Toward the recovery of common sense
in a post-critical intellectual ethos

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Abstract
This article attempts to articulate what philosopher-scientist Michael Polanyi meant by a post-critical intellectual ethos and to explore its implications for concrete academic practice.

The modern critical tradition's strategy for defeating the demon of self-doubt and for securing certainty, as Hannah Arendt has written, restricts serious candidates for belief to those whose conditions of truth can be rendered wholly immanent to focal consciousness within a point of view that is simply taken for granted. Thereby it forecloses the possibility of recognizing the partiality of its own perspective vis-à-vis that of others, taking into account the relevant perspectives of other persons, and reaching any kind of sense in common between perspectives. The institutionalization of this strategy in 20th century academic life is amply and insightfully documented in Bruce Wilshire's Moral Collapse of the University. Michael Polanyi, in his writings, adumbrates a post-critical intellectual ethos in which the making of sense in common between persons of differing perspective is central to the enterprise of teaching, learning, and research.

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1. INTRODUCTION

My remarks here grow out of nearly a quarter century of wrestling with what Michael Polanyi referred to by the phrase, 'towards a post-critical philosophy', in the subtitle of his most important work, *Personal Knowledge*. Polanyi's words imply that he was seeking to articulate a post-critical *philosophy*, and that implication I have no wish to deny. However, it seems clear that it was not just toward a post-critical philosophy that Polanyi was aiming. Just as much or even more so, I believe, Polanyi was seeking to articulate a vision of *a post-critical intellectual ethos*, a context and style of intellectual life, a 'convivial order', that would be free of the inordinate critical passions and objectivist epistemology that plague the modern critical ethos and render it so problematic and unconvivial.

I should make plain at the start that my interest here is less with what Polanyi has said and written than with the enterprise with which I understand Polanyi was engaged and with which he solicited others’ engagement: namely, fostering the emergence of a post-critical intellectual ethos.

My shift of emphasis from 'a post-critical philosophy' to 'a post-critical intellectual ethos' is meant to broaden the focus from the individual knower in the abstract to the knower in community with other knowers, and from a specific philosophical viewpoint that may or may not be shared by other philosophers to Polanyi’s account of what it means to indwell a given theoretical framework alongside of others who may happen to indwell quite distinct theoretical frameworks. It strikes me that most scholarship on Polanyi has focused on the former to the relative neglect of the latter, with the result that little of Polanyi’s work has been used to illuminate our own lives in the academy and the roles that each of us play in our larger intellectual culture. In other words, my concern is to identify some of the implications of Polanyi’s thinking for our practice as intellectuals in the academy.

I shall proceed to do this, first, by relating Polanyi’s thinking to what Hannah Arendt has identified as ‘the loss of common sense’ in the modern world. Second, I shall briefly draw upon one of the more impressive recent attempts to diagnose the current malaise of higher education – namely, Bruce Wilshire’s *The Moral Collapse of the University* (1990) – to give the bones of this relatively abstract analysis some concrete flesh, particularly as it relates to our lives as members of the academy. Third, I shall briefly explain the crux of the difference between our critical intellectual ethos and a post-critical intellectual ethos. Finally, I shall attempt to identify some of the features of the post-critical intellectual ethos that Polanyi envisioned which, if more widely recognized and appropriated, could play a crucial role in the recovery of common sense in the academy.
Political philosopher Hannah Arendt (1958; ch 39) has argued that the modern critical tradition is characterized (in part at least) by a Cartesian strategy it uses to conquer the demon of sceptical self-doubt: It restricts rational evidence to what is or can be made immanent to consciousness (clearly and distinctly), and knowledge to what the mind is able rigorously to infer therefrom. This is the source of the modern mind's insistence upon explicitness; by insisting on keeping all of its (focal) concerns explicit, it maintains strict control (at least it appears to maintain control) over the mind's natural credulity, its tendency to believe what cannot be proved, which is the source of its greatest fears. A candidate for belief, whose truth conditions cannot be made focally immanent to consciousness, especially one originating from another, unfamiliar point of view (whose intimations are inaccessible from the given point of view), is accordingly not given a second thought. (This kind of response is virtually certain when the point of view taken for granted has the authority of established professional academic consensus and the point of view within which the candidate for belief has been expressed does not yet have such a standing.) The curious result of all this, which Arendt points out, is that this Cartesian strategy for securing certainty itself forecloses the possibility of common sense.

What Arendt means by common sense needs some explanation (Arendt 1958; chs 7, 39 & p 208f). First of all, she does not mean what we ordinarily take it to mean: namely, a collection of opinions about the world and things in general that ordinary people find obvious and take for granted without question. Nor does she mean the somewhat more sophisticated set of common-sense beliefs that G.E. Moore took to be foundational for all our understanding of the world (see Moore 1959). Nor, as she makes clear, does she mean by it the Enlightenment idea of a universal faculty of natural reason, possessed by each human being as such and by virtue of actualizing which one is supposed to transcend one's animal nature and realize one's humanity.

In developing her conception, Arendt makes appeal to Aristotle's definition of common sense as the faculty of mind whereby we integrate the deliverances of our five separate senses into a unified perception (a common sensing) of single realities whose different sensory aspects are picked up by the respective senses (Arendt 1958: 208f, 283). However, Arendt goes beyond Aristotle's notion to identify by 'common sense' something quite distinct: She means by it a sense-ability that corresponds not to a human being as such in the singular, but to human beings in the plural: The capacity to make sense in common with other persons, the capacity to integrate into the recognition of a common or public reality between us the private experiences, imaginings and thoughts we respectively have of it as distinct individuals. Common
sense is that by virtue of which we fit our private reasonings into a single world common to us all and by the aid of which we move about in it in relation to one another. By means of it we come to realize how our perspectives differ from and relate to one another's. But it can only do this because it is precisely what enables the experience of mutual recognition between two or more independent persons: Where I come to see that you see the same thing that I see and you come to see that I see the same thing that you see, each from our own distinct perspective. It corresponds not to our ability through some universal form of reasoning each to come up with the same answers (as when we each add 2 + 2 and all come out with 4) (Arendt 1958: 283). It corresponds rather to our ability jointly to recognize that we each are gathered around the same thing between us, each considering it independently from a different angle. It is the ability to recognize something-in-common, not despite our different viewpoints but by virtue of those very differences. It is the ability to catch on to how the same thing can be seen in such different ways. Hence it is much more a matter of 'catching on to' what others are getting at from where they stand than it is a matter of following up and confirming their explicit reasonings. (Note that only the latter is accredited by the modern critical tradition.)

Arendt's conception of common sense thus names the foundational recognition, regardless of whatever point of view or frame of reference we may assume, that we are all embodied knowers alongside one another, concerned with discovery of truths that transcend our respective subjectivities – truths that we recognize do transcend our subjectivities in the measure that they are capable of eliciting mutual recognition between us. We have reason to believe that we do transcend our subjectivities in coming to know the external world precisely as we achieve (and continue to achieve) sense in common with other independent knowers. (Polanyi's [1958:252ff, 300ff] differentiation of the personal from the subjective marks this very transcendence, although it may not sufficiently highlight the respect in which such transcendence entails the possibility of mutual recognition with other independent knowers.)

However, as already mentioned, the modern critical tradition's strategy for defeating the demon of self-doubt and securing certainty – namely, the strategy of restricting serious candidates for belief to those whose conditions of truth can be rendered wholly immanent to focal consciousness (a consciousness whose distinctive point of view is simply taken for granted, though it attempts to escape 'subjective' taint by universalizing its form [Cannon 1981:157ff]) – this strategy closes off the very possibility of common sense between persons, who necessarily embody differing points of view. Indeed, by restricting consideration to what can be made immanent to its own focal awareness, the point of view in question avoids appearing, or being acknowledged, as one perspective among others. For itself it is disembodied. For
itself it is not in the world alongside of others. For itself rational inference is restricted to linear moves within its own frame of reference; no dialectical shift to another perspective can be countenanced as rational. (I suspect that, largely as a result of this restriction, the pre-modern study of dialectics has been eclipsed from consideration in modern logic as a matter of rational inference.) Indeed, for itself, there is allowed to be no other, no cognition of anything transcending itself. Consequently, for itself there are no conceivable, legitimate points of access to the matters with which it is concerned other than its own. Hence there is no need to explore any such alleged points of view and no purpose for empathy as a source of cognitive insight. (One is hard put to make sense of how empathy is even possible on its terms.) For itself, as Arendt makes clear, there is strictly speaking no world in common at all (Arendt 1958:57f).

But what else could one expect, given the Cartesian inheritance of scepticism which renders suspect the very possibility of knowing other minds as well as the possibility of knowing an external world? Notice that the doubtfulness of each of these possibilities follows directly from the implicit Cartesian refusal to entertain as meaningful any point of view but its own. (Within a strict Cartesian frame of reference, the very idea of different points of view becomes meaningless.) Thus, by its very nature, the Cartesian strategy entails the loss of common sense.

It should be clear by now to readers who are at all familiar with the work of Polanyi that his work definitely addresses the range of issues posed by Arendt's analysis as I have presented it. (Those readers who already know Arendt's analysis may recognize my implicit debt to Polanyi in unpacking what Arendt is getting at.) Polanyian themes directly relevant to Arendt's analysis include: The tacit, personal, fiduciary component and the from-to stretch of embodied tacit knowing that domiciles us all in particular points of view; recognition of the personal coefficient of the knower in community with other independent knowers in all intellectual endeavour; all explicit knowledge being necessarily rooted and grounded in tacit knowledge (i.e. all explicit knowledge, despite its focal appearance as representative or propositional knowledge of being domiciled in no point of view, is in actual fact rooted and grounded in a tacit knowledge by acquaintance that is incarnate in a particular embodied viewpoint); our knowing of a comprehensive entity through indwelling and our knowing of other minds through indwelling, which, taken together, make possible a 'meeting of minds' in convivial mutuality concerning the given comprehensive entity; higher-order forms of knowledge being grounded essentially in a convivial order whose accreditation becomes the basis of one's self-accreditation of competence; reality as being inexhaustible to any one viewpoint, and as capable of revealing itself to an indefinite multiplicity of further viewpoints in unexpected ways;
knowing as an adventure of following up intimations of hidden truth – personal intimations of truth-in-common which call forth the services of the individual knower for revealing it and making it known-in-common; and the way in which our affirmations of our respective findings are always made with universal intent, appealing to a mutual, confirming recognition from future independent inquirers into the same matters. In view of these Polanyian themes, I urge you to consider Polanyi’s work as contributing to the effort to re-establish, and provide justification for, our means of making common sense.

II

Bruce Wilshire’s recent book, *The moral collapse of the University*, traces how what Arendt refers to as the breakdown of common sense has become institutionalized in higher education – a breakdown of common sense between one academic professional specialty and another, between faculty member and student, between professional and lay person, and even between colleagues within the same professional specialty – all through the emergence and consolidation over the last century of academic professionalism. What Wilshire identifies is not new, I am sure, to any of us. His synoptic telling of the story in its moral pathos, so far as I am aware, is unmatched.

Bruce Wilshire is a professional philosopher, but his diagnosis of the malaise of the modern university reflects more than a superficial acquaintance with the discipline of cultural anthropology. His own work exemplifies the interdisciplinary research that he advocates (Wilshire 1990:234ff).

Wilshire brings to light, behind and obscured by the idealized, foreground image of professional expertise and accomplishment in each professional academic field, an ‘archaic background’ in which operate powerful, pre-rational purification rituals (Wilshire 1990:ch VII). Through these rituals, recognition of the ‘purity’ or ‘impurity’ (and degrees thereof) of one’s professional performance by one’s colleagues in the professional discipline is bestowed. In this way a sense of one’s identity as a professional sociologist, say, is given shape and a professional conscience is inculcated and reinforced. The ‘pure’ are those which are judged to hue close to the professional paradigm. The ‘impure’ are those which fall short in one respect or another. The remarkable thing is that all this goes on without the participants taking in rationally what is going on – precisely because their conception of knowing is decisively informed by the Cartesian paradigm of so exclusively focusing on the explicit components of knowing that the enveloping tacit background is entirely lost to reflective awareness. In Wilshire’s (1990:170) words:
Combined with the need to achieve professional competence in order to be something definite – but typically hidden by this professional behavior – are archaic identity needs. These tend to go unrecognized. When they threaten to become thematic their shocking nature usually prompts their repression – self-deception occurs (‘Your dogs are barking in the cellars’, says Nietzsche). The result is that the ability of professional competence alone to form the self is overloaded, freighted with hidden baggage. The academic person all too easily pursues professional objectives compulsively – frantically, numbly fearfully. He or she is in no position to see the ‘irrational’ side of the pursuit – particularly that the need for recognition from the professional peer group is so immense that the group acquires the numinous authority of a tribe. One’s identity is engulfed in the identity of the group; those who fall outside it are other, and their presence within it contaminates both it and its members. Students are other.

Wilshire points out how it is precisely by excluding rapport with these others that such professionalism fails to make common sense and cuts itself off from the common world.

More specifically, Wilshire discusses the professionalization of the discipline of philosophy (ch 5) and how some purification rituals work within the American Philosophical Association meetings:

Some acute observers, such as Richard Rorty and Janice Moulton, have pointed out recently that the actual form of exchange between philosophy professors at these meetings fits no historical model of legitimate philosophical dialectic, but is rather modeled on the confrontation of lawyers in a courtroom. In the half century 1930–1980, they claim, philosophers have attacked each other’s positions in the manner of lawyers attacking each other’s briefs: the ‘adversary method in philosophy’, as Moulton puts it. An instant verdict is rendered thereby, and the contestant moves in one way or another in the shifting, breath-taking rankings of ‘professionals in the field’. But the self is not just the professional ego, and it remains burdened with unacknowledged aspirations, aversions, aggressions, anxieties, and various split-off states.

(Wilshire 1990:123)
Although he does not say so in so many words, it does not take much to recognize that such contexts are hardly places in which mutual recognition between persons of significantly different viewpoints is likely to take place.

All this might not be so bad if the consequences of these purification rituals were not so morally problematic. For what they largely take for granted and enforce – without participants really realizing it reflectively – is a scientismist, technocratic, and bureaucratic conception of the university as a knowledge factory (Wilshire 1990:ch III), in which each disciplinary specialty is supposed to tend to its own business of producing, by means of its professional expertise, its pre-assigned bit of useful knowledge for manipulating the world – in blithe indifference to what is going on in any other specialty and in the world outside the academy.

I am not saying that Descartes' philosophical thought created the modern world. But in an uncanny way it reflects and focuses what was at work, and what was to be at work, in the culture at large. It also anticipates the contemporary research university and its master problem: despite its vast research capacities and its knowledge, it exists in strange detachment from crucial human realities, and perpetuates the implicit dogma that there is no truth about the human condition as a whole (e.g. the humanities merely express communal or personal sentiment, hardly knowledge). The university fails to understand what it is doing and what it is abetting, because in the dominant conception of knowledge, truth about ethical relations to others is blocked or obscured, as is also our involvement in the moody background world – matters crucial to who we are and to what education should be.

(Wilshire 1990:40)

Professional recognition (or accreditation of one's 'purity') is accordingly not given (or, at most, rarely given) for efforts or accomplishments which focus on questions of this nature that lie outside the paradigm of one's disciplinary specialty – such as in interdisciplinary study, teaching, or research, in developing comprehensive or integrative understandings that span several disciplines, or in teaching (especially not in the research university). The extraordinary people who do devote significant energies and time to these 'impure' enterprises accordingly go unrewarded; often they are censored. Yet it is precisely such activities that have always constituted the moral core of liberal learning in the university. Hence the title of Wilshire's book: The moral collapse of the university.

The difficulties Polanyi faced with his work in philosophy outside of physical chemistry are illustrative of what Wilshire speaks of as a professional scholar's work
being stigmatized as 'impure'. And I suspect each of us may have stories to tell that illustrate Wilshire's point *ad nauseam*.

In the light of my earlier discussion of Arendt's account of the loss of common sense in the modern intellectual ethos, the purification rituals described by Wilshire are perhaps the chief means of implementing what Arendt identifies as the Cartesian strategy for defeating the demon of self-doubt. They are the practical means whereby intellectual inquiry within a disciplinary specialty is restricted to what amounts to a single perspective - which is taken for granted in an impersonalized form as somehow guaranteeing objectivity. Accordingly, they are perhaps the principal obstacle standing in the way of making common sense, of building up knowledge of a world in common, and of addressing with any effectiveness the large questions pertaining to the meaning and purpose of our lives.

Wilshire's book is very rich, full of insights, pessimistic about any quick solution to these problems, and offers a few practical suggestions about what might be done in the short range (Wilshire 1990:chs XI and XII). It is certainly a book with which any academic who identifies with the post-critical direction of Polanyi's work ought to become familiar.

### III

I have repeatedly alluded to a contrast between the modern critical perspective and a post-critical perspective, the modern critical ethos and a post-critical ethos. Although almost anyone who is appreciative of Polanyi's work has a vague understanding of what is meant by that contrast, few attempts have been made to explain the contrast with sufficient clarity to give practical guidance for someone wishing to have it make a difference in his or her own intellectual work. I here offer my attempt to that end.

To have acquired a modern critical mind is to have been habituated, on the one hand, to distrust one's first and natural inclination to indwell the world with belief and, on the other hand, to enrust oneself to the attitude of critical suspicion as the cardinal intellectual virtue. This is because modernity is premised on the assumption that the root of all error is the inherent human proclivity to project into reality what is not there but only in oneself, in one's credulity and subjective bias. Our modern intellectual conscience insists that we will get at the truth of the matters that concern us only by divesting ourselves of subjectivity, by stepping outside of our merely personal, mind bodily perspectives onto them and following impersonal, 'objective' procedures. In consequence, on reflection at least, we moderns have difficulty believing in our own beliefs and trusting, without defensiveness, in any inward
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summons to venture beyond the safety of impersonally established truths — unless it be critically to disestablish or deconstruct someone else's alleged truths. (This is not to say that such critical efforts do not have their rightful place. It is only to say that such efforts become the only encouraged —indeed, the only 'safe' — creative work within the modern critical perspective.) Our modern minds largely disable us from venturing to construct or establish anything at all. If our own critical intellectual conscience fails to keep our subjectivity in check, we can be sure that our professional colleagues' critical faculties will be more than adequate for the job. (It should be clear from this that so-called 'post-modern' perspectives that define themselves as deconstructive of any and all modern claims to have overcome subjectivity and arrived at objective truth are merely a continuation of the modern critical tradition.)

On the contrary, a post-critical perspective is one that, having passed through the baptism of fire constituted by the modern criticism of subjectivity, nevertheless retains (or regains) confidence in one's own personal, mind bodily perspective — retains confidence in it not as truth itself (which would make it indistinguishable from an ideological commitment per se) but as one's own best avenue, or clue, or stage-on-the-way to discovery of, truth-in-common. To occupy a post-critical perspective is to recognize that there is no other recourse. It is there, in the very particular incarnate rootage of our mind bodily being in the world, with its very particular past, however seemingly narrow, deprived, and parochial it may appear to a deracinated critical perspective — it is there, in being fully oneself, that the wellsprings of a sensibility and passion for an integrity of person in devotion to truth-in-common can be found.

A post-critical perspective thus re-appropriates the pre-modern confidence in methodological belief — a chastened confidence to be sure — to counter and complement modernity's methodological doubt. (For further explanation, see Booth 1974 and Elbow 1986.) Whereas modernity's maxim has been 'Doubt, unless there is good reason to believe', post-critical thought conjoins with it the pre-modern maxim, 'Believe, unless there is good reason to doubt'. In modern critical thought one needs justification to believe, but no justification at all to doubt; indeed, for it one needs justification not to doubt. But in post-critical thought, one needs justification to doubt no less than one needs justification to believe. But such justification may not be publically discernable, at least not for the present. A post-critical perspective recognizes that and respects each person's ability to discern in advance intimations of that justification for herself/himself.
What features of a post-critical intellectual ethos as Polanyi envisioned it are particularly crucial to the recovery of common sense? As I see it, there are four key features that are crucial, though they are not completely independent from each other. Although they are here expressed in a theoretical way, they each have eminently practical implications. Note how each directly counters the modern critical strategy of restricting rational evidence to what can be made immanent to a single, taken-for-granted perspective (which remains a single perspective regardless of how universal its form may appear to be) and restricting knowledge to what can be strictly inferred therefrom within the same perspective. The four features of a post-critical intellectual ethos that I shall highlight are:

- Mutual recognition between independent knowers – that is, common-sense-making – is regarded as paradigmatic of the knowledge that is sought;
- Each person is regarded as having access to transcendent truth-in-common and the tacit knowledge-by-acquaintance through which they have that access is itself regarded as knowable in the experience of mutual recognition of the truth in question;
- Persons other than any given knower are recognized as having transcendental status in relation to that person's knowledge of transcendent truth-in-common; and
- There is mutual regard for and trust in each person's capacity to participate for herself in discovering truth-in-common through following up her own intimations of that truth.

First, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, mutual recognition (common-sense-making) between independent knowers is regarded as paradigmatic of the knowledge that we seek. What does this mean? To begin with, it implies that any given knower's perspective is one perspective among others; yet that given knower's perspective is, in principle, open and accessible to any other perspectives on the same matter. But, more importantly, it means that knowledge is not conceived primarily as an individual matter that the knower can confirm on her own within a single, taken-for-granted perspective (or even as a co-operative endeavour where knowers co-operate closely within a single frame of reference as if they all shared a single point of view). Instead, it means always looking outside of and beyond current perspectives for confirmation of the objective reality of what is believed to be known (see Cannon 1981: 164f). It means building bridges of communication with those who do not share one's perspective to enable a meeting of minds – that is, mutual recognition between persons in different specialties within the same discipline, between persons in different disciplines, between professional academics and students, and between
professional academics and lay persons, and of course between perspectives of gender and ethnicity as well. For this to take place requires building synoptic or integrative understandings between these different frames of reference, extending across whole disciplines and between disciplines; and it means no longer building up knowledge atomistically within a given specialty without regard for its connection with anything else. The point is that our respective findings should serve to build up and make known a world-in-common – common not just to members of some disciplinary speciality, gender, or ethnic group, which is no world-in-common at all, but common to members of the wider human community. (Specifically, this would imply that one’s scholarly responsibility should be understood to be at least as strong to the rest of the academy and to the broader public as it is to one’s peers in the discipline.) To know entails a responsibility to make known. (For those of us in philosophy, it obligates us to call into question at every turn the individualistic and isolating Cartesian assumptions that continue to govern discussions of epistemology within the mainstream of professional philosophy.)

Second, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, each person as such is regarded as having access, through tacit knowledge by acquaintance, to transcendent truth-in-common, and each person’s knowledge itself is regarded as knowable by others in a mutual recognition of the truth in question. Despite the cultural weight of three centuries behind the assumption, the mind is not a closed container, hermetically sealed off from things in themselves, such that its knowledge of what lies beyond itself is necessarily of a representative nature and which representative function is itself dubious. A post-critical intellectual ethos grants each person his or her own access – by means of mind bodily knowledge by acquaintance – to the being of that which mutually concerns us. On the contrary, the modern critical intellectual ethos discredits a priori the very possibility of anyone’s direct acquaintance with what lies beyond his or her mind. As a result, any appeal to that acquaintance, e.g. to get another person to ‘see the point’ and ‘catch on to’ something for herself, can get nowhere. But Polanyi’s tacit knowing by indwelling is a knowing by acquaintance, an acquaintance with reality that goes beyond immediate (outward or surface) appearance: It lays claim to knowledge of realities that transcend our immediate grasp. As Polanyi says, the mark of reality is its intimation of inexhaustible future manifestations. In transcending our own immediate grasp and our capacity for representation, such realities are accessible to points of view other than our own present viewpoint (other points of view simultaneous with and/or successive to our own present point of view). The very idea of the transcendence of reality in this sense is lost to consciousness when knowledge is thought of primarily, or only, as representative (propositional) knowledge, which is always limited to a single frame
of reference. On the contrary, a post-critical intellectual ethos gives primacy to knowledge by acquaintance as the root and ground of knowledge by representation. Such an emphasis grants access to, and a basis for, recognizing reality-in-common. And only such an understanding will prompt a reader or hearer to seek to interpret explicit knowledge within its original living context of intimation – intimation of aspects of reality transcending the specification in question. (Much of current postmodernist interpretation and criticism seems to me to take its license from just this divorce of explicit text from a living context of tacit intimation.) Truth, we want to say, is irreducible to, and inexhaustible for, any single perspective. Being so, it is transcendent in the sense just described: In its fullness or completeness truth-in-common transcends each and every finite perspective. But it makes no sense to say this if it is not simultaneously accessible (in however limited a respect) to each perspective and in a way that can be verified or confirmed in mutual recognition.

Third, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, persons other than any given knower are recognized as having transcendental status in relation to that person's knowledge of transcendent truth. This is to say that they are necessary, in some sense a priori conditions for that knower's laying claim to recognition of transcendent truth-in-common. Other persons are not merely sources of information that extend or supplement my own perspective. As such they (or their own unique mindbodily perspectives) cannot and must not be reduced to an extension of my own perspective. By 'transcendental status' of other persons I mean to identify other persons as such as having access to – and thereby affording me indirect access to – irreplaceable, independent perspectives on the matters that concern me, perspectives in appealing to which I make my claim to transcendent truth-in-common with universal intent. Hence, I need other knowers to be there and to be independent from me and I cannot afford to close myself off from any person whose perspective is relevant to the matters with which I am concerned. To the extent I close myself off to anyone, I close myself off to the dimension of transcendence in the matters that concern me that is uniquely accessible to that person's perspective. Obviously, the inverse holds true as well. Thus, we need to be in conversation with persons of different viewpoints from ourselves. The meaningfulness of the transcendence of truth and reality beyond our subjectivity is grounded in our access to perspectives on that truth other than our own present perspective. Of course – and here's the rub – for access to the other person's perspective to become actual, an open receptivity toward the other and a truly empathetic exploration of his or her perspective on the matters in question are necessary – a receptivity and empathy which can, of course, be frustrated in so far as the other person is unco-operative or fails to develop and explore it himself. There are no sure strategies for overcoming these frustrations, although one of
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the better ones is to attempt an empathetic exploration of the other’s point of view on one’s own concerns despite his unco-operative attitude and soliciting his recognition of the results of that exploration. Recognition of the transcendental status of other persons underscores and highlights that we are mutual occupants and explorers of a world-in-common, quite apart from the specific differences in our viewpoints. Even more: It is what causes there to be a world-in-common for any one of us.

Fourth, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, there is mutual regard for and trust in each person’s capacity to participate for herself in discovering truth-in-common through following up her own intimations of that truth, intimations that only she may be capable of following up. This feature of a post-critical intellectual ethos is particularly relevant to the process of education. To educate is in this sense necessarily to draw forth understanding from within the student in the context of her ongoing experience and developing acquaintance with the world. This notion of education makes little or no sense at all on the basis of the modern critical assumptions that conceive of the mind as a closed container (with no direct access to reality beyond itself) and knowledge as primarily representative (explicit, propositional). On that model, education is principally thought to consist of conveying explicit information (both knowledge claims and their explicit justification). On the contrary, in a post-critical intellectual ethos, not only must there be a trust in each student’s ability to come to discover further aspects of truth-in-common along with the teacher (and other students), but room must be granted for the student in the educational process to participate more and more fully in doing just that, and plenty of opportunity to participate in experiences of mutual recognition in which each student’s own mindbodily perspective makes a significant contribution. That, as Polanyi insists, we each know more than we can tell, behoves us to (a) give the other person the benefit of doubt when we fail yet to see what she may be getting at, and (b) make an empathetic effort to ‘catch on’ to what she is trying to get at. To insist that the other person first make sense on our terms within our own frame of reference (however impersonalized they and it may be) in order to be taken seriously and her claims regarded as meaningful – as the modern critical intellectual ethos would have it – is to deprive ourselves not only of that person’s insights; it is to close us off from reality in its transcendence.

These four features of a post-critical intellectual ethos would not be the only features of such an ethos. Yet they are perhaps the most important of its features relevant to the recovery of common sense. Apart from the emergence of a post-critical intellectual ethos, as Polanyi’s thought anticipates it, I see no likelihood of the recovery of common sense as Arendt conceives it. I hope I have awakened in
you enough of what that ethos amounts to for you to have a somewhat clearer sense of how to foster its growth in the context of your own work as teachers and scholars.

Works cited