great parts of land became royal estates, or belonged to the aristocrats in Jerusalem (see Fiensy 1991:24-60).

The reasons for peasants losing their land were manifold: Not only did the Herodians confiscate land for their own use, but the entrepreneurial investment in the land by the aristocrats was especially one of the main factors (Fiensy 1991:78). When debts could not be paid, farms were foreclosed. Land, then, was again let out for even more income. According to Fiensy (1991:95-105), two of the main reasons for debts were natural disasters like famines, locusts and pests, and also taxes. In terms of taxes, there were soil taxes (*tributum soli*), poll-tax (*tributum capitis*; levied on every male between 14 and 65), temple tax, tithes, and indirect taxes like tolls, crown taxes, taxes on salt and taxes on trade (Fiensy 1991:99-105). This all meant that the peasants had almost nothing left at the end of the day. To survive, they had to borrow from the large landowners, and large debts were at the order of the day. Finally, they lost their land when debts could not be paid. Because of the loss of their land, many peasants then became day laborers, slaves or bandits (Fiensy 1991:85-98). This also led to a situation where many peasants were poor, while the small number of elites just got richer. Economical, cultural and social distance between urban elites and rural peasants thus increased.

Because of this situation, changes on the level of kinship had to come. The extended families started to break up because of the great stress it was under. The medium social unit became the neighbors of the courtyard, and the only viable economic unit soon became the village. The result eventually was that city and village became 'rivals' (Fiensy 1991:178).

With these insights of Fiensy as a background, we can now return to our main argument under discussion. Is the fact that the extended family which came under severe stress in first-century Mediterranean world the reason for Hollenbach, Pilch and

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Oakman (see above) to argue that kinship *and* politics were the main institutions in first-century Palestine? In answering this question, we must remember that Fiensy also states that, although the extended family, the basic social institution in first-century Mediterranean world, came under stress, it could not be said of every village in Palestine (Fiensy 1991:163). Furthermore, the breaking-up of extended families was a process, a process that went on well into rabbinic times (Fiensy 1991:164). Also, did this change in rural societies imply that the traditions of the peasants, especially the Little Tradition, was laid to rest? My opinion is that this question must be answered negatively.

I would, therefore, like to argue, in support of the argument of Malina and others, that kinship is to be seen as the main institution in the first-century Mediterranean world. If it is true that there was a breaking-up of the extended family in first-century Palestine, this does not mean that the pivotal values of honor and shame and the dyadic personality type (see respectively sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 above) were also laid to rest. To put in bluntly, they were alive and well. And because these pivotal values in the first-century Mediterranean world was built on kinship as the main institution, the social institution to be protected and not to be shamed, kinship still was that societal unit from which everything else was derived.

However, I would agree that perhaps many families indeed were not economically viable any longer, at least in terms of certain villages. But still, in the villages, the basic rules of kinship dictated, for example, redistribution, inherited status and purity rules. Thus, although the family may not have been the most visible institution, everything that went along with kinship dictated the political, economical and religious institutions of society. In this regard it can also be mentioned that Malina (1988b:8), for example, argues that patron-client relationships (where some of the clients obviously were landless peasants) suffuse the persons involved with the aura of kinship. What these relationships entailed was to endow and outfit economic, political or religious institutional arrangements with an overarching quality of kinship. Thus, exactly what was seen as the breaking up of the extended family, namely landlords who acquired more and more land, and hiring it out to landless tenants, was also outfitted along the lines of kinship.

To conclude: In first-century Mediterranean society kinship must be seen as the dominant social institution. However, politics, economics and religion were embedded into kinship to such an extent, that kinship, as the dominant institution, could not be identified as such. Or, stated differently: Society became structured in terms of, for example, political power and economic relations. However, although politics and economics may have been the 'visible' aspects that structure of society, these two institu-

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tions were still structured in terms of kinship. In chapter 6 it will be indicated that kinship, especially in the deeds and words of Jesus (as narrated by Mark), is seen by the narrator of the Gospel as the all overarching societal force in the activities of Jesus.

4.2.9 First-century Mediterranean society as a stratified society

Jews in Palestine during the Hellenistic and Roman periods lived in an agrarian society which in itself was part of a large agrarian, bureaucratic and partly commercialized aristocratic empire (Lenski 1966:214; Kautsky 1982:24; Saldarini 1988:35). Agrarian empires are marked by a very steep hierarchy and great inequality with control and wealth in the hands of a very few (Lenski 1966:146-176). Agrarian societies are also constituted by two major classes separated by a wide gulf and unmediated by a middle class. There was no middle class. The two classes are a large peasant class which produce the food to make society run, and a small elite governing class which protects the peasants from outside aggression and lives off the agricultural surplus produced by the peasants. The surplus is not spontaneously produced, since the peasants tend to grow only what they need or can find to use. Consequently, the governing class has to organize society so the peasants are forced to produce a surplus which can be extracted from them, usually by burdensome taxes.

With this as the background of an advanced agrarian society, Lenski (1966:214-296) discerns nine significant classes in agrarian societies, five belonging to the upper class, and four to the lower. The upper classes are the ruler, governing, retainer, merchant and priestly classes. The lower classes are the peasants, artisans, the unclean class and the expendables. In more detail, these classes look as follows:

* The *ruler* was really a separate class because 'all agrarian rulers enjoyed significant proprietary rights in virtually all of the land in their domains' (Lenski 1966:215-216; cf also Rohrbaugh [1993]b:9-13).

* The *governing class* was very small, only about one to two percent of the population. It was made up of both hereditary aristocrats and appointed bureaucrats. The governing classes of agrarian societies probably received at least a quarter of the national income of most agrarian states, and the governing class and the ruler together usually received not less than half (Lenski 1966:228).

* The *retainer class* averaged around five percent of the population and ranged from scribes and bureaucrats to soldiers and generals, but all united 'in service to the political elite, (Lenski 1966:243). According to Saldarini (1988:42), many scribes, as well as the Pharisees, fit into this class.

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* The *merchant class* does not fit neatly into either the ruling or the lower classes. Merchants generally had low prestige, no direct power and were recruited from the landless. They escaped, however, the total control of the governing class since they stood in a market, rather than in an authority, relationship to them. The ruling class also needed them for luxuries and some essentials (Lenski 1966:250-256; cf also Rohrbaugh [1993]b:13-14).

* The *priestly class*, 'last but not least among the privileged elements in agrarian societies', depended on the governing class, as did the retainers. The leaders of the priestly class were members of the governing class, as well as the priestly class. Because of their contributions to the religious system, such as tithing, they often controlled great wealth.

* The *peasants* made up the bulk of the population because most labor had to go into producing food. They were heavily taxed, kept firmly under control and could gain power only when they had military importance or when there was a labor shortage.

* The *artisan class* was similar to the peasants in regard to lack of power. Artisans, along with the unclean class to be listed, were only three to seven percent of the population. They were not productive enough to become wealthy for the most part, and they did not have power unless their skills were so difficult to acquire that they could command high wages and concessions. The artisan class was normally recruited from the ranks of the dispossessed peasantry and their non-inheriting sons and was continually replenished from these sources.

* The *unclean* or *degraded class* usually did the noxious but necessary jobs such as tanning or mining. Within this class the prostitutes were also found.

* The *expendable class*, averaging between five and ten percent of the population in normal times, was the class for which the society had no place nor need. They had been forced off their land because of population pressures or they did not fit into society. They tended to be landless and itinerant with no normal family life and a high death rate. Illegal activities on the fringe of society were their best prospect for a livelihood. It is most likely that the bulk of the brigands, rebels and followers of messianic claimants came from this class (cf also Rohrbaugh [1993]b:16-17).

In a recent article, Duling (1991a:1-29) used Lenski's social stratification of agrarian societies (as described above), as well as the work of Fiensy (1991) to plot all the interest groups in Palestinian society. His interpretation of the social class of the different interest groups in Palestine looks diagrammatically as follows:

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

Duling's understanding of the social stratification in Palestine, when tabulated, looks as follows (see Duling 1991a:16):

* The *ruling class*:
Prefects, procurators and their families (e g Pontius Pilate)
Herodian client kings, tetrachs, etnarchs and their families (e g Herod Antipas)
High priests and a few other priests, including a few Sadducees
Lay aristocrats, including a few Pharisees

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* The *governing class and retainer class*:
  Priests and elders
  Sadducees and Levites
  Pharisees and scribes
  Bureaucrats and tax collectors (e g Levi)
* The *merchant class*
* The *'upper lower' class*:
  Artisans
  Fisherman
* The *slaves*
* The *peasants*:
  Freeholders
  Tenants
* The *expendable class*:
  Beggars, prostitutes, lepers, the unclean
  The urban poor
  Herders.

In sections 6.3 and 6.4, Duling's understanding of the social stratification in Palestinian society will be used as a point of departure to try and unravel the relationships between the different interest groups in Mark. It will be argued that, in Mark's narrative world, Jesus not only belonged to the expendable class, but that part of the target of his ministry (the 'crowds') also belonged to this class. It will be indicated that Jesus acted as the broker between the heavenly Patron and the clients in society that could not defend their honor, that is, especially the expendables. Jesus thus mixed with people of certain despised positions, was perceived as a public danger, and because of this, was declared as the leader of the devils (Mk 3:20-30). Jesus' ministry to the expendables, that is, the defending of their honor, thus brought him into conflict with the honor of other interest groups such as the scribes and Pharisees.

4.2.10 Summary

From the theories describe above, the following picture emerges in terms of first-century Mediterranean society: In first-century Mediterranean society (which was distinctively stratified) there were no individuals, only dyadic personalities. Individuals were embedded into a group, in the family, village or into fictive kinships. Individuals always saw themselves through the eyes of others. Because of this, honor and shame

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were pivotal values in first-century Mediterranean society. Honor and status were derived from the group in which the individual was embedded. If one complied with the norms of the group, or did what was expected from him/her, honor was maintained. Otherwise, such a person brought shame on himself/herself.

In society everyone had his/her place. Or, stated differently, everything had its place. Maps of places, persons, things and times therefore structured society. Everyone had to stay within the lines and boundaries society set for him/her. If these boundaries were crossed, such a person was perceived as dangerous, because he/she was threatening the basic structure of society. Such a person, therefore, had to be 'put in his/her place'. This was done by labelling the person as a deviant. If labelling succeeded, such a person was rendered unclean. Labelling also took place in terms of rituals, whereby a person's status was changed, either in a positive or in a negative direction.

It is therefore clear that there are many tangent points between the theories described above. This will also become clear when these theories are used in sections 6.4 and 6.5 to analyze the activities of Jesus respectively on Galilean and Jerusalem soil. In Mark 3:19-30, for example, Jesus is labelled as being from Beelzebul. Labelling and deviance as theory is therefore important in regard to this narrative. However, it is clear that honor and shame are also at stake here. In terms of Mark 7:1-22, the question of purity and pollution is clearly in the foreground. However, honor is also at stake, as well as the employment of labelling Jesus as a deviant. Or, in terms of Mark 1:40-45, sickness and healing are clearly of importance. However, by touching the leper, purity and pollution also come into the picture. Also honor and shame's importance lies in the healing of the leper incidence. If Jesus did not succeed in healing the leper, he would have lost honor.

4.3 PERSPECTIVE

4.3.1 Preliminary remarks

In section 3.3.6, I argued that the narrator's ideological point of view, in terms of his reflection on his readers' macrosocial world/symbolic universe, is expressed in texts by means of symbols. Understood as such, symbols can be seen as the 'link' which connects, on the one hand, the dialectical relationship between symbolic universe and macrosocial world, and, on the other hand, the microsocial world (text) as the narrator's reflection on his readers' 'specific social location' (Elliott 1989:10). In following Van Aarde (1991d:54-57), it was also stated that ideas, myths and symbols can be seen as the language counterpart of ideology and mythology that comprise the symbolic universe, or, differently stated, symbols relating to the understanding of the relationship between God and man in terms of social structures and interactions.

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In terms of the work of Douglas (1966), this means that the social world is structured by symbols. Concerning their understanding of God (and the creation), the Israelites, for example, developed maps of times, persons, places and things. These maps are nothing less than symbols, symbols which structure society. Also, in section 4.2.7, it was indicated that these maps of society in general were replicated into maps of the body which created a symbolic understanding of society. By this is meant that persons became 'symbols' in the sense of being clean or unclean, acceptable or unacceptable. A person which was labelled a leper, for example, was a symbol of uncleanness. Symbols, therefore, became the way by which persons, places or objects were labelled positively or negatively. In this regard it, was also argued (see again section 3.3.6) that certain spatial designations in Mark such as Galilee, Jerusalem, house and temple can be seen as either negative or positive symbols in terms of the ideological perspective of the narrator.

This choice made in section 3.3.6, namely, to read space in Mark as symbols, makes symbolic interactionism the obvious perspective from which the different cross-cultural theories explained in section 4.2 will be employed to interpret the activities of Jesus on Galilean and Jerusalem soil as narrated by the narrator. As was indicated in section 4.1.2, the perspectives of conflict theory, structural-functionalism and symbolic interactionism are not in themselves models, but rather determine the model(s) to be used through preference for certain theories and research objects. In regard to research objects, it is clear that this study wants to study space in Mark as (political) symbols. This research objective already determined the theories to be used (as explained in section 4.2). By reading Galilee and Jerusalem as spatial symbols, it also determines the perspective from which these theories will be employed. Finally, as will be indicated in section 4.4, the research object, theories to be employed, as well as the perspective from which these theories will be used, will determine the model to be used.

In terms of spelling out the symbolic interactionist perspective to be employed, interactionism in general will first be examined (section 4.3.2), and then more specifically at the perspective of symbolic interactionism (section 4.3.3). Finally, in section 4.3.4, a few remarks will be made in regard to the relationship between symbolic interactionism and the theories described that were chosen to be used as interpretative tools in the interpretation of Jesus' activity in Galilee and Jerusalem as recorded in Mark's narrative of Jesus.

4.3.2 Interactionism

In the late 1800's, European thinkers like Simmel, Weber and Durkheim began to express interest in the micro-sociological concern for the relationships between society and the individual as exhibited in the interaction among individuals (Van Staden 1991:130). Questions were being asked about the way in which society shapes indivi-

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duals, or how individuals create, maintain and change society (Turner 1982:305). Interest thus was diverted from macro-sociological structures and processes (e g class, state, religion, evolution) to the study of *social interaction* and their consequences for the individual and society. The term social interaction, according to Becker (1964:657), denotes the 'reciprocal influence of the acts of persons and groups, usually mediated through communication'.

According to Turner (1982:308; cf Brown 1979:114), Simmel can be seen as the pioneer in terms of the micro-sociology of interaction, and Mead, building on the insights of Simmel, as the father of modern interactionism. In setting out his understanding of interactionism, Mead borrowed key concepts from William James, John Dewey and Charles Cooley, and combined their insights with his own to produce a synthesis that serves to this day as the basis for modern interactionism (see Turner 1982:308).

James, according to Turner (1982:308-309), developed the concept of the *self*, a concept which refers to how people see themselves. The self can be defined as the ability of the individual to 1) denote other people and aspects of the world around him in symbolic terms; 2) to develop attitudes and feelings towards these objects, and 3) to construct typical responses towards objects, so that they can denote themselves, develop self-feelings and attitudes, and construct responses towards themselves (see Turner 1982:308). Based on this insight of the self, James argued that the self is built up through social interaction, and that a person has as many social selves as there are indi viduals who recognize him (Brown 1979:115; Turner 1982:309).

James' concept of the self was redefined by Cooley in the sense that he regarded self as the process by which individuals see themselves as objects, along with other objects, in their social environment (Turner 1982:309). He also recognized that self emerges out of communication with other, in other words, the individual's image of himself is formed on the basis of how others evaluate him (Brown 1979:116). According to Cooley, therefore, 'the gestures of others serves as mirrors in which people see and evaluate themselves' (Turner 1982:309). He also perceived that some groups were more important than others in the maintenance of the society of the self, thus stressing the fact that self arises out of symbolic communication with others in group contexts (Turner 1982:310).

The concept Mead borrowed from Dewey was what Dewey called the *mind*. Dewey saw the mind as a 'process of denoting objects in the environment, ascertaining potential lines of conduct, imagining the consequences of pursuing each line, inhibiting inappropriate responses, and then, selecting a line of conduct that will facilitate adjustment' (Turner 1982:310). Mind, therefore, becomes an instrument on which activity is based, a process rather than a thing or an entity, which emerges and is sustained through interactions in the social world (Turner 1982:310).

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Using the concepts of self (James), mind (Dewey) and society (Cooley), Mead indicated how societies emerge and how they are sustained through the interaction of symbols. According to Turner (1982:312), Mead's synthesis was based on two assumptions:

> (1) The biological frailty of human organisms force their cooperation with each other in group contexts in order to survive; and (2) those actions within and among human organisms that facilitate their cooperation, and hence their survival or adjustment, will be retained.
>
> (Turner 1982:312)

Proceeding from Dewey's understanding of (the) mind, Mead used the terms *imaginative rehearsal* (the process of using language or symbols to covertly rehearse lines of action) and *conventional gestures* (gestures that have acquired common meanings and thereby facilitate adjustment and efficient interaction among individuals), to redefine the concept of mind. An organism possesses mind, accordingly, when it develops the capacity to understand conventional gestures, to employ these gestures to take the roles of others, and to imaginatively rehearse alternative lines of action (Turner 1982:313-314).

According to Turner (1982:314), a very important aspect of the self is that of the *significant other* and the *generalized other*. Meads distinguished three stages in the development of the self: The initial stage is called *play* (where the infant is only able to assume the perspective of a limited number of significant others such as parents). The second stage is called *game*, designating the individual's capacity to derive multiple self-images from a group of individuals engaged in some coordinated activity. The final stage in the development of the self is indicated by the ability of an individual to take the role of the *generalized other*, that is, to assume the general beliefs, values and norms of a community (Berger & Luckmann 1967: 129-132; Turner 1982:318). According to Mead, therefore, society as an organized activity is regulated by the generalized other, in which individuals make adjustments and cooperate with one another in terms of conventional gestures (symbols). In a sense, it can thus be said that society shapes mind and self, and that mind and self affect society. This insight of Mead can also be compared with what has been said in section 3.3.6 in regard to the concepts of the symbolic and social universe, as understood by the exponents of the sociology of knowledge. According to the sociology of knowledge, the social universe must be seen as a reflection on the symbolic universe and vice versa. A change in the social universe would therefore indicate also a change in terms of reflection of the symbolic universe (see Berger & Luckmann 1967:129-132).

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According to Turner (1982:317), the problem with Mead's understanding of the self, mind and society was the fact that it did not explain sufficiently how individual conduct shaped society, and vice versa, how society shaped individual conduct. Because of this problem, a theoretical perspective called *symbolic interactionism* developed, which tries to overcome the shortcomings of Mead's understanding of the self, mind and society.

4.3.3 Symbolic interactionism

According to Turner (1982:320), the perspective of symbolic interactionism focuses on how the symbolic processes of role-taking, imaginative rehearsal and self-evaluation by individuals adjusting to one another form the basis for social organization, or society. Symbolic interactionism, thus, emphasizes the patterns of interdependency in micro-systems on the interpersonal level. This interdependency is the result of shared/common symbols by which individuals negotiate in their interaction so that a structured whole develops and can be maintained (Steyn 1984:6). The maintenance or changing of the social reality depends, therefore, on symbolic communication (cf Foote 1964:665).

The meaning of symbolic communication is obvious — humans use symbols to communicate with each other. Symbolic communication consists not only of language, but also of facial gestures, voice tones, body posture and other symbolic gestures in which there is common meaning and understanding (Turner 1982:324). In fact, interaction could not occur without the ability to read gestures and symbols and to use them as a basis for putting oneself in the position of others (Turner 1982:324).

Contemporary interactionists emphasize the phenomenon of interaction in society as a uniquely human endeavor. Society is actually made possible by the capacities which humans acquire to 'read' symbols as they grow and mature into society in terms of taking the role of the generalized other. According to Turner (1982:325), present-day interactionists recognize the same human capacities as Mead, the mind and the self, but newly included in the concept of mind is what is known as *the definition of the situation*. This refers to the capacities of the mind by which people 'can name, categorize, and orient themselves to a constellation of objects, including themselves as an object, in all situations. In this way, they can access appropriate lines of conduct' (Turner 1982:325; cf also Brown 1979:121-122). All this serves to emphasize the interaction between persons (or actors). In terms of the generalized other, Swanson (1968:441) calls individuals 'actors', to the extent that individuals, in terms of symbolic interactionism, always make decisions and relate to others in terms of the collective and accepted symbols of a given society. This aspect of symbolic interactionism is explained by Turner (1982:325-326) as follows:

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> Humans create and use symbols. They communicate with symbols. They interact through role-taking, which involves the reading of symbols emitted by others. What makes them unique as a species — the existence of mind and self — arises out of interaction, while conversely, the emergence of these capacities allows for the interactions that form the basis of society.
>
> (Turner 1982:325-326)

According to Turner (1982:322), the two most prominent names associated with symbolic interactionism are Herbert Blumer (from the 'Chicago School') and Manford Kuhn (from the 'Iowa School'). Both schools follow more or less what Mead said in this regard, yet, Blumer and Kuhn often diverge, and in fact, represent 'the polar extremes of symbolic interactionism' (Turner 1982:322). The divergence concerns the following issues: Firstly, the nature of individuals and the interaction that they are part of, as well as the nature of the social organization in which this interaction takes place. Secondly, questions relating to the most appropriate method for studying humans and their societies, as well as the question of sociological theorizing.

In terms of these divergences, Blumer views individuals as potentially being spontaneous, interaction as constantly in the process of changing, and social organization as being fluid and tenuous (Turner 1982:330). Kuhn, on the other hand, regards the individual, and social organizations, as being highly structured, with interactions constrained by these structure(s) (Turner 1982:330). From these differences in assumptions, there grew varying conceptions of how to investigate the social world and how to build theory. However, it is clear that in terms of the first-century Mediterranean world as described in section 4.2 by using different cross-cultural models, Kuhn's point of view will be accepted here.

4.3.4 Concluding remarks

It has already been stated that there is a certain correspondence between the preference for specific theories and the perspectives from which these theories are employed to read a text. From the theories described in section 4.2, and from what has been said in explaining symbolic interactionism as a perspective, it is obvious that there are many similarities between them. Or, stated differently, certain aspects of the theories described in section 4.2 and the salient aspects of symbolic interactionism, go hand in hand. Let us look at a few examples:

Symbolic interactionism is interested in the relationships between society and the individual as exhibited in the interaction between individuals, that is, how society shapes individuals, or how individuals create, maintain and change society (Turner

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1982:305). Also, according to symbolic interactionism, people name, categorize, and orient themselves to a constellation of objects, including themselves, in all situations. In this way, they can access appropriate lines of conduct (Turner 1982:325; cf also Brown 1979:121-122).

This same interaction between individual and society has also been described in section 4.2.3, when first-century personality was described as dyadic. Symbolic interactionism argues that society shapes the individual as does our cross-cultural theory of the first-century personality: Individuals always see themselves through the eyes of others. Symbolic interactionism argues that the individual always sees himself as an object in all situations. Our cross-cultural theory of the first-century personality has the same perspective: The individual is always an object in the sense that a meaningful existence depends upon what others say of him in all situations. Symbolic interactionism speaks of mind and self; our cross-cultural theory of the first-century personality speaks of awareness or consciousness.

Furthermore, in symbolic interactionism, the term social interaction denotes the reciprocal influence of acts of persons and groups, usually mediated through communication. Our theory of sickness and healing (see section 4.2.6) indicated that someone has an illness when he is labelled, thus, the illness becomes meaningful through communication. Also, according to symbolic interactionism, humans denote other people and aspects of the world around them in symbolic terms. Our theory in relation to purity and pollution indicated that people not within clear boundaries are symbolically rendered unclean. Symbolic interactionism also states that it is expected from humans to develop attitudes and feelings toward persons and objects, and to construct typical responses toward them. The theory of labelling and deviance stated that all persons were labelled as either positive or negative. If they crossed boundaries, they were deviants, and those present had to label such a person in terms of a negative social label.

To conclude with a final example: Symbolic interactionism sees society as an organized activity regulated by the role taking of the generalized other. The cross-cultural theory of the first-century personality sees society as organized by the fact that individuals existed only in terms of the group in which they were embedded, a group in which one exists only by living out the expectations of others.

From these examples, it is clear that there are many points of similarity between the perspective of symbolic interactionism and the cross-cultural theories' described above in section 4.2. The main similarity, however, lies in both symbolic interactionism's and the cross-cultural theories previously explained notion that the maintenance or changing of society depends on symbolic communication; humans use symbols to communicate with each other.

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Symbolic communication consists not only of language, but also of facial gestures, voice tones, body posture and other symbolic gestures in which there is common meaning and understanding (Turner 1982:324) . When Jesus therefore touched a leper (Mk 1:40-45) or a dead person (Mk 5:41), or is being touched by a menstruating woman (Mk 5:25-34), he not only communicated through highly significant symbols (all of these persons were rendered unclean), but also gave new interpretations to existing symbols. And when symbols are reinterpreted, so is the structure of society. Or, in Paul Ricoeur's words: Symbols orientate in order to disorientate with the view to reorientate. Also, metaphors, and for that matter, symbols, always come as a surprise; they shock[60].

In section 6.4 it will be indicated that many of Jesus' actions and words, through which he reinterpreted the existing symbols of his day, did indeed shock many. Galilee, for example, was perceived by some as a negative symbol, that is, Galilee of the Gentiles (cf Mt 4:15; 1 Macc 5:15)). Jerusalem, on the other hand, was perceived as a positive symbol, because of the temple. In m. Kelim I, 6-9, for example, the last seven degrees of holiness all relate to Jerusalem and the temple. In the map of persons (t. Meg. 2.7), the priests and Levites, both residing in Jerusalem, are perceived as the most holy. The temple in Jerusalem was also the symbol of God's presence and availability. Peasants from Galilee had to travel to Jerusalem to share in this privilege. On the other hand, people like the expendables and unclean were perceived as negative symbols. Jesus, however, challenged all of that according to Mark. Negative symbols (like Galilee), were given positive interpretations, and existing positive symbols (like Jerusalem) were evaluated negatively. By reinterpreting symbols, Jesus also reinterpreted society.

In section 3.4 it was argued that symbols (as part of the microsocial world) can be seen as a reflection on certain beliefs and attitudes and symbols in the macrosocial world. Understood as such, Galilee and Jerusalem (as focal space/symbols that express certain interests) can be seen as symbols in the narrative world of the text that wants to give its intended audience a reinterpretation of symbols which are part of their macrosocial world. The narrator of Mark, therefore, uses specific symbols (like Galilee and Jerusalem) to disorientate his audience's current understanding thereof with the aim of reorientation. And by reorientating his audience's understanding of symbols that are part of their macrosocial world, the narrator also reorientates their understanding of their social world, which in turn leads to a new and different understanding of their symbolic universe.

One last remark: According to Turner (1982:339), a major criticism of symbolic interactionism is that it ignores the structural aspects of society (cf also Brown 1979:138). According to this critique, symbolic interactionism must still prove itself

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by demonstrating how symbolic interactions and exchanges between individuals and individuals or between individuals and groups have an effect on more macro, collective social units, that is, patterns of social organization. However, in regard to this critique leveled at symbolic interactionism, Van Staden (1991:135-136) argues that the perspective of symbolic interactionism also includes a perspective of conflict, in the sense that a reinterpretation of symbols includes conflict. Also, in terms of structural-functionalism, symbolic interactionism has a structural feature in the sense of role-taking and especially in the sense of the generalized other's role. I would therefore argue, in following Van Staden, that symbolic interactionism, as a perspective on society, has the ability to address the question of interaction on the macrosocial level of society.

4.4 METHOD

4.4.1 Model to be used

In any conceptual model there has to be an indissoluble relationship between epistemology, methodology and teleology (Van Aarde 1991b:7). Therefore, the scholar should use his/her method to move from presuppositions to results. The quality of any chosen exegetical method therefore lies in its ability to do just that, namely, to move from presuppositions to results. An exegetical approach (and method) like that of social scientific criticism aims to interpret texts by using a social scientific model. However, because the social scientific model to be used is not always at hand, it has to be first constructed. To that we will now turn our attention.

The point of departure that there should be an indissoluble relationship between epistemology, methodology and teleology is comprised of the epistemic status which is accredited to objects in society (implicitly or explicitly), determined by the shared sociological values of scholars. As such, it means that the epistemic status which is implicitly or explicitly attributed to texts by an exegete therefore determines the aim (τέλος) of the exegete, as well as the method to be followed.

The concept paradigm refers to a certain perspective of reality (Van Aarde 1988d: 49-64; 1991b:8). Thus, a paradigm involves more than a conceptual framework of shared values, common problems and common models in terms of which common problems are treated. As an example, Van Aarde (1991b:8) uses the way in which texts are interpreted. Between the exegete (as subject) and the text (as object) there is always a distance, as well as a certain relationship. The relation between subject and object is determined by the subject's total perception of reality. There is presently, in terms of a postmodern perception on reality, a growing cognition with regard to the plurality and complexity of both reality and society (Van Aarde 1990a:305). A new 'mondial culture' is characteristic of our modern global world. The world we live in is

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a world where another's problems are everyone's problems. Because of this, new directions in biblical exegesis and theological hermeneutics tend to be reality conscious and socially relevant.

However, before theology, or biblical exegesis, can be relevant in terms of socio- and eco-politics, there is, according to Van Aarde, a very important question which has to be answered first: How knowable is metaphysical reality, and how does one make that what is theologically knowable applicable to reality? According to Van Aarde (1991b:9; in following Kant), metaphysical reality can only be known in terms of the language of analogy, that is, metaphors (or symbols). Theological/religious values are therefore communicated in terms of the language of analogy, metaphors or symbols. In terms of the sociology of knowledge (see section 3.3.6), texts are therefore the textual counterpart of the reflection on the symbolic universe. This, then, will be our point of departure in highlighting the epistemological presuppositions of this study.

As was stated previously, to construe a model is to make theories operational. Because human beings inter alia exist linguistically, express themselves through language and texts, and because the main object to be studied in this study is a text, a theory is needed to define and 'categorize' text. It was stated that a text can be seen not only as the product of a specific social situation, but also as a medium of ongoing social interaction. Therefore, in section 3.3.2, it was postulated that an association of a narratological and social scientific reading of a narrative discourse can be helpful.

In narrative discourse we find a dominant ideological perspective, which is the narrator's dialectical reflection on his and his readers' shared symbolic universe, as well as the way in which this understanding of the shared symbolic universe is structured in terms of their social universe (see section 3.3.5)[61]. Because we find in texts ideological perspectives expressed in terms of symbols, it was postulated that Galilee and Jerusalem will be studied as symbols, as a specific reflection of the narrator on his and his readers' shared symbolic universe as mirrored in their macrosocial world (section 3.3.6). Also, symbols clearly relate to the strategy of texts. Under the concept strategy is understood the different literary techniques the narrator employs in his narrating activity to communicate his reflection on the symbolic universe. Because one of the objects of this study is to study space in Mark, a narratological theory was postulated in section 3.4 to detect the narrator's strategy (narrative techniques) in regard to his ideological usage of space as symbols in the social world of the Gospel.

Since texts are the products of a specific social situation, they intend to communicate. However, to study the communication of texts, an analysis of only its strategy is not enough, simply because texts are products of specific social situations (i e, products of a certain culture). In the case of Mark, it should also be remembered that pre-Easter activity of Jesus and the post-Easter reflection of the early church on Jesus' pre-Easter activity are mixed in such a way that it is not always possible to distinguish between

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them (Van Aarde 1991c:12). To understand the culture in which Mark as text evolved, namely in first century Mediterranean society, different cross-cultural theories were discussed which will enable us, in a certain sense, to bridge the hermeneutical gap between the modern exegete and ancient texts, and will also help us to try not to be guilty of anachronism/ethnocentrism and reductionism. Because people communicate in terms of language, texts and symbols, the perspective of symbolic interactionism was chosen as a vantage point from which these theories will be used to analyze the activities of Jesus in Mark (see section 4.3). It is very important to notice that this study is therefore not trying to construct the activities, deeds or words of the historical Jesus, but rather the way in which they are presented to us by the narrator of Mark's gospel[62].

Because a text (as a microsocial or narrative world) can be seen as a specific perspective on its macrosocial world, the model to be used will also make provision for a movement from microsocial to macrosocial world. This is done in two ways: By reading the text first (section 3.3.3), and by using the concepts of emics and etics (section 4.1.3).

To summarize: In terms of the few epistemological remarks made in the beginning of this section, texts can be seen as the linguistic counterpart of the symbolic universe. Reflections on this symbolic universe are communicated in texts by means of symbols. Some of the important symbols in Mark are certain spatial designations. Spatial relationships can be studied from a social scientific perspective as 'maps' symboling the so-called first-century 'politics of purity' (see Borg 1987:86-93), and therefore designating aspects like pollution, honor, shame and deviance. Furthermore, in terms of the sociology of knowledge and cultural anthropology, the symbolic universe culminates to certain institutions in the social universe. In following the incipient insight of Malina (1986b:152-153), kinship is seen as the dominant social institution of first-century Mediterranean society which was an advanced agrarian society. However, because politics, economics and religion were embedded into kinship, actions in the political or economic institutions, for example, always had implications for understanding kinship. In this regard Van Aarde (1992b:439) pointed out:

> Religious, economic and political steps taken in the first century that led to ostracism, for example, should thus be interpreted in terms of an adequate social scientific model and perspective in the light of the familial structures (institutions — EvE) of the period and the social, mythological and religious symbols representing these structures (institutions — EvE).
>
> (Van Aarde 1992b:439)

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In institutions we find certain roles and statuses. Furthermore, certain statuses had certain roles, or had to comply with certain symbols of society. When this was done, society was in balance, and everything and everyone was in the right place and time.

In relation to the latter, it is thus clear that the above constructed model aims to study the activities of Jesus in Galilee and Jerusalem as they relate to the maps of the society of his day (as narrated by Mark). How was Jesus' interpretation of the society's shared symbolic universe recorded? How did he interpret these symbols, according to the narrator's ideological perspective? Did he comply with these symbols? Did he reinterpret them? How is he ideologically depicted in Mark's story? The aim of this study is therefore to utilize the constructed model by employing the different theories which were introduced.

4.4.2 Method to be followed

In section 2.5, two research gaps were identified in the current debate in regard to the study of the opposition between Galilee and Jerusalem in Mark's gospel: Firstly, the need for an exegetical approach which consists of an association of a narratological and social scientific analysis of the text, and second, an analysis of the social background of the Gospel which takes into consideration the dynamics between the social institutions of economics, politics and kinship in first-century Mediterranean world as an advanced agrarian society. In terms of kinship, it was argued that such an analysis can help to avoid the fallacies of ethnocentrism/ anachronism and reductionism. Methodologically speaking, the first research gap was addressed in chapter 3, the second in chapter 4.

To reach the aim of this study as spelled out in the previous section, the following method will be followed: In chapter 5, a narratological analysis of focal space in Mark will be attempted with the aim of gathering emic data. This narratological analysis of space will enable us to discern in which manner the narrator presents certain spatial designations in the text (e g Galilee, Jerusalem, the way, temple, house, village), as well as the ideological interests which can be attached to these spatial designations in the Gospel. In this regard, we will also discern which character can be seen as the *protagonist* in the narrative, which character(s) can be seen as *the target* of the protagonist's mission, which characters are the *antagonists* in the narrative, that is, who are opposing the mission of the protagonist, and finally, which characters can be seen as the *helpers* of the protagonist in carrying out his mission[63]. This study will enable us to discern the different interests and interest groups in the Gospel, as well as the spatial designations that go hand in hand with these interests. Attention will also be given to the way in which certain spatial designations, like the kingdom of God, are used by Jesus himself.

The insight yielded by this emic reading will then be utilized as the starting point for the etic reading of the text in chapter 6.

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ENDNOTES: CHAPTER 4

1 Models can range in size, complexity and degree of abstraction, from concrete scale models to highly abstract conceptual or theoretical models (Elliott 1986:4). In this regard, Carney (1975:9-38), distinguishes between *isomorphic* and *homomorphic* models. Isomorphic models are scale models or replicas, in which there is a one-to-one relationship between the features of the model and those of the thing being modelled. Homomorphic models, on the other hand, do not try to duplicate all the detail of the original. They cast in abstract terms and replicate only the broad features of the original. Homomorphic models are classified mainly in terms of *analogue* or *conceptual* types. Analogue models are constructed when the formal assertions of the model are translated into terms of either computer logic or mathematics. Conceptual models, on the other hand, are mainly the models which are used by the social sciences. Carney (1975:13-24) distinguishes five types of conceptual models:

Ideal type models: Associated with Max Weber, this type of model has two basic forms, namely deductive and inductive. In the case of the deductive model, the ideal type is an extreme case whose postulated constituent elements serve as a norm by which one judges the real phenomenon. Ideal type models based on induction are the most basic kind, and are used simply to describe things. A mass of data is compiled from various sources to construct a general picture. The average deducted in this manner is then used as the basis of assessment when other phenomena are evaluated (see Van Staden 1991:158).

Cross-cultural models: In terms of cross-cultural models, facts only have meaning in relation to one's framework of reference. This implies that any effort at interpretation of the values or behavior that properly belong in a different culture should presuppose an understanding of the frame of reference of that culture. In order to assess such frames of reference, a set of criteria is needed, and the cross-cultural model aims at providing such criteria. According to Carney (1975:16), cross-cultural models are constructed in the following way: Firstly, cultural areas are established (e g African and Mediterranean). Then a phenomenon common to all these cultural areas (such as the belief in evil spirits) are compared in a uniform, methodical and detailed manner. Finally, secondary literature (modern scholarly work on the subject) is reviewed and incorporated into the study. The resulting model is able to determine what kind of attitudes were prevalent in respect to any specific phenomenon, which attitudes were unique to one culture area or time period, and which were common to all areas and periods. The benefit for the use of such models is twofold: Firstly, it enables one to spot anachronisms in both assumptions about and interpretation of the data, and, second, it highlights the fact that assumptions may be very culture-bound and not as objective as the researcher himself/herself wants to believe (see Van Staden 191:159).

Comparative models: Models tend to develop in one of two ways (Carney 1975:18): They either become more specific and detailed or they become more theoretical and abstract. This latter type is normally regarded as a secondary development, based on the cross-cultural model

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described earlier. Its purpose is to cope with societies that change from one culture to another, or to analyze societies shaped by cultural traditions which differ extensively from one's own. Thus, this model constitutes a basic conceptual tool for the purpose of the comparison and the ranking of societies (see Van Staden 1991:159-160).

Postulational models: Also known as the *thought experiment*, these models are used to search for some pattern among a mass of data, especially if the pattern or data is complicated and confusing. The procedure is not to follow a single causally connected chain of consequences, but to perform the analysis as a whole by means of some form of pattern matching. The pattern is created by making a model of the complex for which one wishes to search, a master pattern, to be exact (see Van Staden 1991:160).

Multivariate (matrix-based) models: These models are a development of the postulational model. The thought experiment, in this case, is conducted by casting the thoughts in a particular form, a matrix or tabular layout. This effects a visual correlation between the variables intended for analysis (see Van Staden 1991:160-161).

[2] Because models are highly selective, Gilbert (1981:4) warns against jumping to the conclusion that a model is a correct representation of the real world based on the discovery of structural correspondence between the relationship posited in the model and the relationship discovered in the data. He maintains that such correspondence provides evidence in support of the model, not definitive confirmation of its validity. Since every model is a simplified representation of the real world, Gilbert is convinced that a model can only provide a partial explanation of the data. In regard to the earlier discussion of the relationship between the microsocial and macrosocial world of the text (see again section 3.3.4), this would mean that the microsocial world can only be seen as a simplified/partial representation of the contextual world.

[3] According to Mouton & Marais (1988:141, in using Gorrell 1981:130), models have four characteristics:

* Models identify central problems or questions concerning the phenomenon that ought to be investigated;
* models limit, isolate, simplify, and systematize the domain that is investigated;
* models provide a language game or universe of discourse within which the phenomenon may be discussed; and
* models provide explanation sketches and the means for making predictions.

[4] In this regard, as has been indicated in section 3.3.1, Vorster (1988:36-40) is convinced that New Testament scholarship is heading for a new paradigm, that is, towards a post-critical science. According to him (Vorster 1988:45), the reason for this is that social scientific

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research differs from the 'historico-critical paradigm' in that it is not an attempt at reconstruction, but rather at construction of 'possible social relationships of meaning' (Vorster 1988:36). The distinction that Vorster is making between reconstruction and construction is clearly meant to suggest a difference in epistemological assumptions, whereby 'construction' would refer to a new, more creative understanding of the way in which texts mean (cf Vorster 1988:36-44). According to Elliott (1986:8) and Van Aarde (1988d:45), one can also see the vitality of the new direction social scientific study of the New Testament is taking as a restoration (Elliott) or an adaption (Van Aarde) of the historical critical paradigm. Van Staden (1991:109) also makes the relevant point that construction would inevitably and each time presuppose a measure of reconstruction if some credibility as a trustworthy, and normative scientific endeavor is to be retained.

[5] For a concise description and evaluation of a structural-functional, a conflict and a symbolic-interactionist perspective, see Van Staden 1991:116-135. See also Pilch (1988a:31-62), Malina (1988a:2-31) and Neyrey (1988a:63-92) for a respective description of the salient aspects of a structural-functionalist, conflict and symbolic-interactionist perspective, as well as a respective application thereof in terms of Mark 7:1-23.

[6] Although this is not explicitly stated by Leach (1976:110-114) and Raft (1979:7-13), it is possible to deduce their correspondence in this regard to Malina as it is clearly suggested in their different works.

[7] This relationship between emics (as social data) and etics (as a conceptually constructed model) by which etics is used to interpret emics, is, for example, used by almost all of the contributors to the work of Neyrey (1991a), in which different aspects of the social world of Luke are interpreted by means of social scientific models. The following examples would suffice: Pilch (1991:181-210), by using a social anthropological model in regard to sickness and healing (etics), interprets social aspects like sickness, disease and illness (emics) in Luke's world in terms of fortune and misfortune. Elliott (1991b:211-240), departing from a social scientific point of view, studies the temple and the household, as social data (emics) in Luke as two major opposing institutions in first-century Palestine. Moxnes (1991:241-270), on the other hand, uses a social scientific model in relation to patronage (etics), to study emics in Luke in regards to the relations between Jesus and his followers, including his disciples. Finally, McVann (1991a:333-360) uses a social scientific model (etics) on rituals, to interpret the emic data in Luke 3:1-40, which surrounds Jesus' baptism, to conclude that Jesus' baptism can be seen as a status transformation to a prophet (see also McVann 1988:96-101; 1991b:151-157 for the same study, but with Mark as text).

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[8] These theories are discussed comprehensively in this study for two reasons: Firstly, social scientific analysis that uses the cross-cultural theories to be described are relatively new in South African biblical scholarship, and especially among students in biblical theology. As a result, the following description of the different theories can serve as a future source of reference, or at least a concise introduction for South African biblical scholars who are interested in a social scientific analysis of biblical texts.

[9] Gilmore (1987:16-17) is also of the opinion that honor and shame can be seen as the pivotal values in first-century Mediterranean society: 'Mediterranean ... unity is ... derived from the primordial values of honor and shame, and these values are deeply tied up with sexuality and power, with masculine and gender relations' (Gilmore 1987:16). Gilmore (1987:17) also states that

> if a gender-based honor-and-shame moral system defines a Mediterranean World, then this category emerges not simply as an example of butterfly collection, but as a mutually intelligible framework of moral choices by which people communicate and gain identity both with and within the group.
>
> (Gilmore 1987:17)

Gilmore therefore argues that any society, which is based on a honor and shame culture, normally results in being stratified in terms of groups (individuals) with little (or no) honor, and groups (individuals) that are regarded as honorable. In sections 7.2 and 7.3 it will be indicated that this aspect of first-century Mediterranean society is very important to understand the narrative world of Mark as an example of a advanced agrarian society.

[10] Power, sexual status and religion are defined by Malina (1981:26) as follows: *Power* means the ability to exercise control over the behavior of others, thus a symbol, and not to be confused with physical force. *Sexual status* refers to the set of duties and rights — what you ought to do and what others ought to do to or for you — that derive from symboling biological, sexual differentiation. *Religion* refers to the attitude and behavior one is expected to follow relative to those who control one's existence. Honor, therefore, can be described by using the following example: A father of a family (sexual role), commands his children to do something, and they obey (power): They treat him honorably. Other people seeing this would then acknowledge that he is an honorable father.

[11] This definition of honor by Malina (1981:27-28) concurs with that of Peristiany (1965:211-212) and Pitt-Rivers (1977:1). Their respective definitions of the notion of honor are as follows:

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> Respectability (i e honor — EvE), the reverse of shame, is the characteristic of a person who needs other people in order to grasp his own identity and whose conscience is a kind of interiorization of others, since this fulfill for him the role of witness and judge .... He who has lost his honor no longer exists. He ceases to exist for other people, and at the same time he ceases to exist for himself.
>
> (Peristiany 1965:211-212)

> Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his *claim* to pride, but it is also the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognized by society, *his right* to pride.
>
> (Pitt-Rivers 1977:1; his italics)

12 In regard to the aspect of challenge and response, Peristiany (1965:11) notes the following:

> Within the minimal solidarity groups of [Mediterranean] societies, be they small or large families or clans, spheres of action are well defined, non-overlapping and non-competitive. The opposite is true outside these groups. What is significant in this wider context is the insecurity and instability of the honour-shame ranking .... In this insecure ... world where nothing is accepted on credit, the individual [or interest group] is constantly forced to prove and assert himself .... [H]e [or they] is constantly 'on show', he is forever courting the public opinion of his 'equals' so that they may pronounce him worthy.
>
> (Peristiany 1985:11)

13 See Elliott (1987b:39-42) for a discussion of the sources available which attest such an institution in the Greco-Roman period, and therefore, as well as in first-century Mediterranean society (cf also Landé 1977, Saller 1982, Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984, Stambaugh & Balch 1986, Saldarini 1988 and Crossan 1991a).

14 Clients can be either a person or a group (Crossan 1991a:63). Also, a city, just as well as an individual, could be a client to a powerful patron.

15 Symbolic media of interaction can be best explained by using money as example. Barter is the direct exchange of goods and does not require money or any other medium. But as society and economic interchanges become more complex, a symbolic medium is used to effect economic exchange and aid economic relationships. Money then becomes such a symbolic medium of interaction. It is in this regard that power can be seen as a symbolic medium of interaction in society. It is to be distinguished from a raw act of physical force, which is not in itself constitutive of social interaction in society. It is the best seen as political power, in that it does not require the actual exercise of physical force, but rather is the capacity to be used in

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many situations within a society which recognizes it. Power as symbolic medium still depends upon the ultimate capacity to coerce behavior, but its use in a functioning society is usually symbolic and its permanence is protected by social legitimation (see Parsons 1969:352-404).

[16] An example of a horizontal patron-client relationship is the correspondence between Cicero and Manius Acilius Glabrio as two social equals (see Cicero, *Letters to his friends* 7.30; Williams 2.88-89, cited by Crossan 1991a:61). The case of Trajan and Harpocras, as brokered by Pliny, is an example of a vertical relationship (see Pliny, *Letters* 10.5, 6, 7, 10; Melmoth 2.282-285, 290-291, cited by Crossan 1991a:62-63).

[17] Other examples of patron-client relationships in Mark are, for example, people who approached Jesus for 'mercy': Jairus, the leader of the synagogue (Mk 5:22), the woman who had been suffering from hemorrhages for twelve years (Mk 5:25) and the healing of a blind man, called Bartimaeus (Mk 10:46). These, and other texts in Mark that relate to patron-client relationships, as well as reciprocity, will be dealt with in chapter 6.

[18] In this regard, the most recent study of Mitchell (1992:255-272) on the notion of friendship in Acts 2:44-47 and 4:32-37 can be mentioned. According to Mitchell, in first-century Mediterranean society generosity toward others was facilitated by friendship, but frequently largess was kept within social boundaries. Horizontal friendship was the norm because the element of likeness dictated that it be kept between social equals. Friendship between non-equals was possible, but then it took on the trappings of patron-client relationships and the expectations changed. According to Mitchell, friendship was therefore a vehicle for wealth, status and power for the ruling elite of Luke's day (Mitchell 1992:272). He, however, goes on to argue that Luke uses friendship to equalize relationships in his own community. Luke portrays the early Jerusalem community in Acts as a community of friends who show how friendship can continue across status lines and the poor can be benefited by the rich. Redefining friendship this way helps Luke to achieve his social objective: Encouraging the rich to provide relief for the poor in his community.

[19] The notion of broker can be defined as follows (Crossan 1991a:60): 'A broker ... is one who sustains a double dyadic alliance, one as client to a patron and another as patron to a client'.

[20] Malina (1988b:24-27) defines a faction as follows:

> A *faction* is a coalition of persons (followers) recruited personally, according to structurally diverse principles by or on behalf of a person in conflict with other person(s) with whom they (coalition members) were formerly united over honor and/or control of resources and/or 'truth'.
>
> (Malina 1988:24; his italics)

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In terms of this definition, Malina argues that the Jesus-movement can be best described as a faction. Jesus personally recruited his followers, his movement was in conflict with the Pharisees, scribes, Herodians and Sadducees in competing for the same prize (pleasing the God of Israel) and it fit into the whole polity of Israel, therefore trying to build up as large a following as possible with the minimum expenditure of limited resources. Elliott (1990b:1-31), however, differs from Malina on this point. According to him, the Jesus-movement can best be described as a *sect*, in the sense that 'under particular conditions the Jesus movement ceased to be regarded by the corporate body of Judaism as a Jewish faction ... and gradually began to assume the character and strategies of a Jewish sect' (Elliott 1990b:11). Some of the changing conditions under which this shift from faction to sect occurred are the following: The increase in the quantity and quality of social tension and ideological differences between the Jesus-movement and the corporate body of Israel, a recruitment on the part of the movement of persons previously excluded by conventional interpretation of the Torah, a claim on the part of the movement to embody exclusively the authentic identity of Israel, a replacement on the part of the movement of major institutions, a regard on the part of the movement of the parent body as distinct from the movement group (us/our versus them/ theirs), a move on the part of the corporate body to differentiate and disassociate itself from the erstwhile Jewish faction, and a perception on the part of society at large that the erstwhile Jewish faction has assumed a distinctive social identity within Judaism, that is, a perception expressed in the application of a distinctive label *Χριστιανοί* (see Acts 11:26).

21 What is interesting in Mark is that in all four times that Jesus refers to God (Mk 8:38; 11:25; 13:32; 14:36), he uses the title father.

22 The concept 'kingdom of God' occurs fourteen times in Mark: Mark 1:15; 4:11, 26, 30; 9:1, 47; 10:14, 15, 23, 24, 25; 12:34; 14:25; 15:43.

23 By using inter alia the work of Aalen, Oliver & Van Aarde (1991:379-400) also argue that the concept of the kingdom of God can be understood as the 'household of God'. They argue that Jesus, by using this concept, introduced a specific relationship between God and the believers, namely that of 'father' and 'children', derived from the analogy of his own relationship with God. Understood as such, Jesus constituted the concept kingdom of God not in terms of a king and his subjects, but in terms of a patron, the father and clients, the children. In section 6.4 it will be argued that, by building inter alia on this insight of Oliver & Van Aarde, Jesus can be typified by the narrator of Mark as the broker between God, as the patron, and his followers (the clients).

24 According to Boissevain (1974:148-149) the difference between a broker and a patron is the following: A patron has resources such as land, goods and power, and always stays ahead of his competitors. A broker, on the other hand, is someone who has special contact with someone who has resources like power and land.

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[25] Louw & Nida's (1989:335) understanding of the term synoida corresponds with that of Malina. Louw & Nida situate this term under the semantic sub-domain 'know', and define its semantic meaning as follows: '[T]o share information or knowledge with — to know something together with someone else' (Louw & Nida 1989:335). As an example they cite Acts 5:2.

[26] In this regard, the question can be asked if it is legitimate to speak of 'a first-century Mediterranean person'. According to Malina & Neyrey (1991c:69-72), there are a number of reasons for considering the Mediterranean region a singe cultural area. They list the following: The way illness is perceived through all of the Mediterranean is the same; they have long been subjected to the same social processes; their societies all tend to be rather stable, they maintain traditional, consistent structures and values; they have lived over long periods of time by essentially using the same codes; have the same beliefs and ideas; and handle life crises by established patterns. Also, in a recent article, Malina (1992:66-87) used 'physiognomics' (the science that studies human character on the basis of how people look and act; see Malina 1992:69), and comes to the same conclusion, namely, that it is possible to speak of a 'circum-Mediterranean person'.

[27] The term 'strong group person' used by Malina here is taken over from Mary Douglas' grid/group model. Both of these models represent a systematic classification of an individual within society in terms of two social dimensions, grid and group. Grid represents a system of classifications shared by the individual with his society or social unit such as norms and religious beliefs. 'As a dimension, it shows a progressive change in the mode of control. At the strong end there are visible rules about space and time related to social roles; at the other end ... the formal classifications fade, and finally vanish' (Douglas 1982:192). The term grid, therefore, represents the degree of individuation. The term group, on the other hand, is used for the dimension of 'social incorporation as the response of the individual to the pressure to conform exerted by the social unit (Douglas 1982:199). A strong group, therefore, would be one in which 'the individual is first and foremost constrained by the external boundary maintained by the group against outsiders' (Douglas 1982:205). Atkins (1991), for example, has used this grid/group model of Douglas to study the social world of Paul in terms of a social accounting of the members in what he calls the Pauline church faction. In the South African context, Domeris (1991b:233-250) has used Douglas's model to read the farewell discourse in John from an anthropological perspective.

[28] We find in the New Testament an interesting application of this three zone-model to God (Malina 1979:136-138; 1981:65-67). Jesus referred many times to God as Father, and in the texts that tell us what the Father does, the Father functions like God in terms of three zones. The texts in which the Father is marked of from the son, the Father functions in terms of the

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eyes-heart zone, for example the Father 'sees in secret' (Mt 6:18) and 'knows the heart' (Lk 16:15). When Jesus is marked off from the Father, the mouth-ears zone is used, for example 'no one knows the Father except the Son' (Mt 11:17). Finally, the hands-feet zone always alludes to the spirit of God, for example Mark 11:20 'But it is by the finger of God that I cast out the demons, then the kingdom of God has come to you'.

29 If is therefore possible that one person (e g, a Pharisee) can be an official, professional and a patron at the same time (see again the definition given of a patron in section 4.2.2; see also endnote 24 above). As an official he can, for example, preside over a meal, as a professional he can declare someone clean, and as patron he has resources (e g the ability to forgive sins or to declare God present) that clients would want.

30 According to Van Staden (1991:194), the notion *status* can be defined as a collection of rights and duties which accord people a position in a social system. Such a position stands in relation to other positions in social systems, and is in each system endowed with a specific measure of social prestige. Status should be seen as separate from the individual status-bearer, because it is not a quality of individuals, but an element of social systems. Status is inextricably linked to the notion of *role*. A role is seen as the dynamic aspect of status, the putting into effect of rights and duties. Like status, roles are not attributes of the acting individual, but elements of the social system.

31 For a discussion on the different social institutions in first-century Mediterranean society, as well as the dominant social institution, see section 4.2.8 where this issue is recounted in full.

32 In this regard the following comments of Feeley-Harnik (1981:10) and Klosinski (1988:56-58) are of importance here:

> [I]t is owing precisely to the complex interrelationships of cultural categories that food is commonly one of the principal ways in which differences among social groups are marked.
>
> (Feeley-Harnik 1981:10)

> [S]haring food is a transaction which involve a series of mutual obligations and which initiates an interconnected complex of mutuality and reciprocity. Also, the ability of food to symbolize these relationships, as well as to define group boundaries, surfaced as one of the unique properties of human interaction .... Eating is a behavior which symbolizes feelings and relationships, mediates social status and power, and express the boundaries of group identity.
>
> (Klosinski 1988:56-58)

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[33] In this regard, it is interesting that Jesus warns the disciples to beware of the yeast of the Pharisees and of Herod (Mk 8:15). Although, according to the narrator, the disciples did not understand what Jesus was trying to tell them (see Mk 8:16), it is clear that the yeast or leaven of the Pharisees and Herod refers to their bad doctrine (cf Mk 3:6). Food and bread then clearly symbolize words and instruction (see also Neyrey 1991b:366).

[34] In section 3.3.6 it was argued that one's reflection on the symbolic universe pertains to a specific structuring of one's social universe. If God, for example, is understood by the Pharisees as being holy (whole or complete; cf Lev 11:44; 19:2; Mt 5:48), this means that persons who are not complete (like the lame and the blind) must be called deviants, because they violate the shared social system of meaning and order (see e g Van Aarde 1990b:251-264).

[35] In this regard, there is a similarity between the theory of labelling and deviance described above and that of Uspensky's study of the ideological perspective of the narrator on the phraseological level of the text. According to Uspensky (1973:19), the study of the ideological perspective of the narrator on the phraseological level of text is, inter alia, concerned with character delineation and 'naming' in particular. Van Aarde (1992a:40; in a reworked edition of his 1982 dissertation), in adapting the narrative model of Uspensky, argues that the narrator's ideological perspective on the phraseological level of the text manifests itself mainly against the background of the perspectives that the characters represent through dialogue, monologue, behavior and attitude. In other words, the exegete observes the perspective of the narrator, mainly by analyzing the different perspectives from which the respective characters are narrated. It is in this regard that labelling comes into play. Who calls whom by what label, and is a character described in terms of more than one label, are therefore the important questions in such a study. Van Aarde (1992a:52-84) has used this aspect of labelling in narrative theory to analyze the different labels that are used for Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew, as well as the different labels which are used to describe John the Baptist, the Jewish leaders, the Jewish crowd and the Gentiles. From this, it is clear that, in regard to labelling, an association of a narratological and social scientific analysis can be helpful to study the different characters in the gospels.

[36] It is thus clear that the theory of labelling and deviance has close relations to that of the theory about honor and shame, discussed in section 4.2.1. For instance, acquired honor and acquired status is more or the less the same. Also, by labelling someone as a deviant, one makes sure that one's own honor and status are maintained. Another relationship between these two theories lies in the fact that, according to the theory of honor and shame, only those who are seen as being an equal will be challenged and accordingly be labelled.

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[37] See for example Mark 12:38-39, where Jesus describes the scribes as people who like to walk around in long robes, to be greeted with respect in the marketplaces, and to have the best seats in the synagogues and places of honor at banquets.

[38] See for example Mark 7:5, where the Pharisees try to give broader respectability to their own point of view by linking Jesus' new interpretation (eating with hands that are defiled) to the tradition of the elders (a previously held positive symbol).

[39] As a neutral rule enhancer, Malina & Neyrey (1991b:103) gives the example of 'So what! What else is new?' In terms of this example cited, the remark of the crowd in Mark 1:27 ('What is this? A new teaching — with authority!') is very interesting.

[40] Note that the definition given here by Malina & Neyrey (1991b:103) of the concept ideology, concurs with that given in section 3.3.5.2.4.

[41] Nine distinctive classes can be identified in first-century Mediterranean society (Lenski 1966:214-296). This stratification will be discussed in section 4.2.9. When this stratification is taken into consideration, the remark made here by Pilch that in Mark 2:3, it was most probably the extended family which brought the sick man to Jesus, is problematic. According to Lenski (1966:281-284), the lowest class in first-century Mediterranean society was the expendable class for whom society had no place or need. These expendables had either been forced off their land because of population pressures, had lost their jobs because of economic pressures, or they did not fit into society because they were, for example, rendered unclean. They tended to be landless, itinerant, as well as clannish. In section 6.4, it will be argued that in Mark's story of Jesus, the crowds (including the possessed, sick and unclean) can be seen as the primary target of Jesus' ministry. By using the previously mentioned stratification of Lenski, Van Aarde (1992b:435-453) argues that the pressure to ostracize people in the first-century Mediterranean world would, for example, come from the extended family of an unclean or possessed person, conforming to the ascribed societal boundaries. That this is also true in Mark can be deduced from Mark 6:1-6 where it is clear that the extended family of Jesus was very negative about his ministry. They labelled Jesus a 'insane'. Because of this observation, it can be argued that it was most probably not the extended family of the sick man in Mark 2:3 who brought him to Jesus, but rather other expendables.

[42] The following definition of disease and illness by Murdock (1980:6) concurs with that of Young's:

> The notion of *disease* suggests primarily the communicable virus-borne or bacteria-borne phenomena, while the notion of *illness* embraces any impairment of health serious enough to arouse concern, whether it be due to communicable disease,

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psychosomatic disturbance, organic failure, aggressive assault, or alleged accident or supernatural interference.

(Murdock 1980:6; his italics)

43 It is most probably the case that health care now, or in the past, was delivered in a 'systematic' fashion (Mackintosh 1978:7-13). The concept 'health care system' therefore must be seen as a conceptual model with three overlapping parts, namely a professional, popular and a folk sector. It can also be argued that it actually would be more accurate to call this a sickness care system, since that is the primary focus; but health care system is the recognized and acceptable term. It also serves well as an effective heuristic tool for analyzing the way sickness is identified, labelled and managed in different cultures.

44 In this regard, Borg (1987:57-71, 97-116) has argued that Jesus can be seen as a holy man (in terms of his healings) and as a subversive sage (in terms of his teachings). As folk healer (holy man) and subversive sage, Jesus practiced a politics of holiness (in terms of inclusiveness). Crossan (1991a:314) calls this commensality. The religious leaders, on the other hand, practiced another politics of holiness (immediacy), that is, in terms of separateness/exclusiveness. Borg (1987:125) also states:

> We are not accustomed to thinking of Jesus as a political figure. In a narrow sense, he was not. He neither held or sought political office, was neither a military leader nor a political reformer with a detailed political-economic platform. But he was political in the more comprehensive and important sense of the word: politics as the shaping of a community living in history.
>
> (Borg 1987:125)

Jesus, as folk-healer, therefore, was 'political' in the sense that he advocated a reshaping of the community.

45 Douglas' concept was employed with considerable success by Neusner (1973) first in his book called *The idea of purity in ancient Judaism*, and then in a series of articles (see Neusner 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979). Among New Testament scholars, the works of Belo (1971), Malina (1981:122-151), Borg (1987), Neyrey (1986a:91-127; 1988b:72-73; 1991c:271-304), Elliott (1991b:211-240; 1991d:102-108; 1991e:386-399) and Van Aarde (1991d:51-64; 1992b:435-453) are also all based on this insight.

46 Discrimination in this sense would mean to identify specific categories (e g hybrids or unclean animals) that do not fit in the categories of creation.

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[47] This tractate from m. Kelim I, 6-9, as well as the tractate from m. Kelim I, 3 cited later is taken from Danby (1933). In each instance the translation was checked against the Hebrew.

[48] Jeremias (1969:271) also offers a more extensive map of people which is a combination of the maps found in m. Kid 4.1, m. Hor 3.8, t. Rosh Has 4.1, and t. Meg 2.7:

1. Priests
2. Levites
3. Full-blooded Israelites ('layman')
4. Illegal children of priests
5. Proselytes or Gentile converts to Judaism
6. Proselytes who once were slaves, hence proselyte freeman
7. Bastards (those born of incestuous or adulterous unions)
8. The 'fatherless' (those born from prostitutes)
9. Foundlings
10. Eunuchs made so by men
11. Eunuchs born that way
12. Those of deformed sexual features
13. Hermaphrodites
14. Gentiles, i.e., non-Jews.

(Jeremias 1969:271)

In a recent article, Van Aarde (1992b:435-453) has discussed the position of bastards, the 'fatherless' and foundlings in first-century Mediterranean society.

[49] See also Malina (1981:134-137) where he gives a map of clean and unclean animals.

[50] In this citation from Neyrey (1986a:101), I have replaced his examples not taken from Mark with some examples that do come from Mark, because this is the text under discussion.

[51] In regard to the relationship between internal structure, on the one hand, and boundaries and lines on the other, Neyrey (1991c:281-282) is of the opinion that the different Jewish groups in the time of Jesus were more concerned with keeping boundaries and lines than keeping the correct internal structure of the different groups.

[52] There is a celebrated text which speaks of 'fences' around the law:

> The tradition is a fence around the Law; tithes are fences around riches; vows are a fence around abstinence; a fence around wisdom is silence.
>
> (M. Aboth III, 14)

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It was especially the Pharisees who classified extensively and who normed the world in terms of temple appropriateness. They engaged in a process of making a 'fence' around the Law, extending a perimeter around it and guarding that outer fence zealously (Neyrey 1988a:76). Their interest in boundaries and surfaces thus created this fence.

53 According to Neyrey (1988a:78), the main shortcoming of Neusner's work on purity and pollution in Judaism (see e g Neusner 1973b, 1975) is the fact that he fails to employ this second aspect of Douglas's model, namely the social perception of the physical body as a replication of the general norms and values of society.

54 Politics, in first-century Mediterranean society, should be understood in terms of the notion of power (Parsons 1969:352-404; Saldarini 1988:30-34; Van Aarde 1992d:92-95). Power is a symbolic medium of interaction in society. It is to be distinguished from a raw act of physical force, which is not in itself constitutive of social interaction in society (see again endnote 15 above). It is the best seen as political power, in that it does not require the actual exercise of physical force, though that option remains as a threat in the background and is the basis of power. Power, therefore, is a capacity to be used in many situations within a society which recognizes it. Power as symbolic medium still depends on the ultimate capacity to coerce behavior but its use in a functioning society is usually symbolic and its permanence is protected by social legitimation, for example, by law, custom and some other type of social acceptance. The goal of power in society is to mobilize effectively resources in order to attain social goals. Power can be used to create or maintain order, to organize new social activities or institutions, or to provide in a better way for the needs of the society. In first-century Palestine, power was wielded by the governing class in the Roman empire and formed the basis of the empire. The Roman ruler, and to a lesser extent, the Jewish chief priests, leading elders, large property owners and major officials all had at their disposal power based on force and the wealth to support such a system. At the other levels of society, some people had a lesser amount of power and wealth; for example the peasants (see section 4.2.9).

55 The development and existence of agrarian societies depended on political as well as economical factors. Advances in technology which allowed efficient farming (e g iron plows or elaborate irrigation systems) and specialized military technology (e g the horse, chariot, armor or fortress) were crucial in the development of centralized power (Lenski 1966:192-194). The emergence of a governing class also depended upon and produced a redistributative economy in which a central authority (the government or the state) gathered agricultural produce in a central storehouse (e g the temple) through taxation and then redistributed the goods according to status and occupational roles. As empires became very large or suffered military or economic crisis, the economy tended toward a mobilization economy in which the governing class took control of the economy for military and economic projects. Mobilization of the economy

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allowed empires to acquire great power and produce extensive social differentiation. The Roman empire from its beginning was partly commercialized, which means merchants and traders achieved some independent power apart from the aristocrats who controlled agrarian economy. But the mass of the population, the peasants, were not free to grow and sell their produce for their own benefit, but were controlled by the governing class and impeded by difficulties in transporting and marketing food crops (Kautsky 1982:18-23; Saldarini 1988:39). In agrarian societies economic activities, therefore, were always socially restrained or constrained. The two dominant forms of economic exchange in agrarian societies were reciprocity within kinship relations and redistribution in political economics. Reciprocity means exchange on a gift or barter basis, was characterized by informal dyadic contracts and ensured that goods on the average would be equitably distributed. Redistribution, characteristically observed in the institutions of the state and religious taxation, involved the politically or religiously induced extraction of a percentage of the local production, the storehousing of that product, and its eventual redistribution for some political end or another (Oakman 1986, 1991a:34-37; Van Aarde 1992d:95).

56 For a discussion of the term *agrarian society*, see especially Lenski 1966:189-297 and Lenski & Lenski 1982:207-263: Agrarian societies can be characterized by the invention of the plow, the discovery of how to harness animal power, and the discovery of the basic principles of metallurgy. The latter made possible the forging of iron plowshares, which was a great advantage over their wooden predecessors. The further invention of the wheel and the sail greatly facilitated the movement of people and goods. Agrarian societies can be distinguished, on the one hand, from simple horticultural societies using the digging stick or advanced horticultural societies using the hoe, terracing, irrigation, fertilization and metal tools. It is distinguished, on the other hand, from industrial societies, where the raw materials used are far more diversified, the sources of energy quite different, and the tools far more complex and efficient.

57 Fiensy (1991:vi-vii) defines the concept of peasantry as follows: They are subsistence farmers who provide for their own maintenance from their own labor; they may be freeholders, tenants, day laborers or slaves; they ideally work their holdings as family units and they produce collectively more than is necessary for their own subsistence. With this surplus they support the elite class. Oakman (1991b:3) defines the notion of peasantry in more or less the same vein: A peasantry is a rural population, possibly including those not directly engaged in tilling the soil, who are compelled to give up their agricultural (or other economic) surplus to an outside group of powerholders, and who usually have certain cultural characteristics setting them apart from outsiders. Generally speaking, peasants have very little control over their political and economical situation. In Mediterranean antiquity, the overlords of peasants tended to be city dwellers, and a culture-chasm divided the literary elite from the unlettered villager.

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58 These two terms were coined by Redfield (1956:41-42), who describes peasant culture in general as a half-culture and a half-society. The Little Tradition is the one half of peasant society: It encompasses the culture, folk culture and traditions which is passed on among the unlettered of the village community, and can therefore be seen as the culture of the masses in non-developed societies. The other half is the Great Tradition: This term refers to high or learned culture, and is the tradition of the reflective few, cultivated in schools and temples, the tradition of the philosopher, the scribe, or literary man (Redfield 1956:41). The Great Tradition is always handed down onto the peasant, and the traditions of the peasant (the Little Tradition) are almost always taken for granted and never submitted to much scrutiny.

59 Horsley & Hanson (1985:52-63) argues in this regard that land can be seen as the most important commodity for peasants in an agrarian society. Land was needed for enough food, to grow seed for the next crop, as well as a surplus for the barter of other goods/produce not grown by a specific household. However, land was also needed to grow a surplus to pay taxes to the Roman elite and to the temple. Under the Romans, therefore, a 'double tax' had to be paid. When Roman taxes were raised, for example, the chief priests and other retainers did not lower their taxes, causing a negative experience for the peasants. Because taxes were so high, and also because of the droughts in 24-25 and 40 CE, a great number of peasants could not pay their taxes. These peasants then lost their land or were sold into slavery, which meant that a large amount of peasants became part of the expendable class (cf also Duling 1991a, Oakman 1991b, Van Aarde 1992d). In chapter 7 it will be indicated, by using the insights of Duling (1991a), Oakman (1991b) and Van Aarde (1992d), that this aspect is very important to understand the dynamics of first-century Mediterranean society as an advanced agrarian society, but also the relationship between the social institutions of kinship, politics and economics.

60 It should be noted that Ricoeur (1978) understood the notion 'symbol' in terms of a discourse. The way symbols are perceived here is that society is structured by ways of symbols, that is, persons communicate in terms of symbols.

61 Narratives usually have more than one ideological perspective (Van Aarde 1992a:34-36; cf also Uspensky 1973:9). The Gospel of Matthew is such a narrative. In Matthew, the narrator's ideological perspective coincides with that of the writer and the protagonist, namely Jesus. A character such as this in a story is sometimes called the 'view point character'. The ideological perspective is manifested in what the viewpoint character does, says, thinks, and in the way he acts and speaks. The ideological perspective of the viewpoint character thus forms the dominant perspective in the story. In the Gospel of Matthew, however, there is more than one perspective, that is, there are also the perspectives of the Jewish leaders, the disciples and the crowds. Because of this, the other divergent perspectives in the Gospel should be evaluated in terms of the perspective from which the protagonist, Jesus, is narrated.

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62 In this regard it should also be remembered that Mark's story of Jesus communicated in a specific macrosocial world. In the current debate in regard to the setting of Mark's gospel, three settings are postulated, namely in Rome, Galilee or Syria. Scholars who support a Roman origin for Mark's gospel are inter alia Brandon (1967), Martin (1979), Belo (1981), Perrin (1982), Best (1983), Standaert (1983), Hengel (1985), Senior (1987). Scholars who pose a Galilean setting for the Gospel are inter alia Marxsen (1959), Crossan (1973), Kelber (1974), Weeden (1976), Vanden Broek (1983), Myers (1988), Strijdom & Van Aarde (1990) and Rohrbaugh ([1993]b). Finally, there are also scholars who pose a Syrian setting for Mark, like Kee (1977), Harrington (1979) and Waetjen (1989). Because of the emphasis that the narrator places on Galilee in the Gospel (e g Mk 14:28; 16:7; see also section 5.2.4), it is postulated in this study that the macrosocial world of the Gospel is that of Galilee. In regard to the dating of Mark's gospel, scholars have developed a number of arguments to date the Gospel. Most of these arguments revolve around the understanding of Mark 13:2 and 13:14. If these two sayings of Jesus are understood as *vaticinia ex eventu*, it means that the Gospel can be dated shortly after 70 CE. In following Achtemeier (1978b), Gnilka (1978), Harrington (1979), Perrin & Duling (1979) and Strijdom & Van Aarde (1990), a date of 70-72 CE for Mark is thus postulated, contra the opinions of Marxsen (1959), Martin (1979), Hahn (1985) and Hengel (1985). Since the postulation of a social location and date for the Gospel of Mark is not the main objective of this study, these two choices will not be argued further.

63 Uspensky (1973) discerns four levels in a narrative text from which the narrative point of view of the narrator can be discerned: The ideological, phraseological, psychological, and the temporal and topographical level of the text. In structuralism a distinction is made between the level of observation (the surface structure) and the level of fundamental intentions (the depth structure). The grammatical structure of Uspensky's four levels is as follows:



In light of this, we can label the narrator's perspective on the ideological level of the text as the 'idea' forming the fundamental principle according to which the narrative and its narrative elements are constituted. These are the 'elements' to which reference is made by the expressions of psychology, phraseology, time and space (cf Van Aarde 1992b:34). In section 3.3.5, the notion of ideology, as understood by Uspensky, was already discussed. Also, in section 3.4, the way in which the ideological perspective of the narrator manifests itself on the

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topographical level was explained. In regard to the emic reading of Mark's narrative to follow, there is however, one further level of the text, as understood by Uspensky that is of importance, namely Uspensky's phraseological level. According to Uspensky (1973:19), the study of the phraseological level of a narrative consists inter alia of a delineation of the different characters in the narrative. It is in this regard that the notions of protagonist, target, antagonist(s) and helper(s) are used. The protagonist of a narrative is the main character in the narrative, and the plot of the narrative develops in terms of his actions, words and attitude(s). The target of a narrative can be seen as the object of the protagonist's mission, in the sense that the protagonist is trying to convey his values and beliefs to the target in such a manner that the target becomes a 'bearer of (the protagonist's — EvE) values' (see Vandermoere 1976:30). The antagonists in a narrative are those character(s) who try to make the mission of the protagonist end in a failure. Finally, the helper(s) are those characters in a narrative who helps the protagonist fulfill his mission. In sections 5.2 it will be indicated that in Mark's gospel, Jesus can be seen as the protagonist, the crowds as the target of Jesus' mission, the disciples his helpers and the antagonists, on Galilean soil local scribes and Pharisees as well as scribes and Pharisees from Jerusalem, and on Jerusalem soil, mainly the chief priests, elders and the scribes. However, in section 6.4 it will be indicated that, by ways of an etic reading of the text, the crowd (the target) can be situated in the expendable class.

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