

---

## Chapter 3

### Methodology reconsidered

---

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

In section 2.5 two research gaps that exist in the current debate concerning the political significance of the settings of Galilee and Jerusalem in Mark was identified. It was proposed that an association of a narratological and social scientific analysis looks to be an appropriate methodological starting point to address the first identified research gap in an attempt to analyze the political implications of space in Mark (see section 2.5).

Literary approaches to Mark (structural as well as narratological in orientation) that do not take into consideration the social dynamics of the context of the text or apply social scientific models when reading the text, are abundant<sup>1</sup>. Examples of scholars applying social scientific criticism when reading the text (Mark) are less abundant, since it is a relative new approach in reading texts. Works related to social scientific studies of certain pericopes in Mark that can be mentioned are those of Malina (1988a), Pilch (1988a), Neyrey (1988a), Oakman (1988) and Rhoads (1991).

However, studies on Mark that apply both literary and social scientific criticism to analyze the narrative in terms of, on the one hand, the ideological perspective of the narrator, and, on the other hand, narrative point of view on the topographical level of the text, have thus far not been undertaken. In section 2.4 we saw that Belo, Myers and Waetjen indeed label their respective ideological-critical readings of Mark as those of combining literary and social scientific analysis. My conclusion in evaluating these studies on Mark was twofold: First, their respective literary approaches do not take the narrative techniques of Mark seriously, especially in regard to the ideological perspective of the narrator on the topographical level of the text. Belo and Myers' approaches are structuralistic in nature, and Waetjen's, by using the literary-critical 'theory of aesthetic response' of Iser, concentrates only on one aspect (that of the reader), which can indeed be regarded as important for a narratological reading of Mark as narrative text. Their respective approaches therefore can not, in my opinion, really be seen as narratological readings of Mark.

Second, we saw that the works of Belo and Myers, in concentrating on some sociological aspects of Mark, use models which look to be either social historical in character, or, when social scientific models indeed are used, the question may be asked whether these studies succeed to avoid fallacies of ethnocentrism, anachronism and reductionism. It does not appear to be successful in all respects because they lack an

appropriate methodological basis. It is therefore argued that a social scientific analysis of Mark (in terms of an association of a narratological reading using social scientific models) has yet to be done. This daunting methodological task will be one of the aims of this study<sup>2</sup>.

Although a narratological reading of Mark, in combination with a social scientific analysis of the text, has not been done to date, the work of two other New Testament scholars, namely John Elliott and Norman Petersen, can be used as a methodological starting point. In 1981 Elliott's now well-known book, *A home for the homeless: A sociological exegesis of 1 Peter, its situation and strategy*, was published. The second (paperback) edition of this book followed in 1991. The work of Petersen, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the sociology of Paul's narrative world*, was published in 1985. The works of Elliott (1981, 1991a) and Petersen (1985) respectively concentrate on 1 Peter and on the narrative structure behind the letter to Philemon, and not on Mark. In these two works, however, some very important methodological remarks are made in connection to an association of a narratological and social scientific reading of biblical texts. Therefore, although these two works do not focus on Mark as an exegetical object, they can fruitfully be used as a starting point in developing a method and model<sup>3</sup> by which Mark can be read from the literary perspective of narratology and the social sciences.

## 3.2 AN ASSOCIATION OF LITERARY AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS: THE CURRENT DEBATE

### 3.2.1 N R Petersen

According to Petersen (1985:1), the 'map' of biblical studies looks different from a map drawn a decade ago, with two new routes on it, 'one route is that of literary criticism and the other that of sociology'. His work on Philemon is therefore an attempt to 'integrate contemporary literary and sociological capabilities into the traditional philological base of the historical critical method' (Petersen 1985:ix). This methodological supposition of Petersen presumes two important purposes: First, previous literary and sociological applications of these methods were inadequate, and second, the 'method' he is proposing can be seen as building on the insights of the historical critical approach. A discontinuity between the method he is proposing and that of the historical critical method, should not therefore be supposed. Petersen's main reason for combining a literary and sociological reading of the text is formulated by him as follows:

'[W]orlds' are human constructions, whether they are the constructions of societies or of narrators, and ... *narrative worlds* are comprised of the same kind of social facts — *symbolic forms* and *social arrangements* — as so-called real worlds. Thus narrative worlds can be studied like any other world.

(Petersen 1985:ix; my emphasis)

From this citation it is clear that for Petersen, when using a 'literary sociological method' (Petersen 1985:ix), three concepts are of special importance, namely narrative worlds, symbolic forms and social arrangements.

Petersen (1985:7-14) defines these three concepts as follows: Following the distinction made between text and history by historical criticism, Petersen distinguishes in narrative texts two 'worlds'; a contextual world and a narrative world. The concept *contextual world* refers to the 'notion of context with the time of writing (Petersen 1985:7). The concept *narrative/referential world* however is that 'reality which the narrator bestows upon his actors and upon their actions, a reality into which he authoritatively invites his audience' (Petersen 1985:7)<sup>4</sup>. The way in which the narrator invites his audience into the reality of the text's narrative or referential world, is described by Petersen as follows:

The starting point of literary criticism ... is 'to accept the form of the work' ... [O]ur Gospels ... have a narrative form ... and an imaginative world into which one can enter. How? By participating in the form of the work ... A literary reading of a narrative text ... begins at the moment when we allow ourselves to be addressed by its textually immanent narrator. That is the first step. All others follow from it ... the narrator lures the reader into ... times and places by perspectively locating himself and the reader in the midst of the scenes and events he describes, enabling the reader to see, hear and know things he would not have access to without the narrator's guiding voice. Through this device which literary critics call narrative point of view, the reader becomes a participant in the narrative form ... .

(Petersen 1980c:36-38)

The narrative world of a text is therefore always a *closed system*, an internally ordered whole with an ultimate object of interest, thus a frame of reference (Petersen 1985:20). The relation between these two worlds, that is, the narrative world and the contextual world, is that the narrative world of a text is always a conceptual interpretation of the real, historical or contextual world. Narrative worlds can therefore also be seen as

created texts of/from existing texts, or literary created worlds from existing worlds (see also Van Staden 1991:40). The notions *social arrangements* and *symbolic forms* are defined by Petersen (1985:x) as follows:

'Social arrangements' have to do with the social structures underlying the social relations comprised by the actions of the actors .... 'Symbolic forms', on the other hand, have to do with the overarching cognitive systems, the systems of knowledge, belief, value, that define these actors' identities and motivate their actions<sup>5</sup>.

(Petersen 1985:x)

Social arrangements thus have to do with the social institutions one encounters in everyday life, institutions within the fields of economy, politics, education, kinship and religion. These elements make up the fabric that is known as the *social universe* or *institutional order* (cf Petersen 1985:28). This order is always a segmented one by virtue of its institutionality, and therefore needs to be integrated into a comprehensive and meaningful system. This is done by the *symbolic universe*, which is an all embracing frame of reference which provides an integrative meaning for a society that consists of segmented institutions and diverse subjective experiences (see Van Staden 1988:349, 1991:61). The concept symbolic universe is defined by Petersen (1985:57) as a body of traditional knowledge known through symbols and language, a system of meanings which defines and creates a 'world', that is, real worlds, texts or narrative worlds (cf also Darr 1988:120).

In translating his understanding of these three concepts into his 'literary sociological method' (Petersen 1985:ix), Petersen uses and integrates the salient elements of narratology, cultural anthropology and the sociology of knowledge (cf Hays 1987:173; Osiek 1987:39; Darr 1988:118, Wimbush 1988:121 and Van Staden 1991: 58 for positive assessments of Petersen's accomplishment of combining certain aspects of these three fields).

Petersen's literary model is based on the 'agreement that narrative or story is probably a universal means of understanding human social actions and relationships in time' (Petersen 1985:10). The formal coherence achieved by the narrativizing of experience<sup>6</sup> (i.e. human social actions and relationships) is best represented in texts by three fundamental aspects of any narrative: Point of view, plot and closure, which order historical data, values, and belief systems of contextual worlds into narrative worlds. As such, any narrative world is always an interpretation of the contextual world to which the narrative refers.

*Point of view*, according to Petersen (1985:11-12), refers to the narrator's temporal, spatial and perspectival relationship to the story he is narrating. Temporally, point of view refers to the temporal relationship between the time of the narrator and the time referred to in the story. In terms of space as presented in texts, point of view refers to the spatial position of the narrator when he/she<sup>7</sup> is telling about events in the same or different place<sup>8</sup>, and, in terms of perspective, point of view refers to the narrator's principles or values in selecting some events for narration rather than others, or his ability to tell his audience the feelings, motives and thoughts in the story.

*Plot* refers to 'the sequence of selected events *as they appear in the story*, regardless of whether ... this sequence corresponds to the sequence in which the events took place, or in which the narrator leads us to believe they took place' (Petersen 1985:13; his emphasis). Finally, *closure* refers to the ending that fulfills the story, creates its coherence, and rounds off everything by satisfying expectations generated in the course of narration.

According to Van Staden (1991:60), it is clear that Petersen's social scientific part of his interpretive model is based on his literary insight. Following Eco (1976), Petersen (1985:33) understands the concept of narrative world to refer to the (contextual) world as represented in the text, and which represents the referential function of messages (Petersen 1979:9-48). As such, the narrative world of a text is always a literary construction, and the events which take place in such a world always have a narrative quality, in that the narrative world is that reality which a narrator bestows upon his actors and upon their actions. The narrative world of a text, therefore, is a perspectival presentation (in terms of point of view) of the contextual world in which it is created.

This literary-theoretical statement provides the link between Petersen's literary and social scientific endeavors. Worlds are always human constructions, whether they are constructions of societies or of narrators (Petersen 1985:ix). This insight is not only true in relation to the concepts of contextual worlds and narrative worlds, but is also one of the basic presuppositions of the sociology of knowledge. The primary aim of the sociology of knowledge is to analyze the social construction of reality, that is, the knowledge that determines conduct in everyday life. This presupposition of the sociology of knowledge is formulated by Berger & Luckmann (1967:3) as follows:

[I]nsofar as all human 'knowledge' is developed, transmitted and maintained in social institutions, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done in such a way that a taken-for 'reality' congeals for the man in the street.

(Berger & Luckmann 1967:3)

According to this formulation, one of the major premises of the sociology of knowledge is that all thought is inextricably linked to its delineation by the contemporary historical situation and locality (Berger 1977:240). Because of this, Berger & Luckmann (1967:4) sees the central problem of the sociology of knowledge as establishing 'the existential determination (*Seinsgebundtheit*) of thought as such' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:4). Reality is therefore socially constructed, in that society is a product of man/human beings (Berger & Luckmann 1967:1-3). Man, however, is also a product of society, in that society has a formative influence on man (Berger 1973:13-14).

This means that, according to the sociology of knowledge, man's understanding of his symbolic universe precipitates into a social universe. This social universe consists of certain social institutions, which in turn are filled by social roles, 'because by playing roles, the individual participates in a social world' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:74). Society therefore necessarily has a routine character (Berger & Berger 1976:16), because all human activity tends to become habitualized (Berger & Luckmann 1967:53). This habitualization of human activity is the necessary precondition for the formation of institutions in society.

The link-up in Petersen's approach between his narratological and social scientific (using the theories of the sociology of knowledge) reading of the text therefore is clear: Narratologically speaking, any text consists of two 'worlds', a contextual world and a narrative world, of which the narrative world is a *construction/interpretation* of the contextual world. The sociology of knowledge's presentation of reality boils down to the same relation between 'worlds', in that the social universe (social historical reality) is always a *constructed* reality or *interpretation* of the symbolic universe. By simplification, the narrative world (as a construction in terms of specific reflection on its contextual world), and the social universe (as a construction in terms of a specific reflection on the symbolic universe), are seen by Petersen as pertaining to the same thing, namely, constructed worlds or realities. This, however, does not mean that the same dialectical relationship between a symbolic universe and a contextual world can be indicated.

Petersen's combination of a narratological and social scientific reading of the text, in terms of constructed worlds and constructed realities, is also the reason for his employment of the results from studies done in the field of cultural anthropology (a subfield of social science anthropology)<sup>9</sup> in his exegetical model. As discussed above, the main premise of cultural anthropology is that 'worlds' must be seen as consisting of symbolic forms and social arrangements. From a cultural anthropological perspective, Malina (1986a:11) describes 'culture' as follows:

Culture, then, is a system of symbols, the result of a process of endowing persons, things, and events with meanings — with definition, delimitation, and situation in space and processes. A cultural group is a group of persons who share such a set of meanings and generally feel strongly about meanings shared within the group. The system of symbols thus becomes a system of meaning and feeling, a system of meaningfulness.

(Malina 1986a:11)

Symbolic forms (as an overarching cognitive system or systems of knowledge, belief and value), thus are built on or arise from the contextual world (Van Aarde 1992b: 438). The social arrangements within this world are mirrored in narrative worlds.

The relationship, therefore, between the worlds explored by anthropologists, exponents of the sociology of knowledge and analysts of narratives is that they study 'worlds' mainly as 'closed systems' (Petersen 1985:40). They study 'worlds in worlds', in that narrative worlds, social worlds/universes and social arrangements respectively, are always constructed from contextual worlds, symbolic universes and symbolic forms, and vice versa.

### 3.2.2 J H Elliott

What is needed is a procedure for appropriating and applying sociological models and concepts which at each stage of the exegetical analysis could aid our understanding and interpretation of the interrelation of literary, theological and sociological aspects and dimensions of composition.

(Elliott 1991a:3)

According to Elliott (1991a:4), the reason for this lack in modern exegesis of biblical texts, that is, not attending to both sociological and literary aspects when reading texts, is because we fail to take account of the fact that all ideas, concepts and knowledge are socially determined. Also, we lack the stimulus or means for analyzing the correlation or reciprocity between social realities and religious symbolizations.

Although the historical critical school laid emphasis on some of these aspects (e.g. social context, social conditioning and the social *Sitz im Leben*) of biblical documents, what is lacking 'is a process for ascertaining not only *what* the socio-historical circumstances of given traditions and compositions were but also *how* and *why* these circumstances gave rise to the productions under consideration' (Elliott 1991a:3; his emphasis).

A biblical exegetical model which is able to avoid these shortcomings is an approach which Elliott (1991a:7) calls *sociological exegesis*, 'the combined exercise of the exegetical and sociological disciplines, their principles, theories and techniques' (Elliott 1991a:7-8). According to Elliott (1991a:8), this approach is *sociological* in that it involves the employment of the perspectives, presuppositions, modes of analysis, comparative models, theories and research of the discipline of sociology. It is *exegetical* in that it focuses centrally upon a biblical document, and through the employment of as many as possible of all the subdisciplines of exegesis it attempts to determine the impact of the text within various contexts. Furthermore, the primary goal of such an exegetical model is the interpretation of the text as it was designed to serve as vehicle of socio-religious interaction, that is, focusing especially on the questions of how and why the text was designed to function, and what its impact upon the life and activity of its recipients was intended to be (Elliott 1991a:8). The text is therefore seen mainly as an act of communication in a certain specific context or circumstances. Elliott (1991a:8) defines his 'sociological exegesis' as follows:

[S]ociological exegesis is the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis (correlation) of (1) the literary, sociological and theological features and dimensions of the text ... and (2) this text's relation to and impact upon its narrower and wider social contexts.

(Elliott 1991a:8)

Because texts are sociological both in content and in intent, that is, texts are both the products and vehicles of ongoing social interaction (cf also Van Staden 1991:19), Elliott (1991a:10) distinguishes between the *strategy* and the *situation* of texts.

The strategy of a text, according to Elliott (1991a:11), is the 'deliberate design of a document calculated to have a specific social effect on its intended hearers or readers'. This is also called the *pragmatic dimension* (which can also be called the ideological perspective and interest of the narrator; see section 3.3.5.2.2) of a text by which the text is intended to serve as an effective medium of social interaction (Elliott 1987a: 2)<sup>10</sup>. Elliott (1987a:2; his emphasis) distinguishes the following features that may serve as an appropriation of a text's strategy:

A text

1. *describes* selected features concerning the situation (narrative world and social world), the sender(s) and receiver(s) and their relationship; (... the question of the relation of narrative world to social world);
2. *emphasizes* these selected features;
3. *evaluates* these selected features;
4. *proscribes or criticizes and/or prescribes or praises* certain actions,



norms, sanctions, actors, traits, roles, institutions, attitudes, ideas, beliefs ect.; 5. *explains, justifies, and legitimates* ## 1-4 and attempts to provide a plausible and persuasive rationale for the integration of experience and aspiration, group values and goals and lived reality ... and ideological implication ....

(Elliott 1987a:2; his emphasis)

On the other hand, the strategy of the text has to be related to the situation of the text. The *situation* of a text,

involves various levels and phases. The *macrosocial level of a text* concerns the macrosocial context of the text, the total social system in which the text is produced. The *microsocial level of a text* concerns the more specific social conditions and features of its specific sender(s) and receiver(s). The situation of a text can [be] viewed ... *synchronously* or ... *diachronically* ....<sup>11</sup>

(Elliott 1987a:1; his emphasis)

According to Elliott (1991a:11), this correlation between the *strategy* and the *situation* of a text establishes the integration of a literary and a social scientific analysis of the text. In connection with the integration of a literary and social scientific reading of a text, Van Staden (1991:39) notes that Elliott's contribution, concerning the methodological approach of a social scientific exegesis of Scripture, results in the following statement:

[T]he literary text (in particular its strategy — EvE) serves as the primary focus, starting point, and empirical control of sociological analysis (that is its situation — EvE) .... The *textual* focus of the analysis distinguishes it from the wider diachronic scope of social history and from the synchronic analysis of an entire society at a given period.

(Elliott 1991a:8; his emphasis)

The special stress given to *textual focus* constitutes a choice for an analysis of the text as the methodological first step in the process of the social scientific study of the New Testament, and is indicative of a social scientific investigation of a text from a *literary* perspective (cf also Van Staden 1991:40). From Elliott's distinction between the strategy and the situation of a text, it is clear that the strategy of a text is pursued by primarily literary methods, and the situation of a text is studied by mainly using models and theories from the social sciences.

From what has been said thus far, it is clear that the general objective of Elliott's sociological exegesis is the analysis, interpretation and synthesis of the literary, sociological and theological features and dimensions of the text along with the text's relation to and impact upon its narrower and wider social contexts. More specifically, the objective is the determination of the social as well as literary content, social conditions and intended consequences of the text. The immediate field of interaction to be interpreted, in relation to the sociological features of the text, comprises the author and the intended recipients, their respective situations (political, historical, social, economic, cultural and religious), and the nature of their relationship. The literary features to be interpreted consist of the narrator's design of the text by means of his literary, sociological and theological strategy as a specific response to the specific situation of his intended readers (Elliott 1991a:8).

In the 1991 paperback edition of *A home for the homeless*, Elliott (1991a:xix) redefines his 'sociological exegesis' as 'social science', or more specifically, as 'social scientific criticism' (Elliott 1991a:xix). The reason for this is the fact that the term 'social science/social scientific criticism' embraces not only sociology (primarily the study of modern social systems), but also cultural anthropology (primarily the study of preindustrial social systems), economics, sociolinguistics, semiotics and other related subdisciplines of the social sciences field.

Therefore, according to Elliott, social scientific criticism is an expansion of the conventional historical-critical method, in that it complements other disciplines of the exegetical enterprise through its attention to the social dimensions of the text and its contexts of composition and reception. It differs from approaches labelled 'social history' by attempting to advance beyond mere social description and 'inspired hunches concerning social relationships' to social scientific analysis and description. Thus, it directs attention to the total constellation of factors (ecological, economical, educational, juridical, political, social and cultural [including religious]) shaping the context in which the text is produced. It also gives attention to why certain materials are selected and others are not, the arrangement of such selected material, the rhetorical design<sup>12</sup> of the text and the capacity of the text as a meaningful and effective instrument of communication and social interaction (Elliott 1991a:xx).

Social scientific criticism also includes the awareness and acknowledgement that all interpretation is perspectival. This means that the choice for a method of interpretation, the general paradigm of analysis being used, the interpreter's hermeneutical presuppositions and the criteria guiding the activity of interpretation are always 'subjective'. Therefore, it is valuable to have these presuppositions, choices and criteria being expounded in one's methodological reflection.

Although Elliott applied his social scientific criticism to 1 Peter (in the above mentioned book), he also states that, when this mode of analysis is applied to other writings of the New Testament, the variables will involve the specific document studied and the specifics of its genre, content and context. In such an analysis the following questions will be of importance:

- \* Who are the explicated (or implied) readers and how is their situation portrayed (explicitly or implicitly) in the document? Or in other words, can a social profile of the audience be constructed?;
- \* how are the reflection of and response to the situation presented in the document? This question relates to important matters such as how the document is diagnosing and evaluating the situation, what criteria, norms and values are involved in such an evaluation, what kind of response to the situation is urged by the document, and also, are there any dominant symbols used to characterize the identity and action of the audience and authors;
- \* what is the interpreter's analysis and explanation of the depiction, diagnoses and evaluation of the situation given in the document and the response it seeks of its audience?, and
- \* who are the producers of this document as are evident from either explicit or implicit internal information (see Elliott 1991a:xxiv-xxv)?

To summarize: For Elliott it is clear that the tasks and goals of social scientific criticism and literary-criticism are interrelated (Elliott 1991a:xxx). Both criticisms are necessary for the full exposure of both the social situation and rhetorical strategy of a biblical writing. Social scientific criticism ought to be accompanied by means of attention given to linguistics and literary theory. Therefore, an exegetical approach should be developed that enables a methodological association of these two fronts — social science and literary theory. Or in Elliott's words: 'Here, too, I believe the time has come for methodological consolidation on these two fronts ... (Elliott 1991a:xxx).

### 3.3 EVALUATION: METHODOLOGICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE

From the discussion of Petersen's and Elliot's methodological points of departure in proposing a combination of a rhetorical and social scientific analysis for reading biblical texts (see above section 3.2), it is clear that between these two scholars' presuppositions, certain methodological points of agreement and difference can be indicated. These will, where necessary, be listed below. My interest in the methodological points of departure of Petersen and Elliott, however, lies in using some of their insights to put forward a specific methodological model by which the Gospel of Mark can be interpreted as a *narrative* from a *social scientific* perspective.

In order to make my own methodological points of departure more overt, it will be shown that some aspects of Petersen's and Elliott's insights prove to be indispensable for the methodology proposed here, while some others need correction and/or further elaboration.

### **3.3.1 The relationship between historical-criticism, socio-historical- and social scientific analysis**

Petersen (1985:ix) and Elliott (1991a:xviii-xix) are both of the opinion that the literary and sociological applications of the historical-critical method were inadequate. Emphasis upon social context, the social conditioning and the social *Sitz im Leben* of biblical documents indeed has been the hallmark of the historical-critical method (Elliott 1991a:2). The emphasis of this method was to collect data from biblical texts to ascertain *what* was going on *when* and *where*, thus a focus upon 'historical diachronic sequence rather upon social synchronic interaction as well' (Elliott 1991a:4). What was lacking as the base of the historical-critical method, however, was a process for ascertaining not only what the socio-historical situation of a given tradition or text were, but also '*how* and *why* these circumstances gave rise' to the production of biblical texts (Elliott 1991a:3).

The dynamics that all ideas, concepts and knowledge are socially determined should be 'taken into consideration much more and in a more social scientific manner' (Van Aarde 1992b:437) as it has been the case in the historical-critical approach. Historical contexts of texts have further social dimensions than only that '*what* was going on *when* and *where*'. From a social scientific point of view, the contents of texts also refer to social behavior involving two or more persons, social groups, social institutions, social systems and patterns and codes of sociality. Furthermore, texts themselves are likewise shaped in their language, content and perspectives by the social systems in which they were produced. Moreover, they serve as vehicles of social interaction. The contexts of these texts, also, are social contexts, contexts shaped by societal conditions, structures and processes. In their content, structure, strategies and meaning, these texts presuppose and communicate information about the social systems of which they are a product. The theological issues and interests which shaped the historical-critical enterprise (see for example the works of Lohmeyer, Lightfoot and Kelber in section 2.2) reduced social and cultural data to illustrative background information. This was helpful, though not essential to the task of interpreting the social dynamics which generated biblical texts (cf Elliott 1989:1-2).

What is needed beyond the collection of independent historical and social data is a way to investigate the interrelationship of ideas and communal behavior, belief systems and cultural systems and ideologies as a whole, and the relationship of such cultural systems to natural and social environment, economic organization, social structures and political power.

According to Elliott (1989:5-6), a social scientific study of biblical text has two foci: First, social sciences are used to construct theories and models for collecting and analyzing data which illuminate salient features of ancient Mediterranean and early Christian society and culture. Second, it aims to elucidate the structure, content, strategy and intended rhetorical effect of the text within its social context. The text is analyzed as a vehicle of communication whose genre, structure, content, theme and aim are shaped by the cultural and social dynamics of the social system and the specific historical setting in which it is produced and to which it constitutes a specific response.

The most significant way a social scientific study of texts differs from the historical-critical method, according to Petersen (1985:18-19), is that the social sciences focus on the sociology of narrative worlds (and/or contextual worlds — EvE), rather than on 'historical worlds'. Social scientific study of texts moves beyond social description to sociological analysis (Elliott 1989:2). This distinction between social description and sociological analysis also relates to a further difference between the historical-critical method and that of social scientific reading of a text: While historical-critical analysis tends to focus on individual actors, extraordinary actions, distinctive properties, personal rather than societal relationships, and on the diachronic change of these aspects, sociological analysis tends to focus on social groupings, regular, recurrent and routinized behavior, common properties, systemic relations and structured patterns of behavior (Elliott 1989:10-11). Historical-criticism thus searches out what is unique and particular, while the social sciences is a generalizing discipline (cf also Petersen 1985:18; Rohrbaugh 1987:24; 1991:68). In this regard Rohrbaugh (1991:69) makes the following comment:

Biblical scholars, like most other historians, have been trained to look at the particular and unique .... The social sciences, by contrast, seek the commonplace and generic. Their focus is not on details but generalizations .... Neither their questions nor their answers are those of the historian and the result is that conversation between historians and social sciences is often what Peter Burke has called a 'dialogue of the deaf'.

(Rohrbaugh 1991:69)

In regard to the relationship between historical-critical analysis and that of the social sciences, two other points of view from the field of South African biblical scholarship, namely that of Vorster (1988:49-64) and Van Aarde (1988d:49-64), needs our attention here. According to Vorster (1988:31), nowadays we no longer find it strange to see psychological, sociological, literary, feminist, materialist and other interpretations of Biblical texts getting more attention than the historical-critical method of interpretation. This shift, however, does not imply a restoration of the historical-critical method, but rather a 'revolution' (Vorster 1988:36), in the sense that New Testament scholarship is heading for a new paradigm, that is towards a post-critical science. This shift, according to Vorster (1987c:385-388), can be seen in the different approaches of the historical-critical and social-scientific studies of Biblical texts. Historical-critical analysis is interested in the *reconstructing* of the social context in which a text genetically and mechanistically originated, while social scientific studies wants to *construct* a social context in which the intended communication of a specific text could make sense. Seen as such, according to Vorster (1988:46), a discontinuity exists between previous historical-critical interpretation and a sociological analysis of texts. For Van Aarde (1988d:56), however, a sociological approach (and other 'holistic' approaches) to Biblical texts does not mean an abandonment of historical studies as such. It must rather be seen as an *adaptation* of the previous historical-critical approach. Van Aarde (1988d:56) formulates this as follows:

As we have remarked earlier, historical criticism regards the text analytically as a phenomenon consisting of parts building up a whole. In modern socio-historical and semio-structural approaches the total socio-historical and socio-linguistic scope of a document is holistically taken into consideration while remaining aware of the theoretical and hypothetical obstacles in constructing such a context. The focus is thus laid on the social system that is expressed in the document.

(Van Aarde 1988d:56)

According to Van Aarde (1988d:60), Biblical scholarship may not evade the challenge to be relevant to modern plural society with its tremendous ecological, economic, cultural, political and religious crises. Because of this, Van Aarde (1988d:61) is of the opinion that modern Biblical scholarship has adapted the more (analytical and fragmental) historical approaches into more 'holistic' approaches, with the aim to try and explain biblical truths to our new plural society. Current social scientific studies of the Bible and the biblical world are therefore to be seen as an adaptation of historical-criticism.

Social scientific criticism therefore is an *adaptation*, and not a *replacement* (revolution; Vorster 1988:31), or *expansion* of the conventional historical-critical approach (see Petersen 1985:ix; Elliott 1989:2-3, 1991a:xix-xx). It adapts the other subdisciplines of the exegetical enterprise (text criticism, source criticism, tradition and redaction criticism, theological criticism and reception criticism) by means of its attention to the social dimensions of the text, its contexts of composition and reception and their interrelationships in terms of our modern plural society (with its holistic, multidisciplinary, social-dynamic and pragmatic features).

However, within the scope of the latter, social scientific analysis differs from approaches labeled 'social-history' by attempting to advance beyond 'mere social description and inspired hunches concerning social relationships to social scientific analysis and description' (Elliott 1991a:xix)<sup>13</sup>. The difference between the socio-historical method and that of a social scientific study of biblical texts therefore lies in the self-conscious employment of a social scientific method in order to analyze the text and context of a biblical document<sup>14</sup>.

From the above discussion, three preliminary points of departure for my own reading of Mark have been made more overt: First, Mark, as text, should be seen as product of both social interaction and social force, that is, an instrument of ongoing social force and interaction. Second, to avoid reading Mark merely from a socio-historical point of view, my specific reading of Mark will make use of a consciously designed, conceptual literary and social scientific model(s). And third, this model(s) will be defined in 'public discourse' (to use Jürgen Habermas' terminology). In this way, scientific verification/falsification is made possible. Not only the hermeneutical presuppositions and applied literary and social scientific theories can therefore be objectified in open debate, but also the results that will evolve in relation to the methodological points of departure<sup>15</sup>.

### **3.3.2 Social scientific analysis and narratology: An association of literary criticism and social scientific criticism**

From our discussion of the respective methodological points of departure of Petersen and Elliott (section 3.2), it became clear that both are of the opinion that a combination of a literary and social scientific approach, methodologically speaking, is needed to read (biblical) texts in terms of the communication between author and reader in the specific context of the produced text<sup>16</sup>. However, it should be noted that Petersen and Elliott combine these two exegetical approaches for different reasons.

Petersen (1985:ix) calls his method 'literary sociological'. The 'one route is that of literary criticism, and the other that of sociology' (Petersen 1985:1). The sociological aspect of Petersen's literary sociological method is built on the fact that all worlds, real or narrative, are human constructions (Petersen 1985:ix). Therefore, one has to look for the symbolic forms and social arrangements that sustain the lives of the actors who inhabit such a narrative world. On the other hand, the literary aspect of Petersen's literary sociological method is built on the opinion 'that narrative or story is probably a universal means of understanding human social actions and relationships in time' (Petersen 1985:10). According to Petersen, the formal coherence achieved by the narrativizing of experience is best represented by the point of view, plot and closure of a narrative (Petersen 1985:10). If one takes into consideration Petersen's distinction between texts and contexts (Petersen 1985:6-10) and history and story<sup>17</sup> (Petersen 1985:10-14), one therefore could say that his literary sociological method has two objectives, one literary and one historical (cf Darr 1988:120).

Turning to Elliott, we saw in section 3.2 that he terms his method as *sociological exegesis*, a term which he changed in his 1991 paperback edition to 'social science' (Elliott 1991a:xix). Elliott's methodological points of departure in interpreting (biblical) texts by means of a social scientific model is based on his understanding of what a text is. He defines a text in this regard as 'a specific response (the strategy of the text — EvE) to a specific situation' (Elliott 1991a:xxii). According to Elliott (1989:8), all texts are units of meaningful discourse in oral or written form. Meaningful discourse presumes a shared system of signification. Both the capacity of a text to serve as a medium of communication and its meaning as such are determined by the conventions and constraints of the social and cultural systems in which the text and the senders and receivers are based. Communicative conventions and constraints on expression and meaning are determined by cultural and social scripts which vary according to time and place. Therefore, the expression (form and content) and meaning of a text are relative to its historical and social location. A text thus encodes elements of, information about, and comment upon the social system of which it is a part (cf also Rohrbaugh [1993]a:6).

According to Elliott the aim of social-scientific study of biblical texts thus aims to

elucidate the structure, content, strategy and intended rhetorical effect of the text within its social context. The text is analyzed as a vehicle of communication whose genre, structure, content, themes, message, and aim are shaped by the cultural and social forces of the social system and the specific historical setting in which it is produced and to which it constitutes a specific response.

(Elliott 1989:6)



Seen from this perspective, the chief aim of a social scientific reading of texts is 'the determination of the text's meaning-in-context (the situation of the text — EvE) and its social-rhetorical strategy (the strategy of the text — EvE)' (Elliott 1989:16).

The first methodological point of departure that is of importance for my own model in reading Mark, and which can be taken from Elliott and Petersen, is their insight that a combination of reading the text from both a literary and sociological point of view is not only viable, but essential. Their reasons for combining these two 'routes', of course, are different. On the one hand, Petersen's model, in a sense can be termed 'structural', in that his 'socio-historical' interest lies in looking for the deep structure 'behind' the surface structure of the text, that is the story (world) behind the letter (as genre) (Petersen 1985:ix). Because of this interest, both the sociological and literary aspects of the texts are of importance.

On the other hand, Elliott, in distinguishing between the strategy and situation of the text (Elliott 1989:8-9), is clearly interested in the communication of biblical texts. The fact that he terms his analysis as 'social scientific', which includes a social scientific and rhetorical reading, and Petersen his analysis as 'literary sociological', therefore only brings to the fore their different objectives from which perspective and for which purpose a text is read. From the insight of both these two scholars, however, it is clear that the sociological and literary aspects of their exegetical models, although distinguishable, are inseparable. Both aspects, sociological and literary, go hand in hand.

In devising one's own model to read Mark from a social scientific point of view (by means of an association of a social scientific and literary approach), a combination of the insights of Petersen and Elliott, according to my opinion, opens up certain methodological points of departure for an investigation into possible political associations of the topographical settings regarding Galilee and Jerusalem in Mark.

From our discussion in section 3.2, it became clear that, on the grounds of Petersen's insight that all worlds are human constructions (Petersen 1985:ix), also narrative worlds, as closed systems, can be studied as any other (social) world. We also saw that Petersen (in following Geertz 1973:87-125) is of the opinion that the relatedness of the symbolic universe to the social universe can respectively be defined in terms of symbolic forms and social arrangements. By combining this relationship with the sociology of knowledge's insight in terms of the existential determination of thought (Berger & Luckmann 1967:4), Petersen is able to show that, as society has a routine character and therefore tends to become habitualized (Berger & Luckmann 1967:53), this is also the case when narrative worlds are taken into consideration.

Subsequently, because one is able to understand/construct certain salient features of any certain society's symbolic universe by analyzing the habitualized social arrangements of such a society, it also becomes possible to construct a narrator's interpretation of the contextual world in which he is narrating/writing by analyzing his rhetorical arrangements of events, time, space and characters in the narrative. Social arrangements/structures, are therefore, in a sense, the same as textual arrangements/ structures. This interpretation of Petersen's viewpoint regarding the relatedness of the concepts of symbolic universe (symbolic forms) to social universe (social arrangements), and that of the concepts of contextual world and narrative world (textual arrangements), corresponds to what Routh & Wolff (1977a:3-4) refers to as 'literature as a kind of sociology'. Literature is regarded as a description, and sometimes an exact description, of either the time in which it was written (Petersen's contextual world) or of the time to which it refers (what Petersen calls the referential world of the text). Seen as such, literature 'is seen as a source of data, often data of a type which would not otherwise be accessible to a sociologist, and as a carrier of crystallized values and attitudes, as well as information about institutions' (Routh & Wolff 1977a:3). My contention is, that what Routh & Wolff (1977a:3) terms 'crystallized values and attitudes', are also 'crystallized' (i.e. structurally arranged) in the text as a product of its contextual world.

As we have seen, according to Petersen, the 'narrativizing of experience' (Petersen 1985:10) is presented in texts by the concepts of point of view, plot and closure. This means that, as certain specific social arrangements can be seen as an interpretation of the symbolic world of a society, textual arrangements can also be seen as a certain interpretation of the contextual world in which the narrative is produced.

In a very particular way this is what Elliott is focusing upon. In concentrating, inter alia, on the strategy of texts, which Elliott (1989:17) calls the 'pragmatic dimension' of the text, emphasis is put on the narrator's relationship to his hearers/readers in terms of his structuring of the text to persuade his readers to move cognitively, emotionally and behaviorally towards his specific understanding and interpretation of both their shared symbolic universe and contextual world. This is also the reason why Elliott (1989:10) sees all biblical texts as ideological in nature.

To summarize: Petersen's (1985:10) insights that 'all worlds are human constructions', and 'that narrative or story is probably an universal means of understanding human social actions and relationships', make it possible to draw the following conclusion: Any society's interpretation of the symbolic universe to which they adhere precipitates certain habitualized social arrangements (institutions and roles; cf also Kurz 1987:196; Van Aarde 1988b:238). Because of this, it can be said that, in terms of

texts, the narrator's interpretation of his readers' symbolic universe and contextual world precipitates certain textual arrangements (structures) in the story he is narrating. Or, in the words of Beidelman (1970:30):

[L]anguage is more than simply grammar, syntax and vocabulary. It is rather the sum total of ways in which the members of society symbolize or categorize their experience so that they may give it order and form. Language thus includes total symbolic behavior.

(Beidelman 1970:30)

This Elliott calls the strategy of the text, or which I would like to call the ideological perspective and intent of the narrator (cf Van Eck & Van Aarde 1989:778-800; Van Eck 1990:149-151; 1991b:1023-1038), following Van Aarde's interpretation of this term (see inter alia Van Aarde 1983:13-15; 1986a:62-75; 1988a:25-29; 1988b:235-252). The notion of the ideological perspective and intent of the narrator, ideology as such, as well as the relational qualities of these two concepts to terms like symbolic and social universe and the strategy and situation of the text, will subsequently be discussed in section 3.3.5.

### 3.3.3 First literary analysis, then social-scientific reading

From our discussion in the previous section, the conclusion was drawn that the methodological points of departure of Petersen and Elliott indicate a combination of literary and social scientific analysis which makes it possible to study biblical texts more comprehensively, as it gives attention to both the literary/rhetorical and sociological aspects of texts. Furthermore, it also became clear that both Petersen and Elliott implicitly regard the association of the literary and social scientific aspects of their respective exegetical models as inseparable, although distinguishable from each other. However, although they see this combination as inseparable, both scholars are of the opinion that a literary analysis of the text should be a 'methodological first', followed by and fused with the different social scientific theories applied in their respective exegetical models<sup>18</sup>.

The question regarding the relationship between *text* (strategy) and *context* (situation), and more specifically, which of these two should dominate textual interpretation, is posed by Petersen (1985:6) as follows:

At issue in the debate is the question of which should dominate in textual interpretation, the information internal (intrinsic) to the text (i e, inter alia its strategy — EvE) or contextual information that is external (extrinsic) to the text (its situation — EvE), like ... the historical and cultural climate [of the author]<sup>19</sup>.

(Petersen 1985:6)

[Petersen's response to this problem is expressed as follows: 'The text itself must be comprehended in its own terms before we can ask of what evidence, whether in relation to the time of writing or in relation to the events referred to in it' (Petersen 1978b:20, 38-40). And, elsewhere:

The starting point of literary criticism ... is 'to accept the form of the work' ... [O]ur Gospels ... have a narrative form ... and an imaginative world into which one can enter. How? By participating in the form of the work ... A literary reading of a narrative text ... begins at the moment when we allow ourselves to be addressed by its textually immanent narrator. That is the first step. All others follow from it....<sup>20</sup>

(Petersen 1980c:36)

Elliott supports the point of view that a literary analysis of the text must come first when he, in explaining the correlation between linguistic and sociological analysis of biblical texts, states: 'This thesis (that texts must be studied in terms of its strategy and situation — EvE) is based on, and thus presumes as a first methodological step, an initial close reading of the text' (Elliott 1991a:xxii), and elsewhere, 'the literary text serves as the primary focus, starting, and empirical control of sociological exegesis' (Elliott 1991a:8). Wire (1984:209), in commenting on Elliott's sociological exegesis (see again section 3.2), underscores this methodological point of departure by stating the following:

[T]he text itself is the only witness to its specific situation ... So it all comes back to literary analysis or what is more exactly called rhetorical analysis, searching the text for what Elliott calls the 'strategy' of the writer, and through that finding the situation ... in which this particular strategy makes sense.

(Wire 1984:209)

Also, Petersen's and Elliott's points of view which see literary analysis as the 'first methodological step' of textual analysis, can also be supported with the following remarks of other scholars: 'It is our interpretation of the text which leads us to setting for deeper understanding'<sup>21</sup> (Skinner 1975:227) or in the words of Hermadi (1976:383), 'setting (the contextual world of the text — EvE) can 'enhance' the understanding of the text, [but] textual information has priority and the text fulfills the directive role (Hermadi 1976:383). Also De Villiers (1984:69-73) states:

This reconstruction (of the contextual world of the text — EvE) should be determined by a sound hermeneutical methodology by which the text itself and a proper method of textual analysis direct the reconstruction

.... This would imply that texts which refer explicitly to their own situation, should first be read in their own terms, that is, text immanently, even if they are historical books.

(De Villiers 1984:69-73)

Malina and Van Staden also see things in the same way as Petersen and Elliott in this regard: Malina is of the opinion that '... using the Bible as historical object obviously requires a first step of interpretation, with interpretation being rooted in reading. Thus any use of the Bible as written text requires that it be read' (Malina 1983:120, see also 1982:229)<sup>22</sup>. Finally, Van Staden (1991:33; his emphasis) states:

[M]ethodologically speaking, the only *direct and explicit* social information we have for the contextual history of the text is the literary work itself, constituting a social fact. Social-scientific data within the narrative is not directly accessible or available for a historical (re)construction. Such data have acquired the characteristics of literary elements, and should be analyzed as such (cf also Routh & Wolff 1977b:18; Hellholm 1980:81-82; De Villiers 1982:29-30<sup>23</sup>; Van Aarde [1982]:58<sup>24</sup>, 1988b:3; Van Eck 1991b:1039).

(Van Staden 1991:33; his emphasis)

Reading the text first (in terms of its strategy/narrator's ideological point of view), as the way of getting to the situation (in terms of Elliott's employment of this term), will also be one of the methodological points of departure of this study.

### 3.3.4 Contextual, referential and narrative worlds

In section 3.2.1, when Petersen's literary sociological exegetical model was under discussion, we saw that he (Petersen 1985:7-8), in using the communication model of Roman Jakobson (cf Petersen 1978b:48)<sup>25</sup>, distinguishes between two 'worlds' in any narrative:

In biblical studies, a corresponding distinction is made in terms of *text* and *history*, as we noted in connection with the twin axioms of historical criticism. Accordingly, when narratives like the Gospels ... are the texts in question, their historical context is understood to be that of the time in and for which they were written. This *contextual history* or world, however, is distinguished from the history of events referred to in these texts, such as the events that took place in the time of Jesus and of his followers after his death. Literary and historical critics are therefore

in agreement when they associate the notion of context with the time of writing. But what in literary criticism corresponds to the history referred to in our narrative texts? In literary terms, this *referential history* comprises of the *narrative world* of the text (or story). The narrative world is that reality which the narrator bestows upon his actors and upon their actions, a reality into which he authoritatively invites his audience  
....

(Petersen 1985:7; his emphasis)

According to Petersen (1978b:15, 1985:5), a literary text thus 'is first and foremost evidence of the time in which it was written. It is a primary source for that time, but only a secondary source for the events referred to in it'. Therefore, Petersen urges very strongly that the interpreter of biblical texts should make a conceptual differentiation between two modes of worlds: The *narrative/referential world*, which is a whole, complete world, or 'closed system' (Petersen 1985:8), presented to the reader in and by a narrative, and which offers the reader the only way to understand the real, historical world or *contextual world* of which the narrative world is a reflection.

Elliott (1989:3, 8), on the other hand, also distinguishes between the *narrative world* and the *social world* (Petersen's contextual world) of texts. Because of his interest in the communication of texts, we saw that he also distinguishes between a text's strategy and situation. According to Elliott (1989:8-9), a text's situation is more or less the same as a text's social world. The study of the social world of the text, however, involves various levels and phases:

The *situation of a text* involves various levels and phases. The *macrosocial level of a text* concerns the macrosocial context of the text, the total social system in which the text is produced. The *microsocial level of the text* concerns the more specific social conditions and features of its specific sender(s) and receiver(s).

(Elliott 1989:8; his emphasis)

Elliott, therefore, agrees with Petersen in distinguishing between narrative worlds and contextual worlds<sup>26</sup>, but in the case of the latter, Elliott (1989:8-9) prefers to make a further distinction, that of the macrosocial and microsocial context of the text. However, Elliott does not distinguish between the referential world and/or narrative world of the text as does Petersen.

A closer look shows Petersen's posed correlation between a text's narrative world and referential world however proves to be in some way problematic. If I understand Petersen's interpretation of these two terms correctly, a text's referential world corre-

sponds to 'historical events', or the 'context referred to' in the text (Petersen 1978b:35). In terms of the Gospel of Mark, this would refer to the life/activity of Jesus on Palestinian soil more or less thirty years prior to the writing of the text. On the other hand, the narrative world of the text is defined by Petersen as a 'closed system' (Petersen 1985:8), or in other words, an interpretation of pre-Easter events (i.e. the life and activity of Jesus) in terms of a post-Easter perspective. Because of this, Petersen (1985:10) stresses the fact that the contextual world of a text can only be 'constructed, never *re*-constructed'.

If this latter point of view of Petersen is taken seriously, it seems that the correlation Petersen poses between the referential and narrative world of a text is not possible. The reason for this is the fact that the narrative world of a text consists of both an interpretation of the events referred to in the text (its referential world), as well as an interpretation of its contextual world (the world in which the text is produced). The narrative world of a text (in this case referring to *inter alia* the Gospels), therefore, consists of 'two worlds in one', that is pre-Easter events (its referential world) and post-Easter events (an interpretation of its contextual world).

Van Aarde (1986a:62-75; 1988b:235-252; 1989a:219-233) calls this the 'transparency' of the Gospels (as 'transparent historical narratives; cf Van Aarde 1989a:219) and formulates this concept as follows: 'In the Gospels the pre-Easter activity of Jesus and the post-Easter reflection of the early church on Jesus' pre-Easter activity are mixed in such a way that it is not always possible to distinguish between them' (Van Aarde 1991c:12; my translation)<sup>27</sup>. When this insight of Van Aarde is taken seriously, Petersen's correlation between the concepts referential world and narrative world, as two exchangeable terms, seems to be problematic<sup>28</sup>.

This conclusion is based on two arguments: First, it is clear from the above discussion that the referential world of a text (in our case the Gospel of Mark), refers to 'constructed history' (Petersen 1985:10), that is, 'history' (in the case of Mark the pre-Easter activity of Jesus). Second, the narrative world of a text consists of an interpretation of 'two worlds in one' (Van Aarde 1991c:12), that is both an interpretation of Mark's referential world (pre-Easter events) and an interpretation of these pre-Easter events in terms of the text's contextual world, its post-Easter situation. The narrative world of a text thus pertains to an interpretation of both its referential and contextual worlds (i.e. time of writing), while the text's referential world only pertains to the pre-Easter events referred to in the text. The narrative world of the text therefore consists of both pre-Easter and post-Easter events.

Turning to Elliott's distinction between the macrosocial and microsocial level of the text, this distinction is versed by him as follows: '[The relationship between the text's macrosocial and microsocial world can be seen as] the relation between [its] social world and the narrative world of the text ... the relation of the text's situation and strategy (cf Elliott in Van Staden 1991:v).

This means that Elliott's distinction between the macrosocial and microsocial level of the text corresponds to his distinctions between context and content, or situation (context) and strategy (narrative). Elliott's distinction between the macrosocial and microsocial level of the text corresponds to his interest in the communication of texts, especially how the narrative worlds (i.e. the microsocial level of the text) of the different gospels interpret, reflect and correct the actual circumstances experienced by the different gospels' sender(s) and receiver(s) (i.e. the text's macrosocial level). This supplements our understanding of the different ideologies of the gospels, the novel adjustments of their 'symbolic universes, and the intended social impact of these writings on their intended audiences' (cf Elliott, in Van Staden 1991:v-vi).

Following Elliott (1989:8), as well as Van Aarde (1991b:13-14)<sup>29</sup>, this study, henceforth, will use the terms macrosocial and microsocial world. The first concept, macrosocial world, relates to the contextual world of the text (i.e. its time of writing or social world in which or for which the text was produced), and the latter, the microsocial world, to the narrative world of the text, that is, a closed system or narrated world. Using only these two terms has the following advantages: First, it escapes the jargon in relation to the different 'worlds' of a text. Second, it also escapes the problematic relation between referential worlds and narrative worlds, as was seen in the case of Petersen (1985:10) and Van Staden (1991:34-35). And third, in concentrating only on the relation between the text's macrosocial and microsocial world, it opens up the possibility to study the narrator's interpretation of his audience's symbolic universe as well as their contextual world, and the narrator's ideological point of view; thus the intended social impact of the text upon its targeted audience. This methodological point of departure also correlates with our conclusion in the previous section (section 3.3.3), namely that the text itself (its microsocial world) is the only witness to its specific situation (the text's macrosocial world).

### **3.3.5 Situation and strategy: The concept ideology**

Biblical texts are ideological in nature. The ideas they communicate are related to and expressions of the specific interests, perspectives, and goals of the groups from which they emerge. 'Ideology' is understood



here not in the reductionist sense of 'false consciousness' or dominant ideas of only the dominant class but as a cognitive feature of all self-conscious groups and classes and their textual productions.

(Elliott 1989:10)

Many biblical scholars would agree with the above cited point of view expressed by Elliott in at least two respects: First, because biblical texts are theological in nature, they are also documents that can be termed ideological<sup>30</sup>. And, second, when one uses the term ideology in relation to the study of biblical texts, one is using what Van Aarde (1988b:236) calls 'a contested term'. This especially is clear also from the above citation of Elliott, in that, when using the term ideology, he immediately offers a definition of the term.

However, when one traces the origin of the term ideology, and more specifically, the development of its usage and meaning in literary studies and the social sciences, it soon becomes clear that the term ideology is indeed a contested term.

### 3.3.5.1 The origins of the term ideology

According to Kinloch (1981:4), the term ideology stems from the time of the French Revolution, ascribing the concept to 'liberals concerned with systems of normative ideas and the critique of absolute norms in an attempt to place 'ideal' aims above the more 'material' goals of postrevolutionary society' (cf also Lichtheim 1967:22). Kinloch (1981:5) argues that the term as such was first used in 1797 in a scientific discourse by Destutt de Tracy, in which it referred to a new invented discipline, the science of ideas, with the purpose to support the formation of a new social and political order as opposed to the 'unscientific' past (cf also Drucker 1984:13-15)<sup>31</sup>. In the beginning, therefore, ideologies were 'philosophical, problem-orientated sets of ideas with political implications (see Van Staden 1991:87).

However, according to Kinloch (1981:5-7), the understanding of ideology as the science of ideas became outdated, primarily because of the insights of Karl Marx. Marx saw ideologies as blinding, self-reifying ideas, a form of false consciousness. In discussing subsequent definitions of ideology in the Marxist tradition (inter alia that of Habermas 1970 and D'Amico 1978), Kinloch (1981:6-13) identifies three major dimensions of ideology: First, it is clear that in ideologies certain ideas are limited to particular class interests which try to determine social being existentially. Ideologies, therefore, function to legitimate particular group interests (e.g. Marxism, liberalism, communism and fascism)<sup>32</sup>. Second, ideology 'represents a belief system that intellectually legitimates the political interests of its advocates, constraining the behavior and ideas of those subject to the dominance of an elite. This 'false consciousness' is ratio-

nal in that it furthers the interest of its adherents' (Kinloch 1981:7). In this sense, ideologies therefore also involve particular definitions of reality. And finally, ideologies reduce reality to abstractions and premises that reflect predominant characteristics of the social system.

To conclude, it is clear that the influence of Marx, and the neo-Marxist tradition, in relation to the defining of the term ideology, resulted in the term ideology becoming a pejorative term, that is, especially in the reductionist sense of 'false consciousness', the dominant ideas of the elite class to legitimate elitist interests and favoritism. To define ideology, therefore, in a non-pejorative (Van Aarde 1988b:236) and non-reductionist (Elliott 1989:10) sense, or in terms of what can be called the *ideological perspective and interest of the narrator*, a brief overview of the development and of the different ways in which the term ideology is used in both literary studies and the social sciences will now be given.

### 3.3.5.2 The development and usage of the term ideology

#### 3.3.5.2.1 Introductory remarks

The concept ideological perspective, commonly referred to in literary studies by the term point of view, is perhaps one of the aspects in literary theoretical studies of texts (and especially in narratology) that is presently being debated and scrutinized most frequently<sup>33</sup>. However, despite this vast amount of studies relating to the concept point of view, it can be said that there seems to be still no consensus on what is meant, or to what is referred, when this term is used or applied in the literary study of texts. Lanser (1981:13) formulates this impasse as follows:

Despite substantial attention to narrative point of view by critics in this century, the concept remains elusive and its boundaries unclear. Notions of point of view overlap and conflict, yielding language that is often inconsistent or ambiguous. Some aspects of point of view are discussed repeatedly, while others are repeatedly overlooked.

(Lanser 1981:13)

In this regard Chatman (1978:151) also states that 'the 'plurisignification' inherent in the term 'point of view' cannot give pause to anyone who wishes to use it in precise discussion', and Carrol (1982:51) is of the opinion that 'any study of the novel (and, therefore, also biblical texts — EvE) must confront the problem of point of view, for it is indeed a *problem*' (his emphasis).

Lanser, Chatman and Carrol's previously mentioned opinions in this regard can further be illustrated by looking at the different terms being used in literary studies when scholars refer to the concept of ideological perspective/point of view. Bal (1978), Genette (1980) and Rimmon-Kenan (1983) use the term *focalization* (although

they respectively refer to different literary aspects of texts when using the term), Booth (1961a, 1961b), Kenney (1966), Lubbock (1967), Uspensky (1973) and Sternberg (1985) prefer the term *point of view* (and also see it as referring to different aspects of the text), while Van Aarde (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c) and Van Eck (1986, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; in following Van Aarde) uses the term *ideological perspective of the narrator*, and Stanzel (1979) the term *mediacy*. Also terms like *prism*, *perspective* and *angle of vision* are sometimes used when referring to the concept point of view<sup>34</sup>.

However, Lanser (1981:15-16; cf also Kenney 1966:46) is of the opinion that the whole diverse discussion surrounding the concept point of view can be seen as a positive and fruitful development in that it brought to the fore 'the powerful evidence of anxiety about the *pivotal role* of point of view in the production of literary meaning ... (Lanser 1981:15; my emphasis). She also makes the following significant remark in this regard:

Were point of view simply an irrelevant or academically interesting technical gimmick without ideological significance, it would surely not have generated this degree of passionate concern.

(Lanser 1981:29)

Let us, very briefly, trace this 'passionate concern' in terms of developing an understanding of the concept point of view in literary studies as a necessary step to formulate an own definition of this concept, as well as the methodological manner in which it will be used in studying the political significance Galilee and Jerusalem may have in Mark's microsocial and macrosocial context.

### 3.3.5.2.2 The development of the concept point of view in literary studies

The distinction made by Plato, and Aristotle (1911; in following Plato) between *mimesis* (a representation of 'reality' in that characters speak for themselves in the text) and *diegesis* (as 'distorted reality' in that the narrator is speaking on behalf of the characters; see Lanser 1981:20-27) is well known. Both Plato and Aristotle were of the opinion that only *mimesis* could be termed as 'proper art'. Because of this moral judgment, in terms of the narrator's 'intrusion' into the text, the concept point of view was moved to the background of literary studies, and this continued well into the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Any text that showed evaluative remarks or knowledge of the characters' weak points in terms of comments by the narrator was seen as 'unproper and intruding' (Lanser 1981:21). The concept point of view thus did not receive any attention.

Henry James (1934, 1948) was one of the first scholars who reacted critically toward Plato's and Aristotle's moral evaluation of the incidence of the narrator's point of view in literary art. For James, point of view was 'the principle of the novel — its

center — that principle around which the novel structures itself as form' (Carroll 1982:53). However, James still held the same opinion about 'proper art' as was the case with Plato and Aristotle. James' solution was as follows: An 'intruding' narrator produces 'unproper art'. However, because the point of view of the narrator is the principle/center or form-giving aspect of the novel, it must in some way be taken up or expressed in the novel itself. The solution for James was to appoint the main character (or any other character) in the novel as the one who should embody the narrator's perspective on the story (society) and the characters about whom he is narrating; James' so-called 'indirect method' (James 1936:22-24).

Lubbock (1957, 1967), a student of James, shared James' opinion that the concept point of view was perhaps the most important aspect of the novel. The importance he attached to point of view as the central and most important aspect of the novel is clear from the following:

The whole intricate question of method, in the craft of fiction, I take to be governed by the question of point of view — the question of the relation in which the narrator stands to the story. He tells it as *he* sees it, in the first place; the reader faces the story-teller and listens, and the story may be told so vivaciously that the presence of the minstrel is forgotten, and the scene becomes visible, peopled with the characters of the tale .... If the story-teller is *in* the story himself, the author is dramatized; his assertions gain in weight, for they are backed by the presence of the narrator in the pictured scene.

(Lubbock 1967:263; his emphasis)

Stories, therefore, call for some narrator, somebody who *knows*, to contemplate the facts and create an impression of them. Whether it is the omniscient author or a man in the book, he must gather up his experience, compose a vision of it as it exists in his mind, and lay *that* before the reader .... A good story then, is a story which is seen from one man's point of view, and yet as story in which that point of view is itself a matter for the reader to confront and watch constructively.

(Lubbock 1967:265; his emphasis)

Lubbock thus followed James in the respect that he also saw the concept point of view as the most important aspect of the novel in terms of governing its form, structure and intended meaning<sup>35</sup>. He, however, differed from James in that he was of the opinion that only the main character could be employed to carry the real author's convictions and perspective on what he was telling (cf Lubbock 1967:264).

Although James and Lubbock succeeded in reintroducing the concept of point of view as an important aspect of literary critical studies of text, Lanser (1981:33; cf also Friedemann 1965:33) is correct in saying that they, with their 'indirect method', only represented a part of the larger issue. The study of point of view became a study of point of view characters<sup>36</sup> (that is through whose eyes/perspective the story is told), of modes of representing inner consciousness. Therefore, important aspects pertaining to point of view like the relationship between author, narrator, characters and readers have been eclipsed.

The further development of the concept point of view in literary critical studies can be traced through the work of the *New Critics*<sup>37</sup>. For the sake of our discussion, the work of Cleanth Brooks, one of the main proponents of the *New Critics*, can serve as an example. According to Brooks (1959:xi-xiii), literary criticism, in studying the concept point of view, had to move away from James and Lubbock's 'indirect method', as well as from Anglo-American narrative theory which worked with 'dogmatic' pre-suppositions. To avoid value-judgments like proper or improper art in terms of the narrator's presence or absence in a text, texts had to be studied as autonomous entities. To read texts 'objectively', therefore, an 'intrinsic approach' was proposed, which implies 'a *close reading*', or '*interpretative and analytical reading* of the text' (Brooks 1959:xi-xiii; his emphasis). The literary work thus had to speak for itself. Also Wellek & Warren (1959:27) stated in this regard that 'the natural and sensible starting-point for work in literary scholarship is the interpretation and analysis of the works of literature themselves'.

Brooks understood point of view to be the 'idea' behind the text:

[I]t (point of view as idea — EvE) is a definite 'point', a definite idea or meaning, which, though it is never expressed explicitly ... nevertheless is felt almost by any reader .... [S]uccessful fiction therefore always involves coherent relating of action, character and meaning ... it is a particular writer's way of saying how you can make sense of human experience.

(Brooks 1959:27)

In the third edition of his well known *Understanding fiction*, Brooks (1979:514) defines the concept point of view as 'the mind through which the material of the story is presented'. It therefore seems that for Brooks, as a proponent of the *New Critics*, the notion of point of view implied more than just questioning which character's viewpoint the narrator uses to tell his story. Point of view is the 'definite idea' basic to the story; the 'making sense of human experience' (Brooks 1959:27).

However, Carrol (1982:58), after correctly indicating the influence James and Lubbock had on the *New Critics*, states that 'James led critics in the direction of formalism'. What Carrol means by this is clearly implied in Lanser's (1981:17-27) following critique on the *New Critics*: Brooks, as well as James and Lubbock, realized that the concept point of view was more than just a study of point of view-characters/perspective in texts. However, because the *New Critics* saw the text as an autonomous entity, that is reading the text 'objectively' without asking questions of extra-textual nature, for example, the text's author or the text's historical situation, the objective of the literary critic was to define the 'structure' of the (autonomous) text. And because point of view was structurally found in the text only by means of point of view-characters, the *New Critics'* study of point of view yielded the same results as those of James' 'indirect method' and the Anglo-American narrative theories' value-laden reading of texts. Their 'objectivity' therefore led to their own 'subjectivity'<sup>38</sup>.

According to Booth (1967:87-88), the study of point of view by the *New Critics* in terms of their 'value-free' and 'objective' criticism also led to 'the death of the author' (Booth 1967:88)<sup>39</sup>. Booth was of the opinion that the author in any text was such a reality that he/she could not be overlooked:

We have seen that the author cannot choose to avoid rhetoric; he can *choose* only the kind of rhetoric he will employ. He *cannot choose* whether or not to effect his readers' evaluations by his choice of narrative manner; he can only *choose* whether to do it well or poorly.

(Booth 1961b:273; my emphasis)

Furthermore, for Booth there was also an indispensable relationship between the author of and the narrator in the text:

[P]oint of view not only simply concerns the transmission of a story, but also the communication of values and attitudes from author to reader through the fictional medium (i e by means of the narrator — EvE). The examination of what happens when an author engages a reader fully with a work of fiction goes far beyond the reductions that we sometimes have accepted under the concept 'point of view'.

(Booth 1961b:274)

What was thus needed in the study of point of view to open up new possibilities, was to break with its historical past. To do this, and for indicating 'how the particular qualities of the narrator relate to specific effects' (Booth 1961b:274), Booth postulated the concept *implied author*. For Booth (1961b:275), the implied author was 'the image of the writer which the reader creates through his or her encounter with the text and in

the light of which the reader assesses the literary work and retrieves its norms'. Booth, therefore, put his emphasis of the study of the concept point of view on the *effect* the author, by means of the implied author, wants to create on the reader of the text. In this regard, Booth (1961b:289) states the following: 'The majority of his (the narrator's — EvE) choices are consequently choices of degree, not kind'. It is therefore clear, that for Booth the concept point of view not only related to a study of the author's focalization through (a) specific character(s), but especially related to the *effect* the author tries to create on the reader by communicating certain values and attitudes through the story he is telling. Lanser (1981:49) correctly makes the following positive assessment of the contribution of Booth to the study of the concept point of view:

Wayne Booth and other critics of the 1950s and 1960s, like Kathleen Tiltonson and Wolfgang Kayser, 'rescued' the notion of the author and offer a compromise that suited both the formalists who wish to eradicate the authorial presence and those critics who were dissatisfied with the obliteration of authorial context.

(Lanser 1981:49)

That Booth's introduction of the notion of the implied author was indeed a valuable step forward in studying the point of view of texts becomes clear when one follows the development and implementation of this term in structuralism as movement. For the sake of our argument we will here refer to the works of Chatman (1978), Genette (1980), Stanzel (1986), Bal (1978) and Rimmon-Kenan (1983).

As starting point for a 'fully developed analysis of point of view' Chatman (1978:235), states the following:

The initial question, then, is whether a narrator is present, and if he is, whether his presence is recognized and how strongly it is felt by the audience. The narrator comes into existence when the story itself is made to seem a demonstrable act of communication.

(Chatman 1975:235)

Chatman also believes that three preliminary issues need clarification before a responsible study of the 'narrator's voice' in the text can be undertaken:

To understand the concept of narrator's voice we need to consider three preliminary issues: the interrelation of the several parties to the narrative transaction, the meaning of 'point of view' and its relation to voice, and the nature of acts of speech and thought as a subclass of the class of acts in general.

(Chatman 1978:147)

In terms of the interrelation of the several parties to the narrative transaction, Chatman identifies the following: The real author, narrator, real reader, implied reader and narratee. It is interesting that Chatman does not include here Booth's concept of the implied author. The reason for this is that Chatman (1978:148) considers Booth's implied author as not part of the text (*récit*), but 'the principle that invented the narrator, along with everything else in the narrative, that stacked the cards in this particular way, had these things happen to these characters, in these words or images' (Chatman 1978:148). According to Chatman, the implied author never tells us anything; it is the narrator who is telling the story.

When one looks at Chatman's definition of the concept point of view, it further becomes clear why he considers the implied author as not being 'a structural principle' in the text. He defines the concept point of view as follows:

- (a) literal: through someone's eyes (perception; Chatman's perceptual point of view — EvE); (b) figurative: through someone's world view (ideology, conceptual system, *Weltanschauung*, ect.; Chatman's conceptual point of view — EvE); (c) transferred: from someone's interest-advantage (characterizing his general interest, profit, welfare, well-being, ect.; Chatman's interest point of view — EvE).

(Chatman 1978:150; his emphasis)

Also, because the three above mentioned aspects of point of view can be implemented in the text in different ways, one always has to differentiate between point of view and the 'voice' in the text:

Thus the crucial difference between 'point of view' and narrative voice: point of view is the physical place or ideological situation or practical life-orientation to which narrative events stand in relation. Voice, on the contrary, refers to speech or other overt means through which events and existents are communicated to the audience. Point of view does *not* mean expression; it only means perspective in terms of which the expression is made .... Thus point of view is *in* the story (whether it is the character's), but voice is always *outside*, in the discourse.

(Chatman 1978:153-154; his emphasis)

According to Chatman, therefore, the point of view of the author is found only in the *what* of the text (see Chatman 1978:9), in other words, what Genette (1980:35) calls *histoire* and Bal (1978:14) *geschiedenis*, the linear-chronological story which has to be abstracted from the text itself.



Chatman thus argues that the implied author can be seen as the vehicle for the real author's point of view, whether it is perceptual, conceptual or interested in 'the principle ... that stacked the cards in [a] particular way' (Chatman 1978:148). And because the implied author is not part of the text (only part of the *what* or the story), so is the case with the point of view of the author. In my opinion, the reason for this line of argument by Chatman is that he analyzes texts from a structuralistic point of view. Structuralism works only with those aspects in the text that are demonstrable. Because point of view, especially Chatman's conceptual point of view, is not always easily detected in the text in terms of structural devices, according to Chatman, it simply cannot be part of the text or discourse. Chatman, therefore, failed to see that it is exactly the point of view of the author, as 'carried' by the concept of the implied author and 'narrated' by the narrator that makes the story a discourse, to use his own terms, or the *histoire* the *récit*, to use Genette's terms.

Lanser (1981:50) is therefore correct when she criticizes Chatman's understanding of Booth's concept of the implied author, as well as his contribution relating to the study of point of view as follows:

One must wonder precisely what kind of theoretical enterprise Chatman intends, if he so completely separates aesthetics from ideology, structural analysis from the cultural function of literature. To deny all relationship between author and 'implied author', more ever, is to reduce the notion of 'implied author' to that of an unreliable narrative voice and to negate the possibility of recovering any authorial values from a literary work.

(Lanser 1981:50)

Chatman thus proposes the possibility that a text can be narrated/is narrated without any evaluation of the narrated events, characters, time and space on the part of the real author. Is this possible?

Turning to Genette's contribution to the study of point of view in literary criticism, Culler (1980:10; his emphasis), in his foreword to Genette's *Narrative Discourse*, states that Genette argues 'most theorists have failed to distinguish properly between *mood* and *voice*, in other words, between the question *who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?* and the very different question *who is the narrator?*'.

According to Genette, the aspect of *mood* relates to the question of who sees in the narrative, that is, through which character the narrator is focalizing his narrative. On the other hand, the question whether this focalizator is also the narrator, and whether a third person narrator is telling his story 'through' this person who focalizes, relates to the concept of *voice*. Van Aarde (1988a:9) is therefore correct when he states that

Genette, because of his discontentment with the traditional way in which the concept of point of view was treated in literary criticism, created the concept *focalization*. The concept of *mood* is described by Genette (1980:161) as follows:

Indeed, one can tell *more* or tell *less* what one sees, and can tell it *according to one point of view or another*; and in this capacity, and in the modalities of its use, are precisely what our category of *narrative mood* aims at .... Narrative information ... has its degrees: the narrative can ... keep at a greater or lesser *distance* from what it tells ... and can also adopt ... one or another *perspective*.

(Genette 1980:161; his emphasis)

*Mood* thus relates, in one way, to the distance between the narrator and what he is telling, and, also, to the different perspectives (i.e. focalizations) through which the narrator is looking at the narrated events. According to Genette (1980:162), these two aspects, *distance* and *perspective*, coincide under the term *focalization*. Genette distinguishes between three different kinds of focalizations: *Zero focalization* (where the focalization is done by the narrator himself), *internal focalization* (e.g. the narrator tells what the main character is seeing) or *external focalization* (where the narrator narrates the events in the text as an objective onlooker).

*Voice*, on the other hand, relates to the different kind of narrators who can be found in a text. Genette (1980:213) formulates this concept as follows:

[It is — EvE] not only the person who carries out or submits to the action, but also the person ... who reports it, and, if need be, all those who participate, although passively, in this narrating activity.

(Genette 1980:213)

*Voice*, therefore, relates to the question of who is narrating the story, and aspects like the time of narration and the level of narration is important here (see Genette 1980:215-247).

In terms of Genette's distinction between mood and voice, one can therefore say that for Genette point of view becomes focalization. Where for James it was the principle/center of the novel, for Lubbock the inner consciousness of the narrator, for Brooks the basic attitude of the narrator and for Booth the communication of certain values and norms, for Genette, it becomes something which can be structurally detected in the text, that is, the character through whose eyes the narrator is telling the story. One can also say, that in the case of Chatman (referring to his conceptual point of view), point of view at least still had a certain relationship with the narrator of the text, but in Genette's case, this relation does not exist anymore.

When one looks at Stanzel's understanding of the concept point of view, it is immediately clear he was influenced in this regard by Genette. In his well known *Theorie des Erzählens*, Stanzel sees the primary task of a theory concerning narrative texts as that of 'systematizing the various kinds and degrees of *mediacy* (*Mittelbarkeit*) that result from the shifting relationship in all storytelling between the story [*histoire* — EvE] and how it is being told [*récit* — EvE] (Stanzel 1986:xi; my emphasis). According to Stanzel, the term 'mediacy' must be seen as 'the generic characteristic which distinguishes narration from other forms of literary art' (Stanzel 1986:4), and also as 'the most important starting point for shaping of the subject matter by an author of a narrative work' (Stanzel 1986:6). It therefore seems Stanzel is looking to indicate what principle(s) the narrator is using to conform the *histoire* of the text into *récit*, that is, the text itself<sup>40</sup>.

According to Stanzel 'the fundamental possibilities of narrative mediation' can be formulated as follows:

1. Does the narrator belong to the story or does he/she abide in another postulated realm of existence?
2. Does the narrator directly convey information to the reader or does he/she filter it through the consciousness of one or several of the characters?
3. Does the narrator give the reader an external view of the narrated events or does he/she represent them, as it were, from within?

(Stanzel 1986:xi)

In terms of the above citation, the first aspect relates to person (first person narrative situation), the second to mode (figural narrative situation), and the third to perspective (authorial narrative situation). One of these three narrative situations is always dominant in any narrative.

Of importance for our discussion here, however, is the relationship Stanzel (1986:9-10) postulates between these three modes of mediacy and the concept of point of view. According to Stanzel, point of view can refer to one of the following two meanings:

First, one must distinguish between the general meaning 'viewpoint,' 'attitude towards a question,' and the special meaning 'standpoint from which a story is narrated or from which an event perceived by a character in the narrative'. As the definition of the special meaning reveals, the term point of view in narrative terminology is used in two contexts which are distinct in narrative theory: to narrate, that is to say, to transmit something in words; and to experience, to perceive, to know as a character what is happening in the fictional space.

(Stanzel 1986:9)

From this formulation, it seems Stanzel projects that point of view relates to two different aspects of the text: The viewpoint from which the story is told, that is, by means of the narrator's evaluation (viewpoint) on the story he is telling, and the position from which the story is told, that is external (Genette's zero focalization) or internal (by means of one of the characters in the story). When one, however, looks at the manner in which Stanzel (1986:111-114) understands 'viewpoint', his understanding does not refer to the evaluative activity (or attitude) of the narrator, but only to the distinction of who is doing the telling and who is doing the 'seeing' in the narrative. For Stanzel, therefore, the whole question surrounding the concept point of view is also the question of focalization. He does not deal with the possibility that viewpoint or attitude can also refer to the activity of the narrator in terms of an evaluative point of view, or the narrator's interpretation of the story he is telling to convey a specific understanding of the story to its readers. Thus, for Stanzel, as was the case with Genette, the study of point of view is nothing more than a study of focalization.

The fact that Genette's understanding of point of view only relates to focalization can possibly be best illustrated by Bal's interpretation of Genette. Bal (1978:108) defines the concept of focalization as follows:

When events are described, it is always done from a specific point of view, that is, a specific viewpoint. A story is therefore always narrated from a certain perspective/viewpoint, and this holds true for both the narration of historical facts and fiction. This relationship between the narrator and what is told is called focalization, that is, the relationship between he/she who sees and what is seen.

Bal (1978:108; my translation from the Dutch)

According to Bal (1978:111), one finds in any narrative (if focalization is understood as defined by her in the above citation), only two kinds of narrators/focalizers, that is 'character-focalizers' and 'narrator-focalizers'. In the case of the first, the narrator only narrates what a character in the story sees, and in the case of the latter, the narrator narrates what he himself is seeing.

To conclude: James and Lubbock (although by means of their so-called indirect method) defined the concept point of view as the center or basic idea 'behind' the text. The text is always the narrator's text, that is, his interpretation of the story he is telling. This implies that the narrator, in telling the story from his evaluative point of view, tries to create a certain effect on the reader. Or, differently formulated: He wants the reader to understand the story as he understands it. Because of this insight, Brooks (1959:xviii) called all fiction 'made-up stories', 'a particular writer's way of saying

how you can make sense of human experience' (Brooks 1959:27). For Friedman (1967a, 1967b), however, the concept point of view became the concept by which different narratives could be delineated from each other, especially in terms of the different narrating positions one can identify in narratives. Booth (1961b), in differing from Friedman's understanding of this concept, in some way returned to James' understanding by perceiving point of view as relating to the narrator's communication of certain values and norms. Because of this understanding of point of view, he 'invented' the concept of the implied author.

However, tracing the development of understanding the concept point of view in structuralism, Chatman not only argued that a concept like the implied author does not exist in the text, but, already influenced by Genette, understood point of view not in terms of expression by the narrator (which would include a communication of certain values and norms), but as the perspective (who focalizes) in terms of which the expression is made. This understanding of point of view, referring only to focalization (the one who sees *vis-a-vis* the one who tells), was made possible by Genette's distinction between mood and voice, and thus, in structuralism, point of view referred to nothing more than focalization, as an aspect of the text which could easily be structurally indicated. Also, Stanzel's and Bal's understanding of this term (see above), clearly indicate that Genette's understanding of point of view (as focalization) influenced later structuralists significantly.

Before turning to an evaluation of the development of the concept point of view in structuralism as described above, attention must be given to the interpretation of the concept point of view by Rimmon-Kenan. Her interpretation, although structurally orientated, can be seen as a transition between a structuralistic understanding of this concept and interpretations of this concept by scholars who take the communication of texts seriously.

As is the case of Genette, Rimmon-Kenan (1983:71-74) also thinks that the concept point of view in the first instance refers to the aspect of who tells and who sees in the narrative. She formulates this understanding of point of view (which she calls focalization) as follows: 'The story is presented in the text [*récit* — EvE] through the mediation of some 'prism', 'perspective', 'angle of vision', verbalized by the narrator though not necessarily his' (Rimmon-Kenan 1983:71). However, Rimmon-Kenan (1983:77-82) also understands focalization as referring to more than just who sees in the narrative. According to her, the concept focalization also refers to three facets of the text, which she calls the perceptual, psychological and ideological facet of the text.

The first two facets refer to what is commonly known in structuralism as focalization. The perceptual facet refers to the temporal perspective from which the narrator is telling the story (e.g. retrospective or synchronous) and the spatial per-

spective from which the narrating is taking place (e.g. internal or external in terms of the story). The psychological facet, on the other hand, refers to the narrator's knowledge of the story world he is presenting (restricted or unrestricted). The ideological facet, however, refers to the norms of the text: 'This facet ... consists of 'a general system of viewing the world conceptually' in accordance with which the events and characters of the story are evaluated' (Rimmon-Kenan 1983:81, citing Uspensky 1973:8-9).

For Rimmon-Kenan, therefore, focalization also includes the fact that the narrator, in terms of his perception of the story he is telling, gives certain norms by which the reader can evaluate the events and characters in the story. As such, she is of the opinion that the narrator wants the reader(s) to read and understand the text in terms of his values, norms, and perception. Later in this section, it will be indicated that this facet of Rimmon-Kenan's focalization corresponds, in a certain sense, with the way in which point of view is understood by scholars who take the communication in narratives between narrator(s) and reader(s) seriously.

In evaluating what is intended to be signified by the concept point of view as it has been developed in structuralism, the following statement of Lanser can serve as a direction:

The phrase 'point of view' itself attests to — and perhaps perpetuates — the ambivalence about narrative perspective and the conceptual ambiguity that surrounds its analysis. The dictionary gives two meanings of the term:

1. The position from which something is observed or considered; standpoint.
2. One's manner of viewing things; attitude.

Literary theory, however, has suppressed the second and synthetic meanings of the term, concentrating almost completely on the technical 'standpoint' or 'angle of vision' in its definition of narrative point of view<sup>41</sup>.

(Lanser 1981:15)

According to Lanser (1981:16), the first of the two above references regarding point of view refers to the 'objective' relation or relationship between narrator and narrative, which in structuralism is called focalization. 'Standpoint' therefore, refers to the distance between text and narrator, and also to the question of through whose eyes (or through which character) the narrator is telling the story. The second reference (see

again citation above) of point of view, however, 'denotes some 'subjective' response or evaluation of that reality (the narrator's narrated world — EvE)' (Lanser 1981:16). Point of view, therefore, not only relates to focalization, but also to 'attitude or ideology by which one (the narrator — EvE) perceives and evaluates' (Lanser 1981: 16). In this regard, Stevick (1967:18) stated, much earlier than Lanser, the following:

Of any novel, our understanding of point of view determines to a large extent our perceptions of the novel's value system and its complex of attitudes. It is even true that in a slightly uncomfortable way our judgment of the worth of the novel depends upon our perception of its point of view.

(Stevick 1967:18)

In this regard the following opinion of Van Aarde can be added:

The term point of view refers to two aspects of the text: First, the technical perspective ('angle of vision'), that is the position from which the narrator is perceiving the story world that he is presenting to the reader. Second, it refers to the narrator's ideological perspective from which he evaluates the story world he is narrating, and which also determines the technical way in which he presents the story world in the narrated text. Most literary critics avoid this latter meaning of the concept point of view.

(Van Aarde 1988a:6; my translation from the Afrikaans)

From these formulations cited above, it is clear, especially in structuralism, that the concept point of view was understood only in terms of what Lanser and Van Aarde refer to as the 'first' referential meaning of this notion, namely standpoint or angle of vision. The reason for this is that, after Genette's contribution in this regard, the term focalization was coined. Point of view thus became focalization. And because of this, the study of the intended communication of narrative texts was inclined not to be addressed. But also, as was the case with the *New Critics*, in some way the author 'died' again, mainly because structuralism does not have a preference, as far as its interpretation of the concept point of view is concerned, to study point of view also in terms of the norms, values and attitudes of the narrator of the text, that is, its intended communication<sup>42</sup>.

According to Lanser (1981:53), the development of the concept point of view in structuralism (as being only the structural concept of focalization) had the following consequence:

But all too frequently a part has been mistaken for the whole, and point of view has been conceived in terms of a single, surface-structure relationship between narrator and narrated event. Such a notion leaves no room for exploring the relationships of narrator to audience and or narrator to authorial voice (implied author — EYE).

(Lanser 1981:53)

In this regard, Van Aarde (1988b:237) concluded that narrative exegesis, if it wants to avoid the web of structuralism<sup>43</sup>, should work, as a point of departure, with the idea that a narrative consists of a network of themes and ideas which are meant to be meaningful in a certain context. This 'network' Van Aarde calls the ideology of the text, and this ideology is presented in the text by means of the narrative point of view. Van Aarde is thus of the opinion that narrative exegesis has to concentrate on the communication of texts. Lanser (1981:54) understands the relationship between the narrator, his narrative point of view, the communication act and the reader as follows:

Point of view theory must eventually come in terms with the writer-reader relationship and with the entire problem of literary communication ... Readers bring not just their 'personal' attitudes and experiences to the work of art, but also ... cultural conventions which govern the production of meaning in the text.

(Lanser 1981:54)

To read narrative texts in terms of their intended communication, therefore, requires the following point of departure: A narrative is the product of a real author (e.g. Mark) intended to be read by an intended audience in a specific context. The real author tells a 'story' (Genette's *histoire*). However, the story he is telling is his 'interpretation' of the story (e.g. Mark's interpretation of the story of Jesus). The phrase 'his interpretation' relates to narrative point of view, that is, the communication of the narrator's beliefs, attitudes and interpretation of the story he is telling. The text (Genette's *récit*) therefore always consists of story *and* interpretation, or, in Genette's terms, *récit* is always *histoire* and *narration*.

Texts therefore always have a perceptual and a linguistic dimension. While the interest in structuralism is only to concentrate on the latter, narrative exegesis' interest lies not only in both these aspects, but also in the relationship of one to the other. Seen as such, narrative point of view not only refers to the perceptual dimension of the text, but also to the linguistic dimension, the way in which the text is structured. The structure(s) of the text, however, in narrative exegesis is studied functionally. This means that the *why* question (the intended effect), in terms of the structures of the text,



is always asked. Narrative point of view, therefore, not only refers to the value-system from which the narrator interprets the story he is telling, but also to the way in which he structurally presents his interpretation of the story he is telling by means of a narrative text. Van Aarde (1988b:237) formulates this relationship between communication, point of view, ideology, narrator, reader and linguistics as follows:

In other words, while language (the linguistic dimension) is the communication code, a literary communication *record* (a text) presupposes an ideology (a network of themes and ideas) which is communicated and has meaning only in a certain social context. If the speech-act takes the form of a narration, the ideological perspective (the evaluating point of view) is communicated by means of a narrative-act.

(Van Aarde 1988b:237; his emphasis)

For Van Aarde then, the concept point of view can be understood as follows:

Strictly spoken, the term 'point of view' is ambivalent and comprises two components of referential meaning: the indicated *technical perspective* (the message's dominant structural orientation — EvE; cf Petersen 1978b:35) and the *ideological perspective* from which the narrator/ implied author observes the story-stuff (*histoire* — EvE) of the narrative world and evaluates (selects and combines) it with the result that the narrated world is arranged in a plot as an orchestration to the ideal/ implied reader.

(Van Aarde 1986a:63-64)

The notion of point of view/ideology as a network of themes and ideas that occur in a narrative as an 'imagined' version of a specific reality (as outlined above) is used increasingly in narratology by various scholars like Uspensky (1973), Lotman (1975), Petersen (1978, 1978b), Anderson (1981), Lanser (1981), Lintvelt (1981), Fowler (1982), Resseguie (1982), Culpepper (1983), Dawsey (1983), Sternberg (1985) and Powell (1990), and in South African context by scholars like Van Aarde ([1982], 1986a, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c), Du Plooy (1986), Du Rand (1986) and Van Eck (1990, 1991b), almost everyone following Van Aarde's understanding of this concept in some manner<sup>44</sup>.

The above outlined content given to the concept point of view by these scholars, has its departure in the work of Boris Uspensky (1973). According to Uspensky (1973:6), the study of point of view relates to four planes in a narrative: '[T]he plane of ideology, the plane of *phraseology*, the *spatial and temporal* plane, and the *psycho-*

logical plane' (Uspensky 1973:6; my emphasis). The ideological plane relates to the narrator's evaluative point of view, the phraseological plane to the narrator's evaluation of the speech-characteristics of the characters in the text and by the characters themselves, the spatial and temporal plane relates to the narrator's relation to the text in terms of distance and time, and lastly, the psychological plane relates to the narrator's evaluation of the character's internal thoughts and emotions<sup>45</sup>.

To conclude: If the exegete is interested in the communication of narrative texts, not only the concept point of view is of great importance, but also an application of this notion which would help to unfold the communication-act in a narrative in terms of all its dimensions and interactions. To name a few: The relationship of the real author to the narrator/IMPLIED author, the IMPLIED author to the IMPLIED and intended reader, the narrator to the narratee(s), but also the relationship between the text, its content and context. The importance of this concept for the study of narrative texts, therefore, can not be overrated. We can therefore conclude this section by citing Petersen (1978a: 118) who formulates the importance of this concept for the study of narrative texts, as follows:

The rhetoric of point of view, once we know how to look for it, is the best tangible device we have to help us teach ourselves to listen to what the narrator is telling us. And once we have learned to listen to his voice, soon we will be able to see what he has chosen to show us. Presumably ... [the narrator's — EvE] intent for his readers was to see and perceive, and to hear and understand.

(Petersen 1978a:118)

### **3.3.5.2.3 The concept ideology in the social sciences**

In discussing the concept of ideology in the social sciences, Van Staden (1991:86-93) cites the following remark of Kinloch (1981:3): 'Mainstream sociology, for the most part, continues to insist that it is capable of producing scientific, objective knowledge, relevant to the solution of major social problems in contemporary society'. Following Kinloch, Van Staden (1991:87-88) expresses the view that there is, however, a growing awareness that all knowledge is ideological, in that it represents the vested interests and viewpoints of particular social groups in specific situations. Indeed, so called 'neutral values' also might stand in the service of an unexpressed attempt to get certain values accepted. According to Elliott (1989:10), this is always true in biblical texts, because 'biblical texts are [always] ideological in nature'.

On the basis of this recognition, especially in the social sciences, there seems to be growing interest in what Berger & Luckmann (1967) calls the social construction of reality, with knowledge being regarded as part of that reality. Attention is therefore

directed toward the social context of knowledge. A distinct similarity between the way in which the concept ideology/point of view is used in literary criticism and the social sciences can therefore be denoted: While, in literary criticism (and especially in narratology), the concept of ideology is used to refer to an imagined version of a specific reality (see our discussion on the relationship of the narrative world to the contextual world in section 3.3.4), in the social sciences the term ideology is used to refer to the social construction of reality. In both literary criticism and the social sciences, the concept ideology is used in terms of changing or imagining social contexts, which becomes clear when one looks at a few definitions of ideology as applied in the social scientific study of the Bible. Elliott (1991a:12), in following David Brion Davis, defines the concept ideology as follows:

[Ideology is] an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class at a particular time of history. Because ideologies are modes of consciousness, containing the criteria for interpreting social reality, they help to define as well as to legitimate collective needs and interests. Hence, there is a continuous interaction between ideology and material forces of history.

(Elliott 1991a:12)

As such, Elliott (1991a:xxiv-xxv) is of the opinion that the ideology (i.e. narrative point of view) of a text relates to inter alia the following questions that can be directed at a text's content: Who are the explicated/implied readers of the text and how is their situation portrayed (explicitly/implicitly) in the document? What is the description of and response to the situation presented in the document? How is the situation diagnosed, and what criteria, norms and values are involved in this evaluation? What response to the situation does the document urge on the part of its readers, and how does the document attempt to motivate and persuade the readers to such a response? And lastly: To what shared goals, values and norms is an appeal made, and what modes and means of rhetorical arguments are employed to motivate a certain response?

Interesting here is the way in which Elliott's understanding of the concept ideology concurs with that of Lanser (1981) and Van Aarde (1986a). As discussed in the previous section, Uspensky (1973:1), Lanser (1981:77) and Van Aarde (1986a:63-64) are of the opinion that the concept ideology refers to 'two components', the narrating *technique* and the narrator's underlying *idea*, or, the technical and ideological perspective respectively. The first, the narrative technique, Elliott (1989:9) calls the *strategy* of a text, 'the pragmatic dimension ... the relation to the text's sender(s) and receiver(s) and the *manner* in which the text in both its form and content was designed

by the text's sender (my emphasis; see Elliott 1989:8-11 for a more comprehensive description of his understanding of this term). Uspensky, Lanser and Van Aarde's second 'component', the narrator's underlying idea/ideological perspective, in its turn, is seen by Elliott (1991a:xxv) as the norms, values and goals of the narrator in terms of the story he is narrating 'to have an *intended* effect upon the receiver(s) and thereby serves as an effective medium of social interaction' (Elliott 1989:9, my emphasis). Elliott therefore understands the relationship between these two components, that is, the strategy/pragmatic dimension of the text and its intended effect, as dialectical: The narrator chooses a specific/intended strategy in the text with the aim that the text can have an effect on the receiver(s) and thereby serves as an effective medium of social interaction.

In the same vein, Malina (1986a:178) defines ideology as follows: 'Ideology refers to the articulation of a social group's views and values that legitimate and reinforce the present order and practice against competing groups<sup>46</sup>'. Malina also uses the term mode of ideological implication to refer to the 'ideological setting' of the story, by which is meant 'an assessment of the world along with a set of prescriptions for taking a position in the world and for acting upon that position' (Malina 1986a:178). The mode of ideological implication therefore indicates how the audience of the storyteller 'must view the present because of the continuities with the past discovered by the historian' (Malina 1986a:179).

This understanding by Malina of the concept ideology also relates to what he calls a *core value* (Malina 1986a:112-115). A core value, according to Malina, can be described as 'the general target, goal, end or purpose ... the general direction of flow of action, a direction socially expected and usually pursued in the group' (Malina 1986a:112). Core values are often articulated, expressed and explained in more specific values and norms in order to give meaning to the activity of the group and to mark off the group from other groups. 'Such an articulation of the group's core value is called an *ideology* (Malina 1986a:112; his emphasis).

Malina's understanding of the articulation of core values as a form of ideology, thus corresponds with Elliott's shared goals, values and norms between the narrator and reader. In this sense, ideology can be seen as either an articulation of shared goals, values and norms (in the case of Elliott), or an articulation of certain core values of a group. In this regard Malina (1986a:181-184) distinguishes between four basic ideological positions that can be connected to the mode of ideological implication: The position of the anarchist, that of the liberal, the conservatist and, finally, the radical position. According to Malina (1986a:184), the latter refers to the standpoint that

society should be restructured on an entirely new basis, a standpoint that is, according to Malina, found in all the New Testament writings, except for the Gospel of John. It is thus clear that Malina concurs with Elliott in regard to the notion that ideology (and therefore also ideological perspective) can be understood in a pragmatic sense, that is, ideology is used in texts to have an intended effect on the text's intended addressees.

Several other definitions of the concept ideology are also given by Van Straaten (1987:5-7), to mention only the South African context. Van Staden (1991:91-92), in discussing Van Straaten's different definitions, rightly draws the conclusion that practically all Van Straaten's definitions have in common a description of ideology as a *system of beliefs or ideas*. Van Staden (1991:92) would therefore like to formulate the concept ideology as follows: 'Ideology refers to, on the one hand, to value-laden reflection (system of ideas/beliefs) and, on the other hand, to a practical imperative (for attitude and conduct), on the basis of which one group can clearly be distinguished from another'.

Defined as such, Petersen's (1985:x) understanding of the concept 'symbolic form' also relates to the concept of ideology. Petersen (1985:x) defines the concept 'symbolic form' as follows: 'Symbolic forms ... have to do with the overarching cognitive systems, the systems of knowledge, belief, and value, that define [certain group's] identities and motivate their actions'.

If one looks at the above mentioned definitions of ideology given by Elliott, Malina, Van Straaten, Van Staden and Petersen their different definitions can be summarized as follows: Ideology is a mode of consciousness/reflection/knowledge in terms of a system of beliefs/values that contain the criteria to legitimate/change/reinforce one group's collective needs and interests over and against other groups. Or, in other words, in the social sciences, the concept ideology refers to the construction/legitimizing of social reality in terms of knowledge<sup>47</sup>.

This in turn, brings us to the argument by Berger & Luckmann (1967:95) about symbolic universes being instances of legitimation. Legitimation is described by them as a process by which new meanings are produced, meanings that serve to integrate those other meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes (Berger & Luckmann 1967:92). Ideology then, seen as a specific reflection of the symbolic universe, serves as a frame of reference to provide 'order for the subjective apprehension of biographical experience (Berger & Luckmann 1967:97). Or more specifically: '[T]he symbolic universe orders and legitimates everyday roles, priorities, and operating procedures by placing them *sub specie universi*, that is, in the context of the most general frame of reference conceivable (Berger & Luckmann 1967:99).

To conclude: The concept ideology, in the social sciences, refers to a (specific) reflection of the symbolic universe in terms of a system of belief/values to legitimate/change the current understanding of the social universe. Ideology, therefore, serves as frame of reference to set certain boundaries, the boundaries of the 'in- group' against that of the 'out-group'.

#### **3.3.5.2.4 Ideology: Concluding remarks**

In section 3.3.5.2.2, when the concept ideology/point of view was discussed as it has developed in literary criticism, it was concluded that the concept is more and more understood as referring to a network of themes and ideas in a narrative as an 'imagined' version of reality. It was also stated that the narrator's point of view consists of his ideological perspective (his 'idea') and his technical perspective (his narrative technique). As such, the narrator, by means of his technical perspective, structures his idea of the story he is telling into the form of a narrative text. Or, in terms of my conclusion in section 3.3.4, a narrative's microsocial world is the product of the narrator's reflection of his and his audience's macrosocial world. The macrosocial world is thus interpreted by means of the narrator's ideological perspective and structured into the text's microsocial world by means of the narrator's technical perspective. The concept point of view thus refers to the relationship between the macrosocial (contextual) world and the microsocial (narrative) world of the text. *Seen as such, point of view/ideology is therefore a textual issue.*

In the previous section, when the concept ideology as used in the social sciences was under discussion, I concluded by summarizing the different definitions of ideology given in the social sciences as follows: Ideology is a mode of consciousness/reflection/knowledge in terms of a system of beliefs/values that contain the criteria to legitimate/change/reinforce one group's collective needs and interests over and against other groups. I also argued that, when defined like this, the concept also has some tangent points with Petersen's notion of symbolic forms and the socio-logy of knowledge's understanding of the concept symbolic universe.

In terms of the latter, one therefore could say that the concept ideology refers to a certain reflection of the symbolic universe 'which [is] built on or arise from' a social universe (Van Aarde 1992b:437). According to the sociology of knowledge, this social universe has a routine character, it consists of certain social institutions which in turn are filled with actors and their social roles. Ideology, therefore, as a reflection of the symbolic universe, either serves to legitimize the current social institutions, or to change them. *Seen as such, the concept ideology is a social issue.*

Does this mean that the concept ideology refers to different things in literary criticism and the social sciences respectively? Although it may not seem to be the case, the answer to this question is negative, especially when it takes into consideration Petersen's understanding of 'worlds' which he formulates as follows: 'Worlds are human constructions, whether they are constructions of societies or narrators' (Petersen 1985:ix). If one applies this notion of Petersen to the above summarized definitions of ideology in literary criticism and the social sciences respectively, the following conclusions can be drawn:

In the case of literary criticism, the narrator, by means of his narrative point of view, creates a 'world from a world, that is, by reflecting on the macrosocial world he creates and structures a new world, the text's microsocial world. In the social sciences, ideology, in terms of a system of beliefs, reflects on the symbolic universe and by this legitimates/creates a new/the same social universe. One should, however, remember that the macrosocial world of a text is already a specific manifestation of the symbolic universe. This would mean that the creation of a microsocial world represents also a specific interpretation of the symbolic universe, simply because the macrosocial world already is a product of the symbolic universe, and vice versa.

From this the conclusion can therefore be drawn that a (narrative) text can be seen as a *dialectical reflection* of the current symbolic universe. And as the social universe can be seen as a habitualization/structuring of a certain ideological reflection on the symbolic universe, the microsocial world of the text can be seen as the structuring of a certain ideological reflection on that same symbolic universe. Or, in the words of Petersen: Worlds are all human constructions. The social universe/macrosocial world built on and arising from the symbolic universe according to a specific ideological perspective, corresponds thus to the microsocial world that reflects the macrosocial world (which exists in a dialectical relationship to the symbolic universe) according to a specific ideological perspective. And in both cases, both the macrosocial and microsocial world are structurally constituted, either in terms of institutions or in terms of textual interrelationships. Ideology, as defined by literary criticism and the social sciences can thus be seen as to converge into the same idea.

The concept ideology, when used in the following chapters as 'non-pejorative' as possible, will thus refer to the following definition: *Ideology is an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values (in terms of the symbolic universe), a network of themes and ideas (in terms of the text), representing an interpretation of the social reality (the macrosocial world of the text), intended to have meaning within a particular context (the microsocial world of the text). Ideology/ideological perspective thus has a pragmatic intention: Its intended effect is either the legitimation or the radical*

*restructuring of the contextual world of its intended addressees.* As such, the narrative text is not only seen as both the product and vehicle of ongoing social interaction, but is also studied in terms of its communication, that is its intended social effect.

In my subsequent social scientific reading of Mark, this definition will operate as follows: The narrator of the Gospel interprets the symbolic universe and macrosocial world of its intended addressees in terms of certain beliefs, assumptions and values. This interpretation/reflection (his ideological perspective), is structured in the text by means of his technical perspective. By technical perspective is meant the way in which the narrator uses characterization and structures time, events and space in the text in such a way that the reader is able to unravel his narrative point of view. The concept narrative point of view thus relates to:

- \* the narrator's dialectical understanding of his own, and intended readers'/hearers' current symbolic and social universes;
- \* a textually structuring thereof; and
- \* with the aim to have an intended effect on the addressees of the specific text, that is, either a legitimization or a radical restructuring thereof.

The ideological perspective of the narrator is thus a pragmatic matter: Its pragmatism dimension is the narrator's aim to either legitimize his intended addressees' current understanding of the symbolic universe or to bring them to a different understanding of the symbolic universe and, as a consequence, a different understanding of the social structures in their contextual world. Understood as such, the narrator's ideological perspective is the same as his interest(s).

### **3.3.6 Symbols (in terms of strategy) as nexus between text (microsocial world) and situation (macrosocial world)**

Social life is sustained both by systems of meanings and by systems of social relations, but also by the relations between the two systems. The link between them is *linguistic* and *symbolic* because the systems of social relations, like the world in which they occur, are represented in *language* and *symbol*, and therefore as 'knowledge'. Viewing language and symbol as together comprising a symbol system, symbol systems [can be described] as models of and for social life and social worlds.

(Petersen 1985:17; my emphasis)



Theological formulations, like all other cultural, social, and material expressions of human consciousness, are ideological in nature since they are shaped by specific social locations and express in *symbolic* form the self-understandings and interests of the persons and groups by whom they are formulated and transmitted.

(Elliott 1989:10; my emphasis)

In the previous section it was argued that the narrator's ideological point of view (as a textual instance) can be seen not only as the narrated manifestation of a specific evaluation of his and his audience's social world, but also as either a legitimization or proposed alternative of this social world. Or, formulated differently: In the microsocial world of a narrative discourse, the narrator's dialectical reflection on both the intended reader's current microsocial world (as product of their understanding of or reflection on the symbolic universe), and the current symbolic universe are manifested by means of narrative point of view.

When this understanding of the narrator's ideological point of view is compared with the two above citations from the work of respectively Petersen and Elliott, one could also argue that the ideological perspective of the narrator, in terms of his reflection on his readers' macrosocial world/symbolic universe, is expressed in the texts by means of symbols. Symbols, therefore, serve as 'link' between the dialectical relationship between symbolic universe and macrosocial world, and the microsocial world (text) as the narrator's reflection on his readers' 'specific social location' (Elliott 1989:10). As such, the use of symbols is the way in which the narrator embodies his ideological perspective in the text. Or, in the words of Petersen, worlds are human constructions, which are linguistically expressed by means of symbols (cf Petersen 1985:17).

In this regard, Malina (1986a:75) is therefore correct when he states that 'social interaction is ... fundamentally a form of communication'. Following Rogers & Shoemaker (1971:11), Malina defines communication as the process by which messages are transferred from a source to a receiver by means of symbols and always for a specific purpose. Symbols therefore, are used to encode real-world values in terms of commitment, influence, power and inducement (Malina 1986a:76-78, in following Parsons 1969). Messages are thus encoded in terms of symbolic language to say something about everyday experiences (Malina 1986a:75). Or, stated elsewhere: '[I]ndividual and collective human behavior is organized around the symbolic meanings and expectations attached to objects that are socially valued' (Malina 1982:236). To this can be added the opinion of Meeks (1983:6): '[S]ociety is viewed as a process, in which personal identity and social forms are mutually and continuously created by interactions

(i.e. verbal and non-verbal communication — EvE) that occur by means of symbols'. Douglas (1972:60), for instance, is convinced that the use of symbols can be seen as the only way in and by which communication can take place (cf also Feeley-Harnik 1981, Malina 1981, Pilch 1981, 1988a, Neyrey 1988a).

An interesting perspective on the relation between symbolic universe and symbol(s), in terms of communication, is given by Van Aarde (1991d:54-57). According to Van Aarde (1991d:54), the relation between symbolic universe and symbol(s) can social scientifically be explored by studying metaphors, and for that matter symbols, as root metaphors. In this regard Van Aarde (1991d:54-57) argues as follows:

A root metaphor is defined as the basic assumption we can make about man's existence and experience. Understood as such, a shift in symbolic universe can be studied in terms of the communication of changing metaphors/symbols. A metaphor exists when one thing is seen as another, when one pretends that this is that because one does not really know how to talk about this, and consequently uses that to talk about this. In terms of the relationship between symbolic universe, communication, text and symbol, metaphoricity clearly has important implications for scientific theory. This is especially applicable to the sociology of knowledge (from which the concept symbolic universe has its origins), as well as to theological theorizing. Without the use of metaphors/symbols, theology, as a scientific reflection on man's relationship with God, is therefore not really possible.

Scientific knowledge also has a bearing on reason and observation. Kant (1724-1804), however, argued convincingly that man (as subject) does not know reality (as object) as such. According to Kant (see also Kee 1989:56-58) reality is always known from the manner in which it appears to the knowing spirit. Therefore, knowledge is always the result of the assimilation of empirical data by the mind. In the period before Kant, it was reasoned that the metaphysical reality (the symbolic universe in terms of the sociology of knowledge) as such is discernible and knowable. Kant's own interpretation of human experience is that the transcendental reality is not known, except through analogy or symbols. It is precisely because we know very little about something (the *Ding an sich*, the *Noumenon* in Kantian terms) that we can discuss it meaningfully in terms of something we know a little more about (the *Erscheinung*, the *Phenomenon*). In this sense, ideas, myths and symbols can be seen as the language counterpart of ideology and mythology that comprise the symbolic universe<sup>48</sup>.

The distinction Bultmann made between 'Mythos' (social universe) and 'Mythologie' (symbolic universe) today is being used in the sociology of knowledge in terms of metaphoricity of symbols (Van Aarde 1991d:56). A symbol is therefore the linguistic reflective and dialectical counterpart of the symbolic universe.

The function of metaphors, and for that matter, symbols, when used in narrative texts, is therefore of great importance in understanding which way the text is reflective of the symbolic universe of its narrator(s) and intended reader(s). According to Paul Ricoeur (cf Van Aarde 1991d:54-56), metaphors and symbols question normal linguistic categorization. This is what Ricoeur regards as the working pattern of parables (which also can be seen as a metaphor/symbol): They orientate in order to disorientate with the aim to reorientate.

*In the chapters 5, 6 and 7 it will be indicated that topographical references in Mark's gospel, such as Galilee, Jerusalem, the way, the temple and house can be seen not only as denotations of social interests and/or institutions, but also as metaphors/symbols that reflect a specific understanding of the symbolic universe. It will also be indicated that the way in which Galilee and Jerusalem as focal spaces of interest are structured in Mark as narrative, has certain political undertones seen from the narrator's ideological point of view. It will thus be shown that the narrator conveys his ideological perspective by means of symbols. In Mark, some of the most important symbols which carry the ideological perspective of the narrator is the way in which he structures space in the narrative. Space, in Mark, as symbols, to use the words of Paul Ricoeur, is used to orientate in order to disorientate in order to reorientate.*

### 3.3.7 Clarification of terminology: Narratology and/or social scientific reading?

Thus far the exegetical approach that was advocated in this study in order to read the spatial relations in Mark in terms of their political implications, is that of an association of a narratological and social scientific reading of the text. In section 3.2 it was shown that Petersen and Elliott indeed proposed such a combination.

Petersen (1985:ix) calls his exegetical method 'literary sociological', and his main reason for combining literary and social scientific models is to study the relation between symbolic forms (symbolic universe) and social arrangements (social universe). In stating that 'narrative or story is probably an universal means of understanding human social actions and relationships in time' (Petersen 1985:10; cf also Beidelman 1970:30; Kurz 1987:196; Van Aarde 1988b:238), and devoting a great deal of effort to define the difference between narrative and contextual worlds, it is clear that Petersen is interested in the communication of texts in their specific context.

On the other hand, it was indicated that Elliott (1991a:7) calls his exegetical method 'sociological exegesis,' or, 'social-scientific criticism' (Elliott 1991a:xix). Elliott (1991a:8) defines social scientific criticism as follows: '[T]he analysis, interpretation, and synthesis ... of ... the literary, sociological and theological features and

dimensions of the text ... and this text's relation to and impact upon its narrower and wider social contexts'. Stated simply, therefore, Elliott and Petersen are both interested in especially two aspects when reading a text: Its communication, and the social context in which such communication takes place.

When one turns to narratology as an exegetical method, it is interesting that many similarities can be indicated between the definitions and objects of narratology as exegetical method and that of Petersen's 'literary sociological' model and Elliott's 'social-scientific criticism'. Powell (1990:19) makes the following interesting comments on narrative criticism (narratology) as exegetical method:

Unlike structuralism, rhetorical criticism and reader-response criticism (see Powell 1990:12-18 for his definitions on these exegetical approaches) narrative criticism, as an exegetical method, developed in biblical studies without an exact counterpart in literary studies. According to Powell (1990:19), the difference between these three exegetical methods and that of narrative criticism lies in their respective interests relating to the reader of the text. Rhetorical criticism is interested in the original readers to whom the work was first addressed; structuralism is interested in the competent reader; and reader-response criticism is interested (in the case of Iser) in the first-time reader who encounters the text in its sequential order. Narrative criticism, however, is interested in the implied reader of the text. This means that the main difference between the first three approaches and narrative criticism is that the first three approaches set the reader outside the text, while the latter finds the reader as part of the text. Or, stated differently: In the case of rhetorical criticism, structuralism and reader-response criticism, the communications model is seen as real author-*text*-real reader, and in narrative criticism, the mentioned middle-component of *text* is seen as implied author-narrative-implied reader (see Powell 1990:19 for a diagrammed exposition). Narrative criticism

thus regards the real author and real reader as extrinsic to the communication act that transpires within the text itself. The concept of the implied reader, the reader in the text, moves narrative criticism away from being purely reader-centered (pragmatic) type of criticism and makes it a more text-centered (objective) approach.

(Powell 1990:20)

In relating to Powell's exposition of narrative criticism, a few questions indeed can be asked. Is it, for instance, true that narrative criticism is only interested in the implied reader, and not also in the original reader(s) of the text? And, is it true that a narratological reading of the text can be seen to be more 'objective' and less 'pragmatic'? The fact, however, that Powell stresses narrative criticism's interest in the communication of texts, must be positively evaluated.

Looking at the following definitions of the narrative as textual genre, it soon becomes clear that two salient aspects of the narrative can be seen as its intended *communication* in an intended *social context*.

[A narrative can be seen as] a form of *communication* ... as the process [in which] a source ... sends a message ... along certain channels ... to some receiving individual or group ... in some *situation* ... in order to have some effect.

(Rogers & Shoemaker 1971:11; my emphasis)

To explain this *communicative* act of the production of a text (i.e. a narrative — EvE) by its author, one must describe its meaning as it is constituted by the rule system the author wished the reader to apply and his intentions in producing the text. The meaning of this act of *communication* may, however, be lost if factors from the *setting* are not accounted for.

(De Villiers 1984:67; his emphasis)

Narrative exegesis need not disregard the *historical situation* within which a particular text *communicates*. Indeed, the survival and functioning of a text in its extratextual world makes the hermeneutic exercise possible. To escape the web of structuralism, the *historical situation* should be considered in a narratological theory, despite all obstacles. One must therefore adopt the viewpoint that a narrative involves a network of themes and ideas which are intended to have meaning within a *particular context*<sup>49</sup>.

(Van Aarde 1988b:235; my emphasis)

It can therefore be argued that the salient features of narratology concurs with that of Petersen and Elliott's exegetical models, in that both narratology and the latter two are interested in the communication of narratives in a specific social context. Narratology and, to use Elliott's terminology, social scientific criticism, thus boils down to the same exegetical method. Because of this, henceforth, in following Elliott, only the term social scientific reading of the text will be used. By this will be meant an association of a literary critical reading (narratological) and a social scientific reading of the text, concentrating on the text's situation and strategy, as well as on the intended communication of the text as social force and social product.

### **3.3.8 Interpretation as a perspectival enterprise**

From what has been said above in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.7, it is clear that a social scientific reading of biblical texts involves a conscious and deliberate synthesis of theory and practice. Accordingly, any proposed exegetical model not only requires a clarification of its major presuppositions, but also has to take into account that all exegesis/interpretation is perspectival in nature, because 'all knowledge is socially conditioned' (Elliott 1989:6).

This applies to both the knowledge of the interpreter and the knowledge presupposed or expressed in the objects (in our case Mark) to be interpreted. Thus, there can be no purely objective, unbiased rendition or perception of brute facts or reality. 'The illusion of total objectivity is just that, an illusion' (Elliott 1989:6). Both interpreters and texts have specific social locations which affect general perceptions and constructions of reality (cf Elliott 1989:6-8). And as the sociology of knowledge has shown, reality is always a social construction.

Because of this, the method of biblical interpretation ought to include means and procedures for distinguishing the difference between the social location of the interpreter and the social location of the object(s) to be interpreted. The interpreter should therefore try to avoid imposing his knowledge and perception of reality upon the object and world to be interpreted, and consequently, try to avoid the methodological pitfalls of an anachronistic, reductionistic and ethnocentric reading of the text as object.

According to Elliott (1989:7), this is only made possible by using well defined constructed conceptual models when reading the text. A well defined and tested model therefore will have the possibility to test the results of a reading done by such a model. Because of this, the presuppositions relating to the different aspects of this study's social scientific reading of Mark hopefully was explained as clearly as possible in the previous sections. Only by explicating, explaining and justifying his conceptual constructions of social reality can the interpreter therefore expose his conclusions to verification, and thereby contribute to an actual advance of understanding.

It is, of course, not difficult to state the reasons why models are necessary. Human perception is always selective, limited, culture-bound and prone to be unaware that it is any or all of what has just been said. The cognitive maps with which we select, sort and categorize complex sociological data interpose themselves between texts and our interpretation of them, whether we like it or not. 'The real question, therefore, may be whether we choose to raise this process to a conscious level and examine it, or prefer to leave our biases alone' (Rohrbaugh 1987:23).

In the previous sections the attempt was made to raise this whole problem to a conscious level, taking into account as well that all models (and theories) are contestable. However, any model's value lies in two aspects: First, the explanatory power it has, and, second, the way in which the model(s) used enables the exegete to show that there is a certain relation between his point of departure (epistemology), methodology and teleology. These aspects will get their due attention in the following chapters.

### 3.4 FOCAL SPACE AND SYMBOLS: INTERPRETING THE SPATIAL RELATIONS IN NARRATIVE TEXTS IN TERMS OF AN ASSOCIATION OF A LITERARY AND SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS

#### 3.4.1 Introductory remarks

In section 3.3.7, it was argued that the narrator conveys his ideological perspective in a narrative discourse by means of symbols. In the following section, it will be argued that *focal space* can be seen as one of the symbols the narrator of Mark is using to convey his ideological perspective. This will be done as follows: In section 3.4.2, it will be argued that space, as one of the four salient elements of a narrative (i.e. time, events, characters and space; see Bal 1978:57; Chatman 1978:19-21; Vandermoere 1982:1-15; Rimmon-Kenan 1983:1-5; Brink 1987:35-44) should be seen and treated as an autonomous narratological element (i.e. just as important e.g. as time and characters). Specifically, in this section, attention will be given to the development of the understanding of space from its modest beginnings up to the way space was treated in structuralism and current modern narrative theories. Finally, on the basis of the insights of these theories relating to space, in section 2.4.3, a model of studying space, which will be called *functional model*, will be put forward.

#### 3.4.2 Space as an autonomous element of the narrative

Time, as one of the four salient elements of the narrative (i.e. time, events, characters and space; cf. Bal 1978:13-14), for a long time has received the due attention it deserves<sup>50</sup>. However, this cannot be said regarding the study of space in literary criticism in general and narratology in particular<sup>51</sup>. Brink (1987:107; my translation) formulates this position of space, in terms of the other three salient elements of the narrative, as follows: 'Space is, on the one hand, a thorny, and on the other hand, one of the most neglected subjects in narratology'. In this regard, Bal (1978:101) also feels that in narrative theory, space is sometimes very easily taken for granted, however seldom explained in terms of its intended function in narratives. The consequence for such an attitude towards the study of space in narratology, is described by Zoran (1984:310) as follows:

The existence of space is pushed into the corner, so to speak. It is not altogether discarded, but neither does it have a recognized and clear-cut status in the text .... Although the subject of space has been dealt with more than once, research in general on the subject is quite diffuse, and there are few assumptions that have become generally accepted.

(Zoran 1984:310)

Many reasons can be given for the neglected position of space in most previous and current works relating to literary criticism, methodology and narratology. Zoran may be correct in stating that one of the reasons leading to the negligence of not giving space its rightful position in the narratological study of texts, is that *time*, for a long period, has been seen as the most important element of the narrative. Without time, no events are possible, and without time no plot can unfold. Also, characters cannot survive in 'timeless' conditions. He states this relevance of time, as textual entity, as follows:

Literature is basically an art of time .... [T]he dominance of the time factor in the structuring of the narrative text remains an indisputable fact. The narrative, therefore, with all its components, is arranged in time.

(Zoran 1984:310)

To this, the following reasons given by Brink (1987:107-108), can be added as possible arguments why the concept of space has been treated sometimes as a somewhat 'negative' element of the narrative: Space, other than time, events and characters, is sometimes seen not as a constitutive element of the narrative, but rather as a 'dimension' of the text, 'codes' that must be filled in by the reader. Furthermore, it is sometimes also the case that the actions of characters in the text are described without being connected to a specific space or setting, simply because there is no need to do so<sup>52</sup>. And third, space is sometimes seen as mere setting or place, and therefore is not that important for understanding the text.

There is, however, except for the reasons given above by Zoran and Brink, a further reason, which could be the most important, which led to the negligence of space in texts. This reason has to do with what Venter (1982:13) calls 'the process of doubling' (my translation). The concept of 'doubling' refers to the following: In narratology a distinction is made between *story* and *text*, what in French Structuralism is called the distinction between *fabula* and *suzjet*<sup>53</sup>, and respectively termed by Bal (1978), Chatman (1978) and Genette (1980) as the distinction between *geschiedenis* and *verhaal*, *story* and *discourse* or *histoire* and *récit*. In terms of time, this distinction



refers to the fact that the narrator, to use Genette's terms, by means of his narrating activity (*narration*), dynamically changes the time of the *histoire* into the time as found in the *récit* (e.g. in terms of a different order). A 'doubling' of time thus has occurred<sup>54</sup>.

When one, however, looks at space in terms of the above mentioned distinction, it is clear that such a doubling does not occur between space on the levels of the *histoire* and the *récit*. Space, as described on the level of the *récit*, is therefore more or less the same as on the level of the *histoire*. Because of this, it was thought that space, since it could not fulfill this 'standard opinion' in regard to doubling, did not contribute to the structure, and therefore, to the meaning of the text. Hence, space was sometimes seen as not an important narratological element.

Humans, however, and for that matter, characters in a text, cannot exist without space. Vandermoere (1982:124) formulates this as follows:

Man apprehends himself as determined by space: the spatial dimension is essential to his existence and his actions. In the same manner, the fictional figures and their actions are determined by space. It is probably impossible to create figures, events and actions without at the same time creating the space in which these figures exist and move, and in which the events and the actions take place .... Fictional space is essentially meant for the figures (characters — EvE): it constitutes the material world in which they live and move.

(Vandermoere 1982:124)

While Vandermoere in the above citation is of the opinion that space is an important aspect of the text, Ronen (1986:421) even goes further: 'Space, the domain of settings and surroundings of events, characters and objects in literary narrative, along with other domains (story, character, time and ideology), constitutes a fictional universe (i.e. the text or *récit*). Chatman (1978:145) also expresses the same opinion in this regard: 'However one formulates the questions of the functions of setting and its relation to character ... it seems clear that the notion of setting is no less critical than that of event, and that narrative theory cannot neglect it'.

From this it is clear that space is not only an important 'domain' of the text, but is also just as important as the elements of time, events and characters. Space, therefore, should be seen as an autonomous element of the narrative and studied as such. It is, however, a different question when it comes to *how* space can be studied. To answer this question, the following procedure will be followed in the subsequent sections: First, a short summary will be given of how space was treated up to the rise of

structuralism (section 3.4.2.1.1). This will be followed by a short summary of the works of a few exponents of structuralism, as well as the works of a few exponents of the modern narrative theory's understanding of space (section 3.4.2.1.2). After a summary has been given (section 3.4.2.2) of the different points of departure regarding the study of space as described in section 3.4.2.1, I will finally put forward my own model to show how space can be studied *functionally* in narrative texts. By functionally is meant the study of space as used by the narrator to convey his ideological perspective on the spatial/topographical level of the text, that is, in terms of its intended communication (see section 3.4.3). In this section it will also be shown how space, seen as focal space and read in terms of symbols, can be studied by means of an association of a narratological and social scientific reading of the text.

### 3.4.2.1 Review

#### 3.4.2.1.1 Approach to and study of space up to structuralism

The first signs of an approach towards space as being an autonomous element of the text can be found in Anglo-American narrative theory<sup>55</sup>. However, before space was treated as such, two other stages in the approach towards space up to the works of the proponents of the Anglo-American narrative theory can be indicated: First, a stage wherein space was seen as referring only to extra-textual reality (i.e. seen as imitation)<sup>56</sup> and second, a stage wherein space was used to differentiate between different genres or texts<sup>57</sup>. It is, however, especially in the Anglo-American narrative theory, that space for the first time was seen as an important and salient aspect of the text.

Referring to this phenomenon, Van Luxemburg, Bal & Weststeijn (1983:41), for instance, is of the opinion that space, as used in texts, is not a mere representation of space as found in the real world, but creates its own 'reality'. Issacharoff (1981:215) calls this usage of space in texts 'word space', 'language space' or 'space on paper'. By this is meant 'that space is a *semantic construct* built with linguistic structures employed by the literary text' (Ronen 1986:421). Or, in the words of Zoran (1984:314) and Vandermoere (1982:124):

[A]s far as the verbal usage is concerned, the objects of space and of the world in general constitute an external factor not dependent on language, whereas within the narrative text neither space nor the world have an independent existence but rather an existence only derived from *the language itself*.

(Zoran 1984:314; my emphasis)

Like any phenomenon in the novel, fictional space exists only through language: it is the outcome of a speech-act. This means more in particular that fictional space exist only so far as it is 'described' by the implied author or by the figures in the novel .... [A] fictional description does not really describe something that exists before and beyond the description: a fictional description creates the space it allegedly describes.

(Vandermoere 1982:124; my emphasis)

From the above mentioned citations it is clear that the study of space, which started in Anglo-American narrative theory, finally reached the stage in which space was seen not only as an autonomous and salient element of the text, but also as something that is created by the narrator, and therefore has the possibility to be a powerful tool in the hand of the narrator.

#### 3.4.2.1.2 Study of space in structuralism and modern narrative theory

When one looks at the way in which space is treated by structuralists like Bal (1978), Chatman (1978), Vandermoere (1976, 1982), Venter (1982, 1985) Brink (1987), Zoran (1984) and Ronen (1986), it soon becomes clear that for them space can be seen as one of the salient elements of the text, just as important as events, characters and time. The question for them, in relation to the study of space in the text, was to identify the structure(s) in which space operates in the text. Their respective understandings of how space operates in the text will now briefly be discussed:

Following Genette's distinction between the *histoire* (story-stuff), *récit* (narrative text) and *narration* (the way the narrator transforms the *histoire* into the *récit* by narrating his understanding of the story-stuff; see again end note 46, chapter 2 for this distinction), Bal (1978:13) distinguishes between three 'levels' of the narrative text: The *geschiedenis* (*histoire*), the *tekst* (*récit*) and *verhaal* (*narration*). On the level of the *geschiedenis* space, according to Bal (1978:101), space is mere *plek* (= place), that is, space that must exist for characters to act in and for events not to take place in a vacuum. On the level of the *tekst* (= *récit*), however, space is presented in terms of its perception (Bal 1978:102-107). According to her, on this level space is described, or functions, in two ways: It functions either as *kader*, *plaats van handeling* (= place of action; Bal 1978:102), or as *gethematiseerde ruimte* (= thematized space). In the first case, space refers to settings in which certain characters like to move in or try to avoid. As such, space has symbolic meaning. In the case of the latter, space is seen as being negative or positive, in that it has an influence on any character acting and events taking place in such a spatial setting. Understood as such, certain spatial structures in the text, depending on the perception thereof, have an influence on the characterization of the text.

Turning to space as understood by Chatman (1978), a narrative text consists of 'a *what* and a *way*'. The 'what' of [the] narrative I call its 'story'; the 'way' I call its discourse' (Chatman 1978:9). In terms of this distinction, Chatman is of the opinion that one can identify two 'kinds' of space in the text, 'story-space' and 'discourse-space'. 'Story-space' is described by him as follows:

As the dimension of story-events is time, that of story-existents is space. And as we distinguish story-time from discourse-time, we *must* distinguish story-space from discourse-space .... Story-space contains existents, as story-time contains events. Events are not spatial, though they occur in space; it is the entities that perform or are affected by them that are spatial .... [S]tory-space then is what the reader is prompted to create in imagination (to the extent that he does so), on the basis of the characters' perceptions and/or the narrator's reports'.

(Chatman 1978:96, 104; my emphasis)

'Discourse-space', on the other hand, 'can be defined as ... *focus of special attention* ... that portion of total story-space ... [seen] through a narrator or through the camera eye ...' (Chatman 1978: 12, his emphasis). According to Chatman (1978:143) the function of 'discourse space' is to assign to certain spatial structures symbolic value, to influence the mood of the character(s), or to differentiate between more and less important spatial structures in the text. Chatman's understanding of 'discourse space', and Bal's *ruimte*, thus comes to the same understanding of space on the level of the text.

Vandermoere (1976, 1982), on the other hand, treats space in the narrative texts in a different manner as Bal and Chatman. According to Vandermoere (1982:1), a narrative text can be defined as follows:

To read a novel means to participate in a communication process. The novel is indeed a means of communication, i.e. a means to transmit a message (the *récit* — EvE) between a novelist-sender and a reader-receiver. This description comprises of four elements which are essential to any communication process: apart from the novelist-sender and reader-receiver, it comprises also a code as means of communication and the message (the *récit* — EvE) itself.

(Vandermoere 1982:1)

Under *message* Vandermoere understands the narrative text itself, which consists of four aspects, namely events, characters, time and space. When one looks at the way in which Vandermoere treats these four aspects of the narrative text, the following inter-

resting distinction comes to the fore: Characters, events and time are treated in terms of the difference between the way in which these three aspects manifest on the levels of the *histoire* and the *récit* respectively. This is done by Vandermoere as follows: Events are studied in terms of their (constructed) chronological order on the level of the *histoire*, as well as on the level of the *récit*, that is the way in which the narrator 'reshuffled' these events in the text itself. This is also the case in relation to his study of time. Time is studied in terms of its constructed chronological order in the level of the *histoire*, and on the level of the *récit* in terms of prospection and retrospection (Genette's prolepsis and analepsis; see Genette 1980:33-85)<sup>58</sup>. Also characters are studied in terms of the *histoire* and the *récit*. On the level of the *histoire*, characters are studied in terms of their functions, and on the level of the *récit* the characters are studied in terms of the relationship of the narrator to the implied reader.

Space, however, is treated in a different manner by Vandermoere. Space is studied, not in terms of the difference that (may) exists between space on the level of the *histoire* and the *récit*, but in terms of the relation between the different spatial references on the level of the *récit* alone. According to Vandermoere, therefore, no 'doubling' of space occurs as with the three other aspects of the narrative text, namely events, time and characters.

When space is studied on the level of the *récit* alone, a distinction has to be made between *objective* and *subjective* space (Vandermoere 1982:125): 'When dealing with the spatial aspect of fictional reality, we ought to make a distinction between *objective space* and *subjective space*' (my emphasis). Objective space, for example, refers to space in the text that has no bearing on or importance for characterization, and can be seen as neutral settings for the characters or functions to highlight the distance between certain settings. In contrast, subjective space is defined by Vandermoere as follows:

Materially speaking, subjective space coincides with objective space, but the distinctive feature is that the spatial units and the spatial qualifications have a particular *meaning* for the figures. That meaning is determined by the figure's character and especially by its life ... Man is not only situated in space, his existence is fundamentally determined by space. In so far as man is aware of this fact, a particular *relationship* will be established between himself and the spatial world. That spatial world will become *meaningful* for him. This holds good also for the figures in the novel.

(Vandermoere 1982:125; my emphasis)

The way in which subjective space influences the characters in the text is described by Vandermoere (1982:138) as follows: It can be seen either as an aid or as an obstacle for any character to achieve an end or an aim. Although Vandermoere does not agree with Bal and Chatman regarding the manner in which space should be studied, his subjective space corresponds with Bal's *ruimte* and Chatman's *discourse space*. It is further interesting that space, in all three accounts, on the level of the *récit*, is seen as having something in common with characterization, and space (symbolically understood) as being either positive or negative.

When one looks at the way in which space is treated by Brink (1987), it is interesting that he in many ways differs in his opinion of space and the study thereof, from Bal, Chatman and Vandermoere. According to Brink (1987:38), a text can be defined as a narrative text when 'something happens (events) to someone (characters) in a certain space and time' (my translation). These four elements of the narrative text (events, characters, time and space) can be studied in terms of the structure of the narrative, that is, the *histoire* that becomes the *récit* by means of the *narration*-activity of the narrator. The levels of the *histoire* and the *narration* is further accessible only by means of the *récit*.

In terms of this narrative structure, Brink (1987:110-111) distinguishes between story space, discourse space and narrating space. Story space is the space that is visualized by the reader when he is syntactically reading the narrative. Understood as such, Brink sees story space as being denoted by language, and as such creates the space in which characters can act and live. Narrating space, on the other hand, is the space from which the story is told, and thus refers to the concepts of the so-called *omniscient point of view* or *limited point of view*<sup>59</sup>. Lastly, discourse space is seen by Brink as the story space as narrated by the narrator in the text (*récit*) itself. It thus seems to be the case that Brink, in his study of space in the narrative, concurs with the interpretations of Bal and Chatman in this regard.

When one, however, turns to the way in which Brink studies space, two dissimilarities, in terms of his above mentioned structure of the narrative, and space in the narrative, comes to the fore: Although Brink (1987:39) is of the opinion that the *histoire* of the text can be constructed from the *récit*, he asserts that such a construction can not be really of any use to study the structure of narrative texts. However, after assessing the level of the *histoire* negatively, Brink goes on to describe space as an element of the *histoire*, very comprehensively; and then only as an element of the *histoire*, not as an element of the *récit* also. This not only seems a bit confusing, but may also show that Brink (being accessed as one of the best literary critics in the South-African context) has not yet thought through the whole question of space in narrative texts.

In the South-African context the name of Venter (1982, 1985), in a certain sense, is synonymous with the study of space in narrative texts. According to Venter (1982:4), there is, in narratology, a 'standard consensus' that in narrative a 'doubling' of time, events and characters takes place in a narrative between the levels of the *histoire* and the *récit*. By this Venter means, for example, that story time, by means of the narrator's narrating activity (Genette's *narration*), becomes discourse time. One can thus speak of story time, discourse time and narrating time. Because of this, but also because of the fact that space can be seen as one of the four elements of the text, Venter (1982:4) is therefore of the opinion that one can also speak of story space, discourse space and narrating space. Space, therefore, is subjected to the same 'doubling' principle as is the case with time, and thus must be studied in the same way as the concept of time in narrative texts<sup>60</sup>. Understood as such, space is always narrated space, because, according to Venter (1982:22), all the reader has in front of him is the narrated text.

The difference between story space and discourse space is, according to Venter (1982:24-29), the following: Story space refers to spatial designations in the text in which the characters act, move and live. Story space is thus the place(s) in which the events take place. Discourse space, on the other hand, is structured space, patterns of space within the story space. By this, Venter (1982:28-29) means that certain spatial references, when the text is read by the reader, is seen by the reader as being concentric, symmetrical, contrasting or parallel to each other. Space, on the level of the *récit*, therefore is sometimes structured by the narrator in terms of symbolic or topographical patterns. If this structuring of space is noted by the reader, space becomes discourse space, and if it is not, it remains story space.

Another important contribution to the study of space in narrative texts, relevant for our discussion here, is that of Ronen (1986). Ronen (1986:421) argues that when space is studied in narrative texts, the starting point of such an analysis must be the fact that 'space is a *semantic construct* built with *linguistic structures* employed by the literary text' (her emphasis). This point of departure has, according to her, the following implications for the study of space:

Yet, this discussion is based on the assumption that the components of a fictional space cannot be identified with specific *textual expressions*; rather, fictional constructs of space are the products of the integration of dynamic bodies of spatial information. Thus, I intend, more specifically, to describe the relations between various categories of space-constructs and their surface (linguistic) manifestations.

(Ronen 1986:421; my emphasis)

From the information mentioned above, it is thus clear that Ronen wants to study space on the linguistic level of the text, that is, the text itself, or in Genette's terms, on the level of the *récit*. According to Ronen (1986:421), 'the integration of dynamic bodies of spatial information' can be studied in terms of two concepts, that is space as either *frames* or *settings*. Space as frames is understood by her as follows:

A frame is a *fictional place*, the actual or potential surrounding of fictional characters, objects and places .... A frame, as defined here, is a strictly *spatial concept*, designating the location of various entities.

(Ronen 1986:421; her emphasis)

Setting, on the other hand, is defined by her in the following way:

Frames are fictional places and locations which provide a *topological determination* to events and states in the story. Frames differ according to their position in the overall organization of the fictional universe. A setting is distinguished from frames in general in being formed by a set of fictional places which are the *topological focus* of the story. A setting is the zero point where the actual story-events and story-states are localized .... A setting ... is ... the actual immediate surroundings of an object, character or event.

(Ronen 1986:423; her emphasis)

Frames, therefore, can be seen as 'filling' or background, and not necessarily attributing to characterization or the 'message' of the text. Frames, however, are always a topographical focus, space that determines the actions of characters, and attributes to the fact that certain spatial designations in the text are seen by the reader as either positive or negative. Settings thus have symbolic meaning, or, in Ronen's own words, settings always are relevant frames (Ronen 1986:424). Further, settings and frames can be distinguished from each other in that settings are always a structured matter. Understood as such, Ronen's frames and settings thus corresponds with Vandermoere's distinction between objective and subjective space.

### 3.4.2.2 Summary

From the previous section it is clear that according to Bal, Brink and Venter, a narrative text consists of three levels, and, according to Chatman, Vandermoere and Ronen, two. Because of their point of departure, relating to the structure of narrative texts, Bal studies space in terms of *plek* (= place) on the level of the *histoire* and as *ruimte* (= space) on the level of the *récit*, and Brink and Venter space on the level of the *histoire* as story space and on the level of the *récit* as discourse space. This can



also be said of Chatman, although he only distinguishes between two levels in narrative texts. On the other hand, Vandermoere and Ronen study space only in terms of the level of the *récit*, and on this level distinguish between objective space and subjective space respectively, or between frames and settings.

When one, however, scrutinizes more closely the consequences of the models set forward by Bal, Brink and Venter (and Chatman), one sees that there is not really a difference between these models and those of Vandermoere and Ronen. For the sake of the argument, let us return briefly to the models of Vandermoere and Chatman: These two scholars study space only on the level of the *récit*, and on this level distinguish between objective and subjective space (in Vandermoere's case), and in the case of Ronen, between frames and settings. In both cases objective space/frames refer to space as being background or filling, space for characters to move and live in, and not attributing to the 'message' of the narrative. Subjective space/frames, on the other hand, are always structured linguistically in the text, are symbolic in meaning, attribute to characterization and are understood by the reader as either being negative or positive in relating to certain characters and events.

With this as background, let us compare Vandermoere's and Ronen's models of studying space with those of Bal, Brink, Venter and Chatman. According to Chatman's model as described above, there can be distinguished between story space (on the level of the *histoire*) and discourse space (on the level of the *récit*; Chatman 1978:101-102). Discourse space is space that is 'the focus of special attention' (Chatman 1978:102). Discourse space, therefore, is that spatial relationships which the narrator wants the reader to give attention to, and this is done by structuring discourse space. On the other hand, story space is that space which is sometimes to be visualized by the reader *because it is not always described comprehensively by the narrator*. Does Chatman not imply by this that story space is also part and parcel of the level of the *récit*, that is, the narrative text itself? Therefore, although Chatman tries to distinguish between story space and discourse space (as he distinguishes between story time and discourse time), he in fact also implies that 'story space' is to be found on the level of the *récit* also.

The same discrepancy can be detected in Bal's model of space in narrative texts. According to Bal (1978:102-107), space on the level of the *histoire* is *plek* (= place), and on the level of the *récit*, *ruimte* (= space). Because *ruimte* is always structured in the text, it can either function as *kader*, *plaats van handeling* (place of action; Bal 1978:102), or as *gethematiseerde ruimte* (thematized space; Bal 1978:103). When, however, space on this level is not structured in terms of *kader*, *plaats van handeling* or as *gethematiseerde ruimte*, it functions, according to Bal (1978:104) as *plek*. By this, in my opinion, Bal also indicates that *plek* can be seen as being part of the level of the *récit*.

This can also be said of the models of space as advocated by Venter (1982:24-58) and Brink (1987:109-112). According to Venter, one has to distinguish between story space and discourse space respectively on the level of the *histoire* and the *récit*. Discourse space, according to Venter (1982:27), is always structured space by means of the narrating activity. Story space, however, 'can be narrated by either the narrator or by one of the characters ... and must be concretized by the reader' (Venter 1982:32; my translation). By this, it is clear that Venter, like Chatman and Bal, in practice, see story space as being present (and therefore part) on the level of the *récit*. Also Brink (1987:109-112) sees story space as those spatial relationships on the level of the *récit* that have to be visualized by the reader, or those spatial relations that are not structured in the narrative text to operate as a vehicle for the narrator's ideological perspective on the topographical plane of the narrative.

From the above discussion, the following conclusion can therefore be drawn: Although, in theory, Bal, Chatman, Venter and Brink distinguish between story space and discourse space, respectively being part of the levels of the *histoire* and the *récit*, in practice it looks not to be the case. Maybe this discrepancy is the result of the fact that these scholars are of the opinion that space must be studied in the same way as time. And because a definite 'doubling' of time, in terms the narrating activity of the narrator, can be indicated between story time and discourse time, the conclusion is that this should also be the case when space is studied in narrative texts.

The above mentioned criticism on the models of Bal, Chatman, Brink and Venter, however, showed that such a way of studying space, in practice, is not possible. Also Zoran (1984:310), is of this opinion when he formulates the possibility of distinguishing between story space and discourse space as follows:

In principle, one may also distinguish between the application of the term space to the reconstructed world and its application as a dimension of the verbal text itself .... Nevertheless, despite the possibility of distinguishing between space of the *text* (discourse space — EvE) and that of the *story* (story space — EvE), one cannot point to any *constant correlation* between them.

(Zoran 1984:310; emphasis by him)

If this remark of Zoran is taken seriously along with my above mentioned criticism on the spatial models of Bal, Chatman, Venter and Brink, it can be concluded that one has to look for a method to study space in narrative texts, not only different from the way in which time is studied, but also one which will enable the study of space to be comprehensive and responsible. For this, the methods as advocated by Vandermoere

and Ronen, which study space in terms of its structure on the level of the *récit* only, can be used as a point of departure. To this then can be added the models of Bal, Chatman, Brink and Venter.

If one takes seriously the above mentioned criticism of the models of Bal, Chatman, Brink and Venter, it is possible to see their respective models of studying space as in fact pertaining to the level of the *récit* only. Vandermoere's subjective space, Ronen's setting(s), Bal's thematized space and space of action, Chatman's space as 'special focus of attention', Brink and Venter's discourse space that has symbolic meaning in terms of characters and places being negative/positive evaluated, all results to the same viewpoint: Space, being structured by the narrating activity of the narrator, can be used by the narrator as a tool to convey his ideological perspective on the topographical plane of the narrative. This is done by the narrator who structures space on the level of the *récit* in such a way that space can determine characters' actions and deeds, can be evaluated by the reader as being positive or negative, and also can have symbolic meaning in terms of the 'message' of the narrative. The presentation of such a model of space will now be addressed.

### 3.4.3 A functional model to study space: The important distinction between setting and focal space

In the previous section, two conclusions were drawn: First, the distinction between space as story space on the level of the *histoire*, and discourse space on the level of the *récit*, seemed to show the impossibility of studying space in terms of the ideological perspective of the narrator. The suggestion was therefore made that space, different from time, has to be studied in terms of its structure(s) on the level of the *récit* only. Second, it was shown that this point of departure is indeed present in the works of Vandermoere and Ronen, and indirectly, in the works of Bal, Chatman, Brink and Venter.

When one, however, looks more closely to the way in which space is studied in these works, it seems to be that they are *structuralistic* in intent. By this is meant that one gets the impression that in these works, structures of space are sometimes studied for the sake of structures. The function of these structures of space, the way in which these structures of space are used by the narrator to convey his ideological perspective on the topographical plane of the text, are not addressed. What I would like to call the 'why-question', or the question pertaining to the principle of arrangement behind these structure(s), is not addressed. When, however, these questions are asked consciously, one can move from a structuralistic study of space towards a *functional* one.

A starting point for such an analysis is what Chatman (1978:12) calls 'focus of special attention', or Zoran's concept of 'field of vision' (Zoran 1984:331). The narrator, in his narrating of the narrative, either mention a particular spatial structure for the sake of mere setting (a) for character(s) to act and events in which to take place,

or he can constitute space on the textual level in such a way that these spatial structures serve as a vehicle for his ideological perspective on the topographical level of the narrative. As early as 1960 this distinction was formulated by Blok as follows:

The notion of space, first of all, refers to a topographical aspect. Understood as such, it is the space in which characters live and move. Space, however, can also refer to another aspect as just mere topographical setting. This happens when space in a narrative is closely related to specific character or characters, in that space can become (a) place(s) of personal interest which shape(s) the character(s) that operate(s) in that specific spatial location. We therefore have to distinguish between *setting* and *focal space*. Understood as such, setting can be seen as neutral space which is needed to make a narrative intelligible. Focal space, on the other hand, shapes the character(s) that move(s) within such a space, and as such contribute(s) to the meaning of the narrative.

(Blok 1960:189-197; my translation from the Dutch)

According to Blok, therefore, space is narrated by the narrator in one of two ways: First, space can be narrated in terms of mere filling or background in which characters act and events take place. This spatial relation Blok (1960:189) refers to as *speelruimte* (= setting). Second, space can be narrated in such a way that it has a significant effect on the development of the plot of the narrative. In the case of the latter, space also has an effect on characterization in the narrative. This Blok (1960:190) calls *belangeruimte* (= focal space of interest). Blok's *speelruimte* and *belangeruimte* thus corresponds with Vandermoere's objective and subjective space, Ronen's frame and setting and Chatman's, Venter's and Brink's story space and discourse space.

For Blok's concepts of *speelruimte* and *belangeruimte*, I would like to use the concepts of *setting* and *focal space*. Space as background, filling or space in general is understood as the concept of *setting*<sup>61</sup>. Setting, therefore, does not attribute to either the structure, plot or characterization of the narrative. Focal space, in contrast, attributes to *characterization* (Blok 1960:192; Vandermoere 1982:138; Zoran 1984: 331; Ronen 1986:425, Brink 1987:114, Muir 1968:63-67), *plot* (Blok 1960:189; Bal 1978:102; Barkhuizen 1983:12) and *structure* (Rhoads & Michie 1982:63; Venter 1982:28-29) of the narrative. Focal space can also have *symbolic* meaning (Bal 1978: 103; Peirce, in Louw 1982a:8). Or, stated in a different manner: The moment the narrator uses space in a narrative in such a way that it functions as a vehicle for his *ideological perspective on the topographical plane* of the narrative, *setting* is transformed into *focal space of interest*.

As such, focal space is a *metaphor* (see again Van Aarde 1991d:54-57; section 3.3.7) or a *symbol* (as part of the microsocial world) which give expression to certain beliefs, values and attitudes which exist, or may exist, in the macrosocial world. This understanding of space therefore can also serve as the link between a narratological and social scientific analysis of space in the narrative text. In section 3.2.1, we saw that, in terms of Petersen's distinction between symbolic forms and social arrangements (see Petersen 1985:x), or between symbolic universe and institutional order (Petersen 1985:28), certain beliefs and systems of meanings in the macrosocial world realize themselves in the narrative text by what is called a 'narrativizing of experience' (Petersen 1985:10). In terms of the relationship between the salient features of sociology of knowledge, and the narrating activity of the narrator, the beliefs and attitudes of the 'habitualized world' (see again Berger & Luckmann 1967:53) are taken up in the text by structuring them linguistically through the narrator's ideological perspective on the social world as it is presented in the narrative world. Therefore, in terms of the symboling of space, the spatial structures in a narrative discourse serve as a characterization device, and can be seen as a reflection on certain beliefs and attitudes which relate to the macrosocial world mirrored in the microsocial world of the text.

Within this framework, certain spatial relations in Mark, such as Galilee *vis-a-vis* Jerusalem, house *vis-a-vis* temple, the desert *vis-a-vis* the grave, and spatial designations like the way, the sea and the kingdom of God will be studied. Attention will especially be given to the question of whether the opposition between Galilee and Jerusalem that exists in the Gospel can be seen as a reflection on fixed political positions/oppositions that may have existed in the macrosocial world of the Gospel.

### 3.5 CONCLUSIONS

In the next chapter, attention will be given to the different theories that will be used to construct a model by which focal space in Mark's narrative, from a narrative point of view on the spatial level of the text as well as in terms of the social world of the text, will be analyzed in terms of its possible political implications. Attention will also be given to the method that will be followed to read Mark in terms of the constructed model. To aid the construction of the model that will be used, a summary of the conclusions drawn in this present chapter, will now be given.

In section 3.3.1, the conclusion was drawn that the historical-critical method was inadequate in the sense that it did not take into full account the dynamics that all ideas, concepts and knowledge are socially determined. Because of this, it was concluded that the social scientific study of biblical texts should not be seen as either complementing that of the historical-critical method (see Elliott 1991a:xx), or as an expansion thereof (see Vorster 1988:31-48), but rather as an adaptation of the historical-critical method

(see Van Aarde 1988d:49-64). Biblical scholarship has adapted the 'historical' perspective into more holistic, multi-disciplinary, social-dynamic and pragmatic approaches, with the aim of explaining biblical values to our new pluralistic society (see Davies 1987:53-64).

In section 3.3.2, where the possibilities of an association of literary criticism and a social scientific approach towards texts were discussed, it was concluded that such an association is not only viable, but essential, especially when (biblical) texts are seen as 'a specific response (strategy — EvE) to a specific situation' (Elliott 1991a:xxii)<sup>62</sup>. Literary criticism, and more specifically narratology, when the gospels as narrative texts are concerned, can be helpful in analyzing the *strategy* of narrative texts, and social scientific models can be used to study the text's *situation*. This conclusion was also built on Petersen's insights that all worlds, narrative or real, are human constructions (Petersen 1985:ix), and that 'narrative or story is probably a universal means of understanding human social actions and relations in time' (Petersen 1985:10).

In section 3.3.3, it was determined that, in terms of the relationship between a narratological and social scientific analysis of texts, the narratological (literary) analysis has to precede the social scientific analysis for the sake of methodological reasons. By analyzing first the narrator's strategy, it can be used as a way to get to the text's situation. In relation to these two concepts of strategy and situation, it was also decided in section 3.3.4, that, in terms of the question surrounding the contextual, narrative and referential worlds of text, the terms of microsocial (narrative world) and macrosocial world (contextual world) would be used.

When the concept ideology was under discussion in section 3.3.5, it was determined that this concept, on a textual level, consists of both the narrator's ideological and technical perspective of the text. The narrator's ideological perspective is defined as (his) the narrator's network of themes and ideas by which an 'imagined reality' is created. The technical perspective is (his) the narrator's technique, that is, the way in which he *inter alia* structures space in the text/microsocial world to serve as vehicle for his understanding of the macrosocial world. As a social issue, it was decided that this concept can be seen as a reflection on the symbolic universe, with the aim of either legitimizing current social institutions or changing them. However, since a text can be seen as a dialectical reflection on both the current social universe and its macrosocial world, we concluded that the concept ideology, or narrative point of view, relates to the narrator's dialectical understanding of his own, and his audience's current symbolic and social universes.

In the next section, section 3.3.6, it was contended that the narrator, in terms of his narrative point of view, uses symbols as a nexus between his dialectical reflection of the macrosocial world/symbolic universe and its manifestation thereof in the micro-

social world of the text. This was also explained in terms of Van Aarde's understanding of metaphorical language, to be the narrator's understanding of his readers' macrosocial world/symbolic universe.

The question of terminology was discussed in section 3.3.7 with regard to the concepts of narratology and social scientific analysis. The first conclusion drawn was that both narratology and social scientific criticism are interested in the communication of texts. It was therefore decided to use the term social scientific analysis for the exegetical enterprise that is to follow. This concept means an association of a narratological and social scientific reading of the text, which concentrates on the text's strategy and situation, and more specifically, on its intended communication as a social force and social product.

After a few comments were made relating to the exegetical enterprise as always being perspectival in nature (section 3.3.8), in section 3.4 the discussion turned more specifically to the study of space in narrative texts. It was contended that space, as focal space, can be seen as symbols used by the narrator to convey his ideological perspective/narrative point of view on the topographical level of the text. A brief overview was given regarding the development of the study of space, and it was concluded that a distinction between focal space and setting, on the level of the *récit*, can be used to 'get behind' the narrator's ideological perspective in the text. Finally, the study of focal space makes it possible to understand something of the narrator's reflection on his readers' symbolic universe/macrosocial world by understanding space as metaphors or symbols.

It is hoped that with this methodological reconsideration the first research gap (that was identified in section 2.5) is now addressed. The second research gap identified in section 2.5, the need to read ancient texts from a social scientific approach, while at the same time trying to avoid the fallacies of ethnocentrism/ anachronism and reductionism, will now be addressed in the next chapter.

### ENDNOTES: CHAPTER 3

<sup>1</sup> See for example *inter alia* the works of Petersen (1978a, 1980a, 1980b, 1984), Malbon (1979, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c), Rhoads and Michie (1982), Van Iersel (1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1989) and Kingsbury (1983, 1989), as was discussed in section 2.3. To these can be added that of Boomershine (1974, 1981), Achtemeier (1975, 1978a, 1980), Bilezikian (1977), Dewey (1980, 1982, 1989), Tannehill (1980, 1985), Vorster (1980a, 1980b, 1985, 1987a, 1987b), Best (1981, 1983, 1986), Boomershine & Bartholomew (1981), Fowler (1981, 1983), Rhoads (1982), Standaert (1983), Breytenbach (1984, 1985), Robbins (1992a), Van Eck (1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991b), Telford (1985), De Klerk (1987), Harris (1988), Matera (1988, 1989) and Van Eck & Van Aarde (1989), to name but a few.

<sup>2</sup> It will be argued that when looking at some definitions of narratological readings of texts on the one hand, and on the other hand, social scientific readings of texts, it is possible to conclude that a narratological reading of texts and social scientific reading of texts boils down to two complementary approaches. From the definitions of narratological readings as well as social scientific readings, it will therefore be argued that, in a certain sense, a narratological reading and a social scientific reading of the texts can be seen as surrogate terms. The concept 'surrogate terms' means that, when these two approaches are implemented into a communication model and etics, it can be seen as complementary. The concept etics (and emics) will be discussed in section 4.1.3.

<sup>3</sup> The concepts model and method will be discussed in sections 4.1 and 4.4, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Petersen (1985:7), in using the communication model as developed by Roman Jakobson (cf Petersen 1978b:35-48), sees these two terms, narrative world and referential world, as exchangeable, that is, referring to the same 'world', the imagined world in the narrative that is created by the narrator. In this regard, his view point correlates with that of Van Staden (1991:34-35). In section 3.3.4, it will be argued, however, that when Van Aarde's insight relating to the concept of the 'transparency' of (biblical) texts (see Van Aarde 1986a:62-75; 1988b:235-252; 1989a:219-233) is taken seriously, such an equalization between these two terms is problematic.

<sup>5</sup> Petersen's notions of 'symbolic forms' and 'social arrangements' are derived from the categories of symbolic universe and social universe, terms that were coined in the social sciences by the sociology of knowledge as a subdiscipline of sociology. According to Kee (1989:10-11), the sociology of knowledge developed from the works of Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim. Their works were subsequently further developed in the research of Alfred Schutz, which in turn led to the works of Berger & Luckmann (1967, 1976).

<sup>6</sup> In regard to Petersen's concept of the 'narrativizing of experience' (Petersen 1985:10), the work of Beidelman (1970:30), Van Aarde (1988b:236-239) and Kurz (1987:195-220) can also be mentioned. According to Van Aarde (1988b: 236), following Danow (1987), 'culture' can be described as the mechanism that generates texts. Also, 'culture', as understood by Lotman and Uspensky (see Danow 1987:352), makes it possible, in Van Aarde's opinion, to be replaced by the term 'social context' (Van Aarde 1988b:237), which then can be seen as an indirect, rather than direct, mechanism behind the generation of texts. Understood as such, 'it is *people* who are directly responsible for the production of texts' (Van Aarde 1988b:237). Because of this, according to Van Aarde (1988b:238), 'the narrative act is one of the most natural means of illustrating something in the lives of people of a certain time and place'. This opinion of Van Aarde also concurs respectively with that of Beidelman (1970: 30) and Kurz



(1987:196). In this regard, Beidelman (1970:30 states): '[L]anguage is the sum total of ways in which members of society symbolize or categorize their experiences so that they may give it order and form'. Kurz (1987:196) has the same opinion in this regard when he states that 'human experience has a narrative quality'.

<sup>7</sup> When the narrator is referred to in this study in the masculine form, it does not prevent the narrator from being female, or for that matter, more than one person. For the sake of simplicity, however, the masculine form will be used.

<sup>8</sup> Petersen, in this regard, clearly follows the definition of point of view of Boris Uspensky (1973:58-65).

<sup>9</sup> In this regard, one can find in Van Staden (1991:115) a brief, but very clear discussion on anthropology and its subdivisions, namely social, physical and cultural anthropology.

<sup>10</sup> The concept ideological perspective, when it is used in a non-pejorative sense in literary analysis (see e.g. Van Aarde 1988b:235-252), is sometimes understood to refer only to a literary device, that is,

trying to manipulate the readers into accepting particular *ideas*, while at the same time the whole text, its generation and its reception, may be part of the broader, sociopolitical play in society.

(Smit 1988:445; his emphasis)

Smit (1988:444-447) believes that literary criticism (or narratology, as practiced by inter alia Van Aarde 1988b:235-252), understands the concept ideology only as referring to a literary device. Elliott, however, when he understands the strategy/ideology of the text as the 'deliberate design of a document calculated to have a specific social effect on its intended hearers or readers' (Elliott 1991:11), clearly indicates that the concept ideology as a literary device also has a pragmatic dimension. This is also the way in which this concept is understood by Van Aarde (1988b:235-252), because for him, the pragmatic dimension of the concept can implicitly be deduced: The ideological perspective of the narrator not only tries to manipulate readers into accepting particular ideas, but also, although implicitly, incorporates the pragmatic dimension, that is, to have an intended social effect. When the concept 'ideological perspective and interest' is used in this study (see e.g. section 2.5), it therefore implies both a literary and pragmatic dimension as understood by Smit (1988:445) and Elliott (1991:11).

<sup>11</sup> From Elliott's description of a diachronic and synchronic analysis of the situation of a text, it seems that Elliott (1987a:1) understands these two terms as relating to the following: A diachronic study of the situation of text involves the study of the position of the specific text in terms of the wider diachronic scope of *social history*, while the synchronic analysis refers to an analysis of an *entire society* at a given period. Over against this, a social scientific analysis,

with its textual focus, concerns itself with the specific social conditions and features of the senders and receivers of a specific text (see Elliott 1991a:8). This differs from the employment of these two terms in social sciences on the one hand, and on the other hand, linguistics and especially in semantics. In the social sciences, diachronic/longitudinal studies normally involve the investigation of units of analysis over an extended period. This category would, for example, include the study of changes in political attitudes over a period of time, or research into the origin and development of a particular socio-political movement. Synchronic/cross sectional studies, by contrast, are those in which a given phenomenon is studied at a specific point of time. For example, studies of the attitudes of people or the value systems of a particular sample at a time (see Mouton & Marais 1988:40-41). In linguistics and semantics, for example, it is clear from the works of Caird (1980) and Louw (1982b), that in semantics, originally, the concept diachronic referred to the (historical) development of the 'meaning' of words, its so-called etymology (see Caird 1980:62-84; Louw 1982b:23-32), and the concept synchronic study to the 'meaning' of a word in terms of a specific time (see Caird 1980:131-143; Louw 1982b:91-158).

<sup>12</sup> The concept 'rhetorical analysis' indeed has become an ambiguous term in literary and Biblical studies. According to Black (1965:177)

we have not evolved any system of rhetorical criticism, but only, at best, an orientation to it .... We simply do not know enough yet about rhetorical discourse to place faith in systems (theories — EvE), and it is only through imaginative criticism that we are likely to learn more.

(Black 1965:177)

When one looks at the different definitions that are given by different Biblical and literary scholars in relation to what is to be understood by the term 'rhetorical analysis', Black's comment stated in the above quote seems to be largely correct. To state a few examples: According to Winqvist (1987:122), rhetorical analysis refers to 'an approach to the rhetorical structure of a text's textuality', for Barthes (1974:55) it is 'to determine the referential mode of the text', for Lategan & Vorster (1985:1) the term refers to the question 'in what way does the text refer to reality', and for Eagleton (1983:110-112) it refers to 'reinventing rhetoric' which lends itself to 'political criticism'. Wuellner (1988:283), on the other hand, distinguishes between the rhetorical structure *of* texts (language as discourse where someone is saying/writing something about something to someone) and *in* texts (language as system). To these can be added Robbins' understanding of this term. He sees 'socio-rhetorical criticism as consisting of the study of the inner texture of the text, its intertexture, social and cultural texture and ideological texture' (Robbins 1992:xix-xliv). This definition of Robbins includes his notions of inner and ideological texture (Elliott's strategy), as well as intertexture, social and cultural texture (Elliott's situation). It concurs in a certain sense with that of Elliott

(1991a:xx), who understands rhetorical analysis as the study of a text in terms of a meaningful and effective instrument of communication and social interaction. Rhetorical analysis, when used in this study, refers to an analysis that studies the text as an effective instrument of communication and social interaction.

<sup>13</sup> See Elliott (1989:18-24) for a description of the development of the socio-logical study of biblical texts and the biblical world, as it moved from a socio-historical perspective to a social scientific perspective. Relating to this development, he also lists the main exponents and their respective works, classifying them either as socio-historical or social scientific in perspective and method. See also Van Staden's (1991:31-33) thorough and concise discussion on the difference between social description/social history and sociological analysis (which uses well-defined conceptual social scientific models). The same discussion can also be found in Botha (1989:450-408) and Joubert (1991: 39-54).

<sup>14</sup> The distinction between a socio-historical and social scientific analysis of biblical texts is still a debatable subject among scholars (see e.g. Barraclough 1978, Malina 1982, 1985, 1986c, Burke 1987, Esler 1987, Rohrbaugh 1987 and Elliott 1989). It should, however, at the outset be said that the distinction between social *description* and social scientific *explanation* per se is not in dispute (Craffert 1991:131). However, what is meant by such a distinction is fundamentally determined by one's philosophical view about what history and the social sciences are and what the relationship between them is. According to Craffert (1991:131), therefore, what is really in dispute is the imprecise way in which these two concepts are distinguished and the ignorance about the different meanings in different philosophical molds that are used by these two approaches.

<sup>15</sup> In this regard Van Aarde (see Van Eck 1992:237-238), is of the opinion that the value of any exegetical model (and any other model that is used to interpret an 'object') can be derived from the model's explanatory power, as well as the way in which the model makes a correlation possible between the exegete's points of departure (epistemology), methodology and teleology. This is, however, true not only in regard to verification and falsification, but also in regard to a specific model's cognitive dimension, especially in terms of its pragmatological results (see Van Aarde 1992c:958-959).

<sup>16</sup> This does not imply that Petersen and Elliott can be seen as the only scholars which proposed a combination of a literary and social scientific analysis to read biblical texts in terms of their specific context and therefore, intended communication. In South-African context, for example, the works of De Villiers (1984:66-79), Van Aarde (1988b, 1989a, 1991a) and Van Eck 1990:209-211; 1991b:1039-1041) can be mentioned. This combination is also proposed by Robbins (1992:306-309). According to Robbins, a sole narratological reading of a biblical

text can lead to ethnocentrism and reductionism. Freyne (1988:7), however, is convinced that such an association of a literary and social scientific reading is not possible. He verses his point of view as follows:

[T]he insights of both approaches seem to be so divergent that no reconciliation would appear possible between them. The former (i.e. the social sciences — EvE) is concerned with the extra-textual referent, whereas the latter (i.e. literary criticism — EvE) concentrates totally on the intratextual, fictional world. So different in fact are the concerns of each approach that the practitioners of the one often seem unaware of the aims of the other.

(Freyne 1988:7)

<sup>17</sup> Petersen (1985:7) defines the concepts of text and context (in terms of a distinction between these two concepts) as that which is intrinsic (to the text), like the author's intent, and to that which is extrinsic to the text, like the cultural and historical climate wherein the text is written. On the other hand, his distinction between history and story lies in the fact that story can be seen as 'the narrative quality of a [text's] narrative world' (Petersen 1985:10). History, therefore, in a strict sense, is a story about events. Seen as such, a story is a selected representation of such a history (see also Wright 1992:47-77).

<sup>18</sup> How this relationship between text (literary analysis) and its socio-historical environment is to be construed is also a much debated issue within the sociology of literature. Van Staden (1991:11) correctly indicates that attempts in defining this relationship include inter alia constructs such as the Marxist dialectic-materialistic conception (cf Steinbach 1974, Swingwood 1977), the genetic approach of Goldmann (cf Routh 1977) and the structuralistic approach (cf Bann 1977, Rutherford 1977). My interest in this relationship, however, is not in defining the relationship itself, but is rather to determine which aspect should be first utilized, literary analysis (strategy), or social scientific analysis (situation). This process needs to be carried out without losing sight of the fact that these two aspects of my exegetical model, although distinguishable, are not inseparable.

<sup>19</sup> Petersen (1985:6-7) goes on to show that the movement of the so-called *New Criticism* was the first to rebel against contextual interpretation by advocating the 'autonomy of the text' (see also section 3.3.5.2.2), and as a consequence, identified the contextualist errors of the 'genetic fallacy' and 'intentional fallacy' (see Van Aarde 1985b:547-578 for definitions of these terms). In response to this radical insistence on separating texts from their contexts, different mediating positions emerged in which texts and contexts are held in some kind of balance. Currently, however, the debate among literary critics hinges on the related question of just how determinative even intrinsic textual information is of our understanding and interpretation of texts. The two polar positions in this regard are that of *radical determinacy* (e.g. Hirsch

1967, 1976), which asserts that valid interpretations can be reached, and that of *radical indeterminacy* (e.g. Derrida, in Culler 1982), which proposes a text can not be interpreted, since a text has many meanings, not merely the right one. Between these two positions there is an *intermediate* one (e.g. Iser 1980), which holds that depending on constraints in the text, sometimes an interpretation can be validated, other times not.

<sup>20</sup> See Petersen (1987:2-6) for a discussion on how to move from texts (literary analysis) to contexts.

<sup>21</sup> With the term 'deeper understanding', Skinner (1975:227) refers to a literary analysis of a text which also takes the social background of the text into consideration when it is asked what a text 'means'

<sup>22</sup> Although Malina approaches his reading of the Bible not from a literary perspective (what Elliott calls rhetorical analysis), but from a communication theory perspective (cf Malina 1983:120-128), it is, however, closely related to the literary perspective of Elliott. Because Malina also incorporates literary analysis into his sociological study of biblical texts, his opinion is therefore relevant here.

<sup>23</sup> According to De Villiers (1984:73), this important hermeneutical principle was first underlined by Wellek & Warren (1959) as one of the important methodological points of departure of their text-immanent method by which they read texts from a structural perspective. However, Genette (1980), in distinguishing between the concepts *récit* (narrative discourse) and *histoire* (story), and who states that the *histoire* can only be constructed by ways of the *récit*, implied in an earlier stage that the situation of a text can be construed from the narrative discourse. De Villiers is correct in saying that Wellek & Warren, as part of the *New Critics*, emphasizes a close reading of the text. They were, however, not interested in the situation in which the text emerged (see also section 3.3.5.2.2 in this regard). Note also how Van Staden (1991:33) interprets incorrectly the above mentioned concepts of Genette, that is, the story as *histoire* and the narrative text as *récit*. According to Van Staden, Genette's notion of *récit* refers to story and his notion of *histoire* to the narrative.

<sup>24</sup> Van Aarde ([1982]:58) sees the first methodological step in the study of a New Testament text as that of ascertaining the *type* of text and the *literary principles* according to which it can be studied. In choosing to read Mark methodologically first from a literary (narratological) perspective, it will be shown that the ascertaining of the type of text (Mark), and the literary principles according to which Mark can be read, are seen as part of my preliminary methodological points of departure (see sections 4.4.1). There is therefore no contradiction between my point of view and that of Van Aarde in this regard.

25 Petersen (1978b:33) correctly indicates that Jakobson's communications model, although it stands on its own, made use of three sources in constructing it: Bühler's model of the expressive functions of verbal communications, as well as insights from the Russian Formalists and Prague Structuralists, all which show Jakobson was not only a major figure, but also were concerned with the poetic functions of language.

26 It must be noted that, while Petersen and Elliott are not using the same terms for these two concepts, it seems that they understand it correspondently. Petersen terms the narrative world of the text its referential world, while Elliott uses the concept narrative world. And in the case of the concept contextual world, Petersen uses the term contextual world and Elliott the term social world or context as such.

27 Waetjen's (1989) reading of Mark corresponds to this insight of Van Aarde. Waetjen's understanding of Mark 4:35-5:43, as 'world-building myths' that represent post-70 psychosocial circumstances, can serve as an example: Waetjen (1989:117) understands the narrative about Jesus' healing of the demon-possessed man as the overthrow of 'gentile (dis)order and disintegration', and the middle-aged woman and prepubescent girl of Mark 5:21-43 as respectively 'tradition-bound mother Judaism' and 'the new Israel' (Waetjen 1989:122; cf also Black 1991:84). Interpreted as such, these texts clearly stress the point of Van Aarde's argument, in that they present us with 'two worlds in one' (Van Aarde 1986a:62-75).

28 On this point I, therefore, disagree with Van Staden (1991:34-35) who is of the opinion that the narrative world of the text is the same as its referential world.

29 In this regard, Van Aarde (1991b:13-14) distinguishes between the intertextual world of the text, and its extratextual world, which corresponds with Elliott's distinction between the microsocal and macrosocial world of the text. Van Aarde (1991b:14) also confers with Elliott in that both are of the opinion that the text can be seen as a certain reflection/perspective on its macrosocial world.

30 Van Staden (1991:73-104), in a discussion of the concepts theology and ideology, clearly indicated that theology and ideology, in relation to a social scientific study of biblical texts, can be seen as surrogate terms.

31 According to Kinloch (1984:46), Fanaeian (1981:13-15) however, is of the opinion that the origin of the term ideology can be found in the time of the Enlightenment as a concept which referred to a 'kind of falsity' which was contrary to 'reason'. This, therefore, should be seen as the basis of a definition of the term ideology. Because this understanding of the concept

ideology is contrary to Kinloch's understanding, the latter is of the opinion that Fanaeian is guilty here of anachronism, ascribing a somewhat later assessment of ideology to its time of origin.

<sup>32</sup> In the science of religion the term ideology is understood as 'blueprints of the future made by a certain ideologue or group of elite within the community to move the masses' (Dumas 1966:33). As such, each ideology comes with a set of strategies and methods by which those who drafted it hope to bridge the gap between the idea and its fulfillment (Verkuyl 1978:374). Ideologies thus have a strong collective stamp, they are the children of wholesale revolutions. Because of this, the rise of ideologies always goes hand in hand with the rise of the masses and they make their appeal to the masses, for among the masses burns a fervent desire to participate in the future (see Verkuyl 1978:375-377).

<sup>33</sup> See *inter alia* the studies in this regard by Booth 1961a, 1961b:273-290; 1967:87-107; Kenney 1966:46-56; Friedman 1967b:88-108; Lubbock 1967:245-272; Uspensky 1973:1-99; Chatman 1975:211-257; 1978:196-252; Bal 1978:108-119; 1981:202-210; Genette 1980:161-262, 145-162; Bronzwaer 1981:193-201; Lanser 1981:11-226; Carrol 1982:51-77; Rhoads & Michie 1982:35-42; Rimmon-Kenan 1983:71-85; Van Aarde 1983:38-83; 1988b:236-239; Gräbe 1984a, 1984b:76-77; 1986a, 1986b:151-168; Sternberg 1985:84-143; Pratt 1986:59-72; Brink 1987:145-162 and Vorster 1987a:58-63, 1987b:204-209.

<sup>34</sup> Lanser (1981:13-19) states that two reasons can be given for the current impasse in the study of point of view in literary studies: The first reason relates to 'the nature of the concept itself' (Lanser 1981:13). Because the concept relates to the aspects of the relationship between author, implied author, narrator, characterization, time, space and implied reader and real reader (thus a complex network of relationships), literary critics try to reduce the concept to manageable terms, and therefore 'critics have frequently restricted their analysis to one aspect of point of view, or have sought to restrict the concept itself to a single dimension (Lanser 1981:14). Second, she is of the opinion that a correct understanding of the concept is handicapped by its own past. For example, if one does not have a clear understanding of what is meant by a concept like narrative (of which point of view is an aspect), one will also not be able to define the possible function and meaning of point of view in a narrative. In this regard, I am of the opinion that this is especially the case when one applies a structuralistic approach to analyze narrative texts (i.e. the identifying of structures in the text for the sake of identifying structures), and does not interpret the identified structures in terms of their intended effect or function in terms of the relation narrator and implied reader (cf *inter alia* Van Eck 1990:110).

35 The insight of James and Lubbock that the notion of point of view ought to be seen as the center, form-giving aspect of the novel, and not only as the spatial perspective (what is known in structuralism as focalization) from which the narrator is telling his story, is in some sense a critical interpretation of the structuralistic view, like that of Bal (1978) and Genette (1980), that point of view should be understood in terms of focalization alone.

36 Friedman (1967a, 1967b) for example used James and Lubbock's interpretation of point of view in terms of point of view-characters as a principle for 'thematic definition' (Friedman 1967b:117). Friedman thus tried to categorize different narratives in terms of which characters embodied the point of view of the narrator. Narratives, therefore, can be categorized as, for example, editorial omniscient, I as witness, I as protagonist or multiple selective omniscience (see Van Eck 1990:120-123 for a discussion of these notions).

37 Du Plooy (1986:35) correctly states that *New Criticism* as movement must be seen as a reaction to the Anglo-American narrative theory-movement which interpreted texts in terms of literary historical, social, psychological, moralistic and cultural presuppositions to classify texts as 'proper or improper' literature. According to Du Plooy, the *New Critics* saw these 'dogmatic' presuppositions as hampering a close reading of the text which aims at discovering the 'real meaning' of the text.

38 It must be noted that Käte Friedemann (1965) can be seen as an exception to the rule in this regard. In her work, *Die Rolle des Erzählers in der Epik* (which was published for the first time as early as 1910), Friedemann (1965:33) discusses the concept of point of view as it refers to the term *Blickpunkt*. According to her, the term *Blickpunkt* refers not only the identification of character-focalizers in the text, but also, and especially to 'the one who evaluates, who is sensitively aware ... [the one who] conveys to us a picture of the world as *he* experiences it, not as it really is' (Friedemann 1965:23). In evaluating the contributions of James and Lubbock relating to the concept point of view, she states that, because of their influence, the concept point of view became focalization, which concerns questions like which character is carrying the perspective of the author, or through whose eyes the author is telling his story. According to Friedemann, focalization must be seen as only one aspect of the point of view of the narrator, one of the ways of 'conveying to us a picture of the world as *he* (the narrator — EvE) sees it' (Friedemann 1965:24). Du Plooy (1986:37) is of the opinion that Friedemann's insight in this regard did not really feature in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century because of the fact that her work only became known in Europe in the late 1960'.

39 In this regard Lanser (1981:46) states the following:



Indeed, the 'author' and 'reader' had by 1960 all but disappeared from the analysis of point of view, because they were not considered properly textual personae. Anglo-American New Criticism had taken as a basic tenet the autonomy of the text as a concrete linguistic object; thus, it became virtually taboo to speak of the text as an act of communication among real people in a real world.

40 This understanding of Stanzel in regard to 'narrative mediation' (see Stanzel 1986:xi) clearly relates to Elliott's notion of strategy (Elliott 1991:11). According to Stanzel, the narrator uses specific principles when the story is narrated, and according to Elliott, the strategy of the text is the deliberate design of a document calculated to have a specific social effect on its intended addressees.

41 As examples of such studies in structuralism the works of Chatman, Stanzel Genette, Bal and Rimmon-Kenan were discussed in this study. To these can be added *inter alia* the works of Kenney (1966:45-56), Van Luxemburg, Bal & Weststeijn (1983:167-192) and Culpepper (1983:13-340). In the South African context, the works of Gräbe 1984b:76-77; 1986b:151-168), Brink (1987:138-144), Vorster (1987:205) and Potgieter (1991:95-100) can be mentioned.

42 If one, for instance, follows the debate between Bal (1978) and Bronzwaer (1981:193-201) surrounding Bal's understanding of point of view as focalization, two issues immediately come to the fore: First, James' eventual understanding of the concept point of view is no longer part of the debate. Point of view, for Bal and Bronzwaer as structuralists, is focalization, and therefore the possibility that the narrator wants to communicate certain attitudes, values and norms by means of his point of view on the story he is telling, is totally left behind. Second, it is also clear that only that which can be structurally indicated in the text (e.g. different 'focalizers') is debated. In this sense, the basic shortcoming of structuralism is put on the table: Structuralism is interested in identifying structures in the text, but the question of why the narrator is structuring the text as identified by them is never asked. Structures are therefore studied in terms of structures, and not as possible rhetorical effects on the reader in terms of the narrator's attitude toward and evaluation of the story he is telling.

43 The phrase 'web of structuralism' means that structuralism, in analyzing texts, in most cases avoids exploring the relationships between the narrator and its readers, and also the relationship between real author, implied author and narrator.

44 See Van Eck (1990:147-149) for examples of how some of these scholars interpret the point of view of the gospels (or sections) of Mark, Matthew and Luke in terms of point of view as to refer to both the technical and ideological perspective of the text.

<sup>45</sup> See Petersen (1978a:97-121) for an example of a study of point in view in Mark using Uspensky's model. In section 3.3.5.2.4, it will be indicated that the one shortcoming in Uspensky's model, as applied here by Petersen, is the way in which the point of view on the ideological plane relates to the spatial plane in Mark. For a critical evaluation of this study of Petersen by Matera (1987a:85-91), see again section 2.5.

<sup>46</sup> This definition of ideology (as a social concept) by Malina (1986a:178), thus concurs with Uspensky's understanding of this concept (as a textual concept): According to Uspensky (1973:1-12), ideology is articulated in texts by means of phraseology, that is, it is expressed in terms of linguistic articulation. According to Malina, ideology is expressed by different social groups by articulating their views and values. Understood as such, ideological perspective has a pragmatic dimension, its aim is to have an intended effect on the addressees of a text.

<sup>47</sup> The term knowledge is used here as it relates to the sociology of knowledge's definition of the term which is described by Malina (1981:7) as referring to the following three types of knowledge:

- \* Awareness knowledge or that-knowledge: information about the existence of someone or something, its/his/her location in space and time;
- \* usable knowledge or how-to and how-knowledge: information necessary to use something or to interact with someone properly; and
- \* principle knowledge or why-knowledge: information about the cultural scripts and cues, cultural models behind applicable facts, combined with the commitment to the presuppositions and assumptions that make cultural scripts, the implied values and meanings that ultimately explain behavior.

<sup>48</sup> Van Aarde refers in this regard to Paul Ricoeur, according to whom we create these images in order to contain and describe true observations. Those things that are discernible and recognizable (the *vehicle* or picture part) within the familiar culture (the *social universe* in terms of the sociology of knowledge), are creatively and tensely linked in language to something we experience indirectly or intuitively (the *tenor* or the reality part; see Van Aarde 1991d:55). Metaphorical language relating to God is what Schleiermacher (see Van Aarde 1991d:56) termed 'gottgläubige Selbstbewusstsein' and Bultmann 'mythische Heilsgeschehen'. Bultmann, quoted by Van Aarde, understands 'unter 'Mythos' ein ganz bestimmtes geschichtliches Phänomen und unter "Mythologie" ein ganz bestimmte Denkweise'. The myth 'redet vom Untweltlichen weltlich, von den Göttern menschlich'. From another work of Bultmann, Van Aarde (1991d:56) quotes: 'Man kan sagen, Mythen geben der tranzendenten Wirklichkeit eine immanente weltliche Objektivität. Die Mythe objektiviert das Jenseitige zum Diesseitigen'. Bultmann therefore sees 'mythischen Denken' as the 'Gegenbegriff' of 'wissenschaftliche Denke'. Van Aarde (1991d:54) argues that Schleiermacher referred to this above

mentioned concept as *reflective language* at a much earlier stage than Bultmann and used the expression *responding experience* to explain what is meant by his well known concept 'das schlechthinnige Abhängigkeitsgefühl'. According to Van Aarde, Bultmann's concept of *Existenzverständnis* corresponds with this idea. Therefore, myths are not meaningful in the sense that they are objective portrayals, but because of the *Existenzverständnis* which is expressed through these portrayals.

<sup>49</sup> See also Wimsatt & Beardsley 1954:3-18; Foulkes 1975:24-26; Plett 1975:79; Skinner 1975:209; Kempson 1977:68-75; Traugott & Pratt 1980:10-12; De Villiers 1982:29; Von Glasersfeld 1983:207-217; Potgieter 1991:5 and Van Staden 1991:111 in which the same two aspects, communication and social context, are seen as the two salient aspects of the narrative.

<sup>50</sup> See for example inter alia the works of Forster (1927, 1961), James (1934, 1938), Brooks (1959), Wellek & Warren (1959), Blok (1960), Muir (1967, 1968), Müller (1968), Lämmert (1972), Dolezel (1976), Kayser (1976), Vandermoere (1976, 1982), Bal (1978), Chatman (1978), Genette (1980), Lanser (1981), Prince (1982), Van Aarde ([1982], 1983, 1985a, 1986a, 1988b, 1988c), Rimmon-Kenan (1983), Van Luxemburg, Bal & Weststeijn (1983), Zoran (1984), Stanzel (1986), Brink (1987) and Van Eck (1990).

<sup>51</sup> If one takes the works mentioned in the endnote above, especially those which attempt to describe the salient elements of the novel/story/narrative (cf especially the works of James 1934, Kayser 1976, Bal 1978, Genette 1980, Lanser 1981, Prince 1982, Rimmon-Kenan 1983 and Stanzel 1986), it is obvious how much space is devoted to the description of time in the story, and, in contrast, how little space is devoted to the understanding of the spatial structures in texts.

<sup>52</sup> The following remark of Prince (1982:32), as it relates to the question of the importance or unimportance of space when reading texts, can serve as a good example:

It is quite possible to narrate without specifying any relationship between the space of the narration (the spatial position from which the narrator is narrating — EvE) and the space of the narrated (space as narrated by the narrator in the text — EvE).

If I write a story, not only do I not have to indicate where the events recounted take place, but I do not have to mention where the narration occurs.

(Prince 1982:32)

<sup>53</sup> See for example the works of Greimas (1971), Barthes (1974), Bremond (1977) and Todorov (1977). For a well structured summary of these works see Du Plooy (1986:148-192).

54 Genette's notion of the 'doubling' of time can be explained as follows: In terms of causality in everyday life, events occur in a chronological order, that is, A-B-C-D-E. The narrator, however, by means of his *narration*, can decide to describe these events in the *récit* in a different order, for example, E-A-B-C-D. A 'doubling' of time thus has occurred. To study the 'doubling' of time, one would therefore first (re)construct time, by using the *récit*, in its chronological order as it occurs in the *histoire*. When this is done, it is then possible to indicate how the narrator, by ways of his *narration*, has used (doubled) the time of the *histoire* in the *récit*. For an example of such a study see Vorster (1987b:203-222) for a discussion of the doubling of time in Mark 13-16, and Van Eck (1990:154-188) for such a study of space in Mark.

55 The first exponent of the Anglo-American narrative theory as literary movement was James (1934, 1938). His work, in relation to the salient aspects of the novel, was further taken up and elaborated on especially by Muir (1967, 1968), Lubbock (1957, 1967), Forster (1927, 1961), Liddel (1969a, 1969b), Brooks (1959) and Wellek & Warren (1959). See Du Plooy (1986:15-43) for a discussion on the salient features, as well as development within the Anglo-American narrative theory as textual movement.

56 A good example of this approach towards space is the way in which Homer's Iliad was re-written by Plato in such a way that all 'hampering' references to space in the Iliad (which 'distracts' the attention from the events in the story), is left out. According to Genette (1980:165), space was seen as 'useless and contingent detail, it is the *medium par excellence* of the referential illusion, and therefore of the mimetic effect: it is a *connotator of mimesis*' (his emphasis). This kind of attitude towards space can also be seen in the work of Barthes (see e.g. 1974:122), who sees space in the text as mere *indice* (thematic reference) or *catalyse* (filling), but definitely not as the *noyau* (center) of the text. The same approach towards space, as being mere reference to useless and contingent detail, can also be detected in the works of Hendricks (1973:163-184), Van Dijk (1976a:287-337) and Prince (1982:74). Because space was seen as only referring to filling or setting, in terms of extra-textual references space was seen as useless, and therefore studied in a reductionistic way.

57 In this second stage of development in the study of space, space was used to differentiate between the novel as 'epic' (character novel) or 'tragic' (dramatic novel) in genre (see Venter 1985:20-22). Proponents of this attitude towards space are Muir (1967, 1968), Kayser (1971) and Maatje (1975). The way in which space was used to differentiate between different genres (or sub-genres) of the novel can be illustrated by the following comment from Muir (1967:46):

[T]he imaginative world of the dramatic novel is Time, the imaginative world of the character novel is Space. In the one ... Space is more or less given, and the action is built up in Time; in the other, Time is assumed, and the action is a static pattern,

continuously redistributed and reshuffled, in Space .... The dramatic novel is limited in Space and free in Time, the character novel is limited in Time and free in Space.

(Muir 1967:46)

<sup>58</sup> If A-B-C-D-E are taken as five chronological events, Genette's notions of analepsis and prolepsis can be explained as follows: Prolepsis would be, for example, A-E-B-C-D, and analepsis, for example, B-C-D-A-E. Prolepsis thus refers to an event that occurs later in time, but is told by the narrator earlier in a narrative. Analepsis, on the other hand, is the narrating of an event that occurred in the past; thus a event referred to by the narrator.

<sup>59</sup> Although not first used by him, see Van Aarde ([1982], 1986a, 1988a, 1988b) for a concise, but comprehensive, description of the meanings of the terms omniscient point of view and limited point of view. Van Aarde ([1982]) clearly indicated in this regard that these two concepts belong rather to the question of the technical perspective of the narrator (see section 3.3.5.2.2) than to the study of space in narrative texts.

<sup>60</sup> In this regard, Venter (1982:4) was followed in South African context especially by Brink (1987) and Gräbe (1984b, 1986a). In the same vein, Chatman (1978:96), for example, states the following: 'As the dimension of story-events is time, that of story-existents is space. And as we distinguish story-time from discourse-time, we *must* distinguish story-space from discourse-space (Chatman 1978:96; my emphasis).

<sup>61</sup> It should be noted that my choice for the term 'setting' as mere background or filling should not be confused with Ronen's use of this term to refer to focal space (see Ronen 1986:423). The term I am using for setting thus refers to Ronen's concept of frame (see Ronen 1986:423).

<sup>62</sup> In this regard Rohrbaugh ([1993]a:6) makes the following significant remark:

Historical or social location is not simply the 'background' of a text. It is encoded, embedded, reflected and responded to in a text. It is not a point of reference for a text, it is the text and the text is it. And since this system of social conventions is itself a historical reality, a reality of another time, another place and another culture, it must be uncovered and recovered in order to understand in what way the text is an embodiment of it. Social-science criticism is thus historical in a very fundamental sense: it assumes that a social system of the past, from a culture that precedes the industrial revolution, is the necessary key to understanding the language in the text.

(Rohrbaugh [1993]a:6)

Rohrbaugh thus concurs with Elliott that a social-scientific analysis is necessary to understand biblical texts against their respective social backgrounds.