Making sense out of suffering:

The logic of James 1:2-4 is examined. The argument is viewed as a syllogism, with the demonstrandum: ‘The believer who experiences trials must be happy.’ The proof of the argument runs as follows: If there are trials, then there is testing ( = refining) of faith. If there is testing ( = refining) of faith, then there is endurance in faith. It there is endurance in faith, then there must be perfect works. If there are perfect works, then a perfect character develops. If there is a perfect character, then each virtue is possessed and each fully developed. If each virtue is possessed and each fully developed, then the believer will receive the crown of life. If the believer is to receive the crown of life, he will be happy. 1. PURPOSE This article examines the logical flow of the argument in James 1:2-4. The demon­ strandum of the argument is posited as a paradox in verse 2; TTSaai' riynaaaOe, o6eX^i )i.ou, 6tau neipaa^ou; nepinearixe nouciXou;.... Count it all joy, my brothers, when you fall into various trials.... * Thanks are expressed to Professors J H Barkhuizen and J P Louw of the University of Pretoria for some extremely valuable comments upon an earlier draft of this article. ISSN 0259 9422 HTS 47/4 (1991) 1109 Making sense out of suffering Traditionally, logic examines declarative sentences which may be either true or false (Hodges 1977:19). The argument in James 1:2-4, however, contains sentences which are not declarative in the strict sense of the word. In verse 2 the imperative fiyria a a 6 e occurs and in verse 4 the imperative éxérco. Fortiinately, it is possible to pa­ raphrase these sentences in such a way as to make the argument accessible to logical analysis (Bradley & Swartz 1979:9-12). The first sentence (verse 2) may be paraphrased accurately as ‘It is true in at least one possible world that if x experiences trials x then must experience joy’. The second imperative (verse 4) gives an instruction to the reader on how to construct this possible world: i] 6é vmojioufi ëpyou teX eiov éxéto) (‘Let endurance have a perfect work’). The function of this sentence in the argument may be paraphrased as, ‘It is true that, ifx endures then j: must do perfect works’. The reader is thus call­ ed upon to contribute to the sense of suffering. 2. T H E SYLLOGISM James 1:2-4 is argued in the form of a hypothetical syllogism. According to Graham (1973:20), the syllogism has a particular form, involving at least two premises and a conclusion or demonstrandum. For the purposes of this article, a premise is defined as a belief which is shared between the writer and the reader and which is not in need of proof. From a premise implications are deduced. The syllogistic form may be expressed symbolically as follows (read P — ► Q as ‘If P then Q ’): Show: P — ► R Premises: (1) P — ► Q (2) R Therefore: P — ► R A simple example of a syllogism would be: Show: If I live in Johannesburg, P — ► R then I live in South Africa. Premises: (1) If I live in Johannesburg, (1) P — ► Q then I live in the Transvaal. (2) If I live in the Transvaal, (2) Q — > R then I live in South Africa. Therefore: If I live in Johannesburg, P — ► R then I live in South Africa.

possessed and each fully developed.If each virtue is possessed and each fully developed, then the believer will receive the crown of life.If the believer is to receive the crown of life, he will be happy.

PU RPO SE
This article examines the logical flow of the argum ent in Jam es 1:2-4.The dem on strandum of the argument is posited as a paradox in verse 2; TTSaai' riynaaaOe, o6eX ^i )i.ou, 6tau neipaa^ou; nepinearixe nouciXou;.... Traditionally, logic examines declarative sentences which may be either true or false (Hodges 1977:19).The argument in Jam es 1:2-4, however, contains sentences which are not declarative in the strict sense of the word.In verse 2 the im perative fiyria a a 6 e occurs and in verse 4 the imperative éxérco.Fortiinately, it is possible to pa raphrase these sentences in such a way as to make the argum ent accessible to logical analysis (Bradley & Swartz 1979:9-12).
The first sentence (verse 2) may be paraphrased accurately as 'It is true in at least one possible world that if x experiences trials x then must experience joy'.The second im perative (verse 4) gives an instruction to the reader on how to construct this possible world: i] 6é vmojioufi ë py o u teX eiov éxéto) ('Let endurance have a perfect work').The function of this sentence in the argum ent may be paraphrased as, 'It is true that, ifx endures then j: must do perfect works'.The reader is thus call ed upon to contribute to the sense of suffering.

T H E SYLLOGISM
Jam es 1:2-4 is argued in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.According to G raham (1973:20), the syllogism has a particular form, involving at least two premises and a conclusion or demonstrandum.For the purposes of this article, a premise is defined as a belief which is shared betw een the w riter and the reader and which is not in need of proof.From a premise implications are deduced.The syllogistic form may be expressed symbolically as follows (read P -► Q as 'If P then Q '): Premises: (1) P -► Q (2) R Therefore: P -► R A simple example of a syllogism would be: Show: If I live in Johannesburg, P -► R then I live in South Africa.Premises: (1) If I live in Johannesburg, (1) P -► Q then I live in the Transvaal.
(2) If I live in the Transvaal, (2) Q -> R then I live in South Africa.

Therefore:
If I live in Johannesburg, P -► R then I live in South Africa.

T H E PROBLEM
The gist and flow of the argum ent in Jam es 1:2-4 are understood differently by scho lars.Dibelius & G reeven (1964:97-105) interpret these verses as referring to a joy which results from the acquisition of a perfect moral character here and now.Kistem aker (1986:30-36) attributes this joy to a Christian who has acquired the capacity to withstand trials.According to his analysis, the argum ent is circular: by enduring trials one acquires the capacity to endure trials!M ussner (1967:62-67), again, views this joy as one which is present because of eschatological rewards to the person who resists tem ptations and thereby acquires a perfect moral character.
T here is a reason for these varied interpretations, namely that the text in ques tion is representative of what Eco (1976:243) calls 'of>en signal textures', that is texts which appear to 'invite the attribution of content, thus issuing a sort of interpretive challenge to their addressee'.
This 'openness' of the text centres around four problems: G rosheide (1961:15) and Ruckstuhl (1985:11) choose temptation.Adamson (1976:52) and Balz & Schrage (1973:14) are o f the opinion that the word neipaajicx; refers to trials in the broader sense of the word, to include tem pta tion.They distinguish betw een external trials, for example poverty, and internal trials, for example tem ptation.The totality of the possible meanings of ncipoajióq is read into this one occurrence.According to Louw & Nida (1988 vol 1:332, 775) the word is nowhere used in this broader sense and this interpretation can therefore not be accepted.Dibelius & G reeven (1964:99) argues that an unbiased reading of the text, with out taking 1:12 into account, forces one to accept the meaning trial in the narrow sense of the word in 1:2, referring, for example, to poverty and exploitation.H e is followed by Kistemaker (1986:31), Smelik (1980:18) and Laws (1980:49).The con text seems to favour this interpretation.
The demonstrandum may therefore be formulated as follows: It is necessary that, if x experiences trials, x then exjjeriences joy.

T H E CO N TEN T O F PREM ISES 1 AND 2
The first sentence of the argum ent is stated in verse 3 as t o 5oKÍ)aioy u ^u x f^ n iaxeojq Koctepyá^eTai imonovfii'.This sentence is interpreted differently according to the meaning allocated to the words 5oKÍtiiov and vmojiovfv The word SoKÍ^iou may be used in the sense oigenuineness if taken as the neu ter singular of the adjective 6oicÍM,ioq which means genuine, without alloy (A rndt & Gingrich 1957).If taken as a variant form of 6oKi)Aeiov, it may be used in the sense of testing, or the means o f testing (A rndt & Gingrich 1957).
The word im o^oi/fi is used in the sense of endurance in some action or against some adversity (A rndt & Gingrich 1957;Thayer 1901) under difficult circumstances (Louw & Nida 1988:308).In the current context, the implied action or adversity is unclear.
Taking into account that the word Soicimov could be translated genuineness, testing, or means o f testing, and considering that ^mo^o^/fl may imply endurance in faith, in doing good deeds, or against hardships, the sentence t o 6oictmoi/ újiíSu xiy; Ttíoxeíi)^ KOTcpyá^exai ímojioi/fii/ could theoretically have at least three times three, or nine possible paraphrases: (1) The genuineness of your faith results in endurance in faith.
(2) The genuineness of your faith results in endurance in good works.
(3) The genuineness of your faith results in endurance against adversity.
(4) The testing of your faith results in endurance in faith.
(5) The testing of your faith results in endurance in good works.
(6) The testing of your faith results in endurance against adversity.
(7) The means of testing your faith results in endurance in faith.
(8) The means of testing your faith results in endurance in good works.
(9) The means of testing your faith results in endurance against adversity.
The interpretation of this prem ise in terms of sentences ( 4) and ( 7) does not occur in commentaries.Kistemaker (1986:34) chooses (1) to (3) combined.Pretorius (1988:34)  this word to refer to a process rather than to an object.The possibilities expressed in ( 7) to ( 9) may therefore be eliminated as not fitting the context.
As for sentences (1) to (3), Dibelius & G reeven (1964:101)  The spectacle of the smith at work suggests to the observer at least two parallels concerning human suffering: (1) The genuiness of a metal is tested by subm itting it to fire and hammering.
If gold, silver or iron are pure, then they are able to withstand proofing.
In the same way human qualities are tested when subm itted to trials.
1 Peter 1:5-7 is written against this background, where it is stated that faith is put to the test, so that its genuineness might be clear at C hrist's coming and it might re ceive praise and glory and honour.
This viewpoint is not valid here, as it is clear from the context that the implied reader's faith has many impurities.This leaves us with the second parallel: Making sense out of sufTenng (2) T he process of testing refines metal by removing im purities.In the same way, trials refine human qualities.
A relevant intertext is IQ H V,16, where it is stated that G od put the poor in the cru cible to purify them sevenfold.
Applied to sentences (4) to ( 6), it seem s that num ber (5) 'endurance in good works', may be excluded, as it is faith which is tested.Furtherm ore, in the following sentence (verse 4a) it is stated that an epyou téX eioi/ must accompany the endu rance.If this 'perfect work' is interpreted as endurance in good works, then it is im possible to interpret verse 3 as referring to endurance in good works, as the elem ent of endurance in good works is only added as an imperative in verse 4.This leaves us with sentences ( 4) and ( 6).In Jam es 5:11 Job is utilised as the prime example of somebody with the quality of endurance in his faith.Job's faith specifically was tested by trials and tribulations.He stayed true to his faith; his faith endured.This leaves us with sentence (4) as more likely to fit the immediate as well as the broader context of James.
If we choose sentence (6), the argum ent would in any case be circular: Testing of faith effects endurance against testing.
The simile underlying verse 3 may therefore be explained as follows: From the context it could only refer to the Second Coming of Christ.Jam es 5:7-11 interprets this endurance eschatoiogically.This prem ise assures the re ad er that trials assist his faith to endure till the end.In 1 P eter 1:5-7 the sam e prem ise is found.
This first sentence of the argument may be split into two premises, namely: (1) If X experiences trials, then G od tests (refines) the faith ofx.
(2) If G od tests (refines) the faith of x, then x endures in faith until the coming of Christ.

T H E C O N TEN T O F PREM ISE 3
The third premise appears in verse 4 and reads Vi 6€ Ono>ioi/n cpyoi/ téX cioi/ éxéxio ('Let endurance have a perfect work').
O ur first task is to paraphrase this sentence in such a way as to make it access ible to logical analysis.This may be done as follows: 'It is necessary that, if there is endurance, then a perfect work follows.'Concerning the content of this prem ise, the reference of the phrase epyou xé-Xeiov éxéto) is unclear.It is generally seen as encouraging the reader to carry on enduring for a complete period of time.The sense is then that endurance should be kept for as long as the testing continues.This would ensure that the virtues practis ed during this time become perfect (Adamson 1976:55;G rosheide 1961:16;Kistemaker 1986:34;Louw & Nida 1988 vol 1:658).
This interpretation seems tautological in the sense that the reader is expected to endure in endurance.The meaning endurance already contains the distinctive fea ture of a complete span o f time.Furtherm ore, the connection betw een enduring in faith and the following sentence ïu a ?ÍTe TéXeioi ('in order that you may be perfect') is unclear, as Jam es stresses the connection betw een faith and works (1:25).One would expect the idea here that perfection is reached through an active faith.
On the other hand, some commentators follow Dibelius & G reeven (1964:101-2) in referring the phrase ëpyov téX eiou éxéx(i) to the result of endurance.The be liever is called upon to acquire a perfect character (M ussner 1967:67 referring to the hereafter; Laws 1980:53;Pretorius 1988:35 referring to this life).The sense then would be that the reader's endurance should result in a perfect character.This interpretation also produces difficulties v«th regard to its connection to the next sentence.It seems that something, some action, should precede the quality of perfection, otherw ise the argum ent again becom es tautological: endurance must produce a perfect character, in order that one may have a perfect character.
T here is, however, another avenue, represented by Balz & Schrage (1973:15).They state that the phrase epyou xeXeioi/ éxéxw refers to perfect deeds: 'Standhaf- The sense then would be that endurance [in faith] must imply (be accompanied by) endurance in perfect works.
The fact that the G reek uses the singular form ëpyov teX eioi/ to refer to a plu ral is no real problem.In an inscription (D ittenberger 1903-1905:308) found in Hierapolis, dating from the second century BC, the phrase ëpyov icaXXurcov in the da tive singular is used to refer to deeds done in a lifetime: Kol TT^q) Tipoq Geoix; eúaePeíOM; ë[py]ui KaXXÍa[xo)]i oú ^ieucpóv SoKitieloi' ótnéXijtev.
And he left behind not a small proof of reverence to the gods by m eans of excellent work(s).
The interpretation would furtherm ore fit in with Jam es' call in 1:25 that faith (in the sense of intellectual assent) should be accompanied by deeds.
The third premise may therefore be stated as: (3) It is necessary that, if x endures in faith until the coming of Christ, x then endures in perfect works until the coming of Christ.

T H E CO N TEN T O F PREM ISE 4
T he next problem concerns the connection betw een ëpyov teX eio i' and xcXeux; (doing and being) in verse 4. The final sentence, introduced by tvo, expresses the implication of the previous proposition.To make the connection between premise (3) and its final sentence clear, it is necessary to postulate an implicit prem ise, that is that doing perfect deeds results in a perfect character: (4) If X endures in perfect works until the coming of Christ, then x acquires a perfect character.
Balz & Schrage, whose interpretation of ëpyoi/ TcXeioi/ is accepted in the previous section, do not elaborate on how it is possible that a premise like (4) may be posited w ithout explaining it to the reader.A m odern reader would rather expect the p re mise that a perfect character leads to perfect deeds.
The same basic prem ise, namely that character is formed by deeds, is found in Aristotle (E.N. 1103 al4-b25).Aristotle states here that people become house-builders through building houses, harpplayers through playing the harp.In the same way we grow to be just by doing things that are just (see Lloyd 1968:214-217;Ross 1949:192-197).
It is not suggested here that the author of our epistle had a direct knowledge of A ristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.It is, however, quite plausible that Aristotle's idea worked through to the popular consciousness where it became em bedded as a p re mise.This would explain how the author could accept uncritically his readers' shar ing of this viewpoint.

T H E CO N TEN T O F PREM ISE 5
T here seems to be a relative consensus in the com m entaries concerning the inter pretation of the last two phrases of the argum ent, Kal óXÓKXripoi éw jiiiBei'l Xeinófxevoi ('...and whole, lacking in nothing').Syntactically speaking, the Koi before ÓXÓ-icXiipoi is best taken as explanatory (Blass & D ebrunner 1961: § 442.9).The two concluding phrases would then give a defmition, first positively and then negatively, of the term xcXeux;.A symbolic translation would then read: If j: acquires a perfect character, then Jt is whole, lacking in nothing.
Concerning the reference of these two phrases, Balz & Schrage (1973:15) are of the opinion that they refer to a quality of faith, which is not doubting or partial.This interpretation would destroy the connection betw een deeds and moral character shown in premise 4. Adamson (1976:52, 55)  It [the Scripture] says that he [Noah] becam e perfect, having proved himself in this: because he did not acquire one virtue, but all and, having acquired them, he perfected them by utilising each one abundantly.
The two final phrases, the first describing it positively, the second describing it nega tively, must therefore refer to the totality of virtues acquired and the ripeness attain ed in each virtue (Dibelius & G reeven 1964:103) through practice.
In the rest of the epistle, these virtues are specified and discussed -for example, wisdom, resistance to tem ptation, icnowledge of the W ord, control of the tongue, control of anger, being impartial, having brotherly love, being humble, not judging a brother and not boasting.As is the case in other similar intertexts (for example Mt 5:38), the relativity of human perfection is not at issue here.
Premise 5 should then be formulated as: (5) If X acquires a perfect character at the coming of Christ, then x posses ses each virtue and x has developed each virtue fully.

T H E C O N TEN T O F PREM ISES 6 AND 7
It should be clear that two final premises ought to be postulated to complete the ar gument: (6) If X possesses each virtue and x has developed each virtue fully [at the coming of Christ] then x will receive the crown of life.
(7) It is necessary that, if x is to receive the crown of life, x then must be happy [presently].
From these premises it becomes manifest that the joy of the Christian is a joy in an ticipation of the coming of Christ when earthly roles are reversed -when those who are happy now start to cry, and those who are tearful now become joyful.The analysis of the syllogism in Jam es 1:2-4 exposes the train of thought deployed to prove that in at least one possible worid the experience of trials can result in joy.
The condition for this possible world to become a reality is for the believer to en dure in doing perfect works while experiencing trials.The reader is called upon to make sense out of suffering.
This insight, of course, opens our eyes to the areas o f blindness within the text, stretches of silence, its invisible but present message.T here is at least one implied possible world in which trials produce unhappiness and bitterness.The reader also has control over the creation of this world.If the testing of faith leads, for example.
convincingly argue against this line of interpretation.They dem onstrates that SoKlmou must take up neipaafióq in the previous sentence.Therefore, a meaning referring to the quality of an action or object (genuiness) does not fit the context.It is furtherm ore quite un clear in what way 'genuineness of faith' results in the quality of endurance.Lx)gically, one may just as well argue that endurance gives proof of genuine faith.The solu tion, therefore, must lie in sentences (4) to (6).To arrive at a possible solution, it is im portant to note that the term s t o 6okIm ov and limojioi/n allude to the sphere of metallurgy.Faith is implicitly com par ed to m etal.The process of testing o r refining this m etal is called t o SoKlmov.Heating, hamm ering and cooling the metal, rids it of impurities.The quality of the metal, that which 'rem ains behind', is called vmo>ioi/n or durability.This contrasts with the quality o f th e im pure m etal, which is not d urable and easily becom es brittle.(Fo r a d etailed discussion of m etallurgical p rocedures in antiquity, seeHammond & Scullard 1970:676.)